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Foreword
Social inclusion is at the heart of Europe’s commit-
ment to build a stronger social Europe. The eco-
nomic recovery and growth we are slowly starting 
to witness across Europe needs to reach everybody, 
including the most disadvantaged of our citizens. 
But we are far from reaching this goal.
Poverty reduction is one of the key targets of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. But poverty and social ex-
clusion across Europe continued to grow since the 
target was first set in 2010, affecting almost 25% of 
citizens in Europe, and has only stabilised recent-
ly. Our target to lift at least 20 million people from 
poverty and social exclusion by 2020 remains the 
most difficult one to achieve. The current levels of 
poverty and social exclusion that we are witness-
ing today are not acceptable in 21st century Europe. 
Everybody together — the European Commission 
and all 28 Member States — need to put their 
shoulders to the wheel.
It is essential that the EU continues to shed light on the living conditions of European citizens by monitor-
ing progress in each Member State towards the Europe 2020 target. We have a key EU statistical instrument 
to gather these data: the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (known as EU-SILC). It is with 
this essential instrument that the present book is concerned. It has two aims: firstly, to provide evidence 
about the state of poverty and deprivation as seen at mid-decade, following the recession, and about the 
contribution being made by employment, social protection and other policies to achieving the Europe 
2020 objectives; and secondly, to examine the strengths and weaknesses of existing EU-SILC statistics and 
to make recommendations for further development.
‘Monitoring social inclusion in Europe’ is the outcome of an EU-funded Network of statisticians and social 
scientists who form a partnership that has wide experience in the production and analysis of the EU-SILC 
data. It is also one of the last works that Sir Tony Atkinson leaves us, testament to his ground-breaking and 
life-long work on poverty and social exclusion.
The present volume is intended for policy-makers, statisticians, and all those concerned with ensuring that 
economic and social progress in Europe go hand in hand. Having good data is key to translate our Europe 
2020 priority on social inclusion into targeted policies and concrete action to help our citizens get better 
lives.
Commissioner Marianne Thyssen
Employment, social affairs, skills and labour mobility
Responsible for Eurostat
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Remembering Tony
Sir Tony Atkinson passed away on 1 January 2017. My heart is heavy. Tony’s demise represents an incalcu-
lable loss to all those who fight for social justice throughout the world.
For almost 50 years, Tony was at the forefront of research on income and wealth distribution in gener-
al, and inequality and poverty in particular. In analysing these issues, he combined his unique theoreti-
cal expertise and practical experience with a deep commitment to empirical work in order to propose 
evidence-based policy ideas and strategies to best address them. He was very concerned with the design 
of social policies and with the promotion of inclusive economic growth.
Tony was a forward-thinking and innovative intellectual. His major contributions are many and cover very 
different areas. These include the improvement of the quality of data on income and wealth, optimal 
taxation, microsimulation and welfare economics. Another of Tony’s fundamental contributions was his 
commitment to improving European social monitoring - in particular, the methodological framework 
which still provides the basis for developing the social indicators used by the European Commission and 
European Union (EU) Member States to monitor progress towards the EU common objectives relating to 
social protection and social inclusion.
The book in front of you is an integral part of this European commitment. Issued too late, unfortunately, for 
Tony to see the published version, this book is the final outcome of the second Network for the Analysis 
of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2). Up until a couple of weeks before his death, even though his health had deterio-
rated considerably, Tony and I were still in touch to discuss the very final edits to the book before sending 
it to print. Tony’s role in Net-SILC2 (as well as in its predecessor, Net-SILC1(*)) was crucial. Not only was he 
a co-editor of this book, he also provided detailed feedback on all the papers produced by Net-SILC2 col-
leagues throughout the 4.5 years of the project and advised on the programme of the two international 
conferences organised by the Network.
Tony had a brilliant mind and a great heart. His humility and generosity were extraordinary. All those who 
met him will remember how very interested he always was in real exchanges and interactions - truly caring 
about people as well as sharing his views and carefully listening to those of others. This book is one of 
many examples of how much Tony was interested in collaborative work.
Tony spent most of his life developing the tools to measure, understand and tackle poverty and inequality. 
It is important that we now ensure that his unique contribution lives on and is deepened further by con-
tinuing to challenge them.
Tony was a giant in every possible way upon whose academic shoulders so many, including myself and 
several contributors to this book, have stood. Like many people around the world, I will deeply miss him.
This book is dedicated to him.
Eric Marlier (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER))
Net-SILC2 Project Director
8 January 2017
(*) Atkinson, A.B. and Marlier, E. (eds) (2010), Income and living conditions in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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(Eurostat) in 2011. We would like to thank Eurostat not only for funding Net-SILC2 but also for their very 
active and efficient support throughout the project.
This book represents a major output from Net-SILC2 and is a successor to that produced by the first Net‑
work for the Analysis of EU‑SILC (Net-SILC), entitled Income and Living Conditions in Europe, published in 2010. 
Not all of the scientific work produced by Net-SILC2 could be included in this book. More comprehensive 
and technical material, as well as the very rich output from two Net-SILC2 international methodological 
workshops (see below), are available from the Net-SILC2 web page on the Eurostat website. Most of this 
material was published in the series Eurostat methodologies and working papers. We wish to thank all the 
Net-SILC2 members and the institutions they belong to for their contribution to the project (for a list of 
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which were organised jointly by Net-SILC2 and Eurostat. We would like to thank Statistics Austria for kindly 
hosting the first conference and both Statistics Portugal and the Bank of Portugal for hosting the second 
one. Special thanks also go to Rolf Aaberge, Nuno Alves, Carlos Farinha Rodrigues, Sigita Grundiza, Björn 
Halleröd, Orsolya Lelkes, Pedro Mira, Cathal O’Donoghue, Wiemer Salverda and Ursula Till-Tentschert for 
discussing thoroughly the papers at these conferences.
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statistical and analytical analysis of the longitudinal/ panel component of EU-SILC (Vienna, 9-12 July 2012).
Isabelle Bouvy and Begoña Levices have provided invaluable secretarial and bibliographical help.
It should be stressed that the book does not represent in any way the views of Eurostat, the European 
Commission or the European Union. It also does not represent in any way the views of the persons and 
bodies thanked above. All the authors have written in a strictly personal capacity, not as representatives 
of any Government or official body. Thus they have been free to express their own views and to take full 
responsibility for the judgments made about past and current policy and for the recommendations for 
future policy.
A.B. Atkinson (Nuffield College and London School of Economics, United Kingdom)
A-C Guio (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER))
E. Marlier (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER))
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About the book, its 
policy context and the 
EU‑SILC instrument

1 Monitoring social inclusion in EuropeAnthony B. Atkinson, Anne‑Catherine Guio and  Eric Marlier (1)
1.1 Aim of the book
This book aims to contribute to our understand-
ing of substantive issues that face Social Europe 
and to the development of methods that can be 
applied to yield new insights into issues related to 
income, material deprivation and work. The book 
assembles 26 research studies carried out as part of 
the European Union (EU) funded ‘Second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC’ (Net-SILC2) project. It is 
expected to provide an important input into the 
strengthening of the social dimension of the EU, 
including the monitoring of the EU social inclusion 
target which EU Heads of state and government 
agreed upon in 2010 as part of the Europe 2020 
strategy (2).
(1) A.B. Atkinson is with Nuffield College (Oxford, UK), INET at 
Oxford Martin School, and the London School of Economics. 
Anne-Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier are with the Luxembourg 
Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER, formerly CEPS/
INSTEAD). This work was supported by the second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat and 
coordinated by LISER. The European Commission bears no 
responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely 
those of the authors.
(2) The Europe 2020 strategy on smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth includes five ‘headline targets’ to be achieved by 2020. 
One of them is a specific and time bound social inclusion target 
for the EU as a whole: ‘promoting social inclusion, in particular 
through the reduction of poverty, by aiming to lift at least 20 
million people out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion in 
the EU’ (European Council 2010). This target is measured on the 
basis of an indicator of ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ 
(AROPE), which consists of three indicators: a) the EU 
‘at-risk-of-poverty’ indicator (see Chapter 3 in this book); b) 
an indicator of ‘severe material deprivation’ (people lacking 
at least four out of nine items covering some key aspects of 
living conditions; see Chapter 10); and c) a measure of ‘very low 
The book covers a wide variety of fields and is or-
ganised as follows:
• foreword;
• about the book, its policy context and the EU 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) instrument (Chapters 1 and 2);
• income measurement and income distribution 
(Chapters 3 to 9);
• material deprivation and multidimensional 
poverty (Chapters 10 to 13);
• employment and (quasi-)joblessness, 
income poverty and the Europe 2020 
‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ (AROPE) 
indicators (Chapters 14 to 19);
• dynamics of poverty and social exclusion 
(Chapters 20 to 25);
• technical issues in the development of 
household social surveys (Chapters 26 to 29).
household work intensity’ referred to as ‘(quasi-)joblessness’ 
(see Chapter 16). The EU target is based on the 2008 survey year 
(most recent data available when the target was adopted (in 
2010)), which relates to incomes and job status in the year 2007 
for all countries except for the UK and Ireland (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.2). For a detailed discussion of the target, see Frazer 
et al. (2014). For a thorough discussion of the social challenges 
linked to the Europe 2020 strategy, see the various contributions 
included in Marlier, Natali and Van Dam (2010).
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The next section (Section 1.2) provides a brief sum-
mary of each chapter, so that the reader can obtain 
an impression of the contents. In Section 1.3, we con-
sider some of the key issues raised by the Net-SILC2 
researchers for the future development of EU-SILC 
and of the EU social indicators. There are evident 
implications for the European institutions and for 
Member States. In the final Section 1.4, we look more 
broadly at the goals of European social policy in the 
light of the global perspective adopted as part of the 
United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals. 
How should the EU respond to meet the challenges 
set by the September 2015 global agreement?
1.2 Outline of the contents
The book opens with an account of the key statisti-
cal instrument: EU-SILC. In Chapter 2, Emilio Di Meg-
lio, Didier Dupré, Fabienne Montaigne and Pascal 
Wolff describe how EU-SILC is currently implement-
ed in 34 countries. Every year in Europe more than 
200 000 households and 500 000 individuals are 
interviewed and the microdata are sent to Eurostat. 
EU-SILC has a legal basis which is binding on EU 
Member States and is based on a common ‘frame-
work’ that consists of common procedures, con-
cepts and classifications, including a harmonised 
list of target variables to be transmitted to Eurostat. 
EU-SILC has a cross-sectional component pertain-
ing to a given time period and a longitudinal com-
ponent allowing to measure changes at individual 
person/ household level over a 4-year period. It is 
a multidimensional instrument covering income, 
housing, labour, health, demography, education 
and deprivation. EU-SILC has become the key EU 
reference for data on income and living conditions.
In Chapter 3, Anthony B. Atkinson, Anne-Catherine 
Guio and Eric Marlier bring together the 
EU-SILC-based social indicators with the macroeco-
nomic (national accounts) analysis of aggregates. 
The authors argue that both are essential. The na-
tional accounts are necessary to provide an overall 
perspective; the distributional data in EU-SILC are 
necessary to measure income poverty. The chap-
ter begins with the EU-SILC-based income poverty 
indicator (the headline EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ indi-
cator), and then considers its relation to the level of 
household real income as presented in the national 
accounts. Moving step by step, it seeks to identify 
the reasons for differences between EU-SILC and 
national accounts measures of real incomes. From 
this, it makes a number of recommendations about 
possible improvements in the underlying data and 
in the construction of the social indicators. The 
substantive results help illuminate the differing 
experience of the 3-year period preceding the 
2008 financial and economic crisis and subsequent 
3-year period.
Chapter 4 by Maria Iacovou examines across EU 
countries the relationship between household 
structure, on the one hand, and income poverty 
and subjective hardship, on the other hand. The 
chapter compares two perspectives, the first con-
sidering how the risk of poverty varies by house-
hold type, and the second considering the com-
position of the poor population. In terms of the risk 
of poverty, single-adult households and lone-par-
ent households are at the highest risk of poverty 
in all countries. However, in terms of composition 
the household types with the highest risks of in-
come poverty and/or subjective hardship are pro-
portionally much more numerous in the Nordic 
and North-Western countries than they are in the 
Southern and Eastern regions. In the latter coun-
tries, households with dependent children consti-
tute by far the largest share of the (income) poor 
or living-in-hardship population; households with 
adult children and extended-family households 
also account for a large percentage of the poor or 
living-in-hardship population. The chapter shows 
that, to the extent that differences in household 
composition do affect poverty and hardship rates, 
this effect does not come via substantial differ-
ences in the relative risks of poverty or hardship 
between one household type and another in the 
different countries, but primarily via differences in 
household composition between countries. There 
are evidently important implications for the design 
of policy to combat poverty and social exclusion.
Different features of the income distribution — 
poverty, affluence and dispersion — are brought 
together in Chapter 5 by Rolf Aaberge, Anthony B. 
Atkinson and Henrik Sigstad. The aim of the chap-
ter is to bring together the different concepts in 
a single framework that allows ready comparisons. 
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Such a unified framework contributes both to the 
policy debate and to the theoretical understand-
ing of inequality. There are at present largely sep-
arate literatures on the measurement of poverty, 
and (to a limited degree) affluence, and on bi-po-
larisation. In relation to the EU social indicators, the 
chapter may be seen as providing complementary 
information. A major purpose of this information 
is to test the robustness of the conclusions drawn 
to the choice of indicator. Another is to set the in-
dicators in context. How should the evolution of 
the income poverty rate be seen in terms of the 
changes in the income distribution as a whole? For 
these purposes, the income quintile share ratio (3) 
and the Gini coefficient (4) while together inform-
ative, may not be sufficient. In particular, they do 
not address two of the issues that have surfaced in 
recent debate: the ‘squeezing of the middle’ and 
the ‘racing away’ of the top 1 %.
Affluence and high incomes are further investigat-
ed by Veli-Matti Törmälehto in Chapter 6, which 
examines the top tails of the national income dis-
tributions. Given that EU-SILC is based on sample 
surveys and split into ‘survey’ and ‘register’ coun-
tries (see also Chapter 28), the chapter begins 
with issues related to data quality, including un-
der-estimation of top incomes. The data are then 
used to compute several income-based affluence 
measures, such as simple headcounts, top income 
shares, and affluence gaps. Finally, the chapter ad-
dresses the link between non-income information 
and high incomes, finding that identification of 
the affluent only on the basis of relative incomes is 
not sufficient. It concludes that EU-SILC is a useful 
complementary source on high incomes, in par-
ticular when the aim is to measure the size of the 
economically very well-off group and their living 
conditions, rather than concentration of income 
within the group.
(3) The income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) is an income 
inequality indicator. It is the ratio between the share of 
equivalised income in the highest income quintile (80 % and 
higher) and that in the lowest income quintile (lower than 
20 %).
(4) The Gini coefficient is an income inequality indicator based 
on the cumulative share of income accounted for by the 
cumulative percentages of the number of individuals, with 
values ranging from 0 per cent (complete equality) to 100 per 
cent (complete inequality, i.e. one person has all the income, all 
others have none).
An important issue in the use of EU-SILC is the 
measurement of the imputed rents that arise from 
the economic benefits of owner-occupied and 
social housing. Known to be one of the most sig-
nificant components of household disposable 
income, information about imputed rents has 
been available in EU-SILC since 2007. In Chapter 7, 
Veli-Matti Törmälehto and Hannele Sauli examine 
how the incorporation of imputed rents into dis-
posable income would affect income levels, in-
come inequality and income poverty risk. In gen-
eral, net imputed rents tend to decrease income 
inequality, reduce income poverty rates among 
the elderly, and improve consistency of income 
poverty and social exclusion measures. Over the 
years, the quality of EU-SILC data on imputed rents 
has improved in many respects, but there are still 
shortcomings in terms of stability and complete-
ness of the data and transparency of the estimation 
methods. Consequently, the authors conclude that 
further methodological studies and improvements 
are necessary before the inclusion of imputed rents 
in disposable income can be considered.
Extending the concept of income is equally the 
subject of Chapter 8 by Rolf Aaberge, Audun 
Langørgen and Petter Lindgren, who study the 
impact of including the value of public healthcare, 
long-term care, education and childcare on esti-
mates of income inequality and poverty. The valu-
ation of public services and the identification of tar-
get groups rely on group-specific accounting data 
for each country. To account for the fact that the re-
ceipt of public services like education and care for 
the elderly is associated with particular needs, the 
authors introduce a theory-based common equiv-
alence scale for European countries (needs-adjust-
ed EU scale). Extending the income concept to in-
clude the value of public in-kind transfers reduces 
at-risk-of-poverty estimates by approximately 50 % 
and estimated Gini coefficients by approximate-
ly 20 %. This underlines the importance of public 
services.
The standard approach to measuring economic 
well-being assumes that all incomes are pooled 
within the household and that all the household 
members benefit from the same level of econom-
ic well-being. A few datasets, including the 2010 
EU-SILC thematic module on ‘Intra-household al-
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location of resources’, provide evidence that sig-
nificant shares of individuals living in multi-person 
households keep at least some of their income 
separate. In Chapter 9, Sophie Ponthieux propos-
es a measure of individual ‘modified’ equivalised 
income, using the information provided by the 
2010 module. The analysis is limited to one-cou-
ple households. The results show that departing 
from the assumption of full income pooling within 
households leads to increased levels of inequality, 
as could be expected. The magnitude of the in-
crease illustrates the potential bias resulting from 
the standard assumptions of full income pooling 
and equal sharing within households. For a better 
understanding of intra-household inequality, the 
author suggests that EU-SILC should collect both 
more detailed data on income components at in-
dividual level and information on intra-household 
arrangements.
The next two chapters deal with the measure-
ment of material deprivation (MD) as part of the 
EU indicators development process. In Chapter 10, 
Anne-Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier present an al-
ternative MD indicator which consists of 13 items — 
six are common to the current 9-item MD indicator 
and seven are new. The alternative indicator is de-
rived from a theory-based analytical framework for 
developing robust (i.e. suitable, reliable, valid and 
additive) aggregate indicators that could be used 
for analytical and monitoring purposes at nation-
al and EU levels. The framework has been applied 
to EU-SILC data collected in 2009 (which included 
a thematic module specifically devoted to MD) in 
a systematic item by item analysis carried out at 
both EU and country levels. Chapter 10 examines 
the impact of the move from the current indicator 
to the alternative indicator on the level of MD in the 
different Member States and on the Europe 2020 
social inclusion target, which is a key policy issue 
for individual countries and the EU as a whole. The 
analysis shows that, whereas the move results in 
a significantly more robust indicator, the impact of 
this move on the size and socioeconomic compo-
sition of the deprived population is limited in most 
countries and for the EU as a whole. Chapter 11 by 
Anne-Catherine Guio, David Gordon and Eric Marli-
er is concerned with measuring child MD in the EU 
taking into account information specific to children 
available from the 2009 EU-SILC thematic module 
on MD. The chapter summarises the main results 
of the in-depth analysis of these data, identifies an 
optimal set of children MD items, and recommends 
a child-specific MD indicator for use by EU Member 
States and the European Commission in their regu-
lar social monitoring.
Multidimensional approaches to poverty and MD 
have a long and distinguished history in concep-
tual and philosophical work. In Chapter 12, Sabina 
Alkire and Mauricio Apablaza illustrate the study of 
multidimensional poverty. They calculate a mul-
tidimensional poverty index based on the Alkire 
Foster methodology, which can accommodate dif-
ferent indicators, weights and cut-offs. They draw 
on existing Europe 2020 indicators, as well as on 
indicators of health, education and the living envi-
ronment. Aggregated and country cross-sectional 
results are presented. A short analysis of dynamics 
of multidimensional poverty is also included.
The Europe 2020 social inclusion target is meas-
ured according to work attachment, income and 
MD indicators using EU-SILC. However, there has 
been increasing interest in recent years in wheth-
er expenditure and consumption provide more 
appropriate measures of material living standards 
than income. The aim of Chapter 13 by Paola Seraf-
ino and Richard Tonkin is to compare people’s ex-
posure to poverty using three different measures: 
income, expenditure and MD. However, no single 
data source provides joint information on all these 
variables. Therefore, expenditure from the House-
hold Budget Survey is statistically matched with 
income and MD contained within EU-SILC using 
data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Spain 
and the UK. These matched datasets are used to 
analyse the overlap between income poverty, ex-
penditure poverty and MD, as well as the relation-
ship between income poverty, expenditure pover-
ty and other measures of social exclusion.
In the next chapters (Chapters 14-19), the focus 
switches to employment — in relation to the Eu-
rope 2020 strategy. Chapter 14 by Andrea Brandolini 
and Eliana Viviano examines the notion of employ-
ment rate, one of the targets of the Europe 2020 
strategy. As currently defined by the International 
Labour Office, 1 hour of work during a reference 
week is sufficient to be classified as employed. This 
is a rather crude measure, in the face of the wide 
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diversity of working times and contract durations 
observed in the EU. The authors demonstrate how 
to modify the employment rate to measure not 
only how many people work but also how much 
they work. Their ‘work intensity’-adjusted employ-
ment rate is based on the total annual number of 
hours of work as approximated by the number of 
months worked per year and the number of hours 
worked per week. They use this alternative meas-
ure to compare employment rates across the EU 
Member States and find that the gap between 
Northern countries and Southern and Eastern 
countries narrows, after adjusting for work inten-
sity, for both individuals and households. Though 
these results are based on estimates which can be 
improved in many respects, they neatly highlight 
the importance of exploring new flexible labour 
market statistics.
At the level of individual citizens and the house-
holds in which they live, participation in the labour 
market significantly diminishes the risk of income 
poverty. However, what seems evident at the lev-
el of individuals and households is less evident at 
the country level. Prior to the 2008 crisis, the Lisbon 
strategy could be regarded as a qualified success 
in the field of employment, at least if one assumes 
there to have been causal relationships between 
the Lisbon agenda and growing employment rates 
across Europe. Yet, the Lisbon strategy largely failed 
to deliver on its ambitious promise concerning (in-
come) poverty. Notwithstanding generally higher 
employment rates, many Member States did not 
succeed in reducing poverty. Hence, it is important 
to understand the missing links between employ-
ment policy success (or failure) and inclusion policy 
success (or failure). This is the subject of Chapter 
15 by Vincent Corluy and Frank Vandenbroucke, 
which explores those missing links, relying on the 
EU Labour Force Survey and EU-SILC. The authors 
examine (i) if the differences between changes 
in individual employment and changes in house-
hold employment offer an adequate explanation 
for changes in poverty, and (ii) how these differ-
ent changes can be decomposed in underlying 
factors, such as polarisation of employment. Their 
decomposition analysis yields interesting insights 
into the trajectories that EU welfare states have fol-
lowed during the ‘good economic years’ and dur-
ing the ‘crisis period’. Changes in the distribution 
of employment over households and decreasing 
household sizes constitute important structural 
background features for evolving EU welfare states. 
However, the impact of this evolution on the expla-
nation of differences in the Member States’ perfor-
mance with regard to poverty risk reduction is rath-
er limited and diverse, both before and after 2008.
Household joblessness in Europe has been of 
central policy concern, and it is one of the three 
dimensions making up the Europe 2020 social in-
clusion target. In Chapter 16, Sophie Ponthieux pre-
sents a methodological assessment of the (quasi-)
jobless indicator. There are large cross-country dif-
ferences in the composition of (quasi-)joblessness 
(QJ), suggesting that the notion captures different 
phenomena in different countries. The evolution 
of QJ over time is difficult to interpret. The contri-
bution of this indicator to the Europe 2020 social 
inclusion target is relatively small in most countries, 
and presents some weaknesses from a conceptual 
point of view. The analysis also shows that some 
technical choices in the implementation of the QJ 
concept affect the level, the structure and the evo-
lution of the indicator.
What happened to those in work during the 2008 
crisis? Chapter 17 by Andrea Brandolini and Alfonso 
Rosolia analyses the evolution of the distribution of 
earnings in the Euro Area during the crisis and the 
determinants of this evolution. The authors show 
that the wage adjustment between 2007 and 2011 
was substantially larger according to the EU-SILC 
data than that measured by national accounts, 
and driven mainly by the dynamics of earnings in 
periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal and Spain). Based on their estimates, the real 
monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings in 
periphery countries has decreased on average by 
over 4 % relative to levels in core countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands), but the relative costs of low 
wage labour have fallen far more in the periph-
ery, by some 6-8 %. The changing composition of 
the pool of salaried employees boosted earnings 
growth, thus obscuring a sizeable downward real 
wage adjustment, especially at the bottom of the 
wage distribution.
The risk of poverty depends not only on pay but 
also on household structure. In Chapter 18, Maria 
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Iacovou investigates the relationship between 
household structure and the three components 
of the AROPE indicator: income poverty, severe 
MD, and (quasi-)joblessness. She finds that the in-
cidence of all three indicators varies by household 
type, with lone parents and single adults being 
at elevated risk, and non-elderly couples (with or 
without children) being at the lowest risk. There are 
also substantial variations in risk within household 
types, depending on which of the three target 
components we look at. Among lone parents, the 
risks of poverty and (quasi-)joblessness is particu-
larly high among those with larger numbers of chil-
dren and among those with young babies, while 
couples with larger numbers of children are also at 
a higher risk on all three indicators. The three com-
ponents of the AROPE indicator do not move to-
gether during the life cycle: among single-person 
and couple households, the risk of income pover-
ty is very high among young adults, while the risk 
of (quasi-)joblessness is highest at older ages. This 
suggests that among the young, having a job may 
not offer failsafe protection from poverty, while at 
older ages, a lack of employment is not necessarily 
synonymous with disadvantage, and raises ques-
tions about the ability of the (quasi-)joblessness 
indicator on its own to effectively identify disad-
vantaged groups.
Since the at-risk-of-poverty rate is one of the three 
indicators used for monitoring progress towards the 
Europe 2020 social inclusion target, timeliness of this 
indicator is critical for monitoring the effectiveness 
and distributional aspects of policy interventions 
under the current economic conditions. However, 
due to the complicated nature of microdata col-
lection and processing as well as to the complexity 
of measuring the total annual household income 
concept, income poverty estimates only become 
available with a 2-year delay (3 years until a couple 
of years ago, before major timeliness efforts by the 
European Statistical System). The aim of Chapter 19 
by Chrysa Leventi, Olga Rastrigina, Holly Sutherland 
and Jekaterina Navicke is to present a microsimula-
tion-based methodology for nowcasting changes 
in the distribution of income over years for which 
EU-SILC statistics are not yet available. The term 
‘nowcasting’ here refers to the estimation of current 
indicators using data on a past income distribution 
together with various other sources of information, 
such as macroeconomic statistics. Enhancing the 
EU-SILC based input data of the tax-benefit mi-
crosimulation model EUROMOD with up-to-date 
macro-level statistics, income poverty rates are esti-
mated for twelve EU countries for the period 2009-
2013. The performance of the method, assessed by 
comparing the nowcasted estimates with the ‘true’ 
EU-SILC indicators suggests that this approach pro-
vides useful provisional information until official sta-
tistics become available.
The 2008 crisis had a dramatic impact on European 
citizens, leading to more people experiencing MD. 
The next two chapters explore how MD indicators 
capture the evolution of people’s living conditions, 
using the longitudinal component of EU-SILC. The 
key objective of Chapter 20 by Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier and Marco Pomati is to analyse 
the evolution of MD over time across the EU and to 
estimate the impact of the crisis on this evolution. 
Both cross-sectional and longitudinal EU-SILC data 
are used. The chapter analyses the changes in na-
tional trajectories of MD (before and during/after 
the crisis) — considering in turn incidence, severity 
and persistence aspects. By looking at both entry 
into MD and exit from MD, it allows for a better un-
derstanding of national differences in the levels of 
annual and persistent MD. It explains in particular 
why countries with similar annual MD rates can 
have different persistent MD rates and how the 
increase in entry rates and the decrease in exit 
rates came into play to explain MD increases in the 
countries most affected by the crisis. Finally, it also 
explores the impact of different ‘trigger events’ and 
individual/ household characteristics on entry rates 
into MD. The main contribution of Chapter 21 by 
Anne-Catherine Guio and Marco Pomati is to un-
derstand which items people have to go without 
as their resources decrease, using the longitudinal 
component of EU-SILC. By definition, curtailment is 
a temporal process which to be fully understood 
necessitates longitudinal data. Although only 
a subset of MD items is available in the longitudi-
nal dataset, this allows the authors to compare the 
order of curtailment obtained by using longitu-
dinal and cross-sectional data. An Item Response 
Theory model is also estimated on cross-sectional 
data and used to confirm and aid the interpreta-
tion of the results. Interestingly, the results suggest 
a large degree of homogeneity across the EU in 
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how households curtail expenditure, despite the 
large differences in material and social contexts be-
tween Member States.
The longitudinal component of EU-SILC is also used 
in official EU statistics — to compute the persistent 
at-risk-of-poverty rate, which to date is the only 
longitudinal indicator included in the EU portfolio 
of social indicators used by EU countries and the 
European Commission for measuring progress to-
wards the EU social protection and social inclusion 
objectives (Social Protection Committee 2015) (5). 
Evidence about (income) poverty persistence is 
undoubtedly an important complement to infor-
mation about poverty prevalence at a point in time. 
However, sample drop-out from the longitudinal 
samples (‘attrition’) reduces sample size thereby 
decreasing the precision of estimates of persis-
tent poverty indicators, and may be selective and 
lead to bias. In Chapter 22, Stephen P. Jenkins and 
Philippe Van Kerm examine these issues. They show 
that rates of attrition from the 4-year EU-SILC sam-
ples used to calculate persistent poverty rates vary 
substantially across Member States, and there is also 
substantial cross-national diversity in the character-
istics of individuals lost to follow-up. They provide 
evidence that application of longitudinal weights 
does not fully account for the effects of attrition, 
and that different assumptions about the poverty 
status of those lost (‘attritors’) lead to wide bounds 
for estimates of persistent poverty rates for most 
Member States.
Likewise taking advantage of the longitudinal com-
ponent of EU-SILC, Chapter 23 by Céline Thévenot 
investigates the lessons that can be drawn from ob-
serving year on year changes in working age adults’ 
labour market situation and their related poverty 
status. It highlights that, among non-employed 
individuals, taking up a job might not be enough 
to get out of poverty. The type of job, household 
(5) The most recent EU objectives for social protection and 
social inclusion were agreed in 2011 (Council of the European 
Union, 2011). A set of commonly agreed EU social indicators 
is used for monitoring progress towards these objectives. 
This set is continuously fine-tuned and complemented with 
new measures. The EU body in charge of developing these 
EU social indicators is the Indicators Sub-Group of the EU 
Social Protection Committee (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=830&langId=en). On the use of EU social indicators 
and the methodological EU framework under which these are 
developed, see also: Atkinson et al. (2002) and Marlier et al. 
(2007).
structure or inadequate income support can ex-
plain such a feature. The chapter explores the 
transition from unemployment to employment 
by itself, with a special focus on the role of unem-
ployment benefits coverage. By comparing groups 
of individuals with similar profiles, such as gender, 
education and time spent at work over the last 3 
years, it shows that those unemployed covered by 
unemployment benefits schemes perform better 
in finding a job. Therefore, well-designed unem-
ployment benefit coverage can support transitions 
to employment and contribute to preventing en-
tries into poverty.
In Chapter 24, Francesco Andreoli and Alessio Fus-
co take a different approach, studying inequality of 
opportunity. Opportunities are equally distributed 
when individuals of the same ‘type’ (i.e., sharing 
similar circumstances of origin for which they can-
not be held responsible), who make similar ‘effort’ 
choices (for example in terms of hours worked, edu-
cational choices…), also face identical opportunity 
profiles. Otherwise, a form of inequality of opportu-
nities prevails. This chapter aims at quantifying the 
degree of inequality of opportunity across the EU, 
and assessing its evolution, using the information 
provided by the thematic modules on intergenera-
tional transmission of disadvantage included in the 
2005 and 2011 Waves of EU-SILC. It proposes new 
indicators that are consistent with the normative 
perspectives on equality of opportunity. These 
indicators coincide with the expected change in 
economic (dis)advantage experienced by individu-
als later in life that is induced by a change in the cir-
cumstances of origin. The authors find substantial 
heterogeneity across European countries in terms 
of inequality of opportunity, which does not per-
fectly mirror the portrait drawn from official pover-
ty and social exclusion indicators.
Using the same 2005 and 2011 modules on inter-
generational transmission of disadvantage, Chap-
ter 25 by Luna Bellani and Michela Bia examines the 
causal impact of growing up poor on the individ-
ual’s economic outcomes as an adult. The authors 
find that experiencing financial problems in child-
hood decreases the level of income in adulthood 
and increases the average probability of being at 
risk of poverty. They also find substantial country 
differences in the impact.
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The last four chapters (Chapters 26-29) look at vari-
ous technical issues in the development of house-
hold social surveys. When using sample estimates 
to monitor poverty and social exclusion, it is crucial 
to take the sampling variance into account. Other-
wise, small changes in estimates may be wrongly 
interpreted as real changes in the population. In 
Chapter 26, Yves Berger, Guillaume Osier and Tim 
Goedemé present standard error estimates and 
confidence intervals for cross-sectional measures, 
longitudinal measures and measures of changes 
between two waves. The proposed variance es-
timators are simple and flexible, yet theoretically 
sound. They can accommodate a wide class of 
sampling designs using standard statistical tech-
niques. The suggested approach can be imple-
mented with standard statistical procedures. It can 
also be extended to complex estimators through 
linearisation. The numerical results obtained using 
this approach must however be read with caution 
given the lack of sampling design information in 
the EU-SILC Users’ Databases (UDB) and potential 
quality problems with the current design variables. 
Throughout the whole book, the method pro-
posed in this chapter is applied whenever feasible, 
in order to provide the reader with confidence in-
tervals and appropriate significance testing.
In Chapter 27, Maria Iacovou and Peter Lynn review 
the regulation relating to the EU-SILC ‘following 
rules’ (that determine which particular member(s) 
of sample households should be traced and re- 
interviewed, and under what circumstances), and ex-
amine the implementation of these rules. There are 
large differences between Member States, particu-
larly in respect of individuals or whole households 
who change address; and the authors show that 
this may have important implications for research 
on groups of people who have a higher-than- 
average risk of moving. They discuss ‘best prac-
tice’ in minimising attrition in longitudinal surveys. 
They also discuss the challenges of producing the 
EU-SILC longitudinal data from the perspective of 
National Statistical Institutes, and the value of the 
longitudinal component of EU-SILC from the per-
spective of the research community. They make 
recommendations relating to the future design 
and implementation of the longitudinal compo-
nent of the EU-SILC.
The use of registers in EU-SILC is the subject of 
Chapter 28 by Veli-Matti Törmälehto, Markus Jänt-
ti and Eric Marlier. This chapter reviews the use of 
registers in EU-SILC, summarising the main out-
comes of the international Workshop on ‘The use 
of registers in the context of EU-SILC’ organised by 
Net-SILC2 in December 2012 in Vienna (see Jäntti, 
Törmälehto and Marlier, 2013).
Finally, Chapter 29 by Emilio Di Meglio and Didier 
Dupré describes the planned future developments 
of EU-SILC. The 2008 crisis, the Europe 2020 strate-
gy, the European Commission’s ‘Social Investment 
Package’ and the ‘Beyond GDP’ initiative have 
raised significantly the importance of social statis-
tics. In order to increase responsiveness, Eurostat 
is currently revising EU-SILC as part of a larger pro-
gramme aimed at modernising European social 
statistics. A key objective of this programme is the 
better integration of surveys by standardisation of 
variables, precision requirements based on stand-
ard errors, and more systematic use of registers and 
multi-mode data collection. For poverty and social 
exclusion, the EU-SILC revision aims at: (i) modu-
larising and adapting the periodicity to the needs; 
(ii) improving timeliness, with a global availability of 
EU-SILC data at the latest in June of the year follow-
ing the survey and for MD and other non-income 
data at the end of the survey year; (iii) nowcasting 
and releasing early estimates of key indicators and 
income evolutions; (iv) better integrating EU-SILC 
indicators with macroeconomic variables; (v) pos-
sibly extending the rotational panel from 4 to 6 
years, for better studying long-term phenomenon, 
transitions and recurrences; and (vi) allowing for 
more regional breakdowns.
1.3 Future developments 
of EU‑SILC and EU social 
indicators
The extensive use made of the EU-SILC data as 
part of the Net-SILC2 project means that we have 
learned a lot about its strengths and weaknesses. 
The first of these — the strengths — should be 
stressed. EU-SILC is a remarkably successful statis-
tical instrument. It provides an essential input into 
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the policy-making process. Without such a rich 
source of data, the EU would not have been able 
to set a quantified social inclusion target as part 
of the Europe 2020 strategy, nor to develop an 
evidence-based ‘Beyond GDP’ initiative. The whole 
EU social indicators process would have been im-
possible without this investment in statistics.
At the same time, there are a number of areas 
where the instrument could profitably be devel-
oped or where it needs to adapt to the changing 
world. Moreover, there are significant implications 
for the monitoring of Social Europe — both for 
the EU portfolio of social indicators and for the EU 
comparative analysis of income and living condi-
tions. In what follows, we highlight six of these: (i) 
linking EU-SILC data and the national accounts; (ii) 
combining survey and register data; (iii) confront-
ing income and expenditure data; (iv) putting in 
perspective income-based and MD indicators; (v) 
questioning the employment and (quasi-)jobless-
ness concepts; and (vi) improving the measure-
ment and understanding of the dynamics of pov-
erty and social exclusion.
1.3.1 Linking micro‑ and macro‑
For many years, as noted at the outset of Chapter 3, 
there has been a sharp separation between, on the 
one hand, the macroeconomic evaluation of eco-
nomic policy and, on the other hand, the analysis 
of the impact of policy on the living standards of 
households. On one side are the national accounts, 
where performance is judged in terms of Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP); on the other side are the sta-
tistics on households’ living conditions with which 
we are primarily concerned in this book. It has 
however become increasingly clear that the two 
sides need to be brought together. In particular, we 
need to understand the relation between the ag-
gregate story told by household statistics and that 
contained in the national accounts. Put simply, if we 
add up the household incomes in EU-SILC, appro-
priately weighted, do we arrive at the same amount 
as the aggregate household incomes that feature in 
the national accounts? Or, put in growth terms, do 
the household statistics tell the same story about 
the rise or fall of living standards as do the house-
hold income aggregates in the national accounts?
This question has acquired greater significance 
since 2014, when the Social Protection Commit-
tee (SPC) and its Indicators Sub-Group adopted an 
aggregate indicator of (unadjusted) (6) real gross 
household disposable income as part of the EU 
portfolio of social indicators. This indicator covers 
household income (aggregate for the household 
sector) and is described as ‘providing a link be-
tween macroeconomic developments and house-
hold income developments’ (Social Protection 
Committee 2015). It is measured by the growth 
rate in unadjusted real gross household disposable 
income. This indicator — in contrast to the other 
EU social indicators — is taken from the national 
accounts. This immediately raises the question as 
to how the growth rate compares with that found 
if one makes a comparable calculation using the 
household income data in EU-SILC.
The linking of micro- and macro- statistics is an 
active area of research by Eurostat and OECD, by 
National Statistical Institutes, and by academic re-
searchers. There are therefore good grounds for 
expecting an improvement in our understanding. 
At the same time, there are specific issues that are 
of particular concern in relation to EU-SILC and the 
EU social indicators. A number of these are cov-
ered by the specific recommendations in Chapter 
3. For example, while the national accounts may 
include non-profit institutions serving households 
as part of the household sector, it is important 
that they be separated out for use in construct-
ing social indicators. A second example concerns 
the under-statement in household surveys of cer-
tain forms of income, including property income, 
self-employment income, and social transfers. 
Specific consideration needs to be given within 
EU-SILC to the possible use of corrective factors, or 
to the supplementation of the information collect-
ed in the surveys (including the modelling of the 
receipt of cash transfers). A third example is provid-
ed by the choice of price index to deflate money 
incomes to real terms, where the choice appropri-
ate for the national accounts may not apply to the 
social indicators.
(6) ‘Unadjusted’ refers to the fact that no allowance is made for the 
receipt of social transfers in kind.
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1.3.2 Combining survey and 
register information
The current trend in European statistics is to en-
courage the use of administrative data, and there 
has been an expansion in the use of register data 
in EU-SILC in recent years. The use of registers of-
fers several advantages, including shorter question-
naires, lower demands on respondents and hence 
higher response rates, more accurate measurement 
and greater possibilities for cross-validation. At the 
same time, the partial transition to the use of register 
data poses problems. To quote from Jäntti, Törmäle-
hto and Marlier, ‘the research findings suggest that 
the differential use of registers may affect compa-
rability across countries, while country-case studies 
tend to show that the transition to register income 
data may affect within-country comparability across 
time’ (2013, p. 33). This is illustrated in Chapter 3 by 
Figure 3.6, which compares EU-SILC income with 
that in the national accounts. For three ‘register 
countries’ (Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) the 
EU-SILC income is above 85 % of the national ac-
counts figure, whereas for non-register countries the 
ratio is below. In France, the adoption of a register 
basis in 2007 led to a jump in the ratio. This shows 
that the use of registers increases the consistency 
between micro and macro data. This also shows that 
the transition to use of register data needs therefore 
to be handled carefully. This does not mean that 
there should be any doubts about this move. We 
agree with Jäntti, Törmälehto and Marlier that ‘for 
cost and quality reasons, the way forward is to in-
crease utilisation of registers in EU-SILC’ (2013, p. 33). 
As they note, the ‘greatest potential gains may stem 
from replacing survey questions on social benefits 
and employment income with valid register data in 
as many EU-SILC countries as possible’ (2013, p. 32).
1.3.3 Confronting income and 
expenditure data
The EU social indicators for the risk of poverty are 
based on household incomes. As has been exten-
sively discussed in the literature, there are grounds 
for using household expenditure, rather than in-
come, as the measure of the standard of living. 
These grounds are set out in Atkinson, Cantillon, 
Marlier and Nolan (2002, pp. 82-83), where the au-
thors recognise that there are arguments on both 
sides but conclude that the EU indicators should be 
based on household income. One important consid-
eration was the availability of validated income data 
from the EU household surveys (then the European 
Community Household Survey (ECHP), now EU-SILC). 
Information on household expenditure is available 
from the Household Budget Surveys, but in order to 
make a comparison with the income indicators it is 
necessary to merge the two sources.
In this context, the investigation via merged data-
sets of the relation between income poverty, ex-
penditure poverty and MD presented in Chapter 13 
is very informative, and we quote their conclusion at 
length: ‘on one level, the results of this analysis do 
not appear to directly support the assertion that ex-
penditure provides a better measure of material liv-
ing standards than income, at least for the countries 
examined. Comparisons with MD and a number of 
other related measures of living conditions in gener-
al suggest a slightly stronger relationship between 
these measures and income poverty than expend-
iture poverty’. At the same time, the expenditure 
measures provide an alternative perspective which 
should be further explored.
1.3.4 Putting in perspective 
income‑based and material 
deprivation indicators
Material deprivation indicators, which are included 
in the EU portfolio of social indicators only since 
2009, have been extremely useful in the monitor-
ing of living standards across the EU. Before the 
crisis, they decreased substantially in many East-
ern countries, showing an improvement of living 
standards. During the crisis, they helped capture 
the impact of the crisis on the actual living condi-
tions of people. As shown in Chapter 20, looking 
at the persistence of MD and at the entry and exit 
rates before/after the crisis allow for a better un-
derstanding of national differences in the levels of 
annual and persistent MD; it also shows how the 
increase in entry rates and the decrease in exit 
rates came into play to explain MD increases in 
the countries most affected by the crisis. Without 
complementing the analysis of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal income-based indicators with that of 
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cross-sectional and longitudinal MD variables, part 
of the explanation behind these trends would have 
been missed.
The analyses presented in Chapters 13 and 20 re-
mind us of the interest of using also the ‘standard’ 
EU indicator on MD (which is based on a threshold 
of three lacks out of a list of nine) and not only the 
severe MD indicator included in the social inclu-
sion target (based on a 4-lack threshold). Indeed, 
in most EU countries suffering from three depriva-
tions is a sufficient condition for not having a de-
cent life; this therefore deserves analysis.
Despite the fact that the current EU MD indicators 
have proved very useful in complementing the EU 
income-based indicators, the revision of the list of 
MD items along the lines summarised in Chapter 
10 will increase the robustness of the measure (for 
the full analyses that led to this proposal devel-
oped in the context of Net-SILC2, see Guio, Gordon 
and Marlier 2012). The 13 items included in the pro-
posed alternative EU indicator better capture MD, 
including some of the social aspects of MD. The 
high degree of homogeneity across the EU in how 
households curtail their expenses when facing fi-
nancial difficulties, despite the large differences 
in material and social contexts between Mem-
ber States, further highlights the interest of using 
a common basket of items at the EU level (Chapter 
21). It is very encouraging that the European Sta-
tistical System has decided to follow the Net-SILC2 
proposal — since 2014, all 13 MD items are includ-
ed in the primary EU-SILC target variables and thus 
collected annually in all EU Member States.
Complementing the EU portfolio of social indica-
tors with a child-specific MD indicator that would 
take account of the specific living conditions of 
children, which may differ from their parents’ living 
standards, would be an important step forward 
(see Chapter 11 for the proposed indicator devel-
oped in the context of Net-SILC2; see also Guio, 
Gordon and Marlier 2012 for the full analyses). Reg-
ularly collecting this information on the specific 
living conditions of children is crucial to follow the 
evolution of child well-being across the EU. Here 
again, EU progress is encouraging. The child-spe-
cific MD items selected by Net-SILC2 were in-
cluded in the 2014 Wave of EU-SILC and will be 
part of a regular thematic EU-SILC module (most 
likely repeated every third year). The inclusion of 
a child-specific MD indicator in the EU portfolio of 
social indicators is on the 2016 agenda of the SPC 
Indicators Sub-Group.
1.3.5 The concepts of jobs and 
(quasi‑)joblessness
The analyses presented in the chapters of this book 
that deal with labour market issues have identified 
a number of problems with the measurement of 
employment and (quasi-)joblessness. These prob-
lems reflect both the complexity of the concepts 
and the changing nature of the labour market.
Increasing the rate of employment has long been 
a central concern of the EU. The European Employ-
ment Strategy, launched at the Luxembourg Jobs 
Summit in 1997, was translated into specific targets 
in the Lisbon agenda in 2000; and the Europe 2020 
strategy launched 10 years later seeks to ensure 
that 75 % of the population aged 20-64 ‘should be 
employed’ by 2020 (European Commission, 2010). 
But, as shown in Chapter 14, if the employment rate 
is defined as a simple headcount of those at work, 
then it can be highly misleading. Moreover, in many 
countries the labour market is evolving in ways that 
render irrelevant the simple concept of a ‘job’. It is 
no longer enough to count ‘jobs’. In our view, the 
EU employment targets and indicators need to be 
re-considered to account not only for the number 
of workers but also for their work intensity. Work 
intensity can be based on the number of months 
worked per year and the number of hours worked 
per week. With such a measure, as shown in Chap-
ter 14, we would obtain a different picture.
Household joblessness in Europe has also been of 
central policy concern, and it is one of the three 
dimensions making up the Europe 2020 social in-
clusion target. It is addressed in Chapters 15, 16 and 
18. Chapter 16, in particular, makes concrete sug-
gestions for improving the Europe 2020 indicator 
of (quasi-)joblessness.
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1.3.6 Improving the measurement 
and understanding of the 
dynamics of poverty and social 
exclusion
Chapters 20-25 and 27 explore different ways of 
improving the measurement and understanding 
of the dynamics of poverty and social exclusion 
using EU-SILC data. The analysis of the longitudinal 
(panel) component of EU-SILC shows that similar 
trends in social indicators may result from different 
dynamic processes (see Chapters 20 and 23). For 
example, when considering the Europe 2020 social 
inclusion target, it is important not only to monitor 
national trends in the overall target and its three 
components (income poverty, material deprivation 
and (quasi-)joblessness) but also to analyse entry 
and exit rates in these different indicators — i.e., to 
analyse the dynamic processes at stake.
As explained in Chapter 29, the EU-SILC instrument 
is currently being revised. It is crucial that this re-
vision benefits to the full from the experiences of 
analysing its longitudinal data; that it builds on 
what researchers have identified as strengths and 
weaknesses of EU-SILC panel data so these data 
can be further improved in future. So, Chapters 
22 and 27 show the importance of harmonising 
strict following rules, of monitoring procedures for 
minimising non-response and attrition, and of ad-
equate weighting to correct for selective attrition.
The time window during which individuals are 
currently followed in EU-SILC is only 4 years. As 
explained in Chapter 27, an extension of the panel 
length from 4 to 6 years ‘would permit a broader 
range of analyses and greater power to identify the 
precursors, causes and effects of various dynamic 
processes such as changes in income poverty, ma-
terial deprivation, (quasi-)joblessness and changes 
in health status; EU-SILC would provide a unique 
opportunity to make cross-national comparisons 
of these processes, causes and effects and to bet-
ter understand variation between Member States.’ 
Examples of the potential added value of such an 
extension are evident from Chapters 20 and 23.
A life cycle approach to poverty and social exclu-
sion can also help understand the dynamics of 
poverty and social exclusion. Using the 2005 and 
2011 EU-SILC thematic module on the intergener-
ational transmission of disadvantages, Chapters 24 
and 25 analyse the long-term impact of poverty in 
childhood and suggest new indicators and analy-
ses in this field, which are crucial to better highlight 
the long-term responsibility of the society in the 
fight against child poverty and social exclusion.
1.4 European social goals 
in the global perspective of 
2030
Much of the research reported in this book has 
been concerned with the goals set in the Europe 
2020 agenda. At the time the book went to press, 
half that decade has passed. We need therefore to 
be looking further into the future. In this last sec-
tion, we suggest that the UN agreement on the 
new Sustainable Development Goals provides 
a longer-term horizon and an impetus to consider 
Europe’s goals up to 2030.
1.4.1 The sustainable 
development goals
In September 2015, the United Nations agreed to 
the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
the follow-up to the Millennium Development 
Goals. As indicated by the official title, ‘Transform-
ing our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’, the SDGs set the world objectives 
for the next 15 years. The goals are ambitious, not 
only in what they seek to achieve in the develop-
ing world, but also because they are now global in 
scope. As described by the UN, ‘this is an Agenda of 
unprecedented scope and significance. It is accept-
ed by all countries and is applicable to all, taking 
into account different national realities, capacities 
and levels of development and respecting nation-
al policies and priorities. These are universal goals 
and targets which involve the entire world, devel-
oped and developing countries alike.’
The global reach of the SDGs may be seen from the 
two targets concerning poverty and inequality:
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a) Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere. The 
first two elements of this goal consist of the 
following:
1.1 by 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all 
people everywhere, measured as people 
living on less than USD 1.90 per capita a day 
(previously USD 1.25);
1.2 by 2030, reduce at least by half the pro-
portion of men, women and children of all 
ages living in poverty in all its dimensions 
according to national definitions.
b) Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among 
countries. The first two elements of this goal 
consist of the following:
10.1  by 2030, progressively achieve and sus-
tain income growth of the bottom 40 % 
of the population at a rate higher than 
the national average;
10.2  by 2030, empower and promote the social, 
economic and political inclusion of all, ir-
respective of age, sex, disability, race, eth-
nicity, origin, religion or economic or other 
status.
The second feature of the new SDGs is the incor-
poration of national poverty objectives. Goal 1.1 
refers to the ambition for the abolition of extreme 
poverty, measured by the global poverty line of 
USD 1.90 per capita a day expressed in standard-
ised purchasing power (7) but Goal 1.2 is framed in 
terms of poverty as measured by national defini-
tions. The SDGs are not only about the developing 
world but also about rich countries. The SDGs are 
a challenge to the Member States of the EU — and 
to the United States (U.S.), Japan and others of the 
80 countries defined by the World Bank as ‘high 
income’. (The criterion for ‘high income’ is a Gross 
National Income per head of more than USD 12 735 
in 2014, or some USD 35 a day.)
This raises a third feature of the SDGs. In the sur-
rounding documents, there are frequent referenc-
es to national governments. The UN refers to ‘each 
(7) On the basis of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS) convert the amounts expressed in 
a national currency to an artificial common currency that 
equalises the purchasing power of different national currencies 
(including for those countries that share a common currency).
Government setting its own national targets guid-
ed by the global level of ambition but taking into 
account national circumstances. Each Government 
will also decide how these aspirational and global 
targets should be incorporated into national plan-
ning processes, policies and strategies’ (2015, para. 
55). There is however little or no reference to politi-
co-economic unions of national governments, such 
as the EU. A search of the document UN (2015) for 
‘EU’ (in capitals) reveals no matches. Yet, the role of 
regional groupings has been of importance in the 
study of poverty and in the provision of statisti-
cal information on income distribution. Reference 
should be made, for example, to the work of the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), and of the Asian Development 
Bank. In the case of the EU, the process of adopting 
agreed social indicators has advanced considerably 
and the Europe 2020 agenda represents the com-
mon agreement of Member States on the poverty 
target for the decade.
We therefore believe that the EU should seize the 
opportunity created by the SDGs to establish the 
existing Europe 2020 social inclusion goal as that 
relevant to Goal 1.2 of the SDGs (for the period 
2015-2020). Moreover, it should use the occasion as 
the basis for setting a more ambitious set of goals 
for 2030.
1.4.2 Extreme poverty in the EU
The Europe 2020 goal of reducing the number of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) 
by at least 20 million, a reduction by around 17 % in 
10 years, should remain the priority concern of the 
EU until 2020. At the same time, there are challeng-
es that go beyond the Europe 2020 social inclusion 
target. The first of these is the need to continue af-
ter 2020 to bring down the proportion of the pop-
ulation living in households with total equivalised 
disposable income below 60 % of the median (the 
income poverty component of the target). Together, 
the income poverty and AROPE indicators should be 
the primary focus.
At the same time, the agreement on the SDGs points 
to the need for the EU to also consider extreme 
poverty. To date, the World Bank when calculating 
the number below the USD 1.90 line (Ferreira et al., 
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2015) has simply inserted zero for high income coun-
tries. But this is very much open to question. In the 
U.S., Shaefer and Edin (2013 and 2014) and Edin and 
Shaefer (2015) have argued that, as a consequence of 
the scaling back of welfare, ‘a new group of Ameri-
can poor has emerged: families with children who 
are living on virtually no income’ (2014, p. 28). The 
size of this group depends on the definition of ex-
treme poverty and on the sources of data. Chan-
dy and Smith note that ‘a variety of different data 
sources and definitions (…) generate estimates of 
the number of Americans living under $2 a day that 
range from 12 million all the way down to zero’ (2014, 
p. 3). They go on to argue that ‘the inability to obtain 
a more precise estimate of $2 a day poverty in the 
U.S. ought to be addressed’ (2014, p. 17).
The EU must ask the same question — how much 
extreme poverty is there in the EU? With the mi-
gration crisis, this has become an even more press-
ing issue. As in the U.S., to respond to the question 
we need to consider both definitions and sources. 
A key definitional issue is that already discussed in 
the previous section: the choice between income 
and expenditure when measuring poverty. There is 
a good case for measuring extreme poverty in terms 
of consumption, and hence for basing the estimate 
on expenditure rather than income. At the same time, 
there are important differences between expenditure 
and consumption, and it is not evident that the lat-
ter is adequately captured in Household Budget Sur-
veys. This is particularly the case when we consider 
a second issue: the non-coverage in surveys of the 
non-household population. In its estimates of glob-
al poverty, the World Bank uses sources that in some 
countries attempt to cover the non-household pop-
ulation, but there remains a major problem. Carr-Hill 
(2013) has made estimates of the numbers missing 
globally from the sampling frames of household 
surveys in the form of the institutional population 
(hospitals, prisons and refugees), slum population 
and pastoralists. While the resulting number may be 
a relatively small proportion of the total population, 
they may constitute a much more serious percentage 
of those at risk of extreme poverty.
Any steps in this direction must be cautious, since 
measuring extreme poverty in the EU is a complex 
endeavour. Progress may be possible in the case 
of specific groups, such as taking forward the EU 
work on homelessness. The topic as a whole could 
profitably be the subject of a future Horizon 2020 
international research project.
1.4.3 A more ambitious goal for 
2030?
The setting of the SDGs for 2030 provides a natural 
focus for considering the establishment of EU targets 
for the next decade. Here we should note that the 
SDG aim of reducing poverty as measured nationally 
by a half is twice as ambitious as the Europe 2020 so-
cial inclusion target. In broad terms, the Europe 2020 
target is to reduce the number at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion EU-wide by around a sixth between 
2010 and 2020; the equivalent over 15 years (2015-
2030) would be a reduction of a quarter. The SDG is 
therefore setting a more ambitious goal.
In thinking beyond 2020, we have to recognise that 
progress to date has been extremely disappointing. 
We see no grounds for disagreeing with one of the 
Key Messages of the Social Protection Committee 
in its 2014 annual report, ‘the EU is still not making 
any progress towards achieving its Europe 2020 
poverty and social exclusion target of lifting at least 
20 million people from poverty and social exclusion 
by 2020. (…) Furthermore, national targets contin-
ue to vary in their ambition and do not add to the 
EU collective headline target.’ (2015a, p. 12). Figure 
1.1 shows that the overall AROPE figure, rather than 
falling from 116 million (rounded to the nearest mil-
lion) in the reference year 2008, has risen to more 
than 120 million in 2012-2014 and is still as high as 
118 million in 2015, taking us away from the line, 
marked with an arrow, indicating where we should 
be heading. The target of 96 million is further away. 
The same applies to the individual components. For 
instance, the number of people at risk of poverty 
(AROP), i.e. the number of income-poor people, has 
risen from 81 million to 86 million. A chart like Figure 
1.1 should be on the desk of every Minister of So-
cial Affairs, every Minister of Employment and every 
Minister of Finance in the EU.
Faced with such failure, Europe’s leaders may sim-
ply decide to throw in the towel, and write off 2010-
2020 as a ‘lost decade’. The Europe 2020 objective 
of a reduction of a sixth may simply be pushed 10 
years into the future. Such an outcome would be 
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extremely disappointing to those concerned with 
the social dimension of Europe, and devastating 
for the millions of Europe’s citizens living at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion. We believe that the 
SDGs, with their greater ambition, should be the 
basis for setting Europe’s commitment for 2030. 
Halving poverty by 2030 should not be beyond the 
resources of a rich continent.
1.4.4 A new income inequality 
indicator?
At present the EU portfolio of social indicators con-
tains two indicators of income inequality: the in-
come quintile share ratio S80/S20 and the Gini co-
efficient (see definitions above). The SDGs however 
are proposing a different indicator, which is defined 
in terms of the income growth of the bottom 40 % 
of the population.
The SDG indicator could be implemented in different 
ways. The simplest is to consider the income share of 
the bottom 40 %. The World Development Indica-
tors of the World Bank show for instance that in 1986 
the bottom 40 % in the U.S. received 16.6 % of total 
income but that this figure had fallen to 15.4 % by 
2013. However, the reference to ‘income growth’ in 
the formulation of Goal 10.2 suggests that we need 
to take account of the level of income. The share of 
the bottom 40 % needs not only to be rising but also 
for their real incomes to be increasing.
This suggests that the new inequality indicator 
should be combined with the indicator adopted by 
the SPC Indicators Sub-Group in 2014: the growth 
of the (unadjusted) real household disposable 
income of the bottom 40 %, compared with the 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
AROPE 124 656 122 936 119 205 115 908 114 208 116 356 119 282 122 216 121 414 120 661 117 604 95 908
AROP 79 498 80 159 80 989 80 872 80 461 80 986 82 858 83 046 82 426 85 065 85 755
SMD 52 254 48 283 44 834 41 527 40 094 41 022 43 307 48 774 47 411 43 850 39 745
QJ hhds 39 520 40 051 37 114 34 606 34 549 38 369 38 995 39 171 40 521 41 476 39 171
115 908 117 604
95 908
80 872 85 755
41 527 39 745
34 606
39 171
0
20 000
40 000
60 000
80 000
100 000
120 000
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assessing target achievement
Figure 1.1: Progress towards the EU social inclusion target, 2005‑2015
(in thousands) 
Reading note: In 2008, the reference (survey) year for the Europe 2020 social inclusion target agreed upon in 2010, 80.872 million were at risk 
of poverty (AROP), 41.527 million were severely materially deprived (SMD) and 34.606 million lived in (quasi-)jobless households (QJ). The sum 
of these three figures is higher than the number of people who were at risk of poverty or social exclusion that year (AROPE, 115.908 million) 
because a number of persons AROPE combine two or even all three difficulties considered in this aggregate indicator. The target to be reached 
by 2020 (based on 2018 EU-SILC data) is 95.908 million people AROPE, i.e. a reduction by 20 million compared to 2010 (based on 2008 EU-SILC 
data).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC (codes t2020_50, t2020_51, t2020_52, t2020_53), downloaded on 31 January 2017.
1 Monitoring social inclusion in Europe
  Monitoring social inclusion in Europe48
already existing indicator on the growth of the cor-
responding variable for the population as a whole.
1.4.5 An integrated approach
In the discussion so far, we have focused on the 
two SDGs concerned with poverty and inequality, 
but they form part of a package of objectives and 
need to be seen in this context. The policies pur-
sued need to be assessed in terms of their contri-
bution to all goals.
In this regard, the Europe 2020 strategy, with its five 
overarching goals (in the fields of social inclusion, 
employment, R & D/innovation, climate change 
and education), has provided a good lead. However, 
when evaluating policy options we need to consid-
er all five in conjunction.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the EU-SILC instrument, 
which has become the reference source for com-
parative statistics on income distribution and social 
inclusion in the EU. Its aim is to provide the reader 
of this book with a conceptual and practical insight 
into the background of this instrument and its 
main characteristics.
Reliable and timely statistics and indicators, com-
puted from a pan-European harmonised data 
source and reflecting the multi-dimensional nature 
of poverty and social exclusion, are essential for 
monitoring the social protection and social inclu-
sion process at national and EU level. Furthermore, 
the social consequences of the economic and finan-
cial crisis have given increased importance to data 
on the income distribution and the social situation 
across Europe.
EU-SILC is currently implemented in 34 countries. 
Every year in Europe more than 200 000 house-
holds and 500 000 individuals are interviewed and 
the complete microdata are sent to Eurostat.
(8) Emilio Di Meglio, Didier Dupré, Fabienne Montaigne 
and Pascal Wolff are all at the Statistical Office of the 
European Union (Eurostat). Address for correspondence: 
ESTAT-SECRETARIAT-F4@ec.europa.eu. The European 
Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses and 
conclusions, which are solely those of the authors.
2.2 The EU‑SILC instrument 
and its governance
2.2.1 Scope and geographical 
coverage
As with most household surveys, EU-SILC covers 
only people living in private households; persons 
living in collective household or institution are not 
included in the instrument. This needs to be borne 
in mind when carrying out statistical analyses and 
when interpreting indicators, both within a given 
country and between countries.
EU-SILC was launched in 2003 in seven countries 
and was then gradually extended to all EU coun-
tries and beyond. In 2015, the EU-SILC instrument is 
implemented in 34 countries: the 28 EU countries, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ice-
land, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey; it is 
tested in Montenegro. Small areas of the national 
territory amounting to no more than 2 % of the na-
tional population are excluded from EU-SILC as are 
the following national territories: the French Over-
seas Departments and territories, the Dutch West 
Frisian Islands with the exception of Texel, and lastly 
the Scilly Islands.
2.2.2 Main characteristics of 
EU‑SILC
All EU Member States are required to implement 
EU-SILC, which is based on the idea of a common 
‘framework’ as opposed to a common ‘survey’. The 
common framework consists of common proce-
dures, concepts and classifications, including har-
Investing in statistics: 
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2 Investing in statistics: EU-SILC
  Monitoring social inclusion in Europe52
monised lists of target variables to be transmitted 
to Eurostat.
Two types of annual data are collected through 
EU-SILC and provided to Eurostat:
• Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time 
period, including variables on income, poverty, 
social exclusion and other living conditions. The 
data collected in year N have to be transmitted 
to Eurostat by November of year (N+1) even 
if many countries manage to send their data 
before this deadline.
• Longitudinal data measuring changes over 
time at the individual level. These are collected 
over a 4-year period. They are confined to 
income information and a reduced set of other 
variables, designed to identify the incidence 
and dynamic processes of persistent poverty 
and social exclusion among subgroups 
of the population. The longitudinal data 
corresponding to the period between year (N‑3) 
and year N are currently to be transmitted to 
Eurostat by March of year (N+2).
Eurostat proposed an integrated design with 
a 4-year rotational panel to those countries that 
had launched a new survey (9). Rotational design 
refers to the sample selection based on a number 
of sub-samples or replications, each of them similar 
in size and design, and representative of the whole 
population. From year to year, some replications are 
maintained, while others are dropped and replaced 
by new replications. The fundamental characteristic 
of the integrated design is that the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal statistics are produced from essen-
tially the same set of sample observations (10), thus 
avoiding the unnecessary duplications which would 
be involved if entirely separate cross-sectional and 
longitudinal surveys were used.
(9) Most of the EU Member States have adopted the 4-year 
rotational design recommended by Eurostat. Only France (9 
years) and Norway (8 years) have longer panels. Luxembourg 
used to have a longer panel as well, but has moved to a 4-year 
rotational panel.
(10) Currently only the United Kingdom derives cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data from two different survey instruments.
2.2.3 Legal basis
One of the strengths of the EU-SILC instrument is 
the existence of a legal basis which is binding on EU 
Member States as well as a requirement for accession 
countries. The development of the common frame-
work, including the conception of the annual ad hoc 
modules (see below), is discussed on a permanent 
basis with the main stakeholders, in particular within 
the EU Working Group for Statistics on Living Condi-
tions chaired by Eurostat.
Specifically, the EU-SILC legal basis consists of three 
main components:
• A Framework Regulation (11) which covers the 
scope, definitions, time reference, characteristics 
of the data, data required, sampling rules, sample 
sizes, transmission of data, publication, access for 
scientific purposes, financing, reports and studies 
for the EU-SILC instrument. This Regulation was 
amended by Regulation Nos 1553/2005 (12) and 
1791/2006 (13) in order to extend the EU-SILC 
instrument to include the ‘new’ Member States (i.e. 
countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after).
• Five Commission Regulations, which specify 
some technical aspects of the instrument: 
‘Definitions’ (14), ‘Fieldwork aspects and imputation 
procedures’ (15), ‘Sampling and tracing rules’ (16), 
‘List of primary (annual) target variables’ (17) and 
‘Quality reports’ (18).
(11) Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 June 2003 concerning Community 
statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC).
(12) Regulation (EC) No 1553/2005 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 September 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1177/2003 concerning Community statistics on income and 
living conditions (EU-SILC).
(13) Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 
adapting certain Regulations and Decisions by reason of the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania.
(14) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1980/2003 of 21 October 2003 
— updated by Commission Regulation (EC) No 676/2006 — 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 as regards 
definitions and updated definitions.
(15) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1981/2003 of 21 October 2003 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 as regards the 
fieldwork aspects and the imputation procedures.
(16) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1982/2003 of 21 October 2003 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 as regards the 
sampling and tracing rules.
(17) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1983/2003 of 7 November 
2003 implementing Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 as regards 
the list of target primary variables.
(18) Commission Regulation (EC) No 28/2004 of 5 January 2004 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003 as regards the 
detailed content of intermediate and final Quality reports.
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• Annual Commission Regulations on the list 
of secondary target variables, i.e. the ad hoc 
thematic modules which cover a different topic 
each year and can be repeated every 5 years or 
less frequently.
The EU-SILC instrument is also implemented in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, 
Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. For acces-
sion and candidate countries, the implementation of 
EU-SILC is not compulsory until they join the EU, but 
it is strongly encouraged if the specific situation of 
a given country so permits.
In order to take stock of the initial years of imple-
mentation and to improve the outcome of EU-SILC, 
a revision of the legal basis is under discussion (see 
Chapter 29 of this volume).
2.2.4 Common guidelines
The way to implement the EU-SILC legal basis is 
agreed between Eurostat and the national statis-
tical institutes — in particular in the EU Working 
Group for Statistics on Living Conditions and the 
Task-Forces reporting to this Group. This includes 
common procedures and concepts, as well as an 
increasing number of recommendations on how to 
word the underlying questions. The full set of guide-
lines is publicly available (19). The guidelines are up-
dated yearly in order to fine-tune the data collection 
on particular topics or in order to further improve 
methodological aspects with the final aim of contin-
uously improving the comparability between coun-
tries; these guidelines are agreed by the Working 
Group. Strategic issues regarding the development 
of EU-SILC are discussed in the meetings of the Di-
rectors of Social Statistics and the European Statisti-
cal System Committee.
2.3 Methodological 
framework
2.3.1 Contents of EU‑SILC
EU-SILC is a multi-dimensional instrument focused 
on income that also covers housing, labour, health, 
(19) See in particular annual guidelines available on: https://circabc.
europa.eu in the EU-SILC dedicated interest group.
demography, education and deprivation, so as to 
allow for the analysis of the multidimensional phe-
nomena of poverty and social exclusion, and for the 
joint analysis of its different dimensions. It consists of 
primary (annual) and secondary (ad hoc modules) 
target variables, all of which are forwarded as micro-
data sets by Member States to Eurostat.
Given the principle of flexibility of the implemen-
tation of EU-SILC at national level, the sequence of 
questions needed to construct one target variable 
may vary from country to country. Nevertheless, rec-
ommended wordings of questions are available for 
the ad hoc modules as well as the health and mate-
rial deprivation variables, although countries are not 
obliged to follow these recommendations.
The primary target variables relate to either house-
hold or individual (for persons aged 16 or more) in-
formation. They are grouped as follows:
• at household level: basic/core data, income, 
housing, social exclusion and labour information;
• at the personal level: basic/demographic data, 
income, education, labour information and 
health.
The secondary target variables are introduced every 
5 years or less frequently only in the cross-sectional 
component. One ad hoc module per year has been 
included since 2005:
• 2005: inter-generational transmission of poverty;
• 2006 and 2015: social and cultural participation;
• 2007 and 2012: housing conditions;
• 2008: over-indebtedness and financial exclusion;
• 2009 and 2014: material deprivation;
• 2010: intra-household sharing of resources;
• 2011: inter-generational transmission of 
disadvantages;
• 2013: well-being;
• 2016: access to services.
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2.3.2 Income concept
An important objective of EU-SILC is to adhere as 
closely as possible to the recommendations of the 
international Canberra Group on the definition of 
household income (20). The income concept in the 
sense of the Canberra recommendations has only 
been fully implemented since 2007.
Two main aggregates are computed from EU-SILC: 
total gross household income (GI) and total dispos-
able household income (DI), which are defined as:
• GI  = EI + SEI + PP + CTR + OI
• DI  = GI – CTP
Where:
EI  = Employee income (cash or near-cash em-
ployee income and non-cash employee income; 
employers’ social insurance contributions are not 
included).
SEI  = Self-employment income (but not goods 
produced for own consumption).
PP  = Pensions received from individual private 
plans.
CTR  = Current transfers received (social bene-
fits and regular inter-household cash transfers 
received).
OI  = Other sources of income received (such as 
capital income).
CTP  = Current transfers paid (tax on income and 
social insurance contributions, on wealth and regu-
lar inter-household cash transfers paid).
Employee income
In EU-SILC, employee income is covered thanks 
to the collection of information on ‘Gross cash or 
near-cash employee income’, ‘Gross non-cash em-
ployee income’ and ‘Employers’ social insurance 
contributions’. For non-cash employee income, 
only company cars have been recorded since the 
beginning of EU-SILC and included into the income 
concept. Information covering all other goods and 
services provided free of charge or at reduced price 
(20) See Handbook on Household Income Statistics, 2011. Available 
at: http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/groups/cgh/
Canbera_Handbook_2011_WEB.pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2016).
by employers to their employees and compulsory 
component of employers’ social insurance contri-
butions are to be collected, but are not (yet) includ-
ed into the main income aggregates.
Self‑employment income
Self-employment income is broken down into 
‘Gross cash profits or losses from self-employment’ 
(including royalties) and the ‘Value of goods pro-
duced for own consumption’. Various alternative 
approaches to the measurement of income from 
self-employment are allowed. The value of goods 
produced for own consumption is currently not in-
cluded in the main income aggregates.
Private pension plans
Regular pensions from private plans — other than 
those covered within the ‘Current transfers’ item — 
refer to pensions and annuities received in the form 
of interest or dividend income from individual pri-
vate insurance plans, i.e. fully organised schemes 
where contributions are at the discretion of the 
contributor independently of their employers or 
government.
Current transfers received
Current transfers received include social benefits 
and regular inter-household cash transfers re-
ceived. Social benefits are broken down into family 
and children-related allowances, housing allow-
ances, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, 
survivors’ benefits, sickness benefits, disability ben-
efits, education-related allowances and ‘other ben-
efits not elsewhere classified’.
Other sources of income received
Three sources of income are covered under this 
item: ‘Income from rental of a property or land’, ‘In-
terest, dividends, profits from capital investment in 
unincorporated business’, and ‘Income received by 
people aged under 16’.
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Current transfers paid
Current transfers paid are broken down into ‘Tax on 
income and social insurance contributions’, ‘Regular 
taxes on wealth’ and ‘Regular inter-household cash 
transfers paid’. The ‘Employers’ social insurance con-
tributions’ variable is not included in the computa-
tion of the main income aggregates, even though 
it would be crucial for cross-country comparisons 
related to labour cost.
Imputed rent
The imputed rent has been computed since 2007 
for all households that do not report that they pay 
full rent (i.e. households that own the dwelling they 
live in (owner-occupiers) or households that enjoy 
subsidised rents). Yet, the value of imputed rent is 
not included in the main income aggregates. Its 
inclusion would have a significant impact on all 
income-based indicators but a methodology for 
achieving comparing results for all countries is not 
yet available (21). (For a discussion on the distribu-
tional impact of imputed rent in EU-SILC and the 
lack of cross-country comparability of this compo-
nent, see Chapter 7 of this volume.)
Imputation
The EU-SILC framework requires full imputation for 
income components. The level of imputation of 
income components is reported in microdata by 
means of a set of detailed flags. This requirement 
helps to make the information delivered by the in-
strument more homogeneous and complete. Impu-
tation is performed by Member States.
Income reference period
In all but two countries, Ireland and the United King-
dom, the income reference period is the previous 
calendar year. So, for a survey conducted in year 
N the income information that is collected refers to 
the household income received between 1 January 
N‑1 and 31 December N‑1 (put differently, the ‘survey 
year’ is N and the ‘income year’ is N‑1). Ireland and the 
(21) The position of the Indicators Sub-Group of the EU Social 
Protection Committee is that the imputed rent could be 
included in a small number of income poverty indicators which 
would be listed in the EU social inclusion portfolio (see below) 
as secondary indicators or context information.
UK use a sliding reference period. In Ireland, it refers 
to the 12 months prior to the interview date. In the 
UK, it is centred on the interview date. In addition, 
the respondents are asked to provide figures which 
relate most commonly to their current (and usual) 
incomes, i.e. which could relate to the last week, 2 
weeks, or month. These figures are then annualised.
The more distant in time the fieldwork period is from 
the income reference period, the higher the risk of 
inconsistency between income-related variables 
and other socioeconomic variables (including so-
cio-demographic variables). It is therefore essential 
to limit as much as possible the lag between the in-
come reference period and the fieldwork.
2.3.3 Sample requirements
Sampling design
EU-SILC data are to be collected from nationally rep-
resentative probability samples of the population 
residing in private households within the country, ir-
respective of language, nationality or legal residence 
status. All private households and all persons aged 
16 and above within the household are eligible for 
the operation. Representative probability samples 
must be achieved both for households and for in-
dividual persons in the target population. The sam-
pling frame and methods of sample selection should 
ensure that every individual and household in the 
target population is assigned a known probability of 
selection that is not zero.
Sample size
The Framework Regulation and its updates de-
fine the minimum effective sample sizes to be 
achieved. The ‘effective’ sample size is the size that 
would be required if the survey were based on sim-
ple random sampling (design effect in relation to 
the EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate’ indicator is 1.0). The 
actual sample sizes have to be larger to the extent 
that the design effect exceeds 1.0 because of com-
plex sampling designs and in order to compensate 
for all kinds of non-response. The sample sizes for 
the longitudinal component refer, for any 2 con-
secutive years, to the number of households or 
individuals aged 16 and over that are successfully 
interviewed in both years. Table 2.1 gives the min-
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imum effective sample sizes required for each EU 
Member State (plus Iceland, Norway and Switzer-
land) in terms of households and individuals aged 
16 or over.
2.3.4 Tracing rules
In order to ensure the best quality output, min-
imum requirements for implementation have 
been defined within the legal basis in addition to 
the definition of the minimum sample size. These 
rules concern, for instance, the use of proxy inter-
views, the use of substitutions, fieldwork duration, 
non-response procedures, and tracing (or ‘follow-
ing’) rules.
In each country, the longitudinal component of 
EU-SILC consists of one or more panels or subsam-
ples (four subsamples in the recommended 4-year 
rotational design). For each panel/ subsample, the 
initial households representing the target popu-
lation at the time of its selection are followed for 
a minimum period of 4 years on the basis of spe-
cific tracing rules. The objective of the tracing rules 
is to reflect any changes in the target population 
drawn in the initial sample and to follow up individ-
uals over time. (See Chapter 27 of this volume for 
more details on the EU-SILC tracing rules.)
In order to study changes over time at the individu-
al level, all sample persons (members of the panel/ 
subsample at the time of their selection) should be 
followed up over time, despite the fact that they 
may move to a new location during the life of the 
panel/subsample. However, in the EU-SILC imple-
mentation some restrictions are applied owing to 
cost and other practical reasons. Only those per-
sons staying in one private household or moving 
from one to another in the national territory are 
followed up. Sample persons moving to a col-
lective household or to an institution, moving to 
national territories not covered in the survey, or 
moving abroad (to a private household, collective 
household or institution, within or outside the EU), 
would normally not be traced. The only exception 
would be the continued tracing of those moving 
temporarily (for an actual or intended duration of 
less than 6 months) to a collective household or 
institution within the national territory covered, as 
they are still considered as household members.
2.4 Information on quality
2.4.1 Some comparability issues
The flexibility of the EU-SILC instrument may be 
seen as both its main strength and its main weak-
ness. While flexibility should allow embedding 
EU-SILC into the national systems of social surveys, 
the lack of harmonisation can affect comparability 
across countries. This section addresses some of 
these comparability issues.
Different sampling designs
Almost all countries have used the integrated de-
sign proposed by Eurostat.
The EU-SILC framework encourages the use of ex-
isting sources and/or administrative data. However, 
in practice, not all EU-SILC variables can be obtained 
from registers and administrative data. Hence, it is 
possible to establish two groups of countries on 
the basis of the data sources used in EU-SILC:
• The ‘register’ countries (see also Chapter 28 of 
this volume):
 − ‘Old’ register countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, 
Sweden): In these countries, most 
income components and some items of 
demographic information are obtained 
through administrative registers. Other 
personal variables are obtained by means of 
interview from a sample of persons according 
to the ‘selected respondent model’ (see 
below as well as Chapter 27 of this volume 
for more details), where only one member 
of the household answers to the detailed 
questionnaire while the income information 
is derived from register for all the family 
members.
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Table 2.1:  Minimum effective sample size for the cross‑sectional and longitudinal components
Countries
Households Persons aged 16 or over to be interviewed
Cross‑sectional Longitudinal Cross‑sectional Longitudinal
Belgium 4 750 3 500 8 750 6 500
Bulgaria 4 500 3 500 10 000 7 500
Czech Republic 4 750 3 500 10 000 7 500
Denmark 4 250 3 250 7 250 5 500
Germany 8 250 6 000 14 500 10 500
Estonia 3 500 2 750 7 750 5 750
Ireland 3 750 2 750 8 000 6 000
Greece 4 750 3 500 10 000 7 250
Spain 6 500 5 000 16 000 12 250
France 7 250 5 500 13 500 10 250
Croatia 4 250 3 250 9 250 7 000
Italy 7 250 5 500 15 500 11 750
Cyprus 3 250 2 500 7 500 5 500
Latvia 3 750 2 750 7 650 5 600
Lithuania 4 000 3 000 9 000 6 750
Luxembourg 3 250 2 500 6 500 5 000
Hungary 4 750 3 500 10 250 7 750
Malta 3 000 2 250 7 000 5 250
Netherlands 5 000 3 750 8 750 6 500
Austria 4 500 3 250 8 750 6 250
Poland 6 000 4 500 15 000 11 250
Portugal 4 500 3 250 10 500 7 500
Romania 5 250 4 000 12 750 9 500
Slovenia 3 750 2 750 9 000 6 750
Slovakia 4 250 3 250 11 000 8 250
Finland 4 000 3 000 6 750 5 000
Sweden 4 500 3 500 7 500 5 750
United Kingdom 7 500 5 750 13 750 10 500
Total EU 135 000 101 500 282 150 210 850
Iceland 2 250 1 700 3 750 2 800
Norway 3 750 2 750 6 250 4 650
Switzerland 4 250 3 250 7 750 5 800
Total 141 000 105 950 290 650 217 100
Source: Regulations (EC) Nos 1553/2005 and 1791/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
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 − ‘New’ register countries: More and more 
countries are moving towards retrieving 
income information from registers, but 
without adopting the selected respondent 
model. This is inter alia the case of Spain, 
France, Italy and Austria.
• The other countries: In the ‘non-register’ 
countries, the full information is obtained by 
means of a survey of households and interviews 
with household members.
All the national sampling designs ensure strict 
cross-sectional representativeness and enable 
a significant number of individuals to be followed 
over a period of at least 4 years. In line with the 
legal requirements, all samples are probabilis-
tic (22) — with updated sampling frames and sto-
chastic algorithms used to select statistical units. 
The sampling designs used in 2013 by countries 
were the following:
• sampling of dwellings or addresses: Czech 
Republic, Spain, France, Croatia, Latvia, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and the United Kingdom;
• sampling of households: Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Switzerland;
• sampling of individuals: Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Slovenia 
and Sweden (all these countries are ‘register’ 
countries except for Lithuania).
In all cases, unbiased estimates can be produced 
on firm theoretical grounds. In almost all countries, 
the coverage bias is under control with frequent 
updates of this frame.
Countries have designed their samples so as to 
achieve a good trade-off between reporting needs 
at sub-national level and the cost effectiveness of 
the data collection. Significant increases of the 
sample size, driven by sub-national reporting re-
quirements, were recorded in Spain and Italy and 
are planned in Portugal and other countries.
(22) Germany used quota sample by derogation until 2008.
Differences in the method of data 
collection
In most countries (exceptions: the register coun-
tries that apply the ‘selected respondent’ model), 
all members aged 16 or over in selected house-
holds are asked to fill in a personal questionnaire. 
In the ‘selected respondent’ countries, only one re-
spondent per household receives a personal ques-
tionnaire. These two different rules have different 
impacts on the tracing of individuals over time 
(longitudinal dimensions) depending on wheth-
er only one or all household members are inter-
viewed over time. The selected respondent model 
needs some adaptation in order to avoid bias in the 
follow up of children. The two different rules lead 
to different weighting schemes. In particular when 
the selected respondent type is used, the weights 
of the household and of the selected respondent 
are obviously different.
In 2013, the most frequent mode of data collection 
was CAPI (computer assisted personal interview), 
used as a prevalent mode in 14 countries (Belgium, 
Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom). It was followed by PAPI (pa-
per and pencil interview), used as a prevalent mode 
in eight countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) and 
then CATI (computer assisted telephone interview), 
used in seven countries (Finland, Iceland, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzer-
land). Self-administered paper questionnaire, used 
in some countries as a residual mode, is used as 
a prevalent mode in Denmark and Germany. Some 
countries are also testing web questionnaires and 
mixed modes.
Different non‑response rates
Non-response is measured in EU-SILC at three 
stages: address contact, household interview and 
personal interview. Figure 2.1 presents the overall 
non-response rates for individuals for the whole 
sample broken down by country.
Total non-response of the selected households and 
individuals had to be less than 40 %, which was seen 
as a challenge for a non-mandatory survey. The over-
all non-response rate in the personal interview for 
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the whole sample was equal or below 10 % in 2013 
in four countries: Romania (5 %), Portugal (6 %), Cy-
prus (6 %) and Slovakia (9 %). At the other extreme, 
non-response rates exceeded 30 % in seven coun-
tries and even 50 % in Luxembourg (51 %) and Den-
mark (63 %) where the introduction of web interview 
could in future improve the response rate.
The creation of models using external variables 
in order to correct non-response is highly desira-
ble. Most of the countries apply either a standard 
post-stratification, based on homogeneous re-
sponse groups, or a more sophisticated logistic 
regression model.
2.4.2 Quality reports
Adopted in 2005, the European Statistics Code of 
Practice sets common standards for the independ-
ence, integrity and accountability of the national 
and EU statistical authorities. The EU statistical 
authorities have undertaken to adopt a compre-
hensive approach to high quality statistics which 
builds upon a common definition of quality in sta-
tistics. In this approach, the following dimensions 
are addressed:
• relevance: European Statistics must meet the 
needs of users;
• accuracy and reliability: European Statistics 
must accurately and reliably portray reality;
• timeliness and punctuality: European Statistics 
must be disseminated in a timely and punctual 
manner;
• coherence and comparability: European 
Statistics should be consistent internally, over 
time and comparable between regions and 
countries; it should be possible to combine and 
make joint use of related data from different 
sources;
• accessibility and clarity: European Statistics 
should be presented in a clear and 
Figure 2.1: Overall personal non‑response rates in EU‑SILC, 2013
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understandable form, disseminated in a suitable 
and convenient manner, and should be 
available and accessible on an impartial basis 
with supporting metadata and guidance.
This European definition of quality is monitored in 
EU-SILC with annual ‘Quality reports’ which are pre-
pared by both the countries and (for the EU level) 
Eurostat and which are managed through an inte-
grated IT system.
The national Quality reports provide a useful in-
sight into national implementation practice as well 
as substantive information from which to draw pre-
liminary conclusions regarding the quality of the 
instrument. This material is complemented by the 
information that Eurostat collects through its fre-
quent contacts with national statistical authorities, 
in particular as regards data validation, which is an 
integrated process with tools shared with Member 
States. The purpose of the EU Quality reports is to 
summarise the information contained in the na-
tional Quality reports. Their objective is to evaluate 
the quality of the instrument from a European per-
spective, i.e. by establishing cross-country compar-
isons of some of its key quality characteristics. The 
EU Quality reports and most of the national Quality 
reports are publicly available (23).
2.5 Data and indicators
2.5.1 Data access
EU-SILC data are disseminated either as aggregat-
ed data or as microdata sets. Individual EU-SILC 
records are considered as confidential data within 
the meaning of Article 23 of Council Regulation 
223/2009 (Statistical Law) because they allow in-
direct identification of statistical units (individuals 
and households). In this context, they should be 
used only for statistical purposes or for scientific 
research.
Aggregated results relate to indicators and statistics 
on income distribution and monetary poverty, liv-
ing conditions, material deprivation and childcare 
arrangements. They are presented as pre-defined 
(23) https://circabc.europa.eu, EU-SILC interest group quality folder.
tables or as multidimensional datasets and may be 
extracted in a variety of formats (24).
Commission Regulation (EU) No 557/2013 granted 
the European Commission permission to release 
anonymised microdata to researchers. Anonymised 
microdata are defined as individual statistical re-
cords which have been modified in order to con-
trol, in accordance with best practices, the risk of 
identification of the statistical units to which they 
relate. Both EU and national rules are applied for 
anonymisation, and are described in full with each 
release. They concern variable suppression, global 
recoding or the randomisation of some variables.
Twice a year Eurostat releases anonymised micro-
data to researchers (encrypted CD-ROM with doc-
umentation). Each CD-ROM contains data from the 
latest available operation, as well as revisions from 
any previous datasets. A detailed description of the 
full procedure for accessing microdata is provided 
on the Eurostat website (25).
2.5.2 Indicators computation
In order to monitor progress towards the Europe 
2020 strategy, an analytical tool has been put in 
place: the ‘Joint Assessment framework’ (JAF). The 
JAF underpins evidence-based policy-making 
in the social domain. In particular, it is used as an 
analytical tool in the dialogue between the Com-
mission and the Member States to support the 
identification of key challenges and help Member 
States establish their priorities. In each policy area, 
progress in the implementation of policies and to-
wards the related EU social objectives is assessed 
quantitatively on the basis of a limited number of 
commonly agreed indicators. A large number of 
indicators are computed on the basis of EU-SILC, 
which has become the second pillar of household 
social survey statistics at EU level, complementing 
the EU Labour Force Survey which focuses on la-
bour market information.
The use of commonly agreed indicators (not only 
in the context of the JAF but also, more widely, to 
analyse the social situation across the EU and mon-
(24) Data and publications can be accessed at: http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/
statistics-illustrated.
(25) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/overview
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itor progress towards the commonly agreed EU 
social objectives) is an essential component of EU 
cooperation in the social field. The development of 
EU social indicators is a dynamic process under the 
responsibility of the EU Social Protection Commit-
tee (SPC) and its Indicators Sub-Group. The work 
of the national delegations of experts, who make 
up the Group, and the secretariat provided by the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
‘Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion’ (in close 
cooperation with Eurostat), has enabled the set of 
indicators (and breakdowns of these) to be consid-
erably enriched.
EU social indicators are grouped in four portfolios: 
an ‘overarching’ portfolio and a portfolio for each of 
the three main social areas in which Member States 
cooperate (Poverty and social exclusion; Pensions; 
Healthcare and long-term care) (26). The indicators 
are permanently updated and disseminated on the 
Eurostat website (27).
2.6 Way forward
Even though EU-SILC has become the EU reference 
source for data on income and living conditions, 
Eurostat and a number of stakeholders are reflect-
ing on ways to further improve the tool and its 
(potential) uses. This book, and more generally the 
analysis and activities of the ‘Second Network for 
the analysis of EU-SILC’ (Net-SILC2) which prepared 
it are part of an effort to improve EU-SILC and the 
level of analysis based on it. At a conference (28)
which was organised jointly by Eurostat and the 
Net-SILC2 network, and which was hosted by 
(26) More information on the EU social indicators can be found on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=830&langId=en.
(27) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
(28) 2014 International Conference on Comparative EU statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions, Lisbon, 16-17 October 2014, 
http://ine.pt/scripts/eu-silc2014/conference.html.
Statistics Portugal, a wide-ranging debate on pres-
ent and future perspectives was held in the con-
text of the future revision of the EU-SILC legal basis. 
The main objectives of the revision are:
• in the context of the modernisation of social 
statistics, integration of EU-SILC with other 
data collections, implementation of the 
standardisation of variables and modules, 
wider use of administrative data sources and 
improved statistical frames;
• increase the responsiveness of the instrument 
to new policy needs, currently and for the 
future;
• deliver EU-SILC data faster;
• maintain the stability of the main indicators, 
with adapted frequency and keeping 
a cross-cutting approach;
• maintain and if possible slightly decrease the 
current burden and cost.
• allow sufficient regional breakdown;
• ensure adequate accuracy and quality of 
measurements;
• adapt to multi-modes and multi-sources data 
collections;
• ensure a general consistency of the different 
element of the tool (e.g. frequency of 
non-annual modules and length of the 
longitudinal component).
The planned future developments of EU-SILC itself 
are presented in Chapter 29 of this volume.

Income measurement 
and distribution
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3.1 Introduction
For many years, there has been  a sharp separation 
between, on the one hand, the macroeconomic 
evaluation of economic policy and, on the other 
hand, the analysis of the impact of policy on the 
living standards of households. On one side are the 
national accounts, where performance is judged by 
eagerly watched figures for Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Recovery in the short-term and growth in the 
medium-term have been assessed in these aggre-
gate terms. In the EU, these are the matters on which 
the European Commission’s ‘Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs’ and the EU ‘Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN)’ Council have 
focused. On the other side are the — more slowly 
arriving — statistics on households’ living condi-
tions, now represented by the EU-SILC instrument. 
These form the basis for the EU social indicators 
and for judging success in terms of social inclusion 
across EU countries. These are the matters on which 
(29) A.B. Atkinson is from Nuffield College (Oxford, UK), INET at 
Oxford Martin School, and the London School of Economics 
(UK). A.-C. Guio and E. Marlier are with LISER (Luxembourg). 
The authors would like to thank Emanuela Di Falco for her help 
with some of the calculations. Comments by Frédéric Caruso, 
Michael Förster, Maxime Ladaique, Céline Thévenot and Marco 
Mira d’Ercole are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors 
are the authors’. This work has been supported by the second 
Network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by 
Eurostat. The European Commission bears no responsibility 
for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely those of the 
authors. For an extended version of this chapter, see Atkinson, 
Guio and Marlier (2015). Email address for correspondence: 
Anne-Catherine.guio@liser.lu.
the European Commission’s ‘Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion’ and the EU 
‘Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Af-
fairs (EPSCO)’ Council have focused.
In recent years, however, there have been welcome 
signs of a more integrated approach. Criticism of GDP 
as a measure of performance has led to a ‘Beyond 
GDP’ agenda that recognises not only the need to 
extend the boundaries of national accounts but also 
to relate the national accounts more directly to the 
everyday concerns of citizens (30). National income 
has to be reconnected with household incomes and 
with the distribution of these incomes. The OECD 
has set out a framework for inclusive growth (OECD, 
2014). As it is put in the ‘Employment and social de-
velopments in Europe 2013’, we need indicators of 
inclusive growth to complement GDP growth (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014). From the side of household 
statistics, there has come increasing recognition of 
the need to complement existing (income) poverty 
indicators by measures of real incomes (31). The Indi-
cators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Commit-
tee (SPC) has in 2014 adopted an aggregate indicator 
of (unadjusted) real gross household disposable in-
come as part of the EU portfolio of social indicators.
(30) These issues were discussed in the report of the 
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (2009) and developed in 
a joint OECD-Eurostat project (see, for example, Fesseau, Wolff 
and Mattonetti 2013).
(31) ‘Poverty’ here refers systematically to the EU concept of 
‘at-risk-of-poverty’ (AROP) — i.e. a concept of relative income 
poverty (see definition below).
3 Monitoring the evolution of income poverty and real incomes over time
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe66
In our view, this integration is essential. Its im-
portance has been demonstrated clearly by the 
economic crisis, where there has been a marked 
divergence between aggregate measures of eco-
nomic performance and the experience of individ-
ual households. Put in broad terms, in the early years 
of the crisis GDP fell more than household incomes, 
where these were protected by automatic stabilisers 
and the initial policy packages. Later on, household 
incomes then fell as a result of austerity policies, rais-
ing questions about who is (will be) benefiting from 
any return to prosperity. These events have led to 
a longer-term debate about the way in which the 
fruits of growth have been shared in the past. In both 
cases (the crisis and the longer-term) there are im-
portant distributional issues. The impact of austerity 
has differed across the population; the longer-term 
perspective has raised issues about the failure to re-
duce significantly the rate of income poverty.
These two approaches — macro and micro — are 
important in substantive terms. They also raise se-
rious methodological issues. The national accounts 
are based on aggregate information; the social indi-
cators are derived in large part from household sur-
veys and, in a growing number of countries, register 
data (Jäntti, Törmälehto and Marlier (2013); see also 
Chapter 28 of this volume). These two sources need 
to be reconciled. Measures of the evolution of real in-
comes can be derived from both national accounts 
and EU-SILC. We should be able to understand the 
relation between these two sources. They may differ, 
for example in the underlying definitions, but we can 
only have confidence in the two sources if the differ-
ences can be explained.
The two themes — examination of the social in-
dicators of income poverty and reconciliation of 
micro and macro evidence — are the principal fo-
cus of this chapter. We start in Section 3.2 with the 
headline (income) poverty indicators derived from 
EU-SILC. We then consider the relation with overall 
incomes, starting first in Section 3.3 with what can 
be learned within the EU-SILC framework. In Sec-
tion 3.4, we begin to investigate the bridge to the 
national accounts. What is the relation between 
the overall measures of income in the two sources? 
This analysis leads in turn to examination in Section 
3.5 of the changes in real income and the new in-
dicator adopted by the SPC Indicators Sub-Group 
based on the national accounts. In Section 3.6, we 
explore the possibility of an EU-SILC based real in-
come indicator incorporating distributional con-
siderations. In the course of the chapter, we make 
a number of recommendations. These and the 
main findings are summarised in the concluding 
Section 3.7.
3.2 The headline indicators 
of income poverty and 
income inequality in the EU
We begin with some of the EU social indicators avail-
able on the Eurostat website (32).
The broad picture is well-known. The pre-crisis peri-
od 2005 to 2008 (income years, i.e. survey years 2006-
2009) (33) was disappointing in terms of (income) 
poverty reduction. It is true that the EU-SILC-based 
headline income poverty rate indicator (referred to 
as ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ (AROP) rate (34)) fell overall in 
the ‘new’ Member States (35), but there were new 
(32) National and EU values of all EU social indicators, including 
a number of socio-demographic breakdowns can be 
downloaded from the Eurostat web-database at the following 
address: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
(33) It is important to highlight that in this chapter the years that are 
referred to are the income years (contrary to the years referred 
to on the Eurostat web-database which are the survey years). 
The income year is the year preceding the EU-SILC survey 
for all countries apart from the UK (total annual household 
income calculated on the basis of current income) and Ireland 
(calculation on the basis of a moving income reference period 
covering part of the year of the interview and part of the year 
prior to the survey).
(34) According to the EU definition, the AROP rate is the share 
of people living in a household with a total equivalised 
disposable income (including social transfers) below the 
AROP threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median 
equivalised disposable income (including social transfers). The 
equivalised disposable income is calculated in three steps: 1) all 
monetary incomes received from any source by each member 
of a household are added up (these include income from work, 
investment and social benefits, plus any other household 
income; taxes and social contributions that have been paid, 
are deducted from this sum); 2) in order to reflect differences in 
a household’s size and composition, the total (net) household 
income is divided by the number of ‘equivalent adults’, using 
the so-called OECD-modified (equivalence) scale, which gives 
a weight to all members of the household (1 to the first adult, 
0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and 
over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 14); 3) finally, the resulting 
figure, the equivalised disposable income, is attributed equally to 
each member of the household (adults and children).
(35) ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in 
May 2004 or after. Croatia, that joined the EU in July 2013, is not 
included in our analyses.
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Member States where it increased. AROP increased 
by more than 2 percentage points in Bulgaria and 
Latvia. It did not fall in the EU-15, with an increase of 
more than 2 percentage points in Germany, which 
more than offset the reductions in Ireland and Italy. 
These differential movements meant that the overall 
EU-27 percentage showed no change.
From 2008 to 2012 (income years, i.e. survey years 
2009-2013), the AROP rate remained broadly sta-
ble — it went from 16.4 to 16.6 % for the EU-27 as 
a whole, after a small peak at 16.8 in 2011 and 2010. 
The EU-15 figure rose from 16.2 to 16.4 % (16.6 in 
2010 and 2011), and that for the euro zone by 0.5 
percentage point. There were rises of more than 2 
percentage points in Greece, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
In the opposite direction, there were reductions of 
more than 2 percentage points in Estonia and Latvia. 
There were therefore differences in individual coun-
try experience, but the overall picture is that of little 
change.
These figures relate to the income poverty head-
count, but what about the intensity of poverty? Be-
tween 2005 and 2008, there was in fact a reduction 
in the relative median poverty gap for the EU-27 as 
a whole: from 23.4 to 22.2 (36). This was largely the 
result of a decline in the new Member States, from 
27.3 to 25.1. Conversely, there was an overall rise from 
2008 to 2012, returning the EU-27 figure to its 2006 
level. In this period, the rise was principally due to 
the rise in EU-15 (from 21.4 to 22.7). Measured this 
way, too, there has been no overall progress.
Relative indicators and real 
incomes
The AROP rate is a relative measure in that it would re-
cord the same values if all incomes were doubled or 
all incomes were halved. There are good long-term 
reasons for employing such a relative measure. We 
would not want to judge living conditions in Europe 
today by the same standards as applicable to Renais-
(36) The EU indicator of relative median (income) poverty gap is the 
difference between the median equivalised income of persons 
aged 0+ below the AROP threshold and the threshold itself, 
expressed as a percentage of the AROP threshold. See Eurostat 
web-database, code ilc_li11.
sance Italy. But in the short and medium term, the 
relative measure has to be interpreted in relation to 
the changes in the overall level of living.
In the two periods under consideration (2005 to 
2008 and 2008 to 2012 — income years), these is-
sues arise in different ways. Where overall incomes 
are rising in real terms, as broadly happened in the 
earlier period, a constant AROP rate is consistent 
with those below the income poverty threshold still 
seeing an improvement in their real incomes. This 
is certainly true for a person at the AROP threshold. 
Put differently, if we were to anchor the threshold 
at the 2005 level of purchasing power (i.e. if we up-
rated annually the 2005 threshold on the basis of 
the annual inflation rate, as is done with the EU in-
dicator of ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a fixed 
moment in time’), then the poverty rate might re-
cord a decline.
Where, on the other hand, mean incomes are falling, 
the situation is different. It is now the case that a con-
stant (or even decreasing) AROP rate can be consist-
ent with those below the income poverty threshold 
suffering a worsening in their living standards. Appli-
cation of an anchored income poverty indicator can 
then show a rise in the poverty rate: the Eurostat es-
timates for EU-15 using an income poverty threshold 
anchored at 2007 levels show a rise in the poverty 
rate from 16.4 % in 2007 to 19.2 % in 2012, whereas 
the AROP figure did not increase between 2007 and 
2012 (37).
From this, we can see the importance of setting 
the headline indicator of income poverty in the 
context of what is happening to overall incomes. 
This, in turn, raises the issue of the relation between 
incomes as measured in the EU-SILC dataset and in-
comes as measured in the national accounts. When 
the AROP rate is anchored in the EU-SILC data, to 
give a measure at a constant level of real income, 
how does this EU-SILC income threshold relate to 
average household incomes in the national ac-
counts? It is to this that we turn in the next section.
(37) For a short analysis of the anchored poverty rate, see for 
example the 2014 Social Protection Committee’s annual report 
(SPC, 2015, p. 39).
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3.3 The AROP social 
indicator and overall living 
standards
To introduce the issues involved in building a bridge 
between EU-SILC-based indicators and the national 
accounts, we begin with a simple comparison: be-
tween the AROP threshold (set at 60 % of median 
equivalent disposable household income from the 
EU-SILC data) and the national accounts (NA) figure 
for adjusted gross household disposable income 
(GHDI) (38) per capita. The former is used for calculat-
ing the EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ indicator; the latter is 
the Eurostat headline household disposable income 
indicator. Both are measured in Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS; see Chapter 1 of this volume) (39). It 
should be noted that the adjusted GHDI figure in-
cludes social transfers in kind. We have taken this 
figure, as it is that most commonly cited in the mac-
roeconomic debate, but we later argue that it is 
more appropriate to use the unadjusted GHDI where 
social transfers in kind are excluded in line with the 
basis for the EU social indicator adopted in 2014 by 
the SPC Indicators Sub-Group (40).
The NA figure for GHDI is the sum of employee com-
pensation, operating surplus/mixed income, prop-
erty income and transfers minus taxes and social 
contributions paid. It is therefore the analogue of the 
disposable household income measure in EU-SILC. 
There are however several major reasons why the 
AROP threshold should not be equal to 60 % of the 
NA figure:
a) the difference between the median (used in the 
threshold) and the mean (used in the NA);
b) the use of equivalised income (threshold) rather 
than a per capita calculation (NA);
(38) In national accounts terminology, ‘gross’ refers to items 
calculated before the deduction of consumption of fixed 
capital and ‘net’ refers to items calculated after this deduction.
(39) The Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) are designed to remove 
differences in purchasing power: i.e. differences in price levels 
across countries. Since they are applied to both denominator 
and numerator, the present calculation is not affected.
(40) The indicator adopted by the Indicators Sub-Group is the 
‘growth rate in real gross household disposable income’; we 
discuss the definition further below.
c) differences in the definition of income, such as 
the inclusion or exclusion of social transfers in 
kind;
d) inclusion in the NA of the Non-Profit Institutions 
serving households (NPISH);
e) inclusion in the NA of Non-private households;
f) differences in the accuracy with which different 
elements of income are measured in the two 
sources.
Of these, (a) and (d) are likely to cause the threshold 
to fall below 60 % of the NA total; the effect of (b), on 
the other hand, operates in the opposite direction. 
The effects of (c), (e) and (f) can only be identified 
from a detailed comparison of income components.
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 show the ratio of the AROP thresh-
old to the NA Adjusted GHDI for the income years 
2005 to 2012 (NA data for Malta are not available). 
From these, we can see a number of interesting fea-
tures, concerning both levels and changes over time. 
To begin with, we can see from Figure 3.1 that, even 
for countries that one might expect to be relatively 
similar there are differences in level. The figure for 
Belgium in 2012, for example, is around 50 %, where-
as those for the Netherlands and Denmark are some 
5 percentage points higher. If the NA figure had been 
used, with the same percentage in all countries, then 
the threshold would have had to be raised in Bel-
gium (by a factor of 55/50), increasing the recorded 
poverty. Secondly, the differences are not constant. 
At the beginning of the period, the Netherlands was 
closer to Belgium than to Denmark. This means that, 
relative to the national income figure for household 
income, the threshold rose in the Netherlands be-
tween 2005 and 2012.
The differences and the changes over time be-
come even more marked when we look at the 
Southern European countries in Figure 3.1. The 
figures for Southern Europe are all below those for 
Belgium, and in 2012 those for Greece and Portugal 
are all below 40 %. The figure for Portugal in 2012 is 
three-quarters that for Belgium. It may be that such 
a difference can be explained by the factors listed 
above, such as the greater inequality of income (so 
that the median is further below the mean), but 
this clearly warrants investigation. This is reinforced 
by the changes over time. In Portugal the series is 
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fairly flat, but in Greece the proportion fell from 
41 % in 2009 to 36 % in 2012. In Ireland, there was 
a fall between 2006 and 2012 from 55 % to 50 %.
Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding figures for the 
remainder of the EU-15 countries. The range is small-
er, but there is still a spread in 2012 between 45 and 
56 %. There are also substantial changes over time. 
The figure for Sweden rose from 50 % in 2005 to 
54 % in 2012. In the United Kingdom, the ratio in-
creased until 2008 and then sharply decreased. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the ratios for the new Member States. 
The differences are even larger and the changes over 
time more marked. The threshold in Cyprus, Latvia 
and Slovenia is around twice, as a percentage of the 
NA figure, the threshold in Romania. There seems to 
have been in a number of cases, such as Bulgaria, 
Latvia and Lithuania, where there was a rise in the 
threshold in the first part of the period, followed by 
a fall in the later part.
Overall, the difference between the AROP threshold 
and the NA GHDI per capita figure may be summa-
rised in terms of the (unweighted over EU-27; Mal-
ta excluded) country average in 2012, which was 
46.2 %, rather than 60 %. In order to understand 
the reasons for this difference, we take each of the 
elements (a) to (f) in turn. The first two concern only 
the EU-SILC data and are discussed in the remainder 
of this section. The other three concern the relation 
between EU-SILC and the national accounts, and are 
the subject of Section 3.4.
The EU-SILC data are essential as a source of distri-
butional data. The national accounts cannot pro-
vide any evidence about the median income, nor, 
evidently, about the rate of income poverty. The 
EU-SILC data are the basis for the figures we have 
downloaded from the Eurostat web-database to 
construct Figures 3.1 to 3.3. In order to take the anal-
ysis further, we need to make use of the micro-data 
which the European Statistical System makes availa-
ble to researchers for scientific purposes research. (41)
(41) The conditions for getting access to the EU-SILC Users’ 
Database (UDB) are explained on the Eurostat website (http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/overview). See also 
Chapter 29 of this volume.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of AROP threshold with NA Adjusted GHDI per capita, EU‑15 Member States 
(continued), 2005‑2012 (income years)
(%)
NB: Breaks in EU-SILC series in France (2007), Austria (2007) and United Kingdom (2012).
Reading note: In 2005, the AROP threshold in France was 43.9 % of the NA adjusted GHDI per capita.
Source: AROP threshold from Eurostat web-database, Statistics/Employment and social protection indicators/Social inclusion, variable code 
tessi014; NA adjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr, variable tee00113.
 35
 40
 45
 50
 55
 60
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
A
RO
P 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
as
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 N
A
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
in
co
m
e
Germany
France 1
France 2
Luxembourg
Austria 1
Austria 2
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom 1
United Kingdom 2
Figure 3.1: Comparison of AROP threshold with NA Adjusted GHDI per capita, EU‑15 Member 
States, 2005‑2012 (income years)
(%)
NB: No NA data available for Luxembourg (2005). Break in EU-SILC series in Spain (2008), following the switch to register data.
Reading note: In 2005, the AROP threshold in Belgium was 49.4 % of the NA adjusted GHDI per capita.
Source: AROP threshold from Eurostat web-database, Statistics/Employment and social protection indicators/Social inclusion, variable code 
tessi014; NA adjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr, variable tee00113.
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Mean and median
The first difference is that between the mean and 
the median. As is shown for 2012 in Figure 3.4, the 
mean everywhere exceeds the median. There is 
quite a wide range: from 1.06 for Sweden to 1.23 
for Latvia. This implies that moving to use a per-
centage of the mean as the basis for the income 
poverty threshold, in place of the median, would 
raise the threshold in Latvia, relative to that for 
Sweden, by 17 %. For the EU as a whole, the ratio is 
1.14, so that using the mean rather than the medi-
an would raise the figure of 46.2 % in the previous 
section, for the ratio of the AROP threshold to na-
tional income per capita, to 52.7 %. In other words, 
the ‘shortfall’ is reduced from 13.8 % to 7.3 %. This 
is a material contribution to understanding the 
difference.
The mean/median ratios differ across countries, but 
do they also vary over the period considered? Only 
countries which had a break in the series because of 
a move to registers showed a salient increase in the 
ratio (Cyprus, France and Spain). In the opposite di-
rection, ratios decreased by more than 0.06 between 
2005 and 2012 in Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Slo-
vakia. A decreasing ratio means that if the income 
poverty threshold had moved in line with the mean 
rather than with the median, the change in the pov-
erty rate would have been more negative (i.e. if the 
poverty rate had risen, the increase would have been 
smaller or turned into a fall, and if it had fallen, the fall 
would have been higher).
Figure 3.3: Comparison of AROP threshold with NA Adjusted GHDI per capita, new Member States, 
2005‑2012 (income years)
(%)
NB: ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after. No NA data available for Malta (whole period) and Romania 
(2012). Break in EU-SILC series in Cyprus (2007). No EU-SILC data for Romania in 2005. Croatia is not covered in our analyses.
Reading note: In 2005, the AROP threshold in Cyprus was 60.6 % of the NA adjusted GHDI per capita.
Source: AROP threshold from Eurostat web-database, Statistics/Employment and social protection indicators/Social inclusion, variable code 
tessi014; NA adjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr, variable tee00113.
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Figure 3.4: Ratio of mean to median equivalised income, EU‑27, income year 2012
(Survey year 2013)
Reading note: In Sweden, the ratio of the mean equivalised income to the median equivalised income is 1.06.
Source: Eurostat calculations.
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Equivalisation
In calculating per capita income, everyone counts as 
1, but when an equivalence scale is employed, the 
needs of those sharing a household are reduced 
to take account of economies of scale, so that the 
equivalent income is higher than the per capita 
income (except in one-person household). As a re-
sult, the mean per capita income is only a fraction 
of the equivalised income, as shown in Figure 3.5 
for the income year 2012. For example, in Belgium 
in income year 2012 the mean per capita income in 
euros is EUR 15 811, whereas the equivalised figure is 
EUR 23 279. The mean per capita figure is 0.68 of the 
equivalised figure.
Across all countries, the country unweighted average 
across EU-27 in 2012 is 0.68. The ratios of the mean 
per capita income to mean equivalised income are 
quite stable across time, but they vary across coun-
tries. As is to be expected, they vary according to 
the average household size (strong negative corre-
lation). The varying impact may also reflect the dif-
ferences in household composition documented in 
other chapters in this book (including Chapters 4, 15 
and 18).
In this section, we have identified the major issues 
that arise in relating the relative social indicators of 
poverty and inequality to the overall level of income. 
Using EU-SILC data, we have examined two of these 
elements: the choice of the median and equivali-
sation. Each of these affects the comparison across 
countries, but the variation across time does not 
seem of particular concern. Of the two elements, 
that of equivalisation is stronger: the average ad-
justment factor was 0.68, compared with 1.14 for 
the mean/median difference. This means that, rather 
than closing the gap between the AROP and nation-
al accounts, there is a larger discrepancy to explain 
when we compare mean unequivalised income 
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per capita in EU-SILC with the national accounts. To 
narrow the gap, we have to consider the other el-
ements, which means confronting the EU-SILC data 
with the national accounts.
3.4 The bridge to national 
accounts
As a result of the recent important work by the Eu-
rostat and OECD Joint Expert Group (42) and the re-
port by Mattonetti (2013) for Eurostat, we now have 
a much clearer picture of the relation between the na-
tional accounts (NA) and the EU-SILC data, and of the 
(42) See: http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=STD/CSTAT/WPNA(2013)9/
RD&docLanguage=En.
main elements that contribute to the observed differ-
ence. In this chapter, we draw heavily on this work. 
Our focus is however different. Here we focus on the 
direct implications for the measurement of income 
poverty as in the EU social indicators. This means that 
in considering the sources of the difference we need 
to ask, in concrete terms, how, if at all, should the in-
formation collected in the national accounts and that 
collected through EU-SILC be modified?
In what follows, we consider the most important 
elements accounting for the difference between 
EU-SILC and the national accounts. Table 3.1 lists 
the composition of the national accounts income 
variables.
Figure 3.5: Ratio of mean per capita to mean equivalised income, income year 2012
(Survey year 2013)
Reading note: The ratio of the mean income per capita to mean equivalised income in Bulgaria is 0.645.
Source: Eurostat calculations.
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Social transfers in kind
The first important distinction is that between Ad-
justed GHDI, denoted B7g, and Unadjusted GHDI, 
denoted B6g. The difference is that Adjusted GHDI 
includes social transfers in kind (STiK). In the construc-
tion of the EU AROP indicator, STiK have not been 
included and the new NA-based indicator adopted 
by the SPC Indicators Sub-Group in 2014 takes GHDI 
before adjustment. Given the substantial magnitude 
of STiK, the use of Unadjusted GHDI, as is adopted 
from this juncture, makes a major difference.
Non‑profit institutions serving 
households (NPISH)
A second definitional issue is that some countries 
combine the household sector S14 with the NPISH 
sector, S15 (Non-Profit Institutions Serving House-
holds), which includes bodies such as charities, 
churches, learned societies, trade unions, political 
parties and sports clubs. From the Eurostat-OECD re-
port (Mattonetti (2013)), it appears that five of the EU-
27 countries covered in that report have a combined 
sector account (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Austria 
and the UK). The failure to make the separation raises 
particular problems for the Unadjusted GHDI, as may 
be seen from the case of France, where there are sep-
arate accounts for S14 Households and S15 NPISH. In 
terms of gross income before adjustment, the NPISH 
sector is some 3 % of the household sector: in 2013, 
EUR 45.5 billion compared with EUR 1 326.3 billion. 
However, most of the gross income is used to make 
Social Transfers in Kind to the household sector. This 
means that moving from GHDI to Adjusted GHDI 
adds to household income and subtracts from 
NPISH, leaving the latter with only EUR 2.1 billion. So 
in terms of Adjusted GHDI, the inclusion of NPISH 
would make little difference, but the unadjusted fig-
ure would be some 3 % higher.
Recommendation 1: Given the use of the unadjusted 
GHDI for the newly agreed EU social indicator, it is im‑
portant that all Member States provide national ac‑
counts data for the household sector S14 excluding the 
NPISH.
This should be feasible, since 20 countries from the 
EU-27 have provided statistics for the S14 sector for 
unadjusted GHDI, and their data are used in the con-
struction of Figures 3.6 and 3.7, which show the ratio 
of the EU-SILC mean income per capita to NA Unad-
justed GHDI per capita for EU-15 and the new Mem-
ber States. Both are measured in euros. The missing 
countries are Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Austria and 
the UK (already mentioned above) as well as Luxem-
bourg and Malta. There are therefore only nine EU-15 
countries.
Since we have now allowed for three definitional 
differences (mean/median, equivalisation and ex-
clusion of NPISH), there is a straight comparison. The 
benchmark is 100 %. There is a distinct pattern in 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7. If we distinguish those countries 
where the EU-SILC income is 85 % of the NA figure or 
above, and those where it is below two-thirds, then 
in EU-15 the former group consists of three register 
countries (Netherlands, Sweden and Finland), where 
most income components are obtained from ad-
ministrative registers. In two countries, the adoption 
of a register basis caused a jump: France (2007) and 
Table 3.1: Definition of gross disposable household income
D1 Compensation of employees
+ B2g + B3g Gross operating surplus/mixed income
+ D4 Property income net of property income paid
+ D7 Other current transfers received, net of transfers paid
+ D62 Social benefits, other than social transfers in kind, net of those paid
D61 Social contributions paid net of those received
D5 Current taxes on income and wealth
 = B6g Gross disposable household income
+ D63 Social transfers in kind
=B7g Adjusted gross disposable income
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Spain (2008). At less than two-thirds are Portugal and 
Greece, followed at around 70 % by Spain and Italy. 
Belgium comes in-between.
Among the new Member States, shown in Figure 3.7, 
the ratio in 2012 is above 75 % in Estonia and Slove-
nia (a register country). The ratio is below two-thirds 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Latvia (except for a peak at 70 % in 2007), Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia.
There remain therefore marked differences between 
countries, and we explore these further below. At 
the same time, national ratios remain relatively stable 
over time, particularly if we consider the later part of 
the period (from 2008 to 2012). Exceptions are Greece 
in Figure 3.6 and Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania (43) in 
Figure 3.7, but apart from these the EU mean income 
data have a broadly stable relation with the national 
accounts mean income. To the extent that the dif-
ference can be treated as a (country-specific) fixed 
effect, this is re-assuring. It does however mean — 
paradoxically — that if improvements are made in 
EU-SILC (or in the national accounts) that we can 
then no longer treat them as differing consistently 
by a constant proportion. This is illustrated by the 
case of France and Spain, where the move to a reg-
ister basis has been associated with a rise of some 10 
percentage points.
In order to measure the impact of the sampling er-
ror on our estimation, Figure 3.8 provides the 95 % 
confidence interval of this ratio for 2012 for those 
countries where both EU-SILC and NA data are avail-
able. As shown in this figure, national ratios vary by 
maximum +/- 0.03.
We now consider some of the elements that can 
explain the observed differences.
(43) In Cyprus, it is difficult to interpret the drop in 2007, because of 
a break in the series in that year.
Non‑private households
EU-SILC data cover only private households and 
therefore exclude those people living in prisons, 
boarding schools, retirement homes, hospitals and 
nursing homes, religious institutions, hotels, etc. The 
Eurostat-OECD Expert Group referred to above car-
ried out an extensive exercise to estimate the share 
of non-private households in the NA totals (see Fig-
ure 4 and Annex 6 in Mattonetti, 2013). Here however 
our concern is a different one. The EU-SILC-based in-
dicators are expressed as percentage of the EU-SILC 
population, and the same is true of the per capita 
comparisons with the national accounts. The prob-
lem only arises to the extent that (1) statements are 
made about aggregate numbers (as in the Europe 
2020 social inclusion target; see Chapter 1 of this vol-
ume) or (2) the non-private household population 
differs with regard to the indicator in question. In 
this latter respect, the Expert Group exercise makes 
a contribution in that they take account of the dif-
ferent demographic composition of the non-private 
households and make assumptions about different 
categories of income. Even if they assume that with-
in age groups the income in many categories is the 
same as in EU-SILC, it would be interesting to take 
their analysis further and examine the impact on the 
AROP and other indicators.
Recommendation 2: The effect on EU‑SILC‑based so‑
cial indicators of the non‑coverage of non‑private 
households should be examined, using NA data and 
other relevant sources (registers, specific surveys).
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Figure 3.7: Ratio between EU‑SILC and NA Unadjusted GHDI per capita, new Member States, 
2005‑2012
(income years)
NB: ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after. No data NA available for Malta (whole period) and Romania 
(2012). No EU-SILC data for Romania (2005). Break in EU-SILC series in Cyprus (2007). Croatia is not covered in our analyses.
Reading note: In Lithuania, the ratio of EU-SILC mean per capita income to the NA unadjusted GHDI per capita for the household sector S14 is 
0.48 in 2005.
Source: Eurostat calculations for EU-SILC data and NA unadjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr.
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Figure 3.6: Ratio between EU‑SILC and NA Unadjusted GHDI per capita (S14), EU‑15, 2005‑2012
(income years)
NB: No NA data for Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria and the UK for the whole period and for Portugal in 2012. Break in 
EU-SILC series in France (2007) and Spain (2008).
Reading note: In Portugal, the ratio of EU-SILC mean per capita income to the NA unadjusted GHDI per capita for the household sector S14 is 0.60 
in 2005.
Source: Eurostat calculations for EU-SILC data and NA unadjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr.
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Figure 3.8: Ratio between mean income per capita (EU‑SILC) and the NA Unadjusted GHDI per 
capita (S14), 95 % confidence interval, 2012
(income year)
NB: No NA data for Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania and the UK in 2012.
Reading note: In Greece, the ratio of the EU-SILC mean per capita income to the NA unadjusted GHDI per capita for the household sector S14 is 
comprised between 0.515 and 0.530.
Source: Eurostat calculations for EU-SILC data and NA unadjusted GHDI from Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr.
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Coverage by income category
From the work of the Eurostat-OECD Expert Group 
and Mattonetti (2013), we can compare the coverage 
rate for different income components by country 
for the year 2008 (see Table 3.2). The pattern follows 
that found in earlier comparisons of survey data and 
national accounts (such as Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding, 1995, Table 7). Wages and salaries have 
the highest coverage rate, followed by social bene-
fits in cash, and taxes and social contributions. The 
lowest coverage rates are for self-employment in-
come and for property income.
These figures are worrying. At the same time, the 
coverage rate depends on the choice of baseline 
and we have here a particular focus: the implications 
for the social indicators. The baseline taken in the 
exercise is a ‘reduced scope’ national accounts defi-
nition (Mattonetti, Table 2), which omits for exam-
ple the Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM) element of property income and 
the property income attributed to insurance policy 
holders. Nevertheless, there are a number of ques-
tions concerning the appropriateness of the baseline 
from the standpoint of the indicators. For example, 
the present social indicators are defined on income 
excluding imputed rent on owner-occupied houses. 
This is a substantial item in the national accounts. The 
Expert Group reports that, in the countries analysed, 
the share of income from owner-occupied dwellings 
ranges from 6 % of total adjusted disposable income 
to 13 %. If the baseline were to exclude this item, it 
seems likely that the comparison of ‘operating sur-
plus and mixed income’ would be more favourable. 
A second example is provided by property income 
paid. If mortgage interest is regarded as an outgoing 
(part of housing costs), rather than as a subtraction 
from income, then incomplete coverage of property 
income paid is not important (business loans appear 
under self-employment income).
Recommendation 3: The EU‑SILC coverage of income by 
components exercise should be re‑done, with a baseline 
appropriate for the calculation of the social indicators.
From such an examination of the coverage, it should 
be possible to identify those components where 
there is a significant difference between the EU-SILC 
variable and the desired coverage. In such cases, 
there are two possible routes forward. The first is to 
consider whether there are potential improvements 
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in future EU-SILC practice. One obvious question, 
suggested by the earlier findings, is whether there is 
greater scope for the use of register data. The second 
approach, which can be applied retrospectively, is to 
examine the sensitivity of conclusions to data defi-
ciencies. Here an obvious question to ask is how far 
the AROP and other indicators are affected by pro-
portionate adjustments to different income catego-
ries. If, for example, operating surplus/mixed income 
were to be scaled up by x %, how much would the 
poverty rate be changed?
Recommendation 4: Following the coverage exercise, 
consideration should be given to the future develop‑
ment of EU‑SILC to improve income coverage, and an 
analysis should be made of the sensitivity of past results 
to income under‑recording.
This section has sought to compare the EU-SILC data 
and the national accounts. Such a confrontation 
might well have led to very negative conclusions. 
In terms of the level of income, there are indeed 
worrying features. Even allowing for differences in 
definition, it seems likely that the EU-SILC data yield 
income estimates that fall short of the national ac-
counts totals. We have proposed ways in which this 
could be further explored and possible corrective 
measures. But the good news is that — speaking 
broadly, and with certain notable exceptions — 
these differences appear relatively stable over time. 
The trends in the two sources seem in general co-
herent. If for the majority of countries there is broad 
stability in the ratio of the two series, then this means 
that when using the EU AROP indicator we can be 
re-assured that the threshold is in these cases not 
moving out of line with the picture painted by the 
national accounts. Such a conclusion is also relevant 
to the GHDI indicator of income levels adopted in 
2014 by the SPC Indicators Sub-Group, to which we 
turn in the next section.
3.5 Changes in real incomes
To this juncture, we have been looking at ratios of the 
incomes in the EU-SILC and national accounts; we 
now consider what they show separately about the 
changes in the level of living. Have the changes in 
income poverty with which we began been accom-
panied by rising or falling real levels of income? It is 
for this reason that the SPC Indicators Sub-Group has 
adopted a new indicator based on national accounts 
data on (unadjusted) GHDI per capita: the growth 
rate in real gross household disposable income.
Crucial to such measures of the growth of real in-
come is the choice of price index. Here it is important 
to note that only national information is required. In 
particular, there is no need to have recourse to Pur-
chasing Power Standards or to exchange rates (see 
Annex 3 of Atkinson, Guio and Marlier (2015)). The 
Eurostat‑OECD Methodological Manual on Purchasing 
Power Parities observes that ‘many international com-
parisons require neither PPPs nor exchange rates. 
For example, to compare real growth rates of GDP 
between countries, each country’s own published 
growth rate can be used’ (Eurostat-OECD, 2012, p. 
16). These are of course influenced by exchange 
rate movements, but only insofar as they feed into 
domestic prices. For this reason, we start from the 
amounts in national currency, and deflate by a na-
tional price index to obtain the rate of growth in real 
terms. To underline the fact that the results do not 
allow a comparison of the levels of income across 
Table 3.2: Coverage rate (EU‑SILC over NA), EU‑27, 2008
(%)
Wages and salaries 85.9 to 103.5
Social benefits in cash 72.6 to 92.6
Taxes and social contributions 63.8 to 90.2
Operating surplus and mixed income 53.5 to 108.3
Property income received 8.0 to 51.7
Property income paid 15.1 to 55.4
NB: The intervals show the range excluding the bottom four and the top four EU-27 countries.
Source: Mattonetti, 2013, Table 3.
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countries, the series is expressed for each country as 
an index with 2005 = 100.
The next question is ‘which price index?’ The SPC 
Indicators Sub-Group proposes using the deflator 
of household final consumption expenditure. This is 
the natural measure from the national accounts (see, 
for example, Milusheva and Gal, 2012): ‘Final con-
sumption aggregates’ (Eurostat code nama_fcs_p). 
It does however differ from the standard EU-SILC 
practice, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HCIP: series prc_hicp_aind), as used in the AROP rate 
anchored at a point in time. As we have seen earli-
er, the national accounts measure is more extensive, 
including ‘individual’ government consumption, 
on items such as education and health. The prices 
of these items may have moved differently, and the 
items themselves have acquired a larger significance 
in the total in the crisis years, as other direct spend-
ing by consumers has been curtailed (see Gerstberg-
er and Yaneva, 2013, Figure 7).
In our judgment, the HICP index more closely ap-
proximates the experience of individual households. 
The HICP is the index disseminated in the media 
and it does not include components such as FISIM 
(financial services indirectly measured) that are not 
readily explained, even by experts. The choice is 
however an important one. Over the period 2005 to 
2012, in the EU-27, the national accounts index rose 
by 12.0 %, whereas the HICP increased by 18.4 %. This 
is a large difference: almost 1 percentage point per 
year. The difference arises mainly outside the euro 
area: for the euro area (18) the difference was only 
2.7 % over the period as a whole. In 10 out of the 
27 EU countries, the difference was ‘small’ (less than 
0.25 % per year). On the other hand, in the second 
half of the period, from 2008 to 2012, the proportion 
with small differences fell to a third and there were 
six countries with large differences (more than 1 % 
per year). The reasons for these differences warrant 
further examination.
Recommendation 5: There should be further investiga‑
tion of the reasons for the differences in the changes in 
price level over time indicated by the HICP and by the 
final consumption expenditure deflator.
In order to show the difference from the nation-
al accounts deflator, Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the 
NA-based indicator over the period 2005 to 2012 
derived from Unadjusted GHDI per capita expressed 
in national currency (nasa_nf_tr) and deflated by the 
HICP. It should be noted that these figures include 
NPISH. Data on GHDI are not available for Malta and 
data for Luxembourg only start in 2006. As is to be 
expected, the two sub-periods (2005-2008 and 
2008-2012) are quite different. All EU-15 countries 
except Italy saw positive growth in real income be-
tween 2005 and 2008, even if in Denmark, Germa-
ny and the UK it was less than 2 % over the 3-year 
period. In the middle came, in increasing order, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, France, Spain, Austria, Luxem-
bourg, Belgium and Ireland. In all of these countries, 
the rate of growth was less than 2 % per year. 2 % per 
annum was only achieved in Finland, Sweden and 
Greece. The experience of the new Member States 
from 2005 to 2008 was quite diverse, with the in-
crease in real income per capita ranging from minus 
4.2 in Hungary to more than 20 % in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania (plus 58 %).
In the post-crisis period from 2008 to 2011, there 
are the expected large losers in EU-15 countries 
(Figure 3.9); in increasing order: Spain, Italy, Ireland 
and Greece, to which, when 2012 is taken into ac-
count, we have to add the Netherlands and Portu-
gal. Countries that stand out at the top, with more 
than a 3 % increase are Finland, Denmark, Germa-
ny and Sweden. In the middle with no change 
(France) or moderate reductions are the UK, Lux-
embourg, Austria and Belgium. Among the new 
Member States, the large losers are Latvia, Romania 
and Lithuania, and, if we add 2012, Estonia, Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Hungary. Positive growth of real GHDI 
per capita (between 2 and 6 % for the 3-year pe-
riod) is recorded in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Poland 
(but if we add 2012, Slovakia is back to the 2008 
situation).
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Figure 3.9a: Real unadjusted GHDI per capita (Index 2005 = 100) EU‑15, 2005‑2012
Figure 3.9b: Real unadjusted GHDI per capita (Index 2005 = 100) EU‑15, 2005‑2012
NB: No data for Luxembourg before 2006.
Reading note: In 2012, the real unadjusted GHDI per capita in Greece was 78.4 % of its value in 2005.
Source: NA unadjusted GHDI from Eurostat web-database, Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr; HICP from 
Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (series prc_hicp_aind).
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Figure 3.10: Real unadjusted GHDI per capita (Index 2005 = 100), new Member States, 2005‑2012
NB: ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after. No data for Malta. Croatia is not covered in our analyses.
Reading note: In 2012 the real unadjusted GHDI per capita in Hungary was 88.9 % of its value in 2005.
Source: NA unadjusted GHDI from Eurostat web-database, Statistics/National accounts/Annual sector accounts, nasa_nf_tr; HICP from 
Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (series prc_hicp_aind).
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These changes provide the background against 
which to assess the movements in the AROP indica-
tor in Section 3.2 (44). In the new Member States, from 
2005 to 2008, an overall reduction in the AROP rate 
was achieved at a time when real incomes were ris-
ing, often by substantial amounts. Where the AROP 
rate increased by 3 percentage points, as in Bulgaria 
and Latvia, this has to be seen in the context of 20 
and 38 % increases, respectively, in the level of real 
income. In the EU-15 in this period, the rise in the 
AROP rate in Germany happened when real incomes 
were stagnating.
(44) For a more detailed discussion of the changes in real GHDI from 
the national accounts in Germany, Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
see European Commission (2014, pp. 28-29). It is not clear what 
price deflator was employed.
When we turn to the period 2008 to 2012, we see 
that the positive growth rate of per capita real in-
comes in Germany did not translate into a reduction 
in the AROP rate. The rises in the AROP rate in Greece, 
where real incomes fell greatly, highlight the severi-
ty of the problems faced. In Latvia, in contrast, there 
was a large fall in real income but the AROP rate fell.
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3.6 An EU‑SILC‑based real 
income indicator?
The SPC Indicators Sub-Group has for good reasons 
begun with an indicator of real income based on 
the national accounts. NA cannot however provide 
the distributional information in which the SPC is 
principally interested. The final question that we 
consider therefore is whether a social indicator of 
real incomes could be introduced incorporating two 
distributional elements: the median in place of the 
mean, and equivalised income in place of per capita 
income? Such a measure has indeed already been 
displayed in the Employment and social developments 
in Europe 2013 report of the European Commission 
(2014, p. 389).
In order to throw light on this question, we present 
evidence in two steps — in effect reversing the or-
der of the earlier analysis. First, we contrast the levels 
of change in real mean per capita income derived 
from EU-SILC with those that we have just been 
examining using NA data. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 are 
parallel to Figures 3.9 and 3.10, but are based on 
EU-SILC data. It may be noted that the 2012 figure 
for Greece was 78.4 % of the 2005 index in Figure 3.9, 
using the national accounts data, and is 64 % in Fig-
ure 3.11, using EU-SILC data; but the general trend is 
close. This is however not true for Bulgaria, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia, where 
there appear to be discrepancies when we compare 
both trends (see for details Atkinson, Guio and Marli-
er (2015), Figure 19).
The second step is to replace mean per capita in-
come with median equivalised income, as used in 
the AROP indicator. The results are shown in Figures 
3.13 and 3.14. For Luxembourg and Italy, there was 
no apparent growth in real median equivalised in-
come in the pre-crisis period, but in Spain, Sweden, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK there 
was strong growth (10 % or more for the period). This 
was followed by either levelling-off or decline, and 
six of the fifteen countries in 2012 (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK) were below 
the 2005 level. For the new Member States, shown in 
Figure 3.14, there was rapid growth in many cases up 
to 2008; there was a fall in the majority of countries 
after 2008, but in all cases the 2012 value was ahead 
of that in 2005 (except in Cyprus and Hungary). For 
six of the twelve countries shown in Figure 3.14, the 
increase in real median equivalised income was in 
excess of 20 % (between 2005 and 2012).
Recommendation 6: The possibility of developing an 
EU‑SILC‑based indicator of the growth of median real 
household equivalised disposable income should be in‑
vestigated at the EU level.
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Figure 3.11a: Real mean per capita income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), EU‑15, 2005‑2012
(income years)
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Figure 3.11b: Real mean per capita income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), EU‑15, 2005‑2012 (income 
years)
NB: Breaks in EU-SILC series in Spain (2008), France (2007), Austria (2007) and United Kingdom (2012).
Reading note: In 2012, the real mean per capita income in Greece was 64 % of that in 2005.
Source: Mean income per capita from EU-SILC (Eurostat calculations); HICP from Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (series prc_hicp_aind).
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Figure 3.12: Real mean per capita income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), new Member States, 2005‑
2012
(income years)
NB: ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after. Break in EU-SILC series in Cyprus (2007). No EU-SILC data for 
Romania in 2005 (index 2006 = 100 used instead). Croatia is not covered in our analyses.
Reading note: In 2012, real mean income per capita in Malta was 112.4 % of that in 2005.
Source: Mean income per capita from EU-SILC (Eurostat calculations); HICP from Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices 
(series prc_hicp_aind).
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Figure 3.13a: Real median equivalised income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), EU‑15, 2005‑2012
(income years)
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Figure 3.13b: Real median equivalised income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), EU‑15, 2005‑2012
(income years)
NB: Break in EU-SILC series in Spain (2008), France (2007), Austria (2007) and United Kingdom (2012).
Reading note: In 2012, real median equivalised income in Greece was 69 % of that in 2005.
Source: Median equivalised income from EU-SILC Users’ Database (UDB) March 2014; HICP from Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (series 
prc_hicp_aind).
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Figure 3.14: Real median equivalised income (EU‑SILC; Index 2005 = 100), new Member States, 
2005‑2012
(income years)
NB: ‘New’ Member States are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after. Break in EU-SILC series in Cyprus (2007). No EU-SILC data for 
Romania in 2005 (index 2006 = 100 used instead). Croatia is not covered in our analyses.
Reading note: In 2012, real median equivalised income in Hungary was 96.3 % of that in 2005.
Source: Median equivalised income from UDB March 2014; HICP from Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (series prc_hicp_aind).
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3.7 Conclusions
Before coming to the substantive conclusions, we 
should begin with the unsung hero of our story: the 
EU-SILC dataset. Without the investment in EU-SILC, 
and its predecessor the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), it would not have been 
possible for the EU to embark on the construction 
of social indicators, and the whole development of 
the social dimension of Europe would have been 
much poorer. The EU-SILC data have played a key 
role in policy formation at EU level and in a number 
of EU countries. At the same time, the instrument 
has evident limitations. As its warm supporters, we 
have been concerned that too much weight might 
be placed on what can be achieved using EU-SILC 
data. It is therefore important that it be subjected to 
stringent tests. One such test has been the subject 
of this chapter: a confrontation between the EU-SILC 
data and the national accounts.
Such a confrontation between two different data 
sources might well have led to very negative con-
clusions. In terms of the level of income, there are 
indeed worrying features. But the good news is that 
— speaking broadly, and with certain noted excep-
tions — these differences appear relatively stable 
over time. The trends in the two sources seem in 
general consistent. To a reassuringly high degree, the 
two sources tell a coherent story.
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But the reassurance does not carry over to the com-
parisons across countries. We have seen in Section 
3.3 that the at-risk-of-poverty threshold varies across 
countries in relation to national accounts measures 
of household income per capita. This can in part be 
explained by differences in the median/mean rela-
tionship and in household size, but closer examina-
tion (called for in Section 3.4) of the reasons why the 
EU-SILC data yield income estimates that fall short 
of the national accounts totals is likely to reveal dif-
ferences across Member States. We have identified, 
for example, the differences between countries that 
employ register information and those that rely 
more heavily on household surveys.
This calls into question the comparison of income 
poverty across Member States. In our view, poli-
cy-makers have been well-advised to concentrate 
on the analysis of trends over time within Member 
States. We believe that the EU-SILC data, viewed in 
close conjunction with the national accounts, can 
provide a sound, indeed invaluable, basis for mon-
itoring trends over time. Here our substantive find-
ings have not been encouraging. We see no grounds 
for disagreeing with one of the Key Messages of the 
Social Protection Committee in its 2014 annual re-
port, ‘the EU is still not making any progress towards 
achieving its Europe 2020 poverty and social exclu-
sion target of lifting at least 20 million people from 
poverty and social exclusion by 2020. (…) Further-
more, national targets continue to vary in their am-
bition and do not add to the EU collective headline 
target.’ (2015, p. 19).
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4.1 Introduction45
This chapter examines how the risks of income 
poverty and subjective hardship vary according 
to household type. Tables showing how the EU’s 
at-risk-of-poverty (AROP; see Chapter 3 of this vol-
ume) indicator varies by household type are pub-
lished by Eurostat (46); this work extends that offering 
in several ways.
First, we consider a more comprehensive range of 
household types; in particular, we include house-
holds in which parents live with their adult children 
and extended-family households. Second, we report 
on a larger range of indicators of disadvantage: in 
addition to the EU’s standard AROP indicator, we 
consider a lower income poverty threshold which 
denotes a greater level of disadvantage, and two 
indicators of subjective hardship. Third, as well as 
examining the risk of poverty and hardship as they 
vary between household types, we also examine 
the composition of the population living in poverty 
and hardship. This opens up an interesting debate 
relating to the targeting of welfare policy: while 
lone-parent and single-adult households are at the 
highest risk of poverty and hardship, they account 
for a relatively small percentage of individuals living 
(45) Maria Iacovou is with the Social Sciences Research Methods 
Centre at the University of Cambridge, Department of 
Sociology. This work was supported by the second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. The 
author is grateful to Anthony B. Atkinson, Anne-Catherine Guio, 
Eric Marlier and Sophie Ponthieux, as well as to other Net-SILC2 
project members, for useful comments on previous drafts of 
this chapter. The European Commission bears no responsibility 
for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely those of the 
author. Email address for correspondence: mi305@cam.ac.uk.
(46) See Eurostat’s online Data Explorer facility. http://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_li03&lang=en.
in poverty and hardship. Couples with children un-
der 18, by contrast, are at a very low risk of poverty 
and hardship compared to other household types, 
but account for a very large share of individuals living 
in poverty and hardship.
There are several reasons why we might expect 
household type to be related to the risk of poverty 
and other forms of disadvantage; this relationship 
is complex, because there are likely to be effects in 
both directions, with household type influencing 
the risk of poverty and disadvantage, and individ-
uals’ economic resources influencing the choice of 
household in which they live. This nexus of relation-
ships is discussed in more detail in a longer version 
of this chapter (Iacovou, 2013).
Both household composition and income sufficien-
cy have been the subject of extensive study in their 
own right. Incomes and poverty rates, in particu-
lar, have received a great deal of attention: a large 
number of studies have documented the ways in 
which income levels vary across Europe, with par-
ticular attention paid to inequality (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2000; Atkinson et al., 2010; Fredriksen, 
2012, and many more); the incidence of poverty and 
low income (Förster and Mira d’Ercole, 2005; Lelkes 
et al., 2008); and the incomes of individuals who are 
statistically at a higher than average risk of poverty, 
including most particularly children, young people, 
the elderly, and lone parents (Bradbury and Jäntti, 
1999; Aassve et al., 2007; Rendall and Speare, 1995).
These studies typically find wide disparities in in-
come across Europe, with incomes across Southern 
and much of Eastern Europe substantially lower than 
across most of North-Western Europe, and with in-
come dispersions (and hence, relative poverty rates) 
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typically lower in the Nordic countries and parts of 
Eastern Europe, than in many Southern European 
countries.
A somewhat smaller literature (Iacovou, 2004; To-
massini et al., 2004; Andersson, 2004; Robson and 
Berthoud, 2003; Iacovou and Skew, 2011, Hantrais et 
al., 2006; Hoem et al., 2009; Mandic, 2008; Liefbroer 
and Fokkema, 2008; Saraceno, 2008 and others) deals 
with household composition. As with incomes, sub-
stantial variations may be observed across Europe; 
household sizes are relatively small in Western and 
particularly Northern Europe, while they tend to be 
larger in Southern Europe, and particularly large in 
parts of Eastern Europe. Large households may arise 
for many reasons: high fertility, late home-leaving 
among young adults, and high rates of intergenera-
tional co-residence, for example between older peo-
ple and their adult children. As well as the body of 
literature describing patterns of household composi-
tion, several studies also investigate the reasons why 
household composition varies between countries, 
examining a range of cultural and economic factors.
One aspect of the relationship between household 
type and economic disadvantage which we do not 
consider directly in this chapter, is the role of equiv-
alence scales. Efficiencies in the sharing of resources 
between household members are well researched 
in the academic literature (Förster, 1994; Atkinson 
et al., 1995), and are factored into income and pov-
erty calculations in the form of equivalence scales, 
which adjust household income by a factor relating 
to the needs of household members, and which 
typically assess the needs of second and subsequent 
adults living in a household as some fraction of the 
needs of the first adult in a household. In line with 
EU standard practice in income distribution analysis, 
we use the so-called ‘modified OECD’ equivalence 
scale, which assumes that the second and subse-
quent adults in a households have needs equal to 
0.5 of the needs of the first adult, while children 
below 14 have needs of 0.3 times the needs of the 
first adult. Different equivalence scales may lead to 
different estimates of poverty rates, and often to dif-
ferent poverty rankings between countries, regions 
and groups of people (Burniaux et al. 1998). Thus, 
it is possible that when we compare the incidence 
of poverty between household types, differences 
may arise as an artefact of the particular equivalence 
scale used. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
perform the sort of sensitivity analysis which would 
answer this question definitively. However, alongside 
our analysis of income poverty, we include analysis 
of two different self-reports of hardship, which are 
not sensitive to the particular equivalence scale used 
in income analysis.
4.2 Data and descriptive 
statistics
Our analysis is based on the 2012 Wave of EU-SILC 
cross-sectional data (UDB 2012 Version 2, microdata 
release of August 2014). The use of cross-sectional 
data is clearly appropriate in this context, but it has 
one disadvantage, namely that the data on house-
hold structures relate to the time of interview while 
the data on incomes generally relate to an earlier 
period, the ‘income reference period’ (see Chapters 
2 and 3 of this volume). This causes two problems. 
Most seriously, where there have been movements 
in or out of the household, the calculated total in-
come over the past year may not refer to individuals 
currently living in the household. Even when there 
have been no movements in or out, the problem re-
mains that household income relates to a 12-month 
period, whereas household composition and other 
variables in the data set relate to a moment in time 
(Debels and Vandecasteele, 2008).
In order to address the first of these problems, many 
researchers follow a procedure when working with 
longitudinal data sets, which involves matching in-
comes collected at time t+1 (but which relate to time 
t) with other data which are collected at time t and 
which also refer to the situation at time t Heuberger 
(2003). This is not possible when using the EU-SILC 
cross-sectional files; incomes for households there-
fore relate to the incomes of current household 
members measured over a previous time period.
4.2.1 Income poverty and 
subjective hardship
Two income poverty indicators are used in this 
chapter: the first, which is the standard measure 
of income poverty used by the EU, is an indicator 
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based on whether the equivalised income of the 
household falls below 60 % of the national median. 
The second is based on a similar methodology (and 
is also an EU agreed social indicator), but indicates 
a more severe level of relative poverty, which may 
be more pressing from a policy perspective: this is 
whether the household’s income falls below 50 % of 
the national median.
We also use two indicators of subjective hardship, 
based on the answers of the ‘household respond-
ent’ (47) to two questions. The first is as follows:
‘A household may have different sources of income and 
more than one household member may contribute to 
it. Thinking of your household’s total income, is your 
household able to make ends meet, namely, to pay for 
its usual necessary expenses?’
This is answered on a scale of 1 (with great difficulty) 
to 6 (very easily).
The second indicator is based on answers to the fol-
lowing question:
‘In your opinion, what is the very lowest net monthly in‑
come that your household would have to have in order 
to make ends meet, that is to pay its usual necessary ex‑
penses? Please answer in relation to the present circum‑
stances of your household, and what you consider as 
usual necessary expenses (to make ends meet).’
This question is answered with a monthly amount; 
we create an indicator of hardship which takes the 
value 1 if total monthly household income (i.e., an-
nual income divided by 12) is less than 95 % of the 
stated necessary monthly amount.
These two indicators of hardship have the advan-
tage that they do not depend on assumptions made 
by the analyst about economies of scale within 
the household (that, is they do not vary accord-
ing to which equivalence scale is used). However, 
they have the shortcoming that the questions on 
which they are based are asked only of household 
respondent, and not of other individuals resident 
in the household. In fact, it is possible that the per-
ceptions of household respondents may differ from 
the perspectives of other household members; un-
(47) The household respondent is the adult household member 
who answered the household questionnaire for his/her 
household.
fortunately, EU-SILC does not currently have the data 
necessary to test this.
In the remainder of the chapter, the word ‘poverty’ 
always refers to ‘income poverty’, while the word 
‘hardship’ always refers to ‘subjective hardship’. The 
word ‘disadvantage’ is used as a generic term to cov-
er both sets of indicators.
4.2.2 Working with clusters of 
countries
We analyse data for the 28 countries of the EU, ex-
amining how incomes differ across 10 different 
household types. Full country-by-country analysis 
gives tables containing 280 cells for each of the in-
dicators considered, which is extremely large and 
arguably too complex for the average human brain 
to process. Thus, for reasons of space and clarity, we 
present information only in graphical form, and for 
clusters of countries rather than for individual coun-
tries. This also has the result of increasing cell sizes 
for uncommon family forms, such as extended fam-
ilies in the Nordic countries, and may also increase 
the accuracy of estimates. Full country-by-country 
results in tabular form are available on request from 
the author.
How should the clusters of countries be defined? 
One possibility is to use a typological grouping, 
such as the seminal welfare-regime-based schema 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990 and 1999), or 
an adaptation of such a schema. There are nota-
ble advantages to this approach, namely that it is 
to a degree at least driven by theory; however, as 
Berthoud and Iacovou (2004) point out, a typology 
arrived at for the purposes of understanding (for ex-
ample) income redistribution may not be the best 
typology for understanding (for example) the dy-
namics of the family.
Another possibility is to select a schema empirically. 
Because this chapter is concerned with household 
structure, we use household type (discussed below 
in Section 4.3.1) as the basis for defining a schema, 
using a purpose-built minimum distance algorithm, 
and selecting the country grouping which gives the 
lowest sum of the squared deviations (SSD) from 
calculated group means. This algorithm yields the 
grouping presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Regional clusters used in the analysis
Nordic Denmark, Finland, Sweden
North‑Western Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, UK
Southern Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal 
Eastern Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia.
This reflects a similar typology to one which we 
might have chosen via an adaptation of welfare re-
gime typology, starting with the fourfold typology 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990 and 1999); in-
corporating a ‘southern’ cluster as suggested by 
Ferrera (1996) and noted by numerous other authors 
as displaying clear differences from the Northern 
and Western countries in terms of family forms; in-
cluding the UK and Ireland which Esping-Andersen 
categorises as members of the ‘liberal’ regime type 
with the ‘conservative’ countries of North-Western 
Europe; and assigning the countries which joined 
the EU in or after 2004 to a separate category, with 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta, which have clear 
geographical and cultural commonalities with the 
Southern European countries.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Defining household types
Ten household types are defined, according to the 
number and ages of people living in a household, 
and the relationships between them. These house-
hold types are listed in the Table 4.2 and follow the 
typology of Iacovou and Skew (2011).
Table 4.2: Definitions of household types
Single person < 65 A single person under age 65
Single person > = 65 A single person aged 65 or over
Couple both < 65 A couple (married or cohabiting) both aged under 65
Couple, at least one > = 65 A couple (married or cohabiting), one or both of whom is aged 65 or over
Couple + child(ren) under 18 A couple with one or more of their own children, including at least one child 
aged under 18
Couple + adult child(ren) A couple living with one or more of their own children, all of whom are aged 
18 or over
Lone parent + child(ren) under 18 A single adult plus one or more of his or her own children, including at least one 
child aged under 18
One parent + adult child(ren) A household consisting of one parent plus one or more of his or her own 
children, all of whom are aged 18 or over
Extended family Non-nuclear households whose members all belong to the same family. Most of 
these are either three-generation families, or households including a parent and 
an adult child with a partner or spouse
Other households Other households, including lodgers, unrelated sharers, etc.
NB: that the ‘other households’ category includes some households where all the members are from the same family, i.e. which properly should 
be considered as extended families, but for whom this information cannot be recovered from the information available in EU-SILC, which does 
not provide a full household grid. The distribution of these household types varies greatly between countries and between the regional clusters 
defined in the previous Section. These regional distributions are shown in Table 4.3.
Source: Iacovou and Skew (2011).
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Table 4.3: Distribution of household types by regional cluster, 2012
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Nordic 18.4 11.1 17.7 14.8 24.6 4.5 4.2 2.1 0.3 2.3
North‑Western 19.8 13.0 15.3 13.6 20.4 6.7 4.9 3.4 1.0 2.0
Southern 11.7 12.7 9.3 13.2 21.9 14.8 2.6 6.5 3.6 3.7
Eastern 11.2 14.2 11.0 10.3 18.2 13.2 2.5 7.3 9.2 3.0
Total 15.5 13.1 13.0 12.7 20.6 10.0 3.6 5.0 3.8 2.7
Individuals
Nordic 8.0 4.8 15.2 12.8 42.6 6.3 4.8 2.0 0.6 3.0
North‑Western 8.8 5.8 13.6 12.1 35.9 9.9 6.0 3.3 2.0 2.7
Southern 4.7 5.0 7.4 10.4 33.1 19.9 2.8 5.8 6.3 4.6
Eastern 4.3 5.5 8.5 8.0 26.9 17.3 2.6 6.2 17.0 3.7
Total 6.4 5.4 10.8 10.5 33.2 14.0 4.1 4.6 7.4 3.5
NB: Estimates are weighted according to the procedure defined in Section 4.3.2. The smallest cell size is 103 (extended family, Nordic countries).
Reading note: 18.4 % of households in the Nordic countries are households consisting of a single person aged under 65.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2012-2.
4.3.2 Weighting
All estimates are calculated using weights. The 
cross-sectional weights provided with EU-SILC are 
used as a starting point; however, we ‘trim’ some 
of the weights which are extremely large. When 
considering clusters of countries or all-EU averag-
es, several weighting procedures are possible, and 
none are perfect. Procedures which have been used 
include (a) adjusting weights so that every country 
makes a contribution to the mean proportional to its 
population (the normal procedure for EU social sta-
tistics published by Eurostat); (b) adjusting weights 
so that every country makes an equal contribution 
to the mean; and (c) avoiding the issue by not adjust-
ing weights at all. Option (a) means that estimated 
means would be dominated by populous countries 
such as Germany and France, at the expense of small-
er countries such as Malta and Luxembourg, which 
would make virtually no impression on means at all. 
Under option (b), by contrast, the influence of small-
er countries may be inflated by a factor of several 
hundred relative to their population. We take a mid-
dle way between (a) and (b), by adjusting weights 
by a factor reflecting the square root of a country’s 
population. This means that larger countries have 
a larger influence over regional averages than small-
er countries, but not by such a huge margin as in (a).
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Income poverty and 
subjective hardship by household 
types, counting households rather 
than individuals
Figure 4.1 shows how the risks of income poverty 
and subjective hardship vary by household type, 
over the four clusters of countries defined in Table 
4.1. The average risk of income poverty across all 
household types in each cluster is shown by hori-
zontal lines on the graph; these aggregate per-
centages are given in Table 4.4 and discussed in 
Section 4.4.2.
The top left-hand panel shows the percentage of 
households defined as income-poor under the 60 % 
threshold. In all clusters of countries, lone parents are 
one of the household types with the highest risk of 
income poverty, with percentages ranging from just 
under 30 % in the Nordic countries to 34 % in the 
Southern countries. The other two household types 
at high risk are those living alone. For single elderly 
people, the risk of income poverty under the 60 % 
threshold ranges from 19 % in the North-Western 
countries to almost 40 % in the Nordic countries; for 
non-elderly single-adult households, the risk ranges 
from 22 % in the Southern countries to over 30 % in 
the Nordic countries. In all countries, couples with 
children under 18 are at a slightly higher risk of in-
come poverty than non-elderly couples without 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of households in income poverty or subjective hardship, by household type, 
2012
(percentages of households)
Reading note: In the Nordic countries, of households composed of a single non-elderly person, 31.3 % of households are income-poor (under the 
60 % threshold).
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2012-2.
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children; the difference is very small in the Nordic 
and North-Western countries, and larger in the 
Southern and Eastern countries (where couples with 
children under 18 are slightly more likely than the av-
erage household to be poor).
In all clusters of countries, couples with adult chil-
dren are less likely to be poor than couples with chil-
dren under 18; indeed, income poverty rates among 
couples with adult children are similar to, or lower 
than, income poverty rates among couples with no 
co-resident children.
Turning now to the lower left-hand panel which 
shows the risk of more severe income poverty, un-
der the 50 % national median threshold, we see that 
as expected, the percentages of households at this 
deeper level of income poverty are lower than when 
we consider the 60 % threshold. However, the dis-
tributions by household type are similar, with one 
important exception, namely that elderly people are 
comparatively less vulnerable to this deeper degree 
of income poverty. In all clusters of countries, single 
adults under age 65 are at a substantially higher risk 
of deeper income poverty than single adults over 
age 65; indeed, in all but the Nordic cluster, elderly 
singles are no more likely than the average house-
hold in the same region to suffer this degree of in-
come poverty. This indicates that pension incomes 
or social assistance for elderly people, while in many 
cases insufficient to keep them out of income pov-
erty under the 60 % threshold, are sufficient to keep 
them out of income poverty at the 50 % threshold. 
By contrast, the levels of social assistance payable to 
younger adults, or low earnings, may not be ade-
quate to keep them out of this deeper level of income 
poverty. This is evident to a greater or lesser extent 
in all country groups, and has clear implications for 
social policy and for considerations of intergenera-
tional equity. It also highlights the fact that higher or 
lower income poverty thresholds, as well as yielding 
varying estimates of the percentage of the popula-
tion who are below the threshold, may also result in 
‘poor’ populations of different compositions.
Both the 50 % and 60 % poverty measures are based 
on national median incomes, and are by construc-
tion relative rather than needs-based measures. 
Under these measures, poverty rates in the more 
affluent regions of Northern and North-Western Eu-
rope are a little lower than, but not very different to, 
poverty rates in the less affluent regions of Southern 
and Eastern Europe. The two measures of subjective 
hardship, by contrast, incorporate elements of ade-
quacy in relation to both absolute and relative needs 
(Berthoud, 2012). The fact that these measures incor-
porate an element of absolute need is reflected in 
the much larger differences between the more and 
less affluent regions in Europe.
Table 4.4: Percentages of households and individuals in income poverty or 
subjective hardship, 2012
(percentages of households or individuals, as indicated in Column 2)
Income 
poverty: 60 % 
threshold
Income 
poverty: 50 % 
threshold
Subjective 
hardship: income 
insufficient
Subjective 
hardship: getting 
by ‘with great 
difficulty’
Nordic Households 17.3 8.6 3.4 2.7
Individuals 13.4 6.6 2.5 2.4
North‑Western Households 15.7 9.0 9.8 5.4
Individuals 14.2 7.6 7.7 5.7
Southern Households 18.9 11.9 27.9 18.1
Individuals 19.4 12.6 25.4 19.1
Eastern Households 16.7 10.3 37.2 18.3
Individuals 16.3 10.5 33.4 17.9
Reading note: In the Nordic countries, 17.3 % of households, and 13.4 % of individuals, are income-poor according to the 60 % threshold.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2012-2.
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The first measure defines as ‘in hardship’ those 
households where the household respondent re-
ports a minimum level of income required to ‘get 
by’ higher than the actual level of income reported 
by the household (48). Only 3 % of households in the 
Nordic countries report this type of hardship; the 
corresponding figures are 10 % for the North-West-
ern cluster, and 28 % and 37 % for the Southern and 
Eastern clusters. Despite these differences in the lev-
els of hardship, each region shows a distribution of 
hardship by household type which is (a) similar to 
the distribution under the relative income poverty 
measures, and (b) similar between country clusters. 
Once again, lone parents and single adults (elderly 
and non-elderly) are most likely to report hardship, 
while couples without children, and those living 
with adult children, are less likely; elderly couples 
and households in the ‘other’ category also report 
relatively high levels of hardship under this measure.
The lower right-hand panel reports the percentages 
of households which report that they get by ‘with 
great difficulty’. This is also a subjective measure, and 
in some sense it is an absolute rather than a relative 
measure of income poverty, although it does also 
reflect the degree to which people have adapted 
(or not) to their current level of income. As with the 
previous measure, we observe higher percentages 
reporting hardship in the Eastern and (particularly) 
the Southern countries, where incomes are lower, 
both in nominal terms and adjusted for purchasing 
power. Here, the figures are dominated by lone par-
ents in every cluster of countries, with lone parents 
almost twice as likely to report that they get by ‘with 
great difficulty’ than single adults, either elderly or 
non-elderly (except in the Eastern countries, where 
they are still almost 10 percentage points more likely 
to report hardship than single adults).
(48) Strictly, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, we consider as ‘poor’ 
those households whose actual incomes are under 95 % of 
their reported minimum to get by.
4.4.2 Income poverty and 
subjective hardship by household 
types, counting individuals rather 
than households
The figures discussed in the previous section related 
to the risk of income poverty or subjective hardship 
for households of a particular type. In this section 
we discuss the risk of income poverty or subjec-
tive hardship for individuals living in households of 
different types (49). The risks across individuals are 
presented in Figure 4.2. In the case of single-person 
households and couple-only households, the fig-
ures are identical between Figures 4.1 and 4.2; this 
is because all households within each type are the 
same size. However, where household sizes vary, 
the two figures will be different. In some household 
types, larger households tend to be at higher risk of 
income poverty or subjective hardship. Where chil-
dren are present, they contribute substantially to the 
needs of a household, but typically contribute only 
marginally to its income. In the case of families with 
children under 18, then, because larger households 
are at greater risk of income poverty, we would ex-
pect a higher percentage of individuals to be poor 
than the corresponding percentage of households.
This effect may be reversed for some other house-
hold types. For example, where several adults live 
together, each additional adult would contribute 
to the estimated needs of the household by only 
a factor of 0.5, whereas they may bring in the same 
level of income as the household respondent. Here, 
we might expect larger households to be at lower 
risk of income poverty, and for a higher proportion 
of households rather than individuals to be at risk of 
income poverty or hardship.
In Figure 4.2, as in Figure 4.1, the aggregate per-
centages in income poverty or subjective hardship 
across all household types are shown with horizon-
tal lines. The aggregate percentage of individuals 
in income poverty or hardship is in almost all cases 
smaller than the percentage of households in income 
poverty or hardship; this is because it is the smallest 
household types, namely single-person households, 
and to a lesser extent lone parent households, which 
(49) Equivalised incomes are still calculated on the basis of total 
household income and not on individual income.
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account for the highest rates of income poverty and 
hardship; larger households, such as couples with 
children and extended families, are less vulnerable. 
Table 4.4 shows that in many cases, the estimated 
aggregate risks of income poverty and hardship do 
not vary much according to whether we take the 
household or the individual as a base; however, in 
some cases they are sizeable: in the Nordic coun-
tries, for example, 17 % of households, but only 13 % 
of individuals, are below the 60 % income poverty 
threshold.Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are very similar, in that 
the rankings between household types are virtual-
ly unchanged if we consider individuals rather than 
households as the unit of analysis. However, on the 
two indicators of income poverty, we do observe 
changes in the expected direction for larger house-
holds: households with children under 18, whether 
headed by a couple or a lone parent, are at a higher 
risk of income poverty when the individual rather 
than the household is the unit of analysis. Interest-
ingly, income poverty rates for couples and lone 
parents with adult children are also generally higher 
when the individual is the unit of analysis, indicating 
that the beneficial effects on the household financ-
es of adult children who are earning, is outweighed, 
in aggregate terms, by the effects of adult children 
whose earnings are either very low or nil.
In addition, the subjective hardship estimates are 
affected very little by whether we take the individ-
ual or the household as the unit of analysis. Thus, al-
though there are some differences between Figures 
4.1 and 4.2, we may assert that the estimated risks of 
income poverty and/or hardship do not differ great-
Figure 4.2: Percentage of individuals in income poverty or subjective hardship, 
by household type, 2012
(percentages of individuals)
Reading note: In the Nordic countries, of individuals living in households composed of a lone parent plus children under 18, 32.8 % are 
income-poor (under the 60 % threshold).
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2012-2.
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ly according to whether the individual or the house-
hold is the unit of analysis.
How much do these profiles of income poverty and 
subjective hardship differ between clusters of coun-
tries? Income poverty is clearly more concentrated 
within a few household types in the Nordic coun-
tries, with single elderly people being around six 
times more likely to be poor than non-elderly cou-
ples without children; it is less concentrated in the 
Southern countries, with the risk for lone parents be-
ing under three times the risk of income poverty ex-
perienced by the least vulnerable household types.
However, if we rank household types by their risk of 
poverty, these rankings are very similar across all clus-
ters of countries. Comparing rankings across pairs of 
country clusters yields a Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient of over 90 % for the three pairs of country 
clusters which do not include the Southern coun-
tries, and coefficients of around 80 % for the three 
pairs of country clusters which do include the South-
ern countries. Thus, although there are differences in 
poverty and hardship profiles between the clusters 
of countries, these profiles also exhibit many similar-
ities between country clusters: the three household 
types at greatest risk of poverty and hardship are (a) 
lone parents, (b) the single elderly, and (c) other sin-
gle-person households (50).
4.4.3 Composition of the  
income‑poor and subjectively‑ 
deprived populations
The analysis in the previous sections revealed large 
disparities between household types in terms of 
the risk of income poverty and subjective depriva-
tion. However, the household types at the highest 
risk of poverty form a minority of the population 
as a whole. Across the EU, lone parent households 
with children under 18 account for only around 4 % 
of households and individuals; the single elderly ac-
count for around 13 % of households but only 5 % 
of individuals, while the single non-elderly account 
for around 16 % of households but only 6 % of indi-
(50) We have also performed the same type of analysis for 
individual countries within country clusters, to confirm that 
these clusters are a valid means of grouping countries. These 
results are reported for the 2009 Wave of EU-SILC in Iacovou 
(2013).
viduals. Thus, the three highest-risk household types, 
all together, account for only 32 % of households 
across Europe, and only 16 % of the total population. 
The highest-risk household types form a larger per-
centage of the population in the Nordic and North/
Western countries (around 33 % of households and 
20 % of individuals) than in the Southern and Eastern 
countries (around 27 % of households and 12 % of 
individuals).
In this section, we take as our starting point the 
sample of households and individuals that are in 
poverty or hardship, and analyse how the different 
household types are represented within those pop-
ulations. We restrict the analysis to one indicator of 
income poverty (the 60 % threshold) and one indi-
cator of subjective hardship (getting by with great 
difficulty).
Figure 4.3 presents a breakdown of income-poor 
households (upper graphs) and subjectively- 
deprived households (lower graphs) by household 
type. These results are rather different from those in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Looking first at the two upper 
graphs, depicting the population in income pover-
ty, these are no longer dominated by lone-parent 
families, which, despite being at high risk of pover-
ty and hardship, do not, because of their relatively 
small numbers, account for a high proportion of 
poor households. By contrast, we see that couples 
with children under 18, while at a relatively low risk 
of poverty, account for a much higher proportion 
of poor households: this proportion ranges from 
11 % in the Nordic countries, to 26 % in the Southern 
countries if we consider the 60 % relative poverty risk 
line, and from 15 % in the Nordic and Eastern coun-
tries to 24 % in the Southern countries, if we consider 
the subjective poverty measure.
We also observe the largest differences between 
clusters of countries which we have so far seen in 
the course of this analysis, particularly in the case 
of single-adult households. When we considered 
the relative risks of different household types, 
single-adult households were at a higher-than- 
average risk of poverty and hardship in all country 
clusters; however, they certainly did not dominate 
the statistics. In Figure 4.3, however, single adults 
under age 65 account for over 30 % of poor house-
holds in the Nordic and North-Western countries; 
these figures are much higher than the correspond-
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Figure 4.3: The distribution of household types among the income‑poor and those getting by 
with great difficulty, 2012
(percentages of households (upper graphs) and individuals (lower graphs))
NB: Percentages in each regional block add up to 100 %.
Reading note: In the Nordic countries, 32.1 % of income-poor households (60 % threshold) consist of a single person aged under 65. In the 
Southern countries, 35.5 % of individuals living in households getting by with great difficulty consist of a couple plus children under 18.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2012-2.
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ing figures for the Southern and Eastern clusters of 
countries, where single-adult households are far 
less numerous.
Looking now at the lower panels of Figure 4.3, 
which show the composition of the population in 
poverty or hardship, using individuals as the basis 
for accounting, we note that these are dominated 
by families with children under 18. Of individuals 
living in income-poor households, between 26 % 
(Nordic countries) and 39 % (Southern countries) live 
in couple-headed families with children under 18. 
These are much larger than the proportions living 
in lone-parent families (11 % in the Nordic countries, 
and only 5 % in the Southern countries). This pattern 
also holds when we consider individuals living in 
households reporting hardship: in three of the four 
clusters of countries, people living in couple-head-
ed families make a far larger contribution than those 
living in lone-parent families to the total number of 
people living in hardship. Taking one- and two-par-
ent families together, families with children make up 
37 % of the poor population in the Nordic and East-
ern countries, and 44-45 % in the North-West and 
Southern countries. Not all of these individuals are 
children, since their parents are also counted as part 
of this total; nevertheless, these figures highlight the 
extent of child poverty across Europe.
In the Southern and Eastern clusters of countries, 
lone parents form a smaller proportion of the pool 
of people in poverty and/or hardship than in the 
Northern and North/Western countries, due to their 
generally smaller numbers; instead, in Southern and 
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Eastern countries, couples with adult children make 
a considerable contribution to the pool of poor 
people. In the Eastern countries, people living in 
extended-family households also form a large con-
tribution to the numbers of poor. Although, across 
the Eastern cluster of countries, people in extend-
ed-family households are at only an average risk of 
poverty and hardship, extended-family households 
are fairly numerous across this region (see Iacovou 
and Skew, 2011), and are on average larger than any 
other household type.
4.5 Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has analysed (a) how the 
risk of income poverty and subjective hardship var-
ies between different household types across the 
EU, and (b) how the household type composition 
of the pool of people living in income poverty and 
subjective hardship varies between the countries 
and regions of the EU.
When income poverty is considered (that is, when 
a relative concept is used, according to which 
a household and all its members are at risk of pover-
ty if it falls below a percentage of national median in-
come (in this chapter: 50 % and 60 %)), poverty rates 
computed for the total population do vary between 
regions and between countries within regions; how-
ever, these variations tend not to be large, precisely 
because of the use of a relative measure.
If, instead, we consider subjective hardship, we ob-
serve large differences between country clusters in 
terms of the levels of hardship reported; these reflect 
real differences in living standards between regions. 
However, the same household types — lone parents 
and single-person households — are at an elevat-
ed risk of subjective hardship in all country clusters, 
whether we consider income poverty or subjective 
hardship.
The household types with the highest risks of in-
come poverty and/or subjective hardship are pro-
portionally much more numerous in the Nordic 
and North-Western countries than they are in the 
Southern and Eastern regions. Thus, while people liv-
ing in single-person and lone-parent households ac-
count for a sizeable fraction of individuals in poverty 
and hardship in the Nordic, and to a lesser extent the 
Northern, countries, this is not the case across Eastern 
and Southern Europe, where the household types at 
the highest risk of income poverty and subjective 
hardship account for only a small minority of the 
population suffering these types of disadvantage. 
In the Eastern and Southern countries, families with 
children under 18 constitute by far the largest share 
of the income-poor or living-in-hardship population; 
families with adult children and extended-family 
households also account for a large percentage of 
the poor or living-in-hardship population.
In this chapter, we have attempted to analyse the 
relationship between household structure, on the 
one hand, and income poverty and subjective 
hardship, on the other hand. We have shown that, 
to the extent that differences in household compo-
sition do affect rates of poverty and hardship, this 
effect comes not via substantial differences in the 
relative risks of income poverty or subjective hard-
ship between one household type and another, 
but primarily via differences in household compo-
sition between countries.
These findings raise some interesting issues of policy 
and methodology. We have already noted the dis-
tinction between household types which are at an 
elevated risk of poverty or hardship on the one hand, 
and household types making a large contribution to 
the pool of people living in poverty or hardship, on 
the other; and the dilemmas this may create in terms 
of the targeting of social policy. The analysis in this 
chapter also raises questions about the use of equiv-
alence scales in the calculation of income poverty 
indicators. These scales were developed with the nu-
clear family in mind, and are based on assumptions 
about income sharing within the nuclear family. 
These assumptions are certainly questionable in the 
context of the nuclear family, but they are even more 
questionable in the context of non-nuclear extend-
ed families, which are prevalent across large swathes 
of the new Member States and which account for 
a sizeable proportion of Europe’s poor.
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5.1 Introduction
EU-SILC provides a rich source of evidence about the 
distribution of income in different countries. At the 
same time, the very richness of the data is a chal-
lenge, and it is not surprising that much of the anal-
ysis has tended to focus on particular features of the 
distribution, such as the extent of income poverty 
or the tendency for the middle of the distribution 
to be hollowed out. But, as the recent debate about 
inequality has brought out, it is not enough to look 
at one single indicator. Our statistics have to be en-
compassing. This becomes even more important 
as policymakers become increasingly concerned 
with linking macroeconomic outcomes with their 
impact on the well-being of individual citizens. It is 
not enough to replace GDP per head by just another 
number. As has been well recognised in the design 
of the EU social indicators, there is need for contex-
tual information.
The aim of the present chapter is to bring together 
different features of the distribution — income pov-
erty, affluence and dispersion — in a single frame-
work that allows ready comparisons across coun-
tries and across time. We believe that such a unified 
framework contributes both to the policy debate 
and to the theoretical understanding of inequality. 
The former is well illustrated by the recent media and 
(51) Rolf Aaberge and Henrik Sigstad are with Statistics Norway; 
Anthony B. Atkinson is from Nuffield College (Oxford, UK), INET 
at Oxford Martin School, and the London School of Economics 
(UK). This work has been supported by the second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Contact: 
Rolf.Aaberge@ssb.no. We are most grateful to Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier and Veli-Matti Törmälehto for their valuable 
comments on previous versions.
political interest in inequality generated by the pub-
lication of the English translation of Thomas Piketty’s 
Capital in the Twenty First Century (Piketty, 2014). Atten-
tion in the debate has focused on the top 1 %, and 
how their share of income is racing away, particular-
ly in Anglo-Saxon countries. But others have asked 
how this relates to what is happening at the bottom 
of the income ladder. Do rising top shares have im-
plications for the ambitions of the EU to reduce the 
number at risk of poverty or social exclusion under 
the Europe 2020 agenda? Are the countries with ris-
ing top incomes also those that are failing to meet 
the objective of reducing income poverty and social 
exclusion? When one turns to the academic arena, 
one finds too a need to bring together separate de-
bates. There are at present largely separate literatures 
on the measurement of income poverty, (to a limited 
degree) affluence, and on bi-polarisation (52).
In relation to the EU social indicators, the present 
chapter may be seen as providing complementary 
information. Methods developed at Statistics Norway 
(set out in Aaberge and Atkinson, 2013) are applied 
to the EU-SILC data for 2012 to show how these tools 
extend the concept of contextual indicators. One 
major purpose of this complementary information 
is to test the robustness of the conclusions drawn 
to the choice of indicator. As has been recognised 
from the outset, there is a degree of arbitrariness to 
the choice of a particular percentage (60 %) of the 
median as the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. When 
comparing the progress made by different Member 
States towards the Europe 2020 targets, we need to 
know how sensitive the conclusions are to the per-
(52) We refer to this as ‘bi-polarisation’, to distinguish it from other 
concepts of polarisation, notably those pioneered by Esteban 
and Ray (1994, 1999 and 2012) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray 
(2004).
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centage cut-off. Has a country achieved a substantial 
reduction in income poverty by ‘gaming the system’, 
concentrating financial help on those nearest to the 
cut-off? How should the evolution of the income 
poverty rate be seen in terms of the changes in the 
income distribution as a whole? For these purpos-
es, the existing contextual EU indicators, the income 
quintile share ratio and the Gini coefficient (see defi-
nitions in Chapter 1 of this volume), while together 
informative, may not be sufficient. In particular, they 
do not address two of the issues that have surfaced 
in recent debate: the ‘squeezing of the middle’ and 
the ‘racing away’ of the top 1 %.
5.2 Poverty, affluence and 
dispersion in theory
The key elements in the approach adopted here 
are familiar ones. They are characterised by the key-
words: graphics, dominance, and cumulation. All 
three have a long history, having been embodied 
in the Lorenz curve introduced in 1905. The Lorenz 
curve is a graphic device. It is based on cumulating 
people and incomes from the bottom; and it allows 
us to see whether one distribution is Lorenz-superior 
to (dominates) another. Where we depart is in taking 
the median as a point of reference. In a sense, we are 
following a trend. As has been widely recognised, 
with the rise in inequality at the top in a number of 
countries, notably the United States, the mean has 
become a less satisfactory indicator of overall pro-
gress, and attention is turning to the median. As it 
was put by the Stiglitz Commission, ‘median con-
sumption (income, wealth) provides a better meas-
ure of what is happening to the “typical” individual 
or household than average consumption (income 
or wealth)’ (Stiglitz et al., 2009, pp. 13-14 of Executive 
Summary). In the literature on the ‘middle class’, this 
group is typically defined in terms of a range around 
the median. Following the recommendation of the 
Eurostat Task Force (1998) on social exclusion and 
poverty statistics, the EU social indicators for income 
poverty (referred to at EU level as poverty risk (53)) 
(53) In this chapter, ‘poverty’ always refers to income poverty.
are based on an income threshold defined as a per-
centage of the median, rather than the mean as had 
previously been employed (see Atkinson et al, 2002, 
p. 94).
5.2.1 The median and poverty 
measurement
How is the median taken as a point of reference? We 
start from the fact that, in the countries covered by 
EU-SILC, poverty is a minority phenomenon. No one 
would consider poor a person with income (by 
which we mean equivalised disposable income per 
person in the household) at the median. If we define 
z as income relative to the median, then the poverty 
line is set at z*, where z* is below 1, and the poverty 
headcount is F(z*), where F() is the cumulative dis-
tribution. Whereas there may be a range of views 
about the choice of z*, there is general agreement 
that z* should be below some z+, where z+ < 1.
The distribution of income below the median is il-
lustrated in left hand part of Figure 5.1, which shows 
F(z) from 0 to ½ at z = 1 (the median). For any z* we 
can read off the headcount from the vertical axis, as 
shown by the dashed lines. The maximum poverty 
line z+ demarcates the range of permissible poverty 
lines. If for two countries the curves do not intersect 
in the range from 0 to z+, then the lower curve dom-
inates and we can conclude that there is a lower rate 
of income poverty for all permissible poverty lines. 
The first important point to be noted is that the pov-
erty line is defined in primal space: i.e. income. We 
define poverty in terms of income below a specified 
level and the unknown is the percentage of people. 
An alternative would be to define poverty as peo-
ple in the bottom x %, when the unknown would 
then be the income at the x-th percentile. This ‘dual’ 
approach is not one that has been adopted in the 
EU at-risk-of-poverty indicators, although it is widely 
used when investigating the distribution of earnings, 
when the OECD and others report the earnings at 
the bottom decile (as a proportion of the median). 
In what follows, though, the distinction between pri-
mal and dual approaches runs through the chapter.
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5.2.2 Affluence
The left hand part of Figure 5.1 is familiar. Eurostat 
publishes the dispersion around the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold, taking cut-offs of 40, 50, 60 and 70 %. The 
right hand part of Figure 5.1 is less familiar. This con-
struction, which is due originally to Foster and Wolf-
son (1992/2010) (we have simply turned their Figure 
9 upside down) shows the half of the distribution 
above the median in the form of (1‑F(z)) for z ≥ 1. In 
effect, this inverts the upper half of the cumulative 
distribution, showing the proportion of people above 
any given threshold. Concern with ‘affluence’ is com-
monly presented in terms of the top 10 % or the top 
1 %. In terms of the distinction drawn in the previous 
paragraph, this approaches the measurement of af-
fluence from the perspective of the dual. In Figure 5.1, 
as shown by the dashed lines, it means starting from 
a given percentage on the vertical axis, such as F**, 
and reading across to the income required to enter 
this group. For example, from the World Top Incomes 
Database (54) one can see that, in France in 2009, to 
appear in the top 1 % of gross incomes it was neces-
sary to have an income 4.8 times the mean.
There are however good reasons for considering 
a primal approach to measuring affluence. Not only 
does this parallel the approach adopted in the meas-
urement of poverty, but defining a cut-off above 
which people can be classified as ‘rich’ allows the 
proportion of rich people to vary. There will always 
be a top 1 %, but a society concerned about the dis-
(54) http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
Figure 5.1: Poverty and affluence curves
Reading note: The left hand (‘poverty’) curve shows the proportion of the population with income less than or equal to a poverty defined 
relative to the median; the right hand (‘affluence’) curve shows the proportion of the population with income equal to or above an affluence 
threshold defined relative to the median.
Income relative to the median z
½
1z*
F**
median
Auence curve
Poverty curve
Proportion of the
population
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tance between the top and the bottom may seek to 
reduce the number of people with incomes above 
the ‘affluence’ cut-off (55). Such an approach to defin-
ing affluence has been adopted by Peichl, Schaefer 
and Scheicher (2010, p. 608), who take the richness 
line to be twice the median, describing it as ‘arbitrary 
but common practice’, whereas Brzezinski (2010) 
also considers lines equal to three and four times the 
median.
Again, we may apply a dominance test to the afflu-
ence curve, 1-F. Suppose that we are agreed that the 
affluence threshold z** is no lower than z‑. Where the 
curve for one country lies everywhere below that for 
another country for all z ≥ z‑, then the affluence score 
is lower for all cut-offs. This is important, since, as the 
examples above suggest, there is less agreement 
about the appropriate threshold. It may for example 
be agreed that a person cannot be rich unless they 
have at least twice the median (z‑  = 2), but people 
disagree whether z** should be 2, 3, 4 or higher.
5.2.3 Intersection and cumulation
Application of the principle of dominance only al-
lows us to make definite comparisons in cases where 
the relevant curves do not intersect. The ranking can 
only be extended by attaching a weighting. In the 
inequality measurement literature, this has proceed-
ed by cumulation, based on the assumption that 
a higher weight is attached to those who appear 
earlier in the sum (or integral). This allows us to move 
from first-degree dominance (of the cumulative 
distribution) to second-degree dominance (of the 
Lorenz curve). The crucial question then concerns 
the starting point for the cumulation. When measur-
ing poverty, it is natural to cumulate from the lowest 
income, attaching most weight to the poorest. This 
is the procedure embodied in the Lorenz curve, and 
the basis for Lorenz dominance is that it ranks distri-
butions in the same way as all social welfare func-
tions where the marginal valuation of income falls (or 
does not increase) with income. It follows that, if the 
poverty curve for country A starts out above that for 
country B, then it can never dominate.
In contrast, when measuring affluence we may wish 
to attach most weight to transfers affecting those at 
(55) Reasons why societies may be concerned with the top of the 
distribution are discussed in Atkinson (2007). 
the top of the income scale (56). This means cumu-
lating downwards, as proposed in Aaberge (2009). 
In terms of Figure 5.1, it means integrating from the 
right. If the affluence curve for country A ends above 
that for country B, then it can never dominate.
5.2.4 Specific measures
In order to make a complete ranking, and attach 
numerical values, further assumptions have to 
be made so as to yield a specific indicator. Table 
5.1 shows the different indicators employed here, 
where, as already signalled, we consider both pri-
mal and dual approaches. In arriving at specific 
indicators, the first key assumption is an independ-
ence axiom, which ensures linearity of the indica-
tor in the relevant variable (F in the case of the first 
line in Table 5.1). The axiom takes a different form in 
the primal and dual cases. The second assumption 
is that the remaining part of the indicator should 
be a power function, leaving the choice of the pa-
rameter k that determines how rapidly the weights 
fall away. The effect of weighting may be seen in 
the case of the first indicator, which is the integral 
of poverty headcounts measured at each value of 
z (z is equal to x/M) from 0 to 1, weighted by the gap 
from the median (1‑z) to the power of (k‑1). This pri-
mal indicator of poverty may therefore be viewed 
as corresponding to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(FGT) poverty measure; the dual indicator shown in 
the second line of Table 5.1 corresponds to the Sen 
(1976) poverty measure (57). Where k=1, the two in-
dicators are equal, but for k greater than 1 the two 
indicators diverge. In both cases, the weights vary 
between k (at z=0, F=0) and 0 (at z=1, F=½), but the 
pattern of weighting is different. With the primal 
indicator, with k=2, a person with zero income has 
a weight of 2, but a person with an income equal to 
half the median has half the weight. With the dual 
indicator, half weight would be reached when we 
are at the lower quartile, which is typically further 
up the distribution. If this is the case, then it ex-
(56) It should be noted that, in contrast to Peichl, Schaefer and 
Scheicher (2010), we are assuming that the principle of transfers 
applies. 
(57) See Aaberge and Atkinson (2013). By replacing the median 
M with a poverty threshold T less than M, Ψ
k
 coincides with 
the FGT poverty measure of power k and ∏
2
coincides with 
a modified version of the Sen poverty measure. 
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plains why primal measures may be more sensitive 
to outliers than dual measures.
5.3 Poverty and affluence in 
EU‑SILC
The approach described above has been imple-
mented using the EU-SILC data for 2012. These data 
refer in general to the income year 2011 (exceptions 
are Ireland and the UK; see Chapter 2 of this volume). 
Negative incomes have been set to zero. All house-
holds with missing income data and those consist-
ing only of students have been excluded. The fact 
that we use 1 year as the analytical period instead of 
a life-cycle perspective means that we are unable to 
capture the full economic value of being a student. 
Students partly live on loans justified by higher ex-
pected income in the future. Students’ low cash in-
come is temporary and thus will not be considered 
to be associated with poverty. This practice is con-
sistent with the (national) official poverty statistics in 
several countries.
5.3.1 Dominance
We begin with Figure 5.2, which illustrates well three 
considerations. It shows the poverty and affluence 
curves for Norway, Poland and Portugal. In each case, 
the poverty curves are for the full range z from 0 to 1, 
and the affluence curves from z= 1 to z= 5. The curves 
meet at (1,½). The first two considerations are meth-
odological. First, there is considerable ‘noise’ at the 
tails of the distribution. The same occurs (but is less 
obvious in Figure 5.2) as the median is approached. 
From the standpoint of considering dominance, this 
suggests that the dominance condition should be 
applied to a restricted range. On a primal approach, 
we should limit the range of z over which domi-
nance is tested.
The second point concerns the statistical criterion 
for ranking. As may be seen from Figure 5.2, the 
poverty curves for Poland and Portugal are virtual-
ly indistinguishable over much of the range and we 
would not expect a statistical test, taking account 
of the sampling error, to reject the hypothesis 
that the poverty curves coincide (over a restrict-
ed range). However, as argued in Atkinson, Marlier, 
Montaigne and Reinstadler (2010), sampling error is 
not the only consideration when considering the 
policy significance of differences in poverty rates. 
When examining changes over time, Atkinson et 
al. (2010) took a two percentage points difference 
as salient, and the same practice is followed here. 
A country is said to dominate another where the 
poverty/affluence curve is at least two percentage 
points lower at some point and is nowhere more 
than two percentage points higher. No ranking can 
be made where the differences are everywhere less 
than two percentage points (‘identical’), or where 
both countries are at some point at least two per-
centage points lower (‘intersecting’). (Alternatively 
the dominance condition could be stated in terms 
of differences measured horizontally.)
Table 5.1: Summary indicators
Poverty
Ψ
k
k∫(1–z)k–1 F(Mz)dz
1
0
Primal: weight  = income gap from median
∏
k k∫(1–2F(Mz))
k–1 (1–z)dF(Mz)
1
0
Dual: weight  = note that the rank of the 
bottom half of distribution (note that the 
rank of the median = 0) 
Affluence
Λ
k
k∫(z–1)k–1 (1–F(Mz)) dz
∞
1
Primal: weight  = income minus median
Γ
k
k∫(2F(Mz)–1)k–1 (z–1)dF(Mz)
∞
1
Dual: weight  = rank from top down in top 
half of distribution (median  = 0)
NB: (1) x denotes income; M denotes the median; k is a parameter; F denotes the cumulative distribution; t denotes rank. (2) The formulae for the 
affluence indices apply only to values of k for which the integral converges.
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The third point is substantive. It may be seen by eye 
from Figure 5.2 that the curves for Norway dominate 
over most of the range in both directions. Fewer 
people proportionately in Norway are below any 
poverty threshold; and fewer people are above any 
affluence threshold. The poverty curve for Poland is 
slightly below that for Portugal. Also, the affluence 
curve for Poland lies clearly inside that for Portugal 
for much of the income range. We have therefore 
a clear picture of the differences between the distri-
butions in the three countries, which can be summa-
rised as follows, where the Table 5.2 should be read 
horizontally.
A selection of results for other countries is shown in 
Figures 5.3 to 5.5, where in each case we compare 
three countries. Figure 5.3 compares Finland, France 
and Spain. As would be expected from the published 
Eurostat figures, the poverty curve for Spain is well 
outside those for the other two countries at 60 % of 
the median, and this is true throughout the range 
of z. The poverty curves for Finland and France, on 
the other hand, seem indistinguishable. In contrast, 
the affluence curve for Finland lies inside those for 
the other two countries for most of the range. On 
the other hand, the affluence curves for France and 
Spain intersect, suggesting that there are more rich 
households in France for cut-offs above 3 times the 
median. Figure 5.4 compares Austria, Bulgaria and 
Germany. In this case, Bulgaria clearly lies outside on 
both sides of the median. Above the median, Aus-
tria and Germany appear to be indistinguishable, but 
below the median the poverty curves intersect. At 
low levels of the poverty cut-off, Germany has a low-
er poverty rate, so that it cannot be dominated by 
Austria. However, the poverty curves intersect well 
before we reach 50 % of the median, leading to Aus-
tria performing better on the AROP indicator. Figure 
5.5 compares Slovakia and the UK. Slovakia clearly 
performs better in terms of the affluence curve.
Figure 5.2: Poverty and affluence curves for Norway, Poland and Portugal, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over most of the income range both poverty and affluence are lower in Norway than in Poland and Portugal.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Table 5.2: Ranking of Norway, Poland and Portugal, 2012
Poland Portugal
Norway Dominant on poverty Dominant on poverty
Dominant on affluence Dominant on affluence
Poland Dominant on poverty
Dominant on affluence
Reading note: Dominant on X means less X.
Figure 5.3: Poverty and affluence curves for Spain, France and Finland, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over the entire income range poverty is higher in Spain than in Finland and France and that affluence is 
higher over most of the income range.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.4: Poverty and affluence curves for Bulgaria, Germany and Austria, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over most of the income range both poverty and affluence are higher in Bulgaria than in Austria and 
Germany.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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As the above examples show, in some cases we have 
clear rankings, but not in others. Table 5.3 summa-
rises the rankings obtained applying the criteria de-
scribed above for 29 countries, where dominance 
is defined over the ranges 0≤ z ≤0.75 (poverty) and 
1.5≤ z ≤ 5 (affluence) (58). The 29 countries are 26 of 
the 28 EU Member States (no data were available for 
Belgium and Ireland) plus Iceland, Norway and Swit-
zerland. The first conclusion is that the application 
of these dominance criteria yields a clear ranking 
in the great majority of cases: for the 406 possible 
comparisons for each of poverty and affluence, there 
(58) It should be noted that sample sizes may be small at high 
values of z.
are simply 50 question marks for the poverty curves, 
and only 26 in the case of the affluence curves. In 
the case of Norway, for example, there is a clear 
dominance with regard to the poverty curve over all 
countries apart from Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Malta and the Netherlands. The second conclusion 
is that there are a surprising number of cases (57 in 
all) where there is a clear ranking but it is in oppo-
site directions for poverty and affluence. The UK, for 
example, has less poverty, but more affluence, than 
Italy and Estonia.
Figure 5.5: Poverty and affluence curves for Slovakia and the UK, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over most of the income range both poverty and affluence are lower in Slovakia than in the United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Table 5.3: Dominance of affluence (upper row) and poverty curves (lower row), 2012
NO NL CZ SI FI FR CY SE AT CH LU HU MT DK SK DE UK PL PT LT HR IT EE BG LV ES RO EL
Iceland
- + + - + + + - + + + + + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Norway
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
? + + ? + + + + + ? + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Netherlands
- - ? + + - + + + + + - ? + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Czech 
Republic
- - + + - + + + + + - - + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ ? + + + + + ? + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Slovenia
+ + + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
? + + + + + ? + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Finland
+ + - + + + + + - ? + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
France
+ - - - - - - - - - + + + + ? + + + + + ? +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Cyprus
- - - - - - - - - + + + + ? - + ? + + + -
? ? ? ? + ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Sweden
+ + + + + ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ ? ? ? ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Austria
? + - - - - ? + + + + + + + + + + + +
? ? ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Switzerland
+ ? - - - ? + + + + + + + + + + + +
? + ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Luxem‑
bourg
- - - - - + + + + + + + + + + + +
? + ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Hungary
- - - ? + + + + + + + + + + + +
? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Malta
- - + + + + + + + + + + + + +
? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Denmark
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +
? ? ? ? ? ? ? + + ? + + + +
Slovakia
+ + + + + + + + + + + + +
? + + + + + + + + + + + +
Germany
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
? + + + + + + + + + + +
United 
Kingdom
? + + - - - - + + ? -
+ + + + + + + + + + +
Poland
+ + - - ? - + + + -
+ + + + + + + + + +
Portugal
? - - - - + ? ? -
? + + + + + + + +
Lithuania
- - - - + + + -
+ + + + + + + +
Croatia
- + ? + + + +
? - + + + + +
Italy
+ ? + + + +
+ + + + + +
Estonia
- + + + -
+ + + + +
Bulgaria
+ + + ?
? + + +
Latvia
- ? -
+ + +
Spain
? -
? +
Romania
-
?
Reading note: The first row compares Iceland with other countries. The entry in the second column of the first row compares Iceland and 
Norway: the minus sign in the upper part means that affluence is higher in Iceland; the plus sign in the lower row means that poverty is lower in 
Iceland.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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5.3.2 Summary measures
The indices described in Section 5.2 (Table 5.1) may 
be used to summarise the performance of different 
countries in the poverty and affluence dimensions. 
Figure 5.6 shows the ranking of the 29 countries us-
ing values of k=1, which is the gap measure (where 
the primal and dual coincide). Many countries are 
ranked similarly for poverty and affluence. These 
include Norway and Slovenia, with low scores (high 
rankings), Austria, Germany and Switzerland in the 
middle, and Romania and Spain with high scores 
(low rankings). But there are countries that perform 
better on poverty than on affluence. Portugal and 
the UK, for example, have high affluence scores but 
do better in terms of their poverty ranking. France 
and Cyprus are much better performers in terms of 
poverty than of affluence.
How sensitive are these rankings to the choice of 
index? Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show the primal and 
dual indices for poverty starting from k=1, but then 
considering the higher values of k=2, k=3 and k=4. 
As may be seen, there are some changes in rankings, 
and there is some indication that the dual measures 
are less sensitive to the choice of k. Figure 5.8a and 
5.8b show that the primal measures of affluence are 
much more affected. (In considering these results, 
one has to ask how far they are influenced by the 
use of different data sources. It is possible that the 
register countries have more extensive coverage of 
higher incomes.)
Figure 5.6: Comparing measures of affluence and poverty, 2012
Reading note: Iceland is ranked first with the poverty measure, whereas Norway is ranked first with the affluence measure.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014; no data for BE and IE.
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Figure 5.7a: Ranking by primal measures of poverty, 2012
Reading note: Iceland is ranked first with the primal poverty measures Ψ
1 
 ,Ψ
2
 and Ψ
3
, whereas Finland is ranked first with Ψ
4
.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.7b: Ranking by dual measures of poverty, 2012
Reading note: Iceland is ranked first with all four dual poverty measures.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.8a: Ranking by primal measures of affluence; k=1 to 4, 2012
Reading note: Iceland is ranked first with the affluence measure Λ
1
, Norway is ranked first with the affluence measure Λ
2
 and the Czech Republic is 
ranked first with the affluence measures Λ
3
 and Λ
4
.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.8b: Ranking by dual measures of affluence, 2012
Reading note: Iceland is ranked first on all four of the values of the dual affluence measure.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4
Ic
el
an
d
N
or
w
ay
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Sl
ov
en
ia
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
Cy
pr
us
Sw
ed
en
A
us
tr
ia
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
H
un
ga
ry
M
al
ta
D
en
m
ar
k
Sl
ov
ak
ia
G
er
m
an
y
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Po
la
nd
Po
rt
ug
al
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Cr
oa
tia
Ita
ly
Es
to
ni
a
Bu
lg
ar
ia
La
tv
ia
Sp
ai
n
Ro
m
an
ia
G
re
ec
e
5.4 Dispersion, 
bi‑polarisation and 
tail‑heaviness
In this section, we bring together the two curves 
shown earlier in Figure 5.1. We focus on a special 
case of the general notion of dispersion given by 
Bickel and Lehmann (1979, p. 34). We define disper-
sion in terms of the distance between the afflu-
ence and poverty curves. The distance in terms of 
income (defined relative to the median) between 
percentiles equidistant from the median, indexed by 
t, where t runs from 0 (at the median) to 0.5, gives 
a measure of the spread of the income distribution. 
Since this dispersion curve is defined in terms of 
the percentiles, we refer to it as a dual measure. For 
formal definitions of dispersion, bi-polarisation and 
tail-heaviness curves and associated summary meas-
ures we refer to Aaberge and Atkinson (2013).
The dispersion curve combines what we have 
learned separately from the poverty and affluence 
curves, so that it is not surprising that they confirm 
what we have already found. In Figure 5.9a, the dis-
persion curves show that Norway is less dispersed 
than Poland, and Poland in turn is less dispersed than 
Portugal. In Figure 5.9b, Finland is the least dispersed, 
and Spain the most dispersed, with the dispersion 
curve for France moving from one towards the other.
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Figure 5.9a: Dispersion curves for Norway, Poland and Portugal, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over the entire income range dispersion is lower in Norway than in Poland and Portugal.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.9b: Dispersion curves for Spain, France and Finland, 2012
Reading note: The curves show that over the entire income range dispersion is higher in Spain than in Finland and France.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
Suppose however that we wish to go further and 
to cumulate the distance measure. As noted in Sec-
tion 5.2, the cumulation can be from the bottom 
or from the median. Cumulating from the bottom 
is equivalent to cumulating from the tails, and this 
is in the same direction as for the separate poverty 
and affluence measures. As discussed in Aaberge 
and Atkinson (2013), this is related to the concept of 
tail-heaviness (Doksum, 1969, p. 1169): the measures 
of tail-heaviness are the sum of the measures of pov-
erty and affluence. Put differently, we can see the 
measures of poverty and affluence as decomposing 
total tail-heaviness. In Norway in 2012 for example 
total tail heaviness, with k=1 (when the primal and 
dual measures coincide), was 0.32 and this was made 
up of 0.13 from poverty and 0.19 from affluence 
(figures rounded). The Czech Republic has a similar 
score for poverty but 0.49 for affluence.
Table 5.4 shows the decomposition for the 29 coun-
tries for k=1, ranked in order of tail-heaviness. The 
results provide valuable diagnostic information. For 
10 of the 29, the tail-heaviness score exceeds 1. Of 
these, three countries (Spain, Latvia and Romania) 
have both a relatively high poverty score (in excess 
of 0.17) and a high affluence score (in excess of 0.33). 
Three (Bulgaria, Estonia and Greece) have a relatively 
high poverty score; the remaining four (Lithuania, Po-
land, Portugal and the UK) are tail-heavy on account 
of their relatively high affluence score. At the same 
time, it is clear that countries are in general ranked 
very similarly for poverty and affluence. It is not the 
case that countries can score well on poverty while 
be quite ‘relaxed’ about high levels of affluence.
The tail-heaviness measure cumulates from the tails. 
Cumulating from the median, on the other hand, 
yields the measures of bi-polarisation (Foster and 
Wolfson, 1992/2010), which give more weight to dif-
ferences close to the median. Where the dispersion 
curves intersect, these tell a different story about 
the relative ranking of different countries. Figure 5.10 
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provides an illustration. It shows the dual measures, 
with k=2, of tail-heaviness and bi-polarisation. While 
for many countries their rankings remain the same, 
there are a number of countries with similar scores 
for tail-heaviness that score quite differently on 
bi-polarisation. This is the case with France and Italy, 
and with Bulgaria and Lithuania.
Table 5.4: Decomposition of tail‑heaviness with respect to poverty and affluence, 2012
Country Poverty (psi1) Affluence (lambda1) Tail‑heaviness
Norway 0.13 0.19 0.32
Slovenia 0.14 0.20 0.34
Iceland 0.12 0.24 0.36
Sweden 0.15 0.22 0.36
Czech Republic 0.13 0.25 0.38
Netherlands 0.14 0.24 0.38
Slovakia 0.15 0.23 0.38
Denmark 0.14 0.25 0.39
Finland 0.15 0.24 0.39
Malta 0.15 0.27 0.42
Austria 0.15 0.27 0.42
Hungary 0.15 0.27 0.42
Switzerland 0.15 0.28 0.43
Germany 0.16 0.27 0.43
Luxembourg 0.15 0.28 0.44
France 0.14 0.33 0.48
Bosnia 0.18 0.30 0.48
Cyprus 0.15 0.34 0.48
Italy 0.18 0.31 0.49
Poland 0.17 0.34 0.50
Estonia 0.19 0.33 0.51
Lithuania 0.17 0.35 0.52
United Kingdom 0.16 0.36 0.53
Greece 0.21 0.33 0.54
Portugal 0.17 0.38 0.55
Romania 0.20 0.35 0.55
Spain 0.20 0.36 0.56
Latvia 0.19 0.40 0.59
NB: Countries ranked by tail-heaviness
Reading note: The poverty and affluence measures are defined in Table 5.1, with k=1. Tail-heaviness is the sum of these two measures. For Latvia, 
the poverty measure is 0.19 and the affluence measure is 0.40, giving a tail-heaviness measure of 0.59.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 5.10: Comparing measures of bi‑polarisation and tail‑heaviness, 2012
Reading note: Norway is ranked first with the tail-heaviness measure Δ
2**
 as well as with the bi-polarisation measure Λ
2*
 and Slovenia is ranked 
second with both measures.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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5.5 Conclusions
The chapter has brought together different features 
of the income distribution — poverty, affluence 
and dispersion — in a single framework that allows 
one to see the relation between different concepts. 
The framework helps us see, for example, the dif-
ference between primal and dual measures (Fos-
ter-Greer-Thorbecke versus Sen poverty measures) 
and between tail-heaviness and bi-polarisation. It 
has shown how the at-risk-of-poverty measures em-
bodied in the EU social indicators can be related to 
the wider distribution of income, allowing the full 
range of the EU-SILC income data to be exploited. 
We have focused on cross-country comparisons 
that allow one to identify the sources of differing 
performance across countries without reducing the 
analysis to a single indicator. As we have seen, some 
countries perform better at the bottom and some 
at the top of the income distribution, but in general 
the two move closely together. The different parts of 
the income distribution story cannot be separated.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the top tails of the income 
distributions in Europe, based on EU-SILC data. Us-
ing the most recent cross-sectional data available 
at the time of writing, the chapter explores issues 
related to measurement of the right tail in sample 
surveys, reviews measures of income-based afflu-
ence, and briefly addresses non-income dimensions 
of affluence.
Top incomes have raised considerable debate re-
cently, based on new estimates derived from tax 
data (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2014; 
OECD, 2014). From a data point of view, it is interest-
ing to see whether a set of household surveys with 
a reasonable degree of comparability could offer 
something to the debate. Sample surveys often are 
considered to have low accuracy in the top tail, but 
this need not always be the case, in particular with 
register-based measurement of incomes coupled 
with appropriate sampling designs and reweighting 
schemes. Consequently, with an increasing number 
of countries relying on register-based income data, 
the EU-SILC evidence on those with high incomes 
deserves to be examined.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part 
deals with measurement issues, and begins with 
a description of the data and concepts. To assess 
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sensitivity of the results, a semi-parametric approach 
with different under-estimation scenarios is used. We 
also compare results for selected countries with the 
World Top Incomes Database (Atkinson and Piketty, 
2007, 2010), which includes top income share esti-
mates derived from tax data. The second part goes 
through a range of income-based affluence meas-
ures, i.e. measures of ‘richness’ proposed in the lit-
erature. The third part briefly turns to non-income 
evidence of high economic well-being. This is im-
portant given the weaknesses of the relative income 
approach when comparing countries with very dif-
ferent income levels. It turns out that non-income 
EU-SILC data to identify the affluent are quite limited. 
We also find that in a number of countries those in 
the upper tail of the distribution report having diffi-
culties in making ends meet.
6.2 Definitions and data 
source
6.2.1 The data and definitions
Our data derive from the 2012 EU-SILC UDB (version 
August 2014). A key issue is whether income data, 
and in particular property incomes (dividends, rents, 
etc.), are based on registers. This appears to be the 
case in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Slove-
nia, France, and Switzerland while register data on 
earnings and transfers are used in Austria, and on 
transfers in Latvia. Registers as a part of mixed meth-
ods are used in some other countries (e.g. Italy).
The income distribution refers to the distribution of 
the standard modified-OECD equivalent household 
disposable income allocated equally to household 
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members. Incomes are normalised to median, and 
individual is the unit of analysis. The identification 
of the well-off depends on the unit of analysis and 
the income definition. The issue of units and income 
definitions is elaborated further later when compar-
ing EU-SILC top income shares to the World Top In-
comes Database.
It should be noted that capital gains are not includ-
ed in EU-SILC, although they can be considered as 
income and are very volatile and highly concentrat-
ed to the top. Capital gains are typically measured 
from registers, which means that what is measured 
are taxable realised capital gains. Even then, these 
tend to affect top income shares significantly, but 
are not likely to much affect headcount measures or 
rank-based measures. What is taxable in a country 
is very important, and serious comparability issues 
may arise with register-based measurement (60).
Top coding or other censoring or truncation of top 
incomes in the micro data would be a problem for 
the analyses. In general, we consider the UDB data 
as not top-coded, at least in the sense of top-coding 
typically applied in this context. Regarding outliers, 
the data validation routines of the National Statistical 
Institutes may have improved over the years so that 
very extreme values or highly erroneous or implau-
sible values were not present (Törmälehto, 2017; Van 
Kerm, 2007).
This chapter is mostly concerned with non-sampling 
errors and uncertainty relating to e.g. richness lines, 
but standard errors of top 5 % income shares for 
selected countries are reported when comparing 
results to the World Top Incomes Database. The 
variance estimation method used was the rescaling 
bootstrap method (Rao, Wu and Yue, 1992), while 
the lack of design variables was partially circumvent-
ed using the pseudo-design variables created by 
Goedemé (2013).
(60) For instance, in the height of the internet bubble in 2000 
capital gains added more than 5 percentage points to the 
Gini coefficient in Sweden, whilst in Finland the increase was 
around 2 percentage points and around 1 percentage point 
in Norway (Törmälehto, 2006). This was partly due to more 
extensive definition of capital gains in Sweden.
6.2.2 Household surveys and top 
end of the distribution
Household sample surveys are often expected to 
perform poorly in the tails of the distributions. Esti-
mating characteristics of rare domains (sub-popula-
tions), such as top 1 %, may require specific sampling 
methods. It may be that dual frames and/or highly 
stratified samples would be needed to adequately 
reach the very well-off (e.g. Kennickell, 2007). Under-
standably, such oversampling designs generally are 
not used in EU-SILC. Regarding non-sampling errors, 
a working hypothesis is that unit non-response is 
correlated with income level, and that those in the 
top of the distribution have lower response rates. 
This differential unit non-response may cause bias 
which is not easily compensated by weighting and 
calibration (see Vermeulen, 2014).
Some insight on sample representation can be 
gained by looking at the allocation of sample ob-
servations in the tails of the (estimated) income 
distribution (Figure 6.1). One would expect to have 
similar shares in the sample and in the (estimated) 
population if the sample was drawn randomly from 
the population. A disproportionate sample alloca-
tion may result from sampling design (e.g. stratifica-
tion) and/or from differential unit non-response. As 
shown in Figure 6.1, there is more than 5 % of the 
sample in the top 5 % in about half of the countries, 
and these countries generally have less than 5 % of 
the sample in the bottom 5 %. Somewhat worrying 
for the aims of EU-SILC on poverty measurement is 
that there is close to or less than 5 % of the sample in 
the bottom 5 % of the income distribution in many 
countries.
Absolute sample sizes in the tails are important as 
well. There is significant variation across countries, 
resulting from actual thickness of the tails, the sam-
pling designs and country sizes. Törmälehto (2017) 
suggests that if all countries are included in the 
analysis, a practical upper limit for affluence thresh-
old in EU-SILC could be 250 % of median. Beyond 
that, sample sizes can get quite small. In some 
EU-SILC 2012 countries, sample size was below 
50 households already with the 300 % of median 
threshold.
Whilst sampling bias is difficult to measure, sampling 
variance of an estimate can be quantified by estimat-
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Figure 6.1: Sample allocation in the tails: unweighted proportion of people in the sample 
belonging to the weighted top/bottom 5 % of the population, Income year 2011/Survey year 2012
(% of persons in the sample)
Reading note: EU-SILC net sample size in Denmark was 13 352 persons in EU-SILC 2012. Of these, 6.7 % (901 persons) were in the weighted top 5 % 
of the population, while 1.7 % (224 persons) of the unweighted sample were in the weighted bottom 5 %.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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ing it from an observed sample. Since the sample siz-
es in the tails are small and the distributions skewed, 
some of the indicators (e.g. top income shares) 
could have low precision and wide confidence in-
tervals. Some confidence intervals of the top 5 % 
shares are reported later alongside the comparison 
to the World Top Income Database. However, rules 
of thumb are likely to be needed, since variance es-
timation for many different indicators and affluence 
lines is in practise not feasible. In our estimations, the 
estimated relative standard errors of top 5 % income 
shares tended to be around 2-3 % and no higher 
than 3.6 %, implying that safety margin of around 
7 % could be used as a rule of thumb to control for 
sampling error. That is, if the top 5 % income share is 
15 %, it could be assumed that the 95 % confidence 
interval is not likely to be wider than +/-1 percentage 
point. With income share of 20 %, the margin would 
be no higher than 1.5 percentage points. Moving up 
the distribution, more margin would be needed, in 
relative terms, because sample size decreases.
A distinct problem is measurement error. The ob-
served household income in EU-SILC contains 
measurement error, which may be positively cor-
related with (true) income level. The measurement 
errors are likely to be more severe in the ‘survey’ 
countries which collect income data via interviews, 
due to higher item non-response or misreporting 
compared to register data (61). Measurement errors 
(61) In self-reported tax data, tax evasion and coverage problems 
may be a problem as well. It is reasonable to assume that in 
most countries register data contain less measurement error 
than interview-based data, particularly when the data are 
reported by a third party to the register authorities.
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may be more serious with non-regular and skewed 
income components, such as dividends. Compar-
isons with the national accounts aggregates often 
show more severe under-estimation of property and 
self-employment income totals (Mattonetti, 2013; 
Alkemade and Endeweld, 2014; Törmälehto, 2006). 
This may result in under-estimation of the proportion 
of income attributable to the top of the distribution.
Registers also can be used in calibration of survey 
weights to auxiliary data, and consequently errors in es‑
timation (bias and variance) in the top tail can be much 
less severe in the register-based EU-SILC implementa-
tions. There is variation among the register countries 
in their use of auxiliary register data in estimation, and 
this may explain some of the observed differences.
Given this, Figure 6.2 shows the shares of property 
(capital) income in the top 5 %. Capital income con-
sists of rents, interest, dividends and profit sharing as 
a sleeping partner, but excludes capital gains. Regis-
ter countries have higher shares than survey coun-
tries, but apart from France, Finland, and Iceland the 
differences perhaps are not as large as one would 
expect. There is very significant variation among 
the register countries. France stands out as having 
by far the highest share of capital income in the top 
5 %, followed by Finland and Iceland. This can be 
contrasted with Sweden and Denmark, with lower 
shares and where capital income consists mostly of 
interest and dividends (62). Luxembourg and Greece 
have high share of rental income.
(62) Property income in Denmark is not fully comparable to others, 
because Denmark measures net interest (received-paid).
Figure 6.2: Property income, top 5 %, Income year 2011/Survey year 2012 and Income year 
2006/ Survey year 2007
(% of total gross income)
Reading note: In the top 5 % of France, the share of interest, dividends and rents was 31.7 % of pre-tax household income (gross income) in 2011. 
It was 7.1 % in 2006.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 6.2 also shows the share of property income 
in 2006 (EU-SILC 2007). The changes in most cases 
reflect the effects of financial crisis, but also chang-
es in measurement. A striking example is France, 
which changed from interviews to register-based 
incomes in EU-SILC 2008. There is a conspicuous in-
crease in the share of property income: for the top 
5 %, it jumped from 7.1 to 32.6 % from 2006 to 2007 
(income reference year).
Labour income dominates the upper part of the 
EU-SILC distribution, and this holds also for the top 
1 % in all countries (not reported here). The EU-SILC 
samples are not sufficient to detect a point where 
capital incomes would become the main income 
source, which one would expect to be the case 
with the truly affluent even in the absence of capital 
gains. This would often mean going to the very top, 
such as the richest 0.1 % of the population.
6.2.3 Sensitivity to measurement 
errors in the tail
The 2012 data set does not appear to have serious 
outlier problems (Törmälehto, 2017). It may be, how-
ever, that this results from not measuring the top 
incomes correctly. Under-estimation of top incomes 
could be adjusted for, using external benchmark to 
assess the size of the measurement errors. For in-
stance, Vermeulen (2014) used the Forbes list of ex-
tremely wealthy to improve estimates of wealth sur-
vey micro data. While similar adjustments could be 
conceived with the EU-SILC data, there is no Forbes 
list of very high incomes available. Therefore, we as-
sess the sensitivity to under-estimation by replacing 
the actually observed top tail with sets of simulated 
values, which reflect different levels of under-estima-
tion of income in the top 5 %.
The method is based on the often used assumption 
that the distribution of income (and wealth) in the 
upper tail follows a Pareto distribution. The (comple-
mentary) cumulative Pareto distribution function of 
income is the following:
(1) 1-F(y) = (k/y)α, where α>1, k>0
where k is the scale (threshold) parameter above 
which the power law is assumed to hold, and α is the 
shape parameter (Pareto index), which measures the 
heaviness of the right tail. Lower α implies fatter up-
per tail, and it is an inequality measure in itself. The 
parameter can be expressed in terms of the mean 
and the threshold as:
(2) α = μ/(μ-k)
where µ is the sample mean of those above the 
threshold k. That is, the empirical estimate of α is 
the ratio of mean above threshold to the difference 
between mean and threshold. For instance, if the 
threshold is EUR 30 000 and the mean above thresh-
old is EUR 40 000, the empirical Pareto index is 4. 
Supposing that the mean above threshold is actually 
EUR 50 000, i.e. under-estimation of 20 %, the Pareto 
index would be 2.5.
In what follows, the strategy is to fatten the tail by re-
placing the actually observed incomes above 300 % 
of median with values drawn from a Pareto distri-
bution. In the absence of external data on incomes 
exceeding the EU-SILC maximum values, simulations 
were done over a range of hypothetical Pareto distri-
butions (63). Each reflect a different income distribu-
tion in the top tail than is estimated using the actual 
data values. We report here only results based on 
draws from heavier-tailed distributions than in the 
original data.
Figure 6.3 provides a three-country illustration of the 
procedure. The EU-SILC estimate of top 5 % income 
share in Sweden is 11.8 %, in Finland 13.3 %, and in 
France 16.7 %, shown by the dotted lines. The Pare-
to shape parameters (α) estimated from the data are 
4.2, 2.8 and 2.6, respectively, with the 300 % thresh-
old (64). Replacing the actual values with simulated 
values drawn from Pareto distributions with these 
shape parameters result in income shares equal or 
close to those obtained from the actual data. Draw-
ing values from distributions with lower Pareto co-
efficients results in higher top income shares, as we 
are drawing from heavier-tailed distributions. Even 
with simulated values based on α=1.5, correspond-
ing to close to 40 % of under-reporting in this case, 
the Swedish and Finnish estimates are lower than 
any of the top shares in France. This suggests that 
the results are fairly robust to under-estimation of 
income. In fact, since these three countries measure 
(63) In the simulations, shape parameters varied from 5 to 1.5 by 
steps of 0.1.
(64) These are (pseudo-)maximum likelihood estimates (see 
Törmälehto, 2017).
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incomes from registers, the under-estimation due to 
measurement errors should not be large.
Figure 6.4 reports the original top 5 % income 
shares estimated from the data as well as the in-
come shares based on simulated values corre-
sponding to 10 to 30 % under-estimation of top 
incomes. The original values range from 11-12 % in 
Slovenia and Norway to around 17 % in Portugal, 
Latvia, France, and the UK. The original estimate 
is always the lowest because the incomes of the 
top of the distribution where replaced with val-
ues drawn from Pareto distributions with lower 
Pareto coefficient. Three other income shares are 
shown, based on different Pareto coefficients but 
corresponding to increase of 10, 20 and 30 % to 
the mean above the 300 % of median threshold. 
The 30 % assumption generally means Pareto co-
efficients of around 2 or even lower, which seems 
rather low for equivalent disposable income.
Reading the chart, one could construct different sce-
narios. For instance, it could be assumed that register 
countries have no measurement error (first dots) and 
that survey countries have 10 or 20 % of measure-
ment error (second or third dot). This would imply 
some re-ranking of the survey and register countries. 
France is an exception as a register country, and for 
instance the UK would have higher share assuming 
that its interview-based incomes are under-estimat-
ed. The figure is indicative only, but it seems that the 
Pareto-replacement could be a viable tool for sen-
sitivity analyses when there is no knowledge of the 
size of measurement errors.
Figure 6.3: Top 5 % income shares in Sweden, Finland, and France, income year 2011/survey year 
2012, EU‑SILC original estimates and estimates from semi‑parametric Pareto simulations
Reading note: The top 5 % share in Sweden is 11.8 %, as shown by the dotted line. The Pareto index computed from the data is 4.2. The solid line 
shows the hypothetical top 5 % shares when actual data above 300 % of median are replaced with values drawn from heavier-tailed Pareto 
distributions. Lower Pareto coefficient implies hypothesis of heavier upper tail than is actually observed, assuming more under-estimation of 
top incomes. Even with very severe under-estimation (Pareto coefficient of 1.5), the top 5 % share in Sweden remains lower than in France (both 
actual and simulated values).
Source: Author’s computation, UDB April 2014.
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Figure 6.4: Top 5 % income shares, original EU‑SILC estimates and estimates based on 
Pareto‑replaced values over the 300 % of median threshold, Income year 2011/survey year 2012
(%)
Reading note: In Sweden, the top 5 % share was 11.8 %. The Pareto index computed from the data was 4.2. Assuming that the mean above 
300 % of median is under-estimated by 20 % would correspond to Pareto index of 2.3 in Sweden. If the actual values above 300 % of median are 
replaced with hypothetical values drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter 2.3, the share of top 5 % would be 12.6 %.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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6.2.4 Comparison with the World 
Top Incomes Database
In general, direct comparison of EU-SILC top incomes 
to external benchmarks is not feasible, aside from 
some country-specific register sources and limited 
comparisons with the World Top Incomes Database 
(WTID) (65). The WTID provides tax-based estimates 
of the shares of fixed quantile groups of personal 
pre-tax incomes in selected countries over a very 
long period of time. Tax data are used because of the 
assumption that household surveys do not capture 
(65) Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A.B., Piketty, T. and Saez, E., The 
World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.
parisschoolofeconomics.eu/
well the top of the distribution, and because of the 
fact that surveys do not cover long periods of time.
The WTID income concepts, units, populations and 
estimation methods differ from EU-SILC, since the 
latter aims to measure the distribution of econom-
ic welfare rather than personal incomes. Therefore, 
a direct comparison is not meaningful. Below, we 
compare the adjusted top 5 % income shares of 
EU-SILC to WTID, for income year 2009, by modify-
ing the EU-SILC income concept and using personal 
rather than household incomes to the extent pos-
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sible. The WTID estimate for Finland 2009 (66) is in 
fact based on tax data records linked to the EU-SILC 
sample (national micro data), which means that the 
differences to EU-SILC UDB-based estimates are sole-
ly due to different definitions of income and income 
receiving unit, and sampling and non-sampling 
errors play no role. Therefore Finland serves as the 
benchmark in the comparison.
Figure 6.5 illustrates how the WTID estimates differ 
from EU-SILC estimates because of different defini-
tions in Finland 2009. The WTID estimate for Finland 
is 20.7 %, which is the share of taxable income of per-
sons over 14 years of age (Jäntti et al., 2010). While 
the WTID only reports the top shares, the whole dis-
(66) This corresponds to Top income shares – IDS series in the WTID 
database (IDS stands for Income Distribution Statistics, under 
which the results from EU-SILC are published in Finland).
tribution is shown in the figure. Many of those who 
are over 14 years of age do not have taxable income, 
implied by the zero income shares in the bottom of 
the distribution. The concept of taxable incomes in 
Finland excludes tax-free incomes, which include 
many social transfers received in the very bottom 
(e.g. housing allowances) but it also excludes for in-
stance tax-free dividends which accrue to the very 
top. In contrast, it includes realised capital gains.
EU-SILC income concept captures tax-free incomes 
but excludes capital gains. The figure also shows 
adjusted personal incomes from EU-SILC, defined 
as the share of all personal pre‑tax incomes plus 
household pre-tax property income divided by the 
Figure 6.5: Income shares in vingtiles, Finland 2009: World Top Incomes Database, adjusted 
EU‑SILC and standard EU‑SILC definitions and units
(% of income)
Reading note: The top 5 % income share in Finland is 20.7 % in the World Top Incomes Database (IDS series, data retrieved August 2014). 
The shares in the bottom 15 % were 0 %. Incomes based on the EU-SILC definitions are more equally distributed.
Source: Author’s computation from the Finnish Income Distribution Statistics 2009 micro data (WTID) and UDB August 2014.
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number of persons aged 16 and over (67). The top 5 % 
income share of 17.9 is closer to the WTID than the 
equivalent net household income distribution used 
in this chapter. The remaining difference is partly due 
to the better coverage of incomes in the bottom of 
the distribution.
Table 6.1 then reports top 5 % incomes shares for 
those EU-SILC countries, which had estimates avail-
able in the WTID for year 2009. Except for Finland, 
the WTID estimates are based on tax data. The 
cross-country comparability of the WTID depends 
on the definitions of taxable incomes and target 
populations as well as the estimation method, 
which may differ. For instance, the WTID estimate 
for Finland relates to persons aged 15 and over 
whilst that for Spain relates to persons aged 20 and 
over. For the EU-SILC estimates, approximate con-
(67) This is the definition closest to the WTID-definition that 
could be constructed from the EU-SILC UDB for Finland. From 
EU-SILC, we can only look at personal incomes for people aged 
16 years or above. Using 16 years as the age threshold instead 
of 14 years would in itself decrease the top 5 share of taxable 
income in Finland from 20.7 % to 20.5 %.
fidence limits are provided to control for sampling 
variance based on 1 000 bootstrap replicates and 
pseudo-design information of Goedemé (2013). 
Calibration to margins could not be taken into ac-
count, which could result in too wide confidence 
intervals. This, however, depends on the auxiliary 
variables used in the calibration.
Despite the caveats of the comparison, Table 6.1 
provides useful insight to the quality of EU-SILC es-
timates of top income shares. The results suggest 
that the EU-SILC estimates are not that incoherent 
with the WTID. For instance, after the adjustments 
the top 5 % income shares seem to be at the same 
level in France and Spain, and lower than in Italy in 
both sources. Sampling error cannot be ruled out, 
though. Finland appears to have higher top 5 shares 
than Norway and Sweden, and Switzerland high-
er shares than the Nordic countries. The bottom 
row shows the top 5 % shares based on equivalent 
person-weighted disposable incomes, i.e. the stand-
ard EU-SILC income definition. This gives further ev-
idence on the importance of the income concept, 
Table 6.1: Comparison of the World Top Incomes Database top 5 % pre‑tax income shares with 
EU‑SILC estimates (Income year 2009/Survey year 2010)
Finland France Italy Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland
WTID 2009* (%) 20.7 21.4 23.2 19.1 18 21.4 18 22.9
Adjusted EU‑SILC 
estimate, pre‑tax 
personal incomes, 
persons aged 16 and 
above (%)
17.9 20.2 21.3 19.1 16.9 20.1 16.1 19.7
95 % confidence limit, 
+/-, percentage points 
(pp)
0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 1.1
Difference (pp), 
WTID — EU‑SILC
2.8 1.2 1.9 0 1.1 1.3 1.9 3.2
Original EU‑SILC 
estimate (2009 
incomes), equivalent 
household DPI, person 
weighted (%)
13.2 15.8 14.5 12.8 12.2 14.5 11.7 15.1
95 % confidence limit, 
+/- (pp)
0.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.9
Reading note: In 2009, the top 5 % share of taxable income of persons aged 15 and over was 20.7 % in Finland in the World Top Incomes 
Database. Using the EU-SILC adjusted pre-tax personal incomes the share was 17.9 % (+/-0.6 pp) and EU-SILC equivalent incomes 13.2 % (+/- 0.6 
pp). In Finland, all estimates are based on the same sample survey. In the other countries, the WTID estimates are estimated from different 
sources (tax data).
Source: World Top Incomes Database (retrieved 19.8.2014) and author’s computation from UDB August 2014. Estimated 95 % confidence 
intervals (percentage points) in separated rows.
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income receiving unit and target populations as po-
tential sources of differences.
6.3 Measures of richness 
and affluence
The measurement of top incomes and ‘richness’ has 
evolved significantly in recent years, and new meas-
ures that go beyond simple headcounts have been 
introduced (see Medeiros et al., 2014, for a review; see 
also Chapter 5 of this volume). In this section, we ex-
amine how some of these measures would look on 
the basis of EU-SILC. The measures that are covered 
are headcounts, transfer-sensitive richness indices, 
affluence gaps and redistribution-based measures, 
and also top income shares.
6.3.1 The line of richness
To identify the affluent or the rich based on income 
(or wealth or other resources), a richness line must 
be specified. The threshold could be fixed to a spe-
cific quantile (e.g. 99th percentile) or defined as a dis-
tance from a reference level of income (e.g. twice the 
median), as discussed earlier and mostly used in this 
chapter. Some methods define threshold on the 
basis of distributional effect, such as eradication of 
income poverty (Medeiros, 2006). It is also possible 
to leave the question of affluence threshold open, by 
ordering income distributions by a given index for all 
or a subset of different affluence lines (Chapter 5 of 
this volume; Bose, Chakravarty and d’Ambrosio, 2014; 
Aaberge and Atkinson, 2013).
The aim in our work is, in general, to seek affluence 
orderings of the distributions i.e. all measures have 
been evaluated over a range of income thresholds 
(see Törmälehto, 2017). Whether those above, say, 
250 % of median are affluent or have very high eco-
nomic well-being, cannot be determined only on 
the basis of the rank in the distribution. For this, the 
level of income, other resources such as wealth, and 
non-income information such as subjective experi-
ences are needed.
When the affluence threshold is determined relative 
to the distance from the median income, the size of 
the affluent group can be measured. This ‘income 
space’ approach also relates to income poverty 
as well as to certain definitions of middle-income 
households such as those with incomes between 
75 and 125 % of median (Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2013). Common affluence thresholds are two or 
three times the median. An alternative would be to 
choose ‘people space’ and use quantiles of income 
(deciles, percentiles) as richness lines. This would fix 
the population shares of the affluent and put focus 
on their resources (e.g. income shares of top 1 %). 
Averaging across countries, the 95th percentile cor-
responds roughly to 200-250 % of median, ranging 
from 182 % in Norway to 288 % in Portugal. The top 
1 % threshold corresponds to more than three times 
the median, ranging from 269 % in Norway to 480 % 
in Portugal.
6.3.2 Headcount and 
transfer‑sensitive measures based 
on multiplier thresholds
The simplest measure of richness is the share of pop-
ulation exceeding a high income threshold. Head-
count measures are based on empirical complemen-
tary cumulative distribution functions, which should 
be robust to rank-preserving measurement errors 
or other non-sampling errors, and extreme outliers. 
The headcount measure is insensitive to the incomes 
of the affluent. To account for this, Peichl, Schaefer 
and Scheicher (2010) have proposed a class of trans-
fer-sensitive indices which react also to income dis-
tribution among the rich (see also Sen, 1988).
Figure 6.6 shows the headcount rates and two vari-
ants of transfer-sensitive indices using the 2.5 times 
the median threshold. Latvia and Portugal have the 
highest share of relatively high income households 
and Nordic countries and Slovenia the lowest shares. 
Affluence headcount indicator has the same draw-
back as relative income poverty, i.e. that is does not 
capture the large differences in average living stand-
ards in Europe.
The transfer-sensitive indices would rank the coun-
tries somewhat differently. There are two versions 
of the transfers-sensitive indices, concave and 
convex, with important underlying normative dif-
ferences. The convex version is transfer sensitive 
in a sense that it decreases when a rank-preserv-
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ing progressive transfer between two rich persons 
takes place, e.g. when a billionaire gives money to 
a millionaire. The convex version is quite sensitive 
to thickness of the tail, as indicated by the high 
value of this index in France. The concave version 
of the transfer-sensitive richness index increases 
with more equal distribution among the rich, i.e. 
with more homogeneity in the top. The interpre-
tation of what is ‘affluence’ is therefore quite differ-
ent with the concave index. It also is inconsistent 
with a key element of distributional analysis, the 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. For a proper de-
scription of the indices, we refer to Peichl, Schaefer 
and Scheicher (2010). The intuitive interpretation of 
the indices is not straightforward and the choice 
of parameters is not easy to communicate. Despite 
their attractive theoretical properties, headcount 
measures or top income shares see much more at-
tractive from a practical point of view.
6.3.3 Top income shares
The headcount affluence rate does not tell about the 
resources available to the well-off group. Therefore, 
the income shares of those above a selected quan-
tile (90th, 95th, 99th) are often used as an indicator of 
relative richness, or even income inequality (Piketty, 
2014). The top 1 %, for instance, can be considered as 
a small elite group with fixed size, assumed to have 
Figure 6.6: Headcount affluence rates and transfer‑sensitive convex and concave richness indices 
(Peichl et al.), Income year 2011/Survey year 2012. Income threshold 2.5 times the median of 
equivalent disposable income. Countries sorted by the headcount share of affluent
(%)
Reading note: In Latvia, 7.5 % of population had more than 2.5 times the median income, Measured with transfer-sensitive indices, richness 
would be highest in France and Cyprus with the convex index (α=2), which increases with more unequal distribution of income among the rich. 
With the concave index (β=3), richness would be highest in Latvia and Portugal. The concave index is clearly less sensitive to outliers, and it 
decreases with more inequality among the rich.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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economic and political power beyond its 1 % popu-
lation share because income and other resources are 
concentrated to this group. The top income shares 
are often highly correlated with inequality meas-
ures based on the whole distributions, such as Gini 
coefficients.
Eurostat publishes in their web-database quite de-
tailed results from EU-SILC, including income shares 
of each of the top 5 percentiles. Table 6.2 reports the 
shares of income accruing to those in the top 5 % (68). 
The dominance approach here reflects uncertainty 
about the proper high incomes cut-off (top 5 %, top 
1 %). The 95th quantile is in most countries above 
twice the median.
Over the range from top 5 to top 1 %, Slovenia and 
Slovakia never have higher top income shares than 
other countries. Reading from the bottom of the 
table, dominance holds until Finland (cells where 
dominance holds are highlighted), after which we 
find crossings of the piecewise Lorenz-curves in 
this range up to Denmark. Register countries have 
differences. Among them, there is (point-estimate 
based) affluence-dominance of France, Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Iceland, Sweden and Norway. 
France appears to have a much thicker tail than the 
‘old’ register countries, and it also affluence-domi-
nates Switzerland. Slovenia is tied with Norway, and 
comparison between Denmark and Switzerland is 
inconclusive.
The potential bias of these estimates was already dis-
cussed earlier. Even if unbiased, they are not likely to 
be precise because they are based on small numbers 
of observations. Regarding sample sizes, the top 1 % 
typically has fewer than one hundred households in 
the sample. The UK estimate is, for instance, based 
on 79 households and the French estimate on 123 
households in the sample. Consequently, it may be 
better to use top 5 % rather than top 1 % as the fixed 
quantile definition.
(68) The table on top income shares is based on the Eurostat 
web-database (code ilc_di010). The results for some countries 
differ somewhat from our own estimates from the UDB used 
elsewhere in this chapter.
6.3.4 Affluence gaps and 
redistribution‑based measures
The headcount measures, transfer-sensitive meas-
ures and income shares ignore the levels of income 
among the group of affluent. Thus, the low overall 
relative income inequality is behind the low share 
of the affluent and their incomes in Norway, but this 
tells nothing about how rich or well-off those in the 
top are. One absolute measure of affluence is aver-
age affluence gap, which is the right tail counterpart 
of mean poverty risk gap, i.e. the average shortfall 
from the at-risk-of-poverty line. In general, affluence 
gap builds on the concept of excess over threshold, 
which can be quantified with mean excess functions.
Empirical mean excess function (or mean residual life 
function) can be defined as the average of excess in-
comes above a certain threshold. The denominator 
can be the total population instead of those exceed-
ing a threshold, resulting in excesses or affluence 
gaps per capita. Figure 6.7 shows the average per 
capita affluence gaps for all countries based on five 
thresholds, ranking the countries by the 2.5 times 
the median threshold. France, the UK and Cyprus 
have the highest per capita excess income, followed 
by Switzerland, Portugal, Luxembourg and Italy. East-
ern Europe has the lowest per capita excesses, but 
otherwise there is no clear pattern, not even among 
the register countries. Since the average affluence 
gap is an absolute measure, the values are expressed 
in purchasing power standards (PPS; see Chapters 1 
and 3 of this volume), taking into account differences 
in consumer price levels between the countries.
Affluence gaps are also used in a variant of richness 
measures, which are based on the idea of redistri-
bution of funds from the rich to non-rich so that 
the rich do not fall below the richness line. That is, 
the redistribution is financed by reducing the ex-
cesses above a richness threshold. From a policy 
perspective, this could take place by raising top 
marginal tax rates or progressive capital income 
taxes. Medeiros (2006) proposed that the affluence 
threshold could be defined as the value where 
the sum of excesses would be sufficient to get all 
poor at the poverty risk line, i.e. when the sum of 
excess incomes (affluence gaps) would be equal 
to the sum of poverty risk gaps (for an application, 
see Brzezinski, 2010). Hypothetically, if the value of 
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affluence gap is transferred to the bottom of the 
distribution, poverty risk could be eradicated, ig-
noring all higher order effects.
At country level, this method would yield quite dif-
ferent affluence lines, as reported in Table 6.3, based 
on the 60 % at risk of poverty threshold. Let us note 
however, that in all countries the lines are above 
200 % of median, with the minimum of 205 % in 
Sweden. The affluence lines are in fact measures of 
richness reflecting the thickness of the tails, and are 
above 600 % in Cyprus and France.
Table 6.2: Income shares (% of total equivalent disposable income) over the 95th to 99th 
quantiles, Income year 2011/Survey year 2012
(%)
Country Top 5 % p96 p97 p98
Top 
1 % Country
Top 
5 % p96 p97 p98
Top 
1 %
Portugal 17.3 14.9 12.3 9.3 5.8 Hungary 13.7 11.7 9.6 7.1 4.4
Latvia 16.9 14.5 11.8 8.8 5.4 Romania 13.6 11.4 9.0 6.5 3.8
UK 16.7 14.5 12.2 9.6 6.3 Germany 13.6 11.6 9.5 7.2 4.6
France 16.7 14.6 12.2 9.5 6.2 Luxembourg 13.4 11.4 9.3 7.0 4.5
Bulgaria 16.1 13.9 11.4 8.6 5.5 Austria 13.4 11.3 9.2 6.9 4.2
Cyprus 16.1 13.9 11.7 9.3 6.4 Finland 13.3 11.5 9.5 7.3 4.7
Greece 15.8 13.6 11.3 8.8 5.7 Malta 13.3 11.4 9.3 7.1 4.3
Italy 15.1 12.9 10.6 8.0 5.0 Czech Republic 13.2 11.2 9.1 6.8 4.2
Poland 14.8 12.7 10.4 7.8 4.7 Netherlands 12.9 11.0 9.0 6.8 4.2
Spain 14.7 12.3 9.8 7.1 4.2 Iceland 12.6 10.7 8.7 6.6 4.0
Estonia 14.3 12.1 9.7 7.1 4.2 Sweden 11.8 10.0 8.1 6.0 3.6
Lithuania 14.3 11.9 9.7 7.0 4.1 Norway 11.4 9.6 7.8 5.7 3.4
Switzerland 14.2 12.1 9.9 7.5 4.7 Slovenia 11.4 9.6 7.7 5.6 3.3
Denmark 14.0 12.1 10.2 7.9 5.3 Slovakia 11.4 9.6 7.7 5.6 3.3
NB: Countries ranked according to their top 5 % income shares. UK 2012.
Reading note: Sweden affluence-dominates Norway as it has higher income shares than Norway for all percentiles. Finland has lower share of top 
5 % but higher share of top 1 % than Spain, so dominance cannot be established.
Source: Eurostat web-database, code ilc_di010, retrieved August 2014.
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Table 6.3: Redistribution‑based affluence lines of Medeiros, % of median, 60 % poverty risk line, 
Income year 2011/Survey year 2012
(%)
Cyprus 637 Luxembourg 303 Malta 278 Belgium 238
France 607 Switzerland 302 Estonia 276 Romania 216
UK 450 Netherlands 301 Lithuania 272 Norway 211
Portugal 417 Ireland 301 Italy 272 Slovenia 211
Finland 367 Hungary 298 Austria 261 Slovakia 211
Latvia 352 Bulgaria 290 Denmark 252 Sweden 205
Czech Republic 331 Iceland 285 Greece 251
Poland 314 Germany 283 Spain 238
Reading note: In Ireland, all those below 60 % of median would have income of 60 % of median if incomes in excess of 301 % of median would be 
transferred to them, leaving those above 301 % of median with that income.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
Figure 6.7: Excess income per capita (average affluence gaps), selected high income thresholds, 
Income year 2011/Survey year 2012
(Purchasing Power Standards (PPS))
Reading note: In France, the sum of excess incomes above 250 % of median divided by total population was 1 375 PPS.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
Fr
an
ce
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Cy
pr
us
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Po
rt
ug
al
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ita
ly
D
en
m
ar
k
Ire
la
nd
G
er
m
an
y
A
us
tr
ia
Sp
ai
n
Fi
nl
an
d
La
tv
ia
G
re
ec
e
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ic
el
an
d
Po
la
nd
Be
lg
iu
m
M
al
ta
Es
to
ni
a
Bu
lg
ar
ia
N
or
w
ay
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Sw
ed
en
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
H
un
ga
ry
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Ro
m
an
ia
Ex
ce
ss
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a,
PP
S,
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t D
PI
250 % 200 % 300 % 400 %
6High incomes and affluence: evidence from EU-SILC
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  137
6.4. High incomes and other 
dimensions of affluence
The measures of richness based on income do not 
take into account all available resources (wealth, in 
particular), and mostly neglect the differences in liv-
ing standards among the European countries. The 
relative distance from a national median, even if very 
high, does not necessarily guarantee high economic 
well-being. We next complement the evidence on 
high incomes with other dimensions of affluence 
that could be possibly identified from EU-SILC data.
While EU-SILC does not contain much information 
on wealth, it does have a wealth of information on 
non-monetary shortfalls and subjective economic 
well-being. Unfortunately, there is not much that can 
help in distinguishing the very well off. Nevertheless, 
two questions are quite useful: the first is whether 
the household has difficulties in making ends meet 
and the second whether the household can finance 
an unexpected expense without borrowing or oth-
er help. We combine these into one measure by re-
stricting to households who can make ends meet 
fairly easily, easily or very easily (HS120) and have the 
capacity to finance unexpected expenses of 1/12th 
of the annual poverty risk line from own resources 
(HS060). The combination of the variables leaves out 
Figure 6.8: Share of persons who make ends meet easily and have the capacity to face 
unexpected expenses in households above 200/250/300 percentage points of median, Income 
year 2011/Survey year 2012
(% of population)
Reading note: In Sweden, 99 % of persons above 200 % of median lived in households making ends meet easily and having capacity to finance 
unexpected expenses without borrowing or asking for help. In Lithuania, the corresponding share was 35 %.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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usually less than 5 % of those who make ends meet 
very easily. Törmälehto (2017) provides a more elab-
orated experiment with more dimensions and mul-
ti-dimensional counting approach.
This dichotomous variable aims to combine house-
hold’s perception of adequacy of income in relation 
to consumption as well as emergency-funding type 
of wealth. If a household finds it easy to pay for its 
usual necessary expenses, the ratio of its income to 
its necessary expenses should be quite high. This 
may follow from its resources or consumption pref-
erences. All three categories of ‘easily’ are included 
(instead of just ‘very easily’), since the responses may 
reflect some personal and cultural differences. Re-
garding the second condition, if a household can af-
ford an unexpected required expense without bor-
rowing or asking for help, this indicates having some 
buffer savings in the form of liquid financial wealth 
(Morrone et al., 2011).
Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of people who 
make ends meet easily and have capacity to finance 
unexpected expenses, of those who are above two, 
two and a half and three high income thresholds (69). 
Nearly all of those above the twice the median 
threshold make ends meet easily in Sweden, and 
more than 85 % in all the Nordic countries, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and the 
UK. In heavy-tailed France, the ratio is a bit lower, and 
in Eastern and Southern Europe much lower. In par-
ticular, only around one third of the relatively high 
income households make ends meet easily in Lithu-
ania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Latvia. Differences of this 
magnitude cannot be explained by the inconsistent 
reference times of EU-SILC; income data are from the 
previous year while the subjective variables are from 
the time of the interviews.
In most countries, the share of subjective material 
well-being increases with higher income thresholds. 
The differences among the countries reduce, and 
the figure brings some support to having 250 or 
300 % as the high income threshold instead of 200 % 
of median. It seems evident that using only relative 
income to identify the affluent is far from satisfacto-
ry. For instance, the comparatively large 17 % share 
of total income going to the top 5 % in Latvia does 
not translate to uniformly high subjective economic 
(69) Repeating Figure 6.8 for top 5 and top 1 % does not bring 
much additional insight.
well-being of this group. Given the large disparities 
in average living standards in Europe, affluence may 
be better measured with absolute measures or mul-
tidimensional affluence indicators.
6.5 Conclusions
Although sample surveys are not generally regarded 
as good sources on top incomes, EU-SILC is poten-
tially a useful data source as long as its weaknesses 
and strengths are recognised. The main drawback is 
the low number of observations in the top end in 
many countries, which limits the analysis consider-
ably. In contrast, the top tail is not seriously affected 
by top-coding or extreme outliers. The representa-
tion of the sample, possible unit non-response bias, 
and likely under-estimation are difficult to examine. 
This chapter addressed the data quality indirectly, by 
simulating measurement errors via semi-parametric 
modelling (Pareto-fitting). The method allows for in-
stance sensitivity analysis of more serious under-es-
timation in the survey countries. Tentatively, it seems 
that the estimates of top incomes seem not to be 
overly sensitive to reasonable assumptions about 
under-estimation of top incomes.
The split to survey and register countries is impor-
tant, but the differences between the register coun-
tries deserve attention as well. The impact on top in-
comes in France when changing to register data was 
very significant and shows up in a sizable increase in 
property incomes. The analysis of the change to reg-
ister data in France and its effect on comparability 
should be further examined. We also find differences 
among the Nordic register countries. The possible 
impact of different calibration models should be ex-
amined; for instance, Denmark and Finland seem to 
use much more income data in their re-weighting 
schemes and seem to have fatter tails than the other 
Nordics.
Regarding the results, relative measures such as 
headcount shares and top income shares are highly 
correlated with overall inequality measures. Some-
what different country rankings emerge with trans-
fer-sensitive measures and average affluence gaps, 
which take into account the distribution and/or the 
absolute levels of income in the top tail. For instance, 
the share of persons above 2.5 times the median is 
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highest in Latvia, Portugal and Spain while with av-
erage affluence gaps France, Switzerland and the UK 
would be ranked to be the most affluent. However, 
combining affluence headcounts with the absence 
of financial deprivation suggest that identifying 
the affluent only on the basis of income is far from 
satisfactory.
While the chapter followed the dominance ap-
proach, in many cases the threshold need to be fixed. 
Given the sample size restrictions, the upper limit for 
affluence threshold should not be higher than 2.5 
times the median if all countries are to be analysed. 
The Pareto-fitting and non-income information also 
give some support to this choice. Regarding outliers, 
the recommendation is to take the data as it is, and 
only in very dubious cases consider altering the data. 
Simple trimming or top-coding should be avoided, 
and for instance methodology proposed by Alfons 
and Templ (2013) used instead.
The measurement of ‘richness’ based on EU-SILC is 
best seen as related to measurement of relative in-
come poverty and non-monetary deprivation as 
well as studies of middle-income households and 
middle class. The value added that EU-SILC can bring 
to top incomes debate is more on the size and com-
position of the economically very well-off group 
rather than concentration of income to the very rich. 
Sample surveys do have difficulties in capturing top 
incomes, and sampling errors of population shares 
of the affluent are likely to be less worrying than 
sampling errors of top income shares. In terms of the 
choice between the ‘income space’ and the ‘people’ 
space, the former would be where EU-SILC-based 
richness measures have more to add. In other words, 
the focus could be put on the distances of the ‘mild-
ly’ affluent from the average individual, the size of 
the affluent group, and their living conditions.
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7.1 Introduction
With the introduction of data collection about im-
puted rents in 2007, EU-SILC took a step towards 
a more complete measure of economic well-being. 
The definition of imputed rent in EU-SILC takes into 
account both the returns to home ownership, i.e. that 
the main residence is an asset, as well as the in-kind 
transfers accruing to those whose rent is below the 
prevailing market rent. On a conceptual level, the in-
clusion of imputed rents should improve compara-
bility of household economic well-being over time, 
across countries, and between housing tenures, age 
groups and other population subgroups.
This chapter is based on previous analysis by the 
authors using EU-SILC data on imputed rents, which 
focused largely on issues of data quality (Törmäle-
hto and Sauli, 2010; Sauli and Törmälehto, 2010; 
Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013). It discusses the concept 
and measurement of imputed rent as well as issues 
related to EU-SILC data. It also reviews how adding 
imputed rents into disposable income would affect 
average income levels, inequality and the preva-
lence of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
Finally, it updates our earlier results with the most 
recent data available at the moment of finalising the 
analysis, covering survey years 2007-2012.
(70) Both authors are from Statistics Finland. The authors wish to 
thank Anthony B. Atkinson, Anne-Catherine Guio, Stephen 
Jenkins, Eric Marlier, Mira Pedro and Philippe van Kerm for 
valuable comments and suggestions. All errors remain strictly 
the responsibility of the authors. This work has been supported 
by the second Network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), 
funded by Eurostat. The European Commission bears no 
responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, which are 
solely those of the authors. Email address for correspondence: 
veli-matti.tormalehto@stat.fi.
7.2 Measuring imputed 
rents
Net imputed rent is an estimate of the value repre-
senting the benefit accruing to the household due 
to not paying full market rent. In terms of target 
variables, net imputed rent refers to imputed rents 
(HY030) minus interest repayments on mortgage 
(HY100). Given that rents are to be imputed to around 
80 % of the European households, identification of 
the potential beneficiaries and sensitivity to the un-
derlying assumptions, models and data are of key 
importance. The two main approaches in the meas-
urement are the rental equivalence method and the 
user cost/capital market method, with the rental 
equivalence being preferred in the Eurostat guide-
lines (Eurostat, 2013).
7.2.1 Conceptual and empirical 
framework
Conceptually, imputed rents are closely related to 
measurement of housing expenditure and wealth, 
because a dwelling is both an investment and con-
sumption good. A household’s main residence is 
typically the largest real asset type in household’s 
portfolio, and a dwelling provides a flow of housing 
services to the occupant. Moreover, housing costs 
and affordability of housing are decisive factors in 
the choice of housing tenure (71). Our conceptual 
framework is the same as in our previous studies, 
and builds on the following definition of housing 
costs (user cost of housing):
(71) For a detailed discussion, see Törmälehto and Sauli (2010).
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(1) R  = C + L + T + iD + d + r(V–D) – E(DV)
where:
C  = operational housing costs (service charges, utili-
ties, maintenance and repairs, insurance);
L  = actual rentals paid by tenants;
T  = property taxes – tax relief on mortgage inter-
est – direct housing benefits;
i  = mortgage interest rate;
D  = amount of outstanding housing debt;
d  = cost of major repairs / depreciation (of structures);
r  = interest rate on the alternative use of funds;
V  = current market value of the dwelling;
E(DV)  = expected (E) change (D) in the value of 
dwelling.
So, C represents operational housing costs; T repre-
sents how taxes and benefits affect housing costs; 
whereas the other terms refer to the user costs of 
financial and fixed capital. For tenants, L includes 
the other components except the last one (expect-
ed change in market value), i.e. owner’s costs and, 
in competitive rental markets, returns to owner’s 
investment.
The opportunity cost of an alternative investment 
plan, r(V — D), is a direct measure of return to home 
equity. If measurement of income is the only con-
cern, it is sufficient to measure the current market 
price of a dwelling, interest repayments on mort-
gage, and assume some rate of return. The first two 
may not be easy to measure, whilst the last compo-
nent is purely an assumption about an interest rate. 
This approach can be labelled as the ‘capital market’ 
or ‘user cost’ method.
In the rental equivalence method, the aim is to es-
timate what the rent level in competitive rental 
markets is for a dwelling that has the same charac-
teristics. These estimated rental equivalences are cal-
culated for owner-occupiers and tenants who do not 
pay full market rent. All relevant housing costs nor-
mally paid by the owner are then deducted from the 
rental equivalent. In principle, the estimated rental 
equivalent should reflect all relevant housing costs 
plus some profit for the owner. To derive these, one 
needs a data source containing rental prices and an 
extensive set of covariates to control for differences 
in characteristics. The disadvantage of the method 
is that non-subsidised rental markets are very small 
in most European countries, and rental price mod-
els may be sensitive to the models and estimation 
methods.
In EU-SILC, each country estimates gross imputed 
rents in its own preferred way, but most have opt-
ed for the rental equivalence approach (Törmälehto 
and Sauli, 2013, p. 14). The EU-SILC guidelines take the 
rental equivalence method as the reference estima-
tion method for derivation of estimates of imputed 
rental income. According to the 2013 guidelines, tar-
get variable imputed rent (HY030G) ‘…shall be the 
equivalent market rent that shall be paid for a similar 
dwelling as that occupied, less any rent actually paid 
(in the case where the accommodation is rented at 
a lower price than the market price), less any minor 
repairs or refurbishment expenditure […]. Costs for 
heating, water, electricity, etc. are excluded. Repair 
leading to improvements of fixing major problems 
of the dwelling are also excluded. Depreciation (con-
sumption of fixed capital) shall neither be taken into 
account because they are likely to be offset or super-
seded by variation of market value of the dwelling. 
These latter are not covered in EU-SILC.’ (Eurostat, 
2013, p. 214)
7.2.2 Estimation methods
Balcazar et al. (2014) provide a thorough review of 
the various econometric and statistical methods to 
compute imputed rents. The most common meth-
ods are regression (semi-logarithmic models based 
on hedonic price theory) and stratification (i.e. using 
imputation cells). The principle is the same in both. 
First, the variation of actual rents of tenants in com-
petitive markets is explained with covariates that 
are available for owners and subsidised tenants in 
the EU-SILC sample. In a typical regression model, 
logarithm of rent is the dependent variable and re-
gional and physical characteristics of dwellings the 
independent variables. In the second step, the same 
covariates and the estimated model parameters are 
used to compute predicted rental values (i.e. imput-
ed rents) for owner-occupiers and tenants who do 
not pay full market rent.
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There may be systematic differences between rent-
ers and rented dwellings in competitive rental mar-
kets compared to owners and subsidised tenants. 
In the estimation, this may lead to selection bias, 
which can be taken into account in the regression 
based methods. A standard solution for this is to 
apply the so-called Heckman correction, which ba-
sically entails two-step modelling of both the tenure 
choice (owner/renter) and rental values of renters. In 
EU-SILC, some countries have applied Heckman cor-
rection (Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013, p. 14).
In the rental equivalence method, estimated rents 
should be based on observed rental values in 
the non-subsidised sector. The quality of data on 
rents (external data or the sub-sample of tenant in 
EU-SILC) is therefore very important. The imputed 
rental equivalences can be over- or under-estimated 
because the available rental price data may not be 
granular enough. This can lead to crude approxima-
tions from geographically large and heterogeneous 
rental markets, and also over-estimation if the rental 
prices are abnormally high in some regions (e.g. ma-
jor cities).
As mentioned above, the very small size of the 
non-subsidised sector raises doubts about the suit-
ability of the rental equivalence method for imputa-
tion in many countries. The Eurostat guidelines cited 
above set the threshold of the size of the market rent 
sector for choosing the user cost method rather low 
(at 10 %). The proportion of tenants who pay market 
rents varies considerably through Europe. However, 
only few of the countries with a small market rent 
sector (11 countries in Figure 7.1) have chosen the 
user cost method instead of the rental equivalence 
methods (Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Slova-
kia). Only one country among countries with a small 
market rent sector and using the rental equivalence 
method has accounted for the possible selection 
bias emerging from the segregation between own-
ers and tenants: Cyprus, where the share of popula-
tion on the rental market was 9.9 % in 2007.
The inclusion of imputed rents in household in-
come has a large impact on income levels. In some 
countries, the median gross disposable household 
income increases by more than 15 % after inclusion 
of imputed rents. Small details in calculation tech-
niques may have substantial effects on the amounts 
imputed. Further harmonisation of the techniques is 
therefore necessary. We recommend that Eurostat 
provide more detailed guidelines about the criteria 
regulating the methodological choices, the econo-
metric techniques and covariates in the regression 
models, the use of Heckman corrections and choice 
of stratification criteria, and how to control for ex-
treme outliers.
7.2.3 The prevalence of 
rental income imputation, 
by housing tenure
Imputed rents are a sort of ‘mass imputation’ on a Eu-
ropean scale, affecting the great majority of popula-
tion in nearly all countries. Figure 7.1 summarises the 
prevalence of imputations in 2012. Overall, 78 % of 
the populations in the 31 countries included in the 
data received some imputed income. The Eastern 
European countries, Baltic countries and Malta have 
incorporated imputed rents for more than 90 % of 
their population, i.e. individuals in households. This 
is a direct consequence of the tenure structure in 
those countries. At one extreme, imputed rents have 
been imputed to almost all households (Romania) 
and, at the other extreme, to ‘only’ between 50 % 
and 60 % of individuals in some countries (Germany, 
Denmark). The imputation rate is lowest in Switzer-
land (48 %).
In addition to the very different tenure structures 
in the countries, the prevalence of imputations also 
reflects some deficiencies in the underlying data. In 
EU-SILC, rents are to be imputed both to owner-oc-
cupiers and to tenants not paying full market rent. 
Correct identification of the latter is a more compli-
cated issue. Our conclusion is that the variable on 
tenure status is not fully comparable across coun-
tries, and not always consistent with imputed rental 
values. For instance, according to EU-SILC data there 
is no social housing at all in Denmark and the Neth-
erlands, which is incorrect.
Although tenants who pay full market rent cannot 
themselves receive imputed rents, their relative po-
sition in the income distribution changes. The prev-
alence of poverty is higher among this group when 
it is assessed using cash disposable income, and the 
inclusion of imputed rents in income moves them 
further down the income distribution. Moreover, the 
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size of this group is crucial for obtaining reliable es-
timates of rental equivalences for owner-occupiers 
(see above).
Owners with mortgages are an important subgroup 
as well, because interest repayments on mortgages 
are deducted from gross imputed rental income. 
There is significant variation in mortgage indebted-
ness across European countries, and between age 
groups within countries. Average income levels and 
mortgage take-up rates are positively correlated 
across countries, which may reflect the need for and 
access to finance, taxation, and transmission mech-
anisms of housing wealth (e.g. inheritances, privati-
sation in Eastern Europe). (See Törmälehto and Sauli, 
2010.)
7.3 The data: definitions, 
completeness and outliers
We construct the main analysis variable, net imputed 
rent, by deducting interest payments (HY100G) from 
imputed rents (either HY030G or HY030N). It is impor-
tant to note that, after choosing between HY030G 
and HY030N, we take the data as they are, i.e. derive 
net imputed rent in the same way for all countries. If 
the required variables are not available in the data, 
we do not derive net imputed rents.
While imputed rents are constrained to be positive 
in the data, the subtraction of interest repayments 
on mortgage may lead to negative values for the 
net imputed rents estimated for owner-occupiers. 
We retain any negative values since in the short run 
indebted households with high leverage may find 
Figure 7.1: The share of population receiving imputed rents by tenure status, 2012 
(% of total population)
NB: Countries ranked by the share of population receiving imputed rents.
Reading note: In Romania, approximately 95 % of the population are outright owners, and 99 % of the population receive imputed rents, the rest 
being market renters. By contrast, 45 % of the Swiss population receive imputed rents.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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owning more costly than renting (Törmälehto and 
Sauli, 2010, p. 15). Moreover, negative net imputed 
rents generally do not lead to negative disposable 
income, which would be a challenge for distribution-
al analysis.
Negative net imputed rents are far more prevalent 
than in most countries in the Netherlands as well as 
in the UK (2010-2012) and in Switzerland. We assume 
that net imputed rents cannot be constructed in 
a comparable way for the Netherlands. For the UK, 
there is a break in time-series in 2010.
7.3.1 Completeness 
and comparability
The data for survey years 2007 to 2012 include 
21 countries with no documented reasons for breaks 
in time series or other obvious problems. Conse-
quently, the data coverage is somewhat incomplete 
in the 2007-2012 datasets. Minimum requirement is 
to at least have the variables on imputed rents and 
mortgage interest repayments included in the data. 
In this respect, there are some gaps before 2011. For 
instance, net imputed rents could not be calculated 
for Germany 2007-2009 because mortgage interest 
repayments were missing.
It is sometimes difficult to judge if the variables 
needed for calculation of net imputed rent are com-
parably constructed by the data collectors. Imputed 
rent, before deducting interest repayments, may be 
recorded gross (HY030G) or net (HY030N); and Eu-
rostat’s instructions do not specify what is meant 
by ‘net’. Net can be net of actual costs borne by the 
occupant, or net of taxes in case imputed rents are 
subject to tax. For most countries, we conclude that 
the variable HY030G/N includes imputed rents as 
the value of housing consumption minus the costs 
of occupation. As far as we know, imputed rents are 
subject to tax in Belgium, Luxemburg, Lithuania and 
the Netherlands (Juntto and Reijo, 2010; see also 
Balcazar et al., 2014, p. 19). EU-SILC Quality reports 
(which National Statistical Institutes have to submit 
to Eurostat) do not specify the treatment of the tax-
ation. We use gross interest repayments (HY100G) in 
our analysis, with some uncertainty concerning the 
treatment of tax relief on mortgage interest.
The data on imputed rents have become more com-
plete, and quality may have improved over the years 
with some developments in the applied methods. 
However, it is not easy to judge the consequences 
of the varied imputation methods and data sourc-
es to data comparability on the basis of the UDB 
data and/or metadata. A review of the distributions 
of imputed rental income in Törmälehto and Sauli 
(2013) shows great differences in the amounts of rent 
imputed and the shapes of the distributions across 
countries. Different methods and underlying data 
may produce similar outcomes, and vice versa.
7.3.2 Extreme values and excess 
housing consumption
Outlier estimates for imputed rents may result from 
households’ preferences regarding housing con-
sumption, the characteristics of the housing mar-
kets, or the estimation method. As discussed by 
Sauli and Törmälehto (2010), households may con-
sume housing services ‘excessively’ relative to their 
needs. A typical example is an elderly person who 
lives alone in a large apartment after their children 
have left or the partner has passed away. Arguably, 
this adequately reflects the housing consumption 
and the resources available to the household be-
cause the household could downsize and/or re-lo-
cate if it preferred more liquid assets or an increase 
in non-housing consumption. This argument may 
be moot, however, since the quality of the services 
(‘home’) and other preferences (social relations, be-
quest motives) imply that a person’s home is best 
characterised as a spatially-fixed illiquid asset.
As a more technical check of the impact of outliers, 
we compared winsorised (1 % top/bottom-coded to 
threshold value) and trimmed (1 observation or 1 % 
excluded) means of imputed rents and mortgage 
interest repayments, and examined how average 
values of estimates changed (72). We found that the 
data were reasonably robust to extreme outliers. 
Nevertheless, we recommend that Eurostat’s data 
checking routines should be adapted to eliminate 
very extreme outliers in case they are found.
(72) We also made some futile attempts to identify outliers based 
on robust multivariate regression, with characteristics of the 
dwelling and the household as explanatory and log of imputed 
rents as the dependent variable.
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In Figure 7.2, we also examined the weighted 
shares of individuals in households with gross im-
puted rental values beyond the upper quartile plus 
or minus 1.5 times the interquartile range (the ‘box-
plot fences’). We also calculated the shares of those 
for whom the imputed rents (net) would at least 
double their income level. Overall, we find estimat-
ed shares to be quite stable over the four years, but 
with some variation across the countries, in particu-
lar in the proportion with values above the upper 
boxplot fence. For instance, the high shares outside 
the upper fence in Ireland and Slovenia seem to be 
anomalies of the survey year 2012, whilst in the 
Netherlands and Slovakia the proportions are fairly 
high in all of the years. The share of those for whom 
incomes would double is generally low, and with 
some decline over the years.
Although the data itself do not indicate outliers or 
excessive housing consumption as imminent prob-
lems, it is sometimes questioned whether one can 
reasonably assume a 100 % ‘liquidity’ of the eco-
nomic advantage of home ownership. One way 
of dealing with ‘excessive housing consumption’ 
relative to needs could be to implement restric-
tions on the amount of imputed rent assigned to 
households.
With a view to start exploring how such a restriction 
could be concretely implemented, using EU-SILC 
2007 data, Sauli and Törmälehto (2010) analysed the 
impact of a capping based on the number of rooms 
Figure 7.2: Prevalence of outlying values of imputed rents (HY030, gross of interest repayments) 
and doubling of income levels due to net imputed rents (HY030‑HY100G), 2012.
(% of population conditional on having imputed rents)
Reading note: In Spain, 1.3 % of individuals in households with imputed rents have imputed rents higher than the upper fence of 9 172 euros 
(75th percentile 6 257 euros + 1.5 times interquartile range 1 943 euros), while 0.5 % have imputed rents lower than 3 342 euro (lower fence). 
If imputed rents were added, equivalent disposable income would double for 2.6 % of Spanish individuals living in households with imputed 
rents.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2014.
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needed for not living in an overcrowded household 
(according to the agreed EU definition). For dwell-
ings whose number of rooms is above the over-
crowding norm, the imputed rent was capped at 
the norm level. For others, full value of imputed rent 
was allowed. The effects of capping on the overall 
at-risk-of-poverty rate were hardly distinguishable, 
although capped imputed rents reduced elderly 
poverty rates markedly less in some countries com-
pared to full imputed rents. Capping also narrowed 
the dispersion of imputed rents substantially. The 
key advantage of the capping method used is that it 
was based on an EU social indicator that was agreed 
further to comparative analysis and in-depth discus-
sion at EU level. Consequently, the method could be 
further explored as specific to the methodology of 
EU indicators, if ‘liquidity’ is seen as a vital require-
ment and excessive housing consumption a critical 
issue. However, in our view, ‘capping’ should be kept 
distinct from a more general estimation methodolo-
gy of imputed rents.
7.4 Distributional effects
In general, EU-SILC data indicate that imputed 
rents reduce relative inequality, and in particular 
at-risk-of-poverty rates of the elderly. The average 
income levels increase quite significantly in most 
countries. These results are in line with many oth-
er studies (for a review, see Balcazar et al., 2014). 
In this section, we review the impact of adding 
imputed rents on average income levels, relative 
income inequality, at-risk-of-poverty (AROP), and 
at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) (see 
Chapters 1 and 3 in this book for a definition of these 
two indicators).
7.4.1 Changes in average income 
level and income inequality
The magnitude of the distributional effect depends 
on the income share of imputed rents (i.e. how aver-
age income changes when imputed rents are add-
ed), the distribution of imputed rents among those 
receiving them, and the correlation between imput-
ed rents and cash disposable income.
First, we examine how average income levels change 
when imputed rent is added in (see Table 7.1). Taken 
at face value, the data indicate that changes in av-
erage income range from around minus 8 % in the 
Netherlands to around 20 % in Bulgaria. Disregard-
ing the Netherlands, we still find extreme variations, 
from roughly minus 1 % in Switzerland to around 
15 % in Spain, Greece, Italy and Poland.
The impact on average income depends on the 
homeownership rate, the proportion of tenants in 
subsidised housing, the average rents or housing 
prices, the average level of the costs that are deduct-
ed from rental equivalences, the mortgage indebt-
edness and interest rates. Of these factors, EU-SILC 
data show that both homeownership rates and 
proportions of households holding mortgage debt 
range widely across European countries (Törmälehto 
and Sauli, 2010). The share of outright owners is very 
high in some Southern and Eastern countries, while 
housing indebtedness is more prevalent in the Neth-
erlands, the UK and the Nordic countries.
We have used data for all countries, including those 
with missing data or unstable series. The first years 
of data construction seem less stable than the lat-
er years, indicating changes in methods and pos-
sibly improvements in data quality. Such changes 
in methods are typically not explained in the doc-
umentation; only Portugal reported a change in its 
method in 2008 (73). In particular, Switzerland (74), the 
UK, Malta, and Estonia have changes in their esti-
mates which signal possible changes in data prac-
tices, but their Quality reports do not mention such 
changes. Moreover, there are inexplicable changes 
in gross imputed rents for some countries, e.g. Po-
land (2008) and Belgium (2011). In the UK, gross im-
puted rents decrease considerably in 2010. The UDB 
documentation points to a change in the estimation 
method but the Quality reports do not give further 
details.
However, ignoring the seemingly unstable data fluc-
tuations, one observes in many countries either no 
change or a slightly declining trend in the shares of 
imputed rents in household disposable income be-
(73) Portugal switched to regression rental equivalence from the 
subjective method in 2008, and this explains the observed 
change. The UK also changed its methodology in 2008, but the 
nature of the change is not explained in the Quality reports.
(74) Switzerland had a positive mean net imputed rent before 2010, 
then negative.
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tween 2007 and 2012. Exceptions are Greece, Den-
mark, and Norway, which experienced increases 
after 2010.
Table 7.2 summarises our estimates of how inequal-
ity changes when imputed rents are added into in-
come. Inequality and changes in inequality between 
2007 and 2012 are measured using the Gini coeffi-
cients (75). With a few exceptions, net imputed rents 
reduce inequality in all countries and in every year. In 
percentage point terms, imputed rents consistently 
reduce levels of inequality more in many Southern 
and Eastern European countries, although Portugal, 
the Czech Republic and Romania are exceptions.
Based on Gini coefficients of 2012 (Income year 2011), 
there are some interesting changes in the country 
(75) See Törmälehto and Sauli (2010) for estimates based on other 
inequality indices and using 2007 EU-SILC data.
inequality ranking. If imputed rents were included, 
there would then be less inequality in Spain com-
pared to the UK, and in Italy compared to France. 
Looking at the changes in inequality between 2007 
and 2012, not much can be said because the data 
are not comparable over this period in all countries. 
Taken the figures as they are, Gini including imput-
ed rents increases notably more (or decreases less) 
than Gini of cash income in a number of countries 
(e.g. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Portugal, UK).
As mentioned above, the change in relative inequal-
ity depends inter alia on how the imputed rents are 
concentrated over the distribution of cash dispos-
able income. Net imputed rents (including also zero 
values) tend to be more evenly distributed than cash 
disposable income (Törmälehto and Sauli, 2010.). 
Table 7.1: The impact on average equivalent income of adding in imputed rents, 2007‑2012
(%)
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Netherlands -8 -8 -8 -8 -9 -8 Germany    9 9 9
Switzerland  9 9 10 -1 -1 Norway 10 6 5 9 9 10
Czech Republic 2 2 1 1 1 1 Slovenia 11 10 10 10 16 10
Hungary     2 2 Lithuania 16 13 13 13 11 10
United Kingdom 10 7 9 1 2 2 Finland 10 9 8 10 11 11
Romania 2 3 2 2 2 2 Luxembourg 11 10 11 10 11 12
Portugal 18 4 2 2 3 3 Ireland 10 10 13  8 13
Malta   9 10 5 5 Cyprus 14 16 18  14 14
Latvia 11 6 5 5 6 6 Denmark 9 9 14 14 14 14
Iceland 8 8 5 5 6 6 Poland 15 27 15 16 14 15
Sweden 11 9 9 8 10 7 Spain 16 15 14 16 16 15
Austria 6 6 8 8 8 7 Hungary 23 23 20 20 18 16
Estonia 20 20 15 11 9 8 Italy 15 17 15 17 17 16
France 13 10 10 9 10 9 Greece 16 15 15 14 17 18
Slovakia 10 10 11 11 11 9 Bulgaria 23 13 14 16 16 19
Belgium 9 9 11 9 -3 9        
NB: Countries ranked according to impact in survey year 2012. Values (before rounding) less than 0, between 10 and 20, and more than 20 are 
highlighted — in light orange, dark orange and blue respectively.
Reading note: In almost all countries net imputed rents are positive, on average, and would increase disposable income if added to the income. 
In the Netherlands, average net imputed rent is negative and decreases disposable income.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB March/August 2014.
7The distributional impact of imputed rent in EU-SILC 2007-2012
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  149
Looking at the conditional distributions of imputed 
rents (excluding zero values), we find that the varia-
tion of values differs quite a bit between countries. 
This may partly reflect differences in how disag-
gregated the imputation models are, particularly if 
the stratification method is used (cell-based mean 
imputation).
7.4.2 Changes in income poverty 
and social exclusion
Given the sizable effects on average income and 
income inequality, the addition of imputed rents to 
the income measure may also change estimates of 
EU social indicators. We now examine the impact of 
adding in imputed rents on levels and on trends in 
estimates of AROP and AROPE rates.
Net imputed rents generally increase median in-
come and consequently also the income poverty 
threshold (decrease in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land). This causes transitions out of poverty (‘cash 
poor’) and transitions into poverty (‘house poor’), 
which depend on the distributions of both net im-
puted rents and cash disposable income.
Table 7.2: The impact on Gini coefficient of adding in imputed rents: Gini including imputed rents 
minus Gini without imputed rents (pp‑change), Survey years 2007‑2012/Income years 2006‑2011
(percentage points)
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
G
in
i, 
ca
sh
 
D
PI
, 2
01
2
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
G
in
i, 
ca
sh
 
D
PI
, 2
01
2
Spain -3.5 -3.0 -3.1 -3.5 -3.5 -3.2 35.0 Sweden -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 24.8
Italy -2.5 -2.2 -2.3 -2.1 -2.4 -2.3 31.9 United Kingdom -3.5 -1.8 -1.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.6 32.8
Cyprus -2.5 -2.4 -2.1 0.0 -2.3 -2.3 31.0 Croatia     -0.4 -0.5 30.5
Poland -2.2 -2.7 -2.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.3 30.9 Portugal -2.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 34.5
Greece -2.4 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.6 -2.2 34.3 Finland -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 25.9
Estonia -3.5 -2.6 -2.8 -1.9 -1.7 -1.7 32.5 Norway -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 22.6
Latvia -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.5 -1.4 -1.6 35.7 Germany    -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 28.3
Lithuania -0.8 -1.4 -1.9 -2.8 -1.9 -1.6 32.0 Luxembourg -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 28.0
Malta   -2.6 -2.7 -1.5 -1.6 27.1 France 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 30.5
Slovenia -1.4 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -2.5 -1.6 23.8 Switzerland 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 28.8
Ireland -2.6 -2.5 -2.8 0.0 -2.2 -1.5 29.9 Iceland -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.6 -0.2 24.0
Belgium -1.8 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 0.0 -1.3 26.6 Romania -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 33.3
Slovakia -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -1.3 25.3 Czech Republic -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 24.9
Hungary -1.8 -1.6 -1.3 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 26.9 Netherlands 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 25.4
Bulgaria -2.0 -2.1 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 33.6 Denmark -0.3 -0.4 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 28.1
Austria -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 27.6        
NB: DPI = Disposable personal income. Countries sorted according to impact in 2012 (Income year 2011).
Reading note: Decreases are highlighted in light orange, increases in blue. In most countries, imputed rents reduce income inequality. For 
example, in Spain, the Gini coefficient decreases by 3 percentage points.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB March/August 2014.
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Table 7.3 shows changes in overall AROP rates, as well 
as relative changes by age groups. Countries differ 
greatly in the magnitude and pattern of effects by 
age. The general effect of adding in net imputed 
rents is to decrease the AROP rates of elderly people 
in a majority of countries. The elderly tend to have 
high home-ownership rates and high shares of out-
right owners compared to younger households. The 
elderly therefore have, on average, more net hous-
ing wealth, which shows up in relatively large net 
imputed rents. In general, at-risk-of-poverty rates of 
outright owners decrease substantially in nearly all 
countries, while those of owners with mortgage and 
market renters usually increase (Törmälehto and Sau-
li, 2013, Table 6).
By contrast, among children and young adults, the 
AROP rate increases in a few countries and changes 
fairly little in most of them. This is again a reflection of 
the lower home-ownership rate among this group, 
and the constraints of mortgages. This age-based 
polarisation can be observed in the countries with 
an increase or no change in the overall AROP rate 
due to imputed rents, but it also is very visible for 
instance in the United Kingdom.
There is sometimes substantial yearly variation in the 
age-specific effects (see Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013, 
Figure 12). The high rates of change in the AROP rate 
for the elderly age groups, in particular vary more 
between years. However, with the exception of 
a few countries, we do not consider the ranges of 
change rates to be alarming.
One of the most important indicators derived from 
EU-SILC is the ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ 
(AROPE) rate. Income poverty is one of the three 
dimensions used to construct this indicator, the 
other two being severe material deprivation and 
(quasi-)joblessness. Clearly, AROPE changes if imput-
ed rents are added to disposable income, because 
the income dimension and the joint distribution of 
the three dimensions of the AROPE change.
Because imputed rents re-rank people in the income 
dimension, there will be exits from and entries into 
the pool of people who are counted as income-poor 
or materially deprived or living in (quasi-)jobless 
households. Sauli and Törmälehto (2010) concluded 
that imputed rents improve consistency of income 
poverty and non-monetary indicators, such as ma-
terial deprivation. When imputed rents are added, 
the income-poor tend to have higher non-monetary 
deprivation rates than with cash disposable income.
The net effects on AROPE rates of adding in imput-
ed rents are shown for the 2012 distribution in Table 
7.4. Exits are concentrated among the elderly popu-
lation. The countries with a decrease in the overall 
AROPE rates are mostly also countries with a de-
crease in AROP rates of the elderly.
Table 7.5 summarises trends over time (2008-2012) in 
the effect of adding in imputed rent on the estimates 
of AROP and AROPE rates. Unsurprisingly, the chang-
es of both indicators move in parallel in each coun-
try. In a majority of countries, both at-risk-of-poverty 
rates and at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rates 
decrease by one or two percentage points. The im-
pact is substantial in all Southern countries (except 
Portugal), Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Poland and Slo-
venia. The exceptions from the general pattern are 
Luxembourg, Denmark as well as, to a lesser extent, 
Iceland and Germany, where both AROP and AROPE 
increase when net imputed rents are added.
During this short time span any trends of changes 
in the impact of imputed rent in each country are 
hardly detected. The effect on the two indicators 
discussed here seems to change in some countries. 
For example, the decreasing effect weakens clearly 
in Spain and Estonia, while the increasing effect in-
tensifies in Luxemburg, but it is hard to discover any 
general trend.
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Table 7.5: Effects on AROP and AROPE rates of adding in imputed rent, 2008‑2012
(percentage points)
AROP AROPE
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium -1.4 -1.8 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -1.0 -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0
Bulgaria -0.3 -0.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.9
Czech Republic -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0
Denmark -0.4 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.3 -0.9 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3
Germany . . 1.0 0.8 0.5 . . 0.6 0.4 0.1
Estonia -4.3 -4.7 -1.3 -1.3 -0.9 -3.8 -4.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6
Ireland -3.7 -3.8 . -1.4 -3.0 -2.4 -1.7 . -0.5 -1.1
Greece -2.6 -2.6 -1.8 -3.8 -2.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.2 -2.6 -1.5
Spain -3.9 -3.0 -3.2 -2.8 -2.4 -3.5 -2.5 -2.4 -2.2 -1.9
France 0.8 -0.2 1.1 -0.4 0.0 0.6 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 0.0
Croatia .. .. .. -0.9 -1.1 .. .. .. -0.5 -0.8
Italy -1.8 -1.9 -1.0 -1.7 -1.9 -1.6 -1.7 -0.8 -1.7 -1.6
Cyprus -2.6 -1.0 . -2.7 -2.4 -2.3 -1.4 . -2.3 -1.8
Latvia -2.2 -2.2 -1.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4
Lithuania 0.0 -2.1 -2.5 -0.5 0.0 0.4 -0.8 -1.4 0.1 0.7
Luxembourg 0.4 1.3 1.2 2.2 2.5 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.9 2.3
Hungary -1.1 -0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -1.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Malta . -3.7 -3.8 -1.8 -2.2 . -2.8 -2.9 -1.2 -1.5
Netherlands -1.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.3 -0.1 0.7
Austria -0.3 0.5 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.7
Poland -1.2 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 -1.7 -0.9 -1.3 -1.3 -1.4 -1.2
Portugal 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4
Romania -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4
Slovenia -1.5 -1.8 -2.2 -3.4 -2.2 -1.1 -1.5 -1.6 -2.6 -1.6
Slovakia -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0
Finland -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0 -1.1 -0.7 -1.3 -0.8
Sweden 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 0.0
United Kingdom -1.2 -1.7 -1.3 -1.4 -0.6 -1.7 -2.1 -1.0 -1.2 -0.8
Iceland 0.3 0.7 -0.2 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.5 0.5
Norway -0.6 -1.1 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.8 -1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1
Switzerland -0.4 -0.1 -0.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4
Reading note: Decreases are highlighted in orange, increases in blue. Darker colours indicate larger effects. For example, in Austria, the changes 
in the AROP rate vary between -0.3 and +0.5 percentage points, and in the AROPE rate between -0.7 and +0.2 percentage points.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB March/August 2014.
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7.5 Conclusions
EU-SILC data quality has improved in many respects 
in recent years. This is also the case with imputed 
rents. Since survey year 2011, EU-SILC data have 
been sufficiently complete to allow calculation of 
net imputed rents for all countries. Nevertheless, 
we believe that disposable income including im-
puted rents is best considered as a supplementary 
or complementary income concept, to be analysed 
and published as a memorandum item to the cur-
rent cash-based income concept. There are suspi-
cious changes in time-series, and shortcomings in 
comparability of the data between countries and 
within countries across time. The derivation of im-
puted rent estimates should be further analysed 
from both methodological and substantive per-
spectives. We propose changes in various aspects 
of the data derivation process in order to enhance 
the transparency of the concept and measures (see 
also Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013).
The definition of imputed rent in EU-SILC includes 
two concepts. First, home ownership is seen as 
an asset to which returns accrue. Second, tenants 
whose rents are set below the prevailing market 
level are assumed to receive economic benefits. 
The definition of imputed rents given in the EU-SILC 
guidelines needs to be revised and clarified. In 
particular, the nature of the deductions from the 
imputed rental equivalences should be clarified. It 
needs to be made more explicit what should be 
deducted and what not. The reasons for exclud-
ing depreciation should be clarified, because their 
exclusion is inconsistent with the treatment in the 
National Accounts.
The treatment of social housing is a complicated 
issue. We conclude that the variable summarising 
tenure structure in EU-SILC is not fully comparable 
across countries and not always consistent with 
the imputed rental values. Since imputed rents of 
tenants are an in-kind social transfer, they could 
be considered as such. As a remedy to the data 
problems, imputed rents could be added to in-
come only for the owner-occupiers, while imputed 
rents of tenants could be added to adjusted dis-
posable income only in situations in which other 
social transfers in kind are included (education, 
health, etc.).
The countries employ different methods to derive 
imputed rent estimates, but a proper assessment 
of comparability requires a study that applies 
and compares the different imputation meth-
ods in each country. Another methodological 
cross-national exercise similar to that conducted 
by Frick et al. (2010), with focus on applicability in 
EU-SILC is called for. In particular, the suitability of 
the user cost (capital market) method should be 
reconsidered, due to its better transparency, rela-
tive simplicity, and lower production and respond-
ent burden. The quality of data about the current 
market prices of dwellings may be better than 
that of data about competitive market rents, even 
if market price values were derived from survey 
respondents. Moreover, this would mean that in 
most countries at least two thirds of the total value 
of household assets would be covered. This follows 
from the fact that the value of main residences is, 
invariably and by far, the most significant asset type 
in household sector.
Many countries estimate imputed rents using ei-
ther standard ordinary least-squares log-linear 
regression or stratified (cell-based) mean imputa-
tion. Given the differences across countries in the 
owner-occupied and rented dwellings (number of 
rooms, amenities, etc.), the current methods should 
be systematically benchmarked against results 
obtained with a method that takes into account 
the possible selection bias (Heckman selection 
models).
Since the imputed rental variables that are availa-
ble and the data flags do not tell us about the un-
derlying methods, these should be properly doc-
umented in the EU-SILC Quality reports. National 
Statistical Institutes should comply with Eurostat’s 
guidelines (which should be reviewed) as to the 
composition of housing costs (HH070), imputed 
rents (HY030G or HY030N) and interest repayments 
on mortgages (HY100G or HY100N); if they are not 
able to comply, they should report relevant devia-
tions in their Quality reports.
From the point of view of substantive results, it is 
safe to conclude that adding imputed rent into the 
measure of income reduces relative inequality and 
increases average income levels. AROP and AROPE 
rates fall in a majority of countries when imputed 
rent is added in, although there are a few countries 
7The distributional impact of imputed rent in EU-SILC 2007-2012
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where the effect is the reverse. The effects on AROP 
and AROPE rates are greatest for elderly people and 
also younger people.
References
Balcazar, C.F., Ceriani, L., Olivieri, S. and Ranzani, M. 
(2014), ‘Rent Imputation for Welfare Measurement, 
A Review of Methodologies and Empirical Find-
ings’, Policy Research Working Paper No 7103, World 
Bank Group.
Eurostat (2013), Document EU‑SILC 065, Description 
of Target Variables: Cross‑sectional and Longitudinal, 
2013 operation (version May 2013), Luxembourg.
Frick, J.R., Grabka, M.M., Smeeding, T.M. and Tsak-
loglou, P. (2010), ‘Imputed Rent and its Distribution-
al Impact in five European Countries’, Journal of 
Housing Economics, Vol. 19, No 3, pp. 167-179.
Juntto, A. and Reijo, M. (2010), The comparability of 
imputed rent, Eurostat methodologies and working 
papers, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
Sauli, H. and Törmälehto, V.-M. (2010), ‘The distri-
butional impact of imputed rent’, in A.B. Atkinson 
and E. Marlier (eds), Income and living conditions in 
Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg, pp. 155-178.
Törmälehto, V.-M. and Sauli, H. (2013), The distribu‑
tional impact of imputed rent in EU‑SILC 2007‑2010, 
Eurostat methodologies and working papers, Publi-
cations Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

8.1 Introduction76
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the conven-
tional income distribution studies by accounting for 
the value of public services received by the house-
holds. In a previous study Aaberge, Langørgen and 
Lindgren (2010) included the value of primary and 
secondary education and healthcare services, while 
the present analysis also includes the value of early 
childhood education and care (ECEC services) and 
long-term care (care for the elderly and disabled) (77). 
The 2010 study was restricted to 17 European coun-
tries for which 2006 EU-SILC data and OECD expend-
iture data on primary and secondary education and 
healthcare services were available. Extensions of the 
data sets have made it possible to include 23 coun-
tries in the present chapter. The additional six coun-
tries are Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and 
the UK. Moreover, the dataset is also extended with 
observations from 2009, which allows us to analyse 
the changes in income inequality and (financial) 
poverty from 2006 to 2009. This period is of particu-
lar interest since the Great Recession took place in 
2007-2008. Assessing the value of public services en-
joyed by different households cannot be achieved 
(76) The authors are with Statistics Norway. They would like to 
thank Anthony B. Atkinson, Andrea Brandolini, Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier and Cathal O’Donoghue for most helpful 
comments and suggestions. Of course, these persons are not 
responsible in any way for the present contents. This work has 
been supported by the second Network for the analysis of 
EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), an international research project funded 
by Eurostat. Financial support from the Norwegian Research 
Council is also gratefully acknowledged. The European 
Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses and 
conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email 
address for correspondence: audun.langorgen@ssb.no.
(77) For an extended version of this chapter see Aaberge, 
Langørgen and Lindgren (2013).
without relying on various basic assumptions. First, 
since most public services are produced by public 
institutions we only observe expenditures and not 
prices. This chapter draws on standard practice by 
assuming that the total value of public services is 
equal to the total costs of producing them. To this 
end, we use the national spending data on childcare, 
education, healthcare and long-term care provided 
by the OECD. The recipients are classified by gender 
and age group, and individuals are assumed to re-
ceive the average benefit in their respective groups 
of each public service, while the average benefit is 
allowed to vary across countries. The value of public 
services received by a given household is equal to 
the sum of the values received by the members of 
the households.
The importance of accounting for needs and econ-
omies of scale in households when analysing the 
distributional impact of public services is universally 
acknowledged. However, since equivalence scales 
designed to account for needs and economies of 
scale in disposable income are not necessarily ap-
propriate for public services, it is required to relax the 
assumption that the relative needs of different sub-
groups remain unchanged when the definition of in-
come is extended to include the value of public ser-
vices. To this end, Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen and 
Mogstad (2010) and Aaberge, Langørgen and Lind-
gren (2010) introduced theory-based equivalence 
scales for extended income. These equivalence 
scales, denoted the needs-adjusted (NA) scales, can 
be expressed as a weighted average of the EU scale 
and a scale accounting for public services. The NA 
scale assigns higher weights to children and the el-
derly compared to the EU scale, because children 
8
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and the elderly have higher needs for basic public 
welfare services like education and healthcare.
This chapter also introduces a simplified representa-
tion of the NA scale, denoted the SNA scale, which 
solely depends on the number of household mem-
bers in different age groups. Thus the SNA scale can 
be computed for any micro-dataset with household 
information that includes the age of household 
members. Moreover, we find that the SNA scale is 
highly correlated with the NA scale, and therefore 
can be considered as an appropriate approximation 
of the NA scale.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 pro-
vides a discussion of the theoretical foundation for 
needs-adjusted (NA) equivalence scales and pre-
sents a theory-based common equivalence scale for 
European countries. Section 8.3 discusses empirical 
methods, and presents estimation results for the NA 
scale and SNA scale. Section 8.4 displays the results 
of the empirical analysis of income inequality and 
poverty in 23 European countries. A brief conclusion 
is provided in Section 8.5. For more detailed infor-
mation of data and empirical methods, see Aaberge, 
Langørgen and Lindgren (2013).
8.2 Needs for public 
services and equivalence 
scales
By adjusting for differences in needs, equivalence 
scales justify interpersonal comparability of incomes 
across heterogeneous households, and thus play an 
important role in analysis of income inequality and 
poverty. While theoretically justified equivalence 
scales can be derived from the cost functions of 
households with different demographic character-
istics, most empirical analyses typically use more 
pragmatic scales adjusting crudely for differences 
in household size and composition (see e.g. Coulter 
et al., 1992). However, as argued by Radner (1997) 
equivalence scales designed to account for needs 
and economies of scale in disposable income are 
not necessarily appropriate when analysing an in-
come concept that includes the value of public ser-
vices. For instance, the elderly tend to utilise health 
services more frequently than younger people due 
to differences in health status, whereas children 
have comparably higher needs for education (78). As 
a consequence, studies using equivalence scales de-
signed for disposable income risk overestimating the 
equivalent incomes of groups with relatively high 
needs for public services.
A contribution of this chapter is to relax the assump-
tion that the relative needs of different subgroups 
remain unchanged when the definition of income 
is changed. However, we rely on the previous litera-
ture on income inequality and poverty by applying 
the modified OECD scale to account for heteroge-
neity of needs for disposable income. The EU scale 
assigns weight 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each 
member aged 14 and above and 0.3 to each mem-
ber aged below 14. Scale economies in consumption 
are used as justification for assigning a higher weight 
to the first adult of the household. Jointly consumed 
goods, such as cars and housing, are assumed to 
contribute to economies of scale. The relatively low 
weight that is given to children in the EU scale is due 
to the fact that children generally consume small 
quantities of basic goods, such as food and bever-
ages. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that children have 
smaller needs for private consumption goods than 
adults. Even if this assumption is correct for con-
sumption of goods financed by disposable income, 
the picture may change when we extend the needs 
concept to include needs for public education ser-
vices. Thus, if the weight 0.3 is considered appropri-
ate for children when analysing the distribution of 
disposable income, it makes sense to increase the 
weight for children when income is extended to in-
clude public childcare and education expenditures. 
This proposition is based on the assumption that 
children are in needs of childcare and education, 
and that the children and the associated household 
members should not suffer economically when they 
belong to a household with high needs for childcare 
and education services. This means that the value of 
childcare and education services allocated to house-
holds with children should be adjusted for the child-
care and education needs of children. Moreover, 
higher needs for healthcare and elderly care among 
the elderly means that the equivalence scale should 
(78) The equivalence scales estimated by Jones and O’Donnell 
(1995) and Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) show that the disabled 
have relatively high needs for non-cash as well as cash income.
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differentiate between adults in different age groups 
when the income definition includes public health-
care and care for the elderly.
8.2.1 Needs‑adjusted equivalence 
scale
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief pres-
entation of a needs-adjusted EU equivalence scale 
proposed by Aaberge, Langørgen and Lindgren 
(2015). The needs-adjusted EU equivalence scale is 
designed to deal with situations where the income 
concept is extended to include public in-kind trans-
fers. The first step of designing a common needs-ad-
justed EU scale for European countries consists of 
estimating needs-adjusted scales for each of the 
European countries that is included in this chapter. 
Next, the country-specific needs-adjusted scales are 
assigned to all households in the total population 
of the countries in the chapter. Finally, the common 
scale is determined by the average of the coun-
try-specific needs-adjusted equivalence scales for 
every household in all countries. A more detailed 
presentation of this method for deriving a common 
needs-adjusted EU scale is given below.
Let H be the number of households in the Eu-
ropean countries that are included in this chap-
ter, and let ( )0 1, , ...,hk hk Shkγ γ γ=hkγ  be a vec-
tor of good-specific needs parameters, where 
ihk
γ  ( i = 0,1,...,S and h = 0,1,...,H  and k = 1,2,...,K ) is 
a measure of the need for service i targeted to house-
hold h derived from the public service and living 
standard prevailing in country k.
In line with the approach of Aaberge, Bhuller, Langør-
gen and Mogstad (2010), we use the cost function 
approach to justify the following family of relative 
equivalence scales:
(2.1) , 1, 2, ...,hk
hk
rk
NA h H
γ
γ
+
+
= =
where hkγ +  and rkγ +  is the total need of extended 
income of household h and the reference household 
r, as evaluated by the needs parameters of country 
k. Thus, 
hk
NA  is the scale factor for household h de-
rived on the basis of the assessed needs parameters 
for country k, Accordingly, equivalent income is giv-
en by 
h hk
C NA , where hC  is the extended income 
of household h, i.e. the sum of disposable income 
and the value of local public services that household 
h enjoys. Equivalent income can be interpreted as 
the cost required for attaining the same welfare level 
for the reference household as household h enjoys 
from extended income 
h
C .
It follows from (2.1) that the 
hk
NA  scale admits the 
following decomposition:
(2.2) ( )1hk rk h rk hkNA CI NCθ θ= + −
where 
0 0
/
h hk rk
CI γ γ=  is the equiva-
lence scale for disposable income (79), 
00hk hk hk  rk  rk++( ) ( )/NC γ γ γ γ= − −  is the scale for 
public services, and 0 /rk rk rkθ γ γ+=  is the weight as-
signed to disposable income in the composite NA 
scale for extended income. This weight is equal to 
the ratio between the needs for disposable income 
and the needs for extended income of the reference 
household r. As demonstrated by expression (2.2) 
the hkNA  scale can be considered as a disposable 
income scale that is adjusted for the needs of public 
services.
Since the scale for public services differs across 
countries the composite equivalence scale (2.1) for 
extended income will also vary across countries. 
However, to justify comparison of extended in-
come distributions across countries it is required to 
derive a common equivalence scale on the basis 
of the available country-specific scales. As indicat-
ed by Ebert and Moyes (2003) a common scale for 
extended income should satisfy the conditions of 
unit consistency and reference independence. Unit 
consistency means that the equivalence scale is in-
variant with respect to changes in measurement unit 
or currency for any country. This condition implies 
that measures of inequality and poverty are inde-
pendent of the choice of scale of measurement for 
a given country. Reference independence means 
that measures of (relative) inequality and poverty are 
independent of choice of reference household for 
the definition of the equivalence scale.
As demonstrated by Aaberge, Langørgen and Lind-
gren (2015) the following equivalence scale satisfies 
the conditions of unit consistency and reference 
independence:
(79) The equivalence scale for cash income is common for all 
countries.
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where 
1
H
k hkh
γ γ
++ +=
= ∑  and , 1, 2, ...,kw k K=  are 
country-specific weights that are constant and inde-
pendent of the needs parameters and the reference 
household. Note that the equivalence scale defined 
by (2.3) is common for all countries.
Choosing w
l
> 0  and 0kw =  for all k l≠  means 
that country l is treated as a reference country, i.e. 
the NA scale derived for country l is applied for all 
countries. An alternative approach is to give all coun-
tries equal weights or to weight countries by the pro-
portion of the total population. The method chosen 
in this chapter is to weight each country by popula-
tion size. This method assigns higher weights to the 
service standards of larger countries than of smaller 
countries.
As is demonstrated by Aaberge, Langørgen and 
Lindgren (2015) the theoretical basis underlying the 
methods used in this chapter ensure that measures 
of equivalence scales, welfare, inequality and pover-
ty can be considered as a unified framework that se-
cures internal consistency between different parts of 
the methodology and has a transparent normative 
justification.
8.2.2 Estimation method
Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen and Mogstad (2010) 
used detailed accounting data of municipalities as 
a basis for estimating the NA scale for local public 
services in Norway. Minimum quantity parameters 
for different service sectors and target groups are 
considered as measures of the local governments’ 
assessment of the need of different services for dif-
ferent population subgroups. The justification for this 
approach is that the estimated minimum quantities 
can be considered as a result of central government 
regulations, expert opinion, or a consensus among 
local governments about how much spending the 
different target groups need, given the budget con-
straint of the municipalities. Moreover, it is assumed 
that the social planner uses the same functional 
form for measuring the welfare produced by public 
services as is used by local governments to decide 
the spending on public services.
As for large international comparisons detailed mu-
nicipal accounting data are difficult to find, we es-
timate needs parameters for European countries 
relying on the national mean public spending tar-
geted to different population subgroups defined 
by age and gender. Average spending per person 
received by the different target groups of public 
services, such as children and the elderly, is used as 
indicators of the population groups’ need for child-
care, education, healthcare and long-term care. The 
mean in-kind transfers received by different target 
groups are assumed to reflect the relative needs of 
the target groups. Since the estimated need param-
eters for public services are referring to individuals, 
household specific need parameters are obtained 
by simply aggregating the need parameters of the 
individuals in each household.
We use the EU scale to account for differences in 
needs of disposable income for households who dif-
fer in size and composition and the median of the 
distribution of equivalent income in a given country 
as a basis for determining the needs parameter for 
the reference group. Thus, the needs parameter 0rkγ  
of disposable income for the reference household in 
country k is defined by the median of the distribu-
tion of individual equivalent disposable income in 
country k (80).
For households that are not of the reference type we 
use the chosen EU scale to assess the need for dis-
posable income in the following way:
(2.4) 0 0hk rk hEUγ γ=
where hEU  is the EU scale for disposable income per-
taining to household h. Thus, the size of the needs 
for disposable income for household h relative to 
the reference household r is equal to the EU scale. 
Note that the country-specific needs parameters of 
disposable income are used as a basis for assessing 
the weights of the common equivalence scale de-
fined by (2.2).
(80) In this study, the reference household type is defined by 
childless single male adults aged 35-44 years.
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8.3 Empirical 
implementation
This section presents the empirical implementation 
of the methods for allocating the value of public ser-
vices to individuals, and the methods used for evalu-
ating the income distribution.
8.3.1 Population of analysis
This chapter relies on the EU-SILC 2007 and 2010 
cross-sectional data. The data sets refer to the year 
the data were collected (2007, 2010), although the 
income data were earned in 2006 and 2009. How-
ever, the demographic information refers to 2007 
and 2010. We assume that the household composi-
tion was the same in 2006 (2009) as in 2007 (2010). 
The data provide access to cross-sectional data for 
29 European countries: 27 EU Member States as well 
as Norway and Iceland. The results in this chapter 
concern 21 EU countries, plus Norway and Iceland. 
Six EU-SILC countries were omitted from the chapter 
due to limited data on public services (Bulgaria, Cy-
prus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania). A lack of 
participation in the OECD data systems is the reason 
for not including all the countries reporting data to 
EU-SILC.
A fairly large share of the households is constituted 
by two adults below 65 years of age with one or 
more children. In particular, this household type is 
rather common in the Nordic countries and in Ire-
land, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Households 
with three or more adults are rather common in Es-
tonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Norway and Sweden have relatively high shares of 
single adults aged 18-64 without children, while 
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and the UK have 
high shares of single adults with children. For further 
details on the demographic composition of different 
countries in the chapter, see Aaberge, Langørgen 
and Lindgren (2013).
8.3.2 Value of public services
Analyses of extended income normally assume that 
the value of public services is equal to the cost of 
providing them (Smeeding et al., 1993; Garfinkel et 
al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2010). Aaberge and Langørgen 
(2006) question this assumption by demonstrating 
that local governments provide public services at 
different costs. Furthermore, the production cost ap-
proach disregards differences in quality and efficien-
cy in the service production, and does not account 
for the possible welfare losses when the govern-
ment imposes quantity constraints in the consump-
tion of public services. Nevertheless, the production 
cost approach might provide a useful benchmark by 
offering an estimate of the value of public services, 
whereas the standard approach simply ignores the 
impact of public services on welfare.
We have chosen to include four publicly financed 
services: health services, long-term care, education 
and early childhood education and care (ECEC). 
While Aaberge, Langørgen and Lindgren (2010) fo-
cused on the distributional impact of education and 
health services, this chapter extends the analysis by 
also including long-term care and ECEC services 
based on OECD data. The data are net public ex-
penditure, and thus the households’ out-of-pocket 
payments and other financial sources beyond gov-
ernment sources are excluded.
The OECD System of Health Accounts provides ex-
penditure data on healthcare and long-term care. 
In the System of Health Accounts long-term care 
spending comprises both health and social support 
services to people suffering from chronic conditions 
and disabilities who need care on an ongoing ba-
sis. Since the reporting practices of the allocation of 
long-term care spending between the health and 
social components may differ between countries, 
we have chosen to include total spending on both 
components to facilitate comparability across coun-
tries. For Ireland, Greece, Italy and the UK, the OECD 
data do not allow for splitting between healthcare 
and long-term care. Instead, estimates for these 
countries are based on Oliveira Martins et al. (2006) 
who report expenditures for both health services 
and long-term care as shares of GDP. The relative size 
of healthcare and long-term care from that study is 
utilised here.
Education expenditure is available from the Educa-
tion Database at OECD Statistics. The data are sep-
arated into primary, lower secondary and upper 
secondary education. This enables us to identify 
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the value of three levels of basic education in Euro-
pean countries. The data also include information 
on pre-primary education, but we have instead in-
cluded pre-primary education as part of the ECEC 
services.
The OECD Family Database provides public expend-
iture on childcare and pre-primary education as 
a share of each country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). As the OECD also offers GDP data, these data 
are combined to calculate the value of ECEC servic-
es in millions of the national currency. A limitation 
is that the Family Database does not provide a sep-
aration between different types of public financial 
support for ECEC services. Consequently, in-kind 
transfers are mixed with cash transfers and support 
through the tax system in the figures for public 
spending on ECEC services. In some countries this 
may lead to double counting of benefits, for instance 
in the United Kingdom where many parents pay for 
private childcare and are partly reimbursed through 
the tax system.
Aaberge and Langørgen (2006) and Aaberge, Bhu-
ller, Langørgen and Mogstad (2010) account for re-
gional differences in public service provision. This is 
enabled by detailed accounting data for Norwegian 
municipalities. Due to data limitation, it is not possi-
ble to account for spending differences across geo-
graphical regions within the European countries.
8.3.3 Allocation of public services
Who receives what of public services is an outcome 
of government decisions. The governments are 
assumed to target public services to specific sub-
populations based on evaluation of relative needs 
for public services associated with different demo-
graphic characteristics. Children are provided edu-
cation services because they need to develop their 
skills, while the elderly need to receive healthcare 
and long-term care due to their high likelihood of 
becoming ill or disabled. Since both the selection of 
recipients and the amount of public services are de-
cided by the government, it is important to account 
for the targeting policies of different governments. 
Different welfare regimes may have consequences 
for economic inequality when countries provide dif-
ferent levels of public services.
Education and childcare services — the 
actual consumption approach
Two methods are used to assess the value of pub-
lic services per receiver. Either the value is based on 
actual consumption or on the probability to use the 
service. In the former case, the ex post perspective, 
the value consumed by each individual forms the 
basic measurement unit. This method is applied for 
the value of education and ECEC services. Enrolment 
numbers in each education level (primary, lower 
secondary and upper secondary) is accessible from 
OECD. Total expenditure divided by the enrolment 
number provides an estimate of the value received 
per pupil. We assume that participants at a given 
education level and country receive an equal share 
of the value. In the EU-SILC data, actual participation 
in education institutions is only known for people 
aged 16 years or above. For younger children, how-
ever, education participation is largely compulsory 
and we therefore assume 100 % participation rates 
for these children. All three education levels are seen 
as necessary for acquiring the required skills to par-
ticipate actively in a developed society. Thus, people 
that are in the age-group for which education is tar-
geted but do not participate will thus have a need 
for education that is not fulfilled. Older persons that 
do in fact participate in one of the education levels 
acquire a value that they do not seem to need at the 
time (81).
A limitation of the data is that information on partic-
ipation in public or private education is not accessi-
ble. Thus, it is assumed that every pupil in a certain 
education level receives the same amount of gov-
ernment funding, irrespective of whether or not 
the person actually participates in publicly funded 
schooling.
Our method assumes that the value of childcare and 
pre-primary education is allocated to users only. The 
calculation from total public expenditure to per hour 
value is based on actual participation. Since there are 
no reliable data on children’s total use of childcare 
and pre-primary education in European countries, 
(81) Several of these data challenges are rooted in the 
methodological choice of analysing only 1 year. By applying 
a perspective of such a short time span, we are not able 
to account for inter-temporal planning and adjustment. In 
a life-cycle perspective, on the other hand, the understanding 
of income, needs, and public services can be tackled in a less 
rigid manner. 
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we have assumed that total use in a country equals 
a weighted sum of the individual participation rates 
in the EU-SILC data. EU-SILC data include variables 
that provide information about the average hours of 
participation per week in childcare and pre-primary 
schooling. We estimate the public expenditure per 
hour per week given to children in each country, 
and allocate this value multiplied by the number of 
hours attended in ECEC services to the actual recipi-
ents registered in EU-SILC. EU-SILC data do not distin-
guish between children in private and public ECEC 
institutions, which means that we allocate benefits 
to all children receiving ECEC services, irrespective 
of whether or not the child actually participates in 
publicly funded childcare or pre-primary education.
Probability to use healthcare and 
long‑term care — the insurance approach
Healthcare and long-term care services are treated as 
insurance arrangements, i.e. the value is assessed on 
an ex ante basis, which means that it is the probabil-
ity to consume rather than the actual use of the ser-
vice that matters. Such a view has been applied by 
Smeeding et al. (1993), Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen 
and Mogstad (2010), Aaberge, Langørgen and Lind-
gren (2010) and Paulus et al. (2010). The probability 
of receiving healthcare and long-term care services 
depends on demographic characteristics — age and 
gender. The European Commission have established 
user profiles by age and gender for both health-
care and long-term care services (82). By combining 
these user profiles with population data, the relative 
provision to each citizen is established. Multiplica-
tion with the total expenditure gives the individual 
healthcare and long-term care insurance. Since the 
probability of using healthcare and long-term care 
services differs across individuals by age and gender, 
the allocation procedure is carried out separately 
for health services and long-term care. It is impor-
tant to note that the probability of using healthcare 
and long-term care is solely determined by demo-
graphics. For instance, we assume that the value of 
the health premium is unaffected by the individuals’ 
position in the income distribution (83).
(82) See European Commission, 2010, pp. 111-112.
(83) We rely on this simplification despite the fact that empirical 
evidence from European countries suggests that there is 
positive relationship between the health conditions and the 
income levels of individuals.
Heterogeneous population
Since individuals’ needs of education, childcare, 
healthcare care and long-term care depend on age 
and gender, we classify the population into target 
groups defined by age and gender. The following 
age groups are employed by EU-SILC: 0-17 years, 18-
24 years, 25-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 
years, 65-74 years and 75 years and above. We find it 
required to introduce a more detailed classification 
for children and infants. The reason is that govern-
ment expenditures per person to different levels 
of education (primary, lower secondary and upper 
secondary) vary. Moreover, the participation rate in 
ECEC services varies by age. Children in pre-educa-
tion age are divided into three target groups: 0 year, 
1-2 years and 3 years to primary education age. Since 
the age intervals for attending different education 
levels vary between countries, the age group clas-
sification is allowed to vary between countries to 
take into account the features of different education 
systems. The classification combines 14 age groups 
with gender (males and females), which makes up 
a total of 28 different target groups.
8.3.4 Estimation and simplified 
representation of the NA scale
To estimate the NA scale as outlined in Section 8.2, 
it is not sufficient to have data on household size 
and composition. It is also required to estimate the 
γ-parameters that account for the relative needs for 
disposable income and public services as a func-
tion of household characteristics. As explained in 
Section 8.2.3 these estimates are based on median 
disposable income and on spending levels as well 
as spending profiles by age and gender for different 
public services. Since the computational complexity 
may reduce the practicability and therefore prevent 
utilisation of the NA scale, we develop a simplified 
representation of the NA scale, termed the SNA 
scale. The SNA scale requires only data for household 
size and composition by age groups, and is easily 
computed for any dataset with household informa-
tion that includes age of the household members. 
The SNA scale is computed in the same way as the 
EU scale, except that the SNA scale includes several 
age groups and moreover assigns weights to the age 
groups that differ from the EU scale.
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The SNA scale is derived from a linear regression 
(OLS) of the NA scale on the number of household 
members in different age groups:
(3.1) 
8
0
1
hjhjh
j
NA nα α ε
=
= + +∑
where 
h
NA  is the estimated NA scale for household 
h (included in the EU-SILC sample), nhj  is the number 
of members of household h in age group j, and εh is 
the error term in the regression. The SNA scale is de-
fined as the predicted NA scale from the regression 
model (3.1), i.e. 
8
0 1
ˆ ˆ
jhjh j
SNA nα α
=
= +∑ , where jˆα  
are parameter estimates (j=0,1,…,8). Some of the age 
groups have been merged in the regression model, 
which is why the model in (3.1) includes only eight 
different age groups. The SNA scale is also simplified 
in the sense that it does not distinguish between fe-
males and males, since it turns out that the effect of 
gender on the NA scale is modest (84).
Economies of scale in household consumption are 
captured by a positive estimate for the constant 
term 
0
α  in the regression equation (3.1), while a zero 
estimate for the constant term implies that there are 
no economies of scale. When a similar regression as 
(3.1) is performed with the EU scale on the left hand 
side, the parameter 
0
α  is estimated equal to 0.5, 
since the first adult is assigned a weight 1, which is 
0.5 higher than the weight of other adults in the EU 
scale (85). However, since the NA scale is normalised 
to 1 for the reference household type, we impose 
the restriction 0 1 rα α= − , where r is the age group 
of the (single) reference household type (86). This re-
(84) The NA scale is estimated based on 28 target groups (14 age 
groups times 2 genders). When all 28 target groups are included 
in the regression model for the NA scale, we find that the 
model explains 100 % of the variation in the NA scale. Thus, the 
reduction in the number of target groups is the reason why the 
SNA scale is not an exact representation of the NA scale.
(85) Furthermore, the parameter estimate for adults is 0.5 and the 
parameter estimate for children is 0.3 in a similar regression 
with the EU scale on the left hand side.
(86) While the reference household type for the NA scale includes 
single males aged 35-44 years, the reference household type 
for the SNA scale is broader by including single households of 
both genders above education age to 54 years of age.
striction secures that the SNA scale is equal to 1 for 
the reference household type (87).
In order to allow for flexibility we have estimated the 
NA scale and the SNA scale for each of four different 
public services, and also for different combinations 
of the public services that are included in this chap-
ter. This procedure also provides information about 
the contribution of different public services to the 
SNA scale.
The estimation results are reported in Table 8.1. As 
a measure of model fit R2-adjusted shows that the 
goodness of fit is almost perfect for the six different 
models for different combinations of public services. 
The results show that children and elderly are given 
higher weights in the SNA scale than in the EU-scale, 
depending on which public services are included 
in the NA scale. Including childcare and education 
increases the weights of children, while including 
long-term-care and healthcare increases the weights 
of the elderly.
The SNA scale is an approximation of the NA scale 
that can be easily applied by scholars interested in 
examining the distribution of extended income 
when services such as childcare, long-term care, 
healthcare and/or education are included in the 
analysis. The SNA scale that includes all four ser-
vices is computed by using the weights for age 
groups that are reported in the last column of Ta-
ble 8.1. For comparison of the SNA scale estimates 
across household types and their close agreement 
with NA scale estimates, we refer to Table 5 in 
Aaberge et al. (2013).
(87) When healthcare is included in the definition of extended 
income, the estimate of 
0
α  is below 0.5. This owes to the fact 
that healthcare is the most important service received by the 
reference household. A positive need for public services for the 
reference household implies that economies of scale are less 
important in the NA scale than in the EU scale, since the NA 
scale for public services does not include economies of scale.
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Table 8.1: SNA scale estimation results, including different public services in the scale, 2009
Variable ECEC Education Healthcare Long‑term care
Education 
and 
healthcare
All 4 
services
Constant 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.46
0‑3 years 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.41
3 years to education age 0.56 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.57
Education age 
(below 14 years)
0.30 0.67 0.34 0.30 0.69 0.69
Education age 
(above 13 years)
0.50 0.95 0.53 0.50 0.95 0.95
Above education age — 
54 years
0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.54
55‑64 years 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.60
65‑74 years 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.51 0.67 0.69
75 years and above 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.57 0.75 0.86
R2 adjusted 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999
Reading note: Figures are estimated weights assigned to individuals in different age groups. When all four services are included, a person 75 years 
old contributes (additively) with a weight of 0.86. The constant weight is added to the sum of weights over individuals in a given household to 
derive the household equivalence scale. The reference household scale equals unity, where the reference group is childless single adults below 
55 years and above education age.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB October 2012 and OECD data.
Table 8.2: Definitions of equivalent income
Income definition Equivalence scale Equivalent income definition
Disposable income EU scale Disposable income (EU)
Extended income EU scale Extended income (EU)
Extended income NA scale Extended income (NA)
Extended income SNA scale Extended income (SNA)
8.3.5 Income definitions
We consider four different combinations of income 
definitions and equivalence scales in this chapter. 
First, we use the standard approach combining dis-
posable income and the EU equivalence scale. Fur-
thermore, extended income is combined with three 
different equivalence scales. For the sake of compari-
son the EU scale is used in combination with extend-
ed income, since many studies have used the dis-
posable income equivalence scale also for making 
comparisons across heterogeneous households in 
the analysis of extended income. However, using the 
extended income in combination with the NA scale 
has a more convincing theoretical justification. Thus, 
we provide empirical evidence on the potential bias 
in inequality and poverty estimates when using EU 
scale rather than the NA scale for analysing the dis-
tribution of extended income. Finally, we include the 
combination of extended income with the SNA scale 
as a test of the sensitivity of the empirical results by 
replacing the NA scale with the SNA scale. Table 8.2 
displays the different combinations of income defi-
nitions and equivalence scales used in this chapter.
The EU-SILC variable HY020 is used as a measure of 
disposable income (88). The disposable income vari-
able is defined by the sum of earnings, self-employ-
ment income, capital income, public cash transfers, 
imputed rent and subtracted income taxes. Note 
that this variable also includes non-cash compo-
nents, such as non-cash employee income, imput-
(88) Disposable income in national currency is defined by HY020 
(disposable income in Euros) * HX010 (Exchange rate) * HY025 
(Inflation factor).
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ed rent (89) and value of home produced goods 
for household consumption. We refer to Table 7 of 
Aaberge et al. (2013) who presents country-spe-
cific relative distributions of extended income by 
income components. The results show that while 
disposable income is by far the most important 
income component in all countries, there are sig-
nificant differences in relative disposable income. 
Note also that health insurance and education ac-
count for a major share of in-kind transfers from the 
government to the households.
8.3.6 Household weights
When estimating measures of inequality in a hetero-
geneous population, there are different methods for 
weighting different household types. The standard 
approach, favoured for instance by Shorrocks (2004), 
assigns a weight given by household size (number 
of household members) to each household. This 
means that the unit of analysis is given by individu-
als, and the Lorenz curve is defined over the popula-
tion of individuals and equivalent incomes assigned 
to individuals. An alternative method is proposed by 
Ebert (1997) where household needs as measured by 
the equivalence scale are used to weight the house-
holds. This means that the unit of analysis is given by 
‘equivalent adults’. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shor-
rocks (2004) argue that the two weighting methods 
are supported by different ethical principles. In this 
chapter, we follow the standard approach weighting 
households by their size which means that individu-
als are treated as the unit of analysis. For a compari-
son with results based on households weighted by 
their needs, we refer to Aaberge et al. (2015).
In this chapter, statistics on income distribution 
are generally calculated on the basis of equivalent 
incomes allocated to individuals, using cross-sec-
tional sampling weights available in the EU-SILC 
data set. The purpose of weighting is to reduce 
biases in the estimation in order to draw inference 
from the EU-SILC sample to the whole population. 
For obtaining population estimates, respondents 
are given weights which are inversely proportional 
(89) Imputed rent is defined as the value of owning your dwelling 
or having access to below-market or free-of-rent dwelling, 
and is estimated as the market rent. For an analysis of the 
distributional impact of imputed rent in EU-SILC, see Chapter 7 
in this volume.
to the probability of being selected. Moreover, the 
sample weights are adjusted to counterbalance 
non-response. However, we do not have full infor-
mation on how these weights are constructed in 
each country, because the national statistical institu-
tions are not obliged to provide full details.
8.4 Empirical Results
This section examines the impact on income in-
equality and poverty estimates of accounting for 
non-cash income from public services, while ac-
counting for differences in needs for such services 
across individuals and households.
8.4.1 Income inequality
Empirical analyses of inequality in income distribu-
tions are normally based on the Lorenz curve. To 
summarise the information content of the Lorenz 
curve and to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz 
curves we follow the standard approach by using 
the Gini coefficient, which is equal to twice the area 
between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference.
Table 8.3 shows that disposable income inequality 
is low in Slovenia, Sweden and Norway and high 
in Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and 
the UK — the Gini coefficient shows a difference 
of around ten percentage points. By replacing dis-
posable income with extended income, the esti-
mates of inequality become significantly smaller in 
all countries; the reduction of the Gini coefficients is 
approximately 20 %. When extended income with 
the NA scale is used, the estimated Gini coefficients 
are slightly higher than when extended income EU 
scale is used. Hence, some of the equalising effect of 
public services is offset when we adjust for needs for 
public services. Table 8.3 shows that the SNA scale 
produces estimates that are rather close to the es-
timates based on the NA scale. Note that the 2008 
financial crisis appears to have had an ambiguous 
short run effect on income inequality in European 
countries, since inequality increases or is unchanged 
in some countries whereas it decreases in other 
countries.
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Table 8.3: Gini coefficient for the distribution of income by income definition and country, 
2006 and 2009
(%)
Country
Disposable income 
(EU)
Extended income 
(EU)
Extended income 
(NA)
Extended income 
(SNA)
2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009
Belgium 26.2 26.1 20.8 20.6 21.3 21.0 21.3 21.0
Czech Republic 25.2 24.8 19.6 19.3 20.8 20.5 20.9 20.5
Denmark 24.0 24.8 18.6 19.1 18.4 19.1 18.5 19.3
Germany 29.8 28.9 24.4 23.4 25.4 24.3 25.4 24.4
Estonia 32.8 31.2 27.1 25.7 28.3 26.4 28.2 26.3
Ireland 31.3 32.8 24.3 24.7 25.7 26.1 25.7 26.1
Greece 34.3 32.8 28.1 27.3 28.9 28.1 29.0 28.1
Spain 31.2 33.2 24.8 26.1 25.9 26.9 25.9 27.0
France - 29.5 - 23.8 - 24.1 - 24.1
Italy 32.1 31.0 25.5 24.7 26.4 25.8 26.5 25.8
Luxembourg 27.4 27.7 21.7 21.0 21.8 21.5 21.9 21.5
Hungary 25.5 24.0 19.9 19.1 20.3 19.6 20.3 19.6
Netherlands 27.1 25.2 20.7 19.3 21.3 19.6 21.4 19.7
Austria 26.1 26.0 20.7 20.7 21.3 21.1 21.4 21.2
Poland 32.0 31.1 26.1 25.5 26.9 26.5 26.9 26.5
Portugal 36.6 33.5 29.0 26.3 29.8 27.2 29.8 27.3
Slovenia 22.6 23.8 18.7 19.8 18.8 19.8 18.8 19.8
Slovakia 24.6 26.0 18.8 20.2 20.4 21.8 20.4 21.8
Finland 25.9 25.2 20.9 20.4 21.3 20.6 21.4 20.7
Sweden 23.2 23.8 17.0 18.1 17.3 18.1 17.4 18.2
United Kingdom 32.8 32.8 26.3 25.8 27.6 26.6 27.7 26.7
Iceland 27.8 25.5 21.8 20.2 22.1 20.6 22.2 20.7
Norway 23.2 22.8 17.8 17.5 18.0 17.7 18.2 17.9
NB: France is treated as missing in 2006 due to a break in time series.
Reading note: In Austria, the Gini coefficient is equal to 21.3 in 2006 and 21.1 in 2009 when the income measure is extended income adjusted by 
NA scale.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB October 2012 and OECD data.
8.4.2 At‑risk‑of‑poverty
Table 8.4 displays the at-risk-of-poverty rates in Euro-
pean countries, according to four different income 
definitions in 2006 and 2009. In line with the EU defi-
nition, a person is at risk of poverty if he or she has 
an income lower than 60 % of the median income of 
the country where he or she lives (this approach is 
followed for either concept of income — disposable 
and extended). By replacing disposable income (EU) 
with extended income (NA), the estimated propor-
tion of people who are at risk of poverty is reduced 
by at least 40 % in most countries.
A breakdown of the population by household type 
(not presented here) shows that households with 
single adults below 65 years (with or without chil-
dren) are exposed to a relatively higher risk of pov-
erty when needs for public services are accounted 
for. Elderly couples aged 65 years and above face 
a lower risk of poverty in most European countries. 
For elderly single adults aged 65 years and above the 
impact on the risk of poverty varies considerably be-
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tween European countries, depending on the level 
of public cash and in-kind transfers received by the 
elderly. For further results, see Aaberge et al. (2013).
Poverty estimates based on our extended income 
measure do not change much when the NA scale 
is replaced by the SNA scale. Moreover, the rank-
ing of countries by the poverty headcount is rather 
insensitive to changes in the income measure. For 
all definitions, the Czech Republic, Iceland and the 
Netherlands have a low poverty rate, while Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK 
have relatively high poverty rates. Most countries 
experience a rise in poverty from 2006 to 2009, irre-
spective of the income definition that is used.
Table 8.4: At‑risk‑of‑poverty by income definition and country, 2006 and 2009
(%)
Country
Disposable income 
(EU)
Extended income 
(EU)
Extended income 
(NA)
Extended income 
(SNA)
2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009
Belgium 15.1 14.6 9.0 9.7 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.3
Czech Republic 9.5 8.9 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7
Denmark 10.5 12.4 8.1 9.4 5.2 6.8 5.2 6.8
Germany 14.7 15.5 10.6 10.6 9.3 8.8 9.2 8.8
Estonia 19.6 15.7 14.5 12.1 14.1 11.1 14.3 11.1
Ireland 16.5 15.2 9.2 9.6 7.0 6.6 7.1 6.4
Greece 20.5 20.0 12.7 13.1 12.5 13.1 12.4 13.2
Spain 19.7 20.6 11.2 12.8 11.8 12.8 11.7 12.6
France - 12.8 - 7.5 - 6.5 - 6.6
Italy 19.7 18.1 11.6 11.4 11.5 11.0 11.5 11.1
Luxembourg 13.4 14.5 8.2 8.5 5.9 6.2 6.0 6.3
Hungary 12.2 12.1 7.2 6.4 5.6 5.0 5.6 5.0
Netherlands 9.8 9.6 6.2 6.6 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3
Austria 11.8 11.9 7.5 7.2 5.6 5.3 5.7 5.4
Poland 17.3 17.4 11.4 11.4 10.3 10.9 10.4 10.7
Portugal 18.2 18.0 10.0 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3
Slovenia 10.8 12.7 7.7 9.2 6.2 7.8 6.1 7.7
Slovakia 10.5 12.0 5.3 7.1 5.9 7.6 6.0 7.5
Finland 12.5 12.8 8.8 9.2 5.9 6.6 5.8 6.5
Sweden 10.1 12.5 7.5 8.9 5.3 6.4 5.4 6.5
United Kingdom 18.8 17.1 11.3 11.3 10.6 9.3 10.6 9.4
Iceland 9.5 9.0 6.2 6.7 3.7 5.0 3.6 5.1
Norway 11.2 10.0 8.4 7.4 6.6 5.2 6.5 5.1
NB: France is treated as missing in 2006 due to a break in time series.
Reading note: In Austria, the poverty rate is equal to 5.6 % in 2006 and 5.3 % in 2009 when the income measure is extended income adjusted by 
NA scale.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB October 2012 and OECD data.
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When the EU scale is replaced with the NA scale in 
the analysis of extended income, the results present-
ed in this chapter show that the change in income in-
equality and poverty is modest. For most countries, 
inequality estimates become higher and poverty 
estimates smaller when the EU scale is replaced with 
the NA scale. However, as has been demonstrated by 
Aaberge et al. (2013) the choice of equivalence scale 
has a significant impact on poverty estimates of sub-
groups of the population.
8.4.3 Overlap between poverty 
and material deprivation
The ‘standard’ (as opposed to ‘severe’) EU indicator 
of material deprivation rate expresses the inability to 
afford at least three items out of nine specified items, 
considered by most people across Europe to be de-
sirable or even necessary to provide an adequate life 
(see Guio et al. (2012) as well as Chapters 10 and 13 in 
this book). So, material deprivation (MD) is based on 
respondents reporting a lack of items and assessing 
this lack as being due to a lack of financial resources. 
By contrast, the at-risk-of-poverty definition (based 
on disposable and extended income) is ‘objective’, in 
the sense that it is derived from an income measure.
Table 8.5 displays a breakdown of the population 
into groups with different types of overlap between 
MD and poverty measures based on disposable in-
come (EU scale) and extended income (NA scale). 
Note that the total rate of MD can be calculated by 
adding figures in columns number one, three, four 
and seven in Table 8.5.
Material deprivation and poverty are known to 
capture different aspects of poor living conditions 
and to overlap (very) imperfectly, for a variety of 
reasons, besides measurement errors for both in-
dicators (see among others Fusco et al., 2011). Even 
if a non-negligible proportion of the population 
suffers from both income poverty (disposable and 
extended income) and MD (see Table 8.5, first col-
umn ‘yes-yes-yes’), the two measures do not overlap 
for a substantial proportion of the population, who 
suffers:
1. either from MD, but not income poverty;
2. from income poverty, but not MD.
The first group, which is deprived but not poor 
(whatever the income poverty measure used — see 
the seventh column ‘no-no-yes’), is relatively large 
in Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia, 
whereas this group constitutes small proportions in 
wealthy nations like the Nordic countries, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This reflects the 
difference between the use of relative poverty meas-
ures and a measure of MD which is designed to cap-
ture differences in national level of living standards.
The second group consists of people who are in-
come-poor but not materially deprived. This is the 
case, in particular, of people who can rely on savings/
assets or on transfers in-kind. Indeed, all things be-
ing equal, people who benefit from ample in-kind 
transfers can more easily spend a larger share of their 
budget on other expenses (such as food, heating, 
durables or holidays) than those who have to pay for 
social services. Our approach allows disentangling 
different explanatory factors at the international 
level. In Table 8.5, those (disposable) income-poor 
but not deprived may also be income-poor once 
the extended definition is used (second column 
(‘yes-yes-no’) or may no longer be income-poor on 
the basis of the extended definition (fifth column 
‘yes-no-no’). For this last group, the non-overlap 
between income poverty and MD disappears once 
transfers in-kind are taken into account. This group 
represents a substantial share of those ‘disposable 
income-poor and not deprived’. This share (i.e. the 
share of the fifth column in the sum of the second 
and fifth columns) attains 60 % or more in Austria 
and Luxembourg, and is between 50 % and 60 % in 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Norway, meaning that 
in these countries more than half of the lack of over-
lap between ‘income poverty’ and ‘non-deprivation’ 
may (partly) be explained by the role of transfers 
in-kind (Germany and Sweden are borderline).
Finally, Table 8.5 confirms previous results, show-
ing that using the extended income definition 
rather than the disposable income definition de-
creases the income poverty risk. Indeed, the pro-
portion of people not poor according to the dis-
posable income definition, who would become 
poor once the extended income is used, is almost 
non-existent (see fourth column ‘no-yes-yes’ and 
sixth column ‘no-yes-no’).
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Table 8.5: Overlap between poverty and material deprivation by income definition and country, 2009
(%)
Incidence of poverty and material deprivation by combination
Disposable income (EU) poverty Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
Extended income (NA) poverty Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Material deprivation Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No
Belgium 3.3 4.0 2.5 0.0 4.7 0.0 6.6 78.7
Czech Republic 2.9 1.9 1.8 0.0 2.4 0.0 10.6 80.4
Denmark 1.3 5.3 1.0 0.1 4.8 0.1 3.6 83.9
Germany 4.1 4.7 2.1 0.0 4.7 0.0 4.9 79.6
Estonia 5.3 4.6 3.4 0.4 2.5 0.9 13.6 69.5
Ireland 2.0 4.6 3.1 0.0 5.5 0.0 14.4 70.4
Greece 8.1 5.0 3.7 0.0 3.3 0.0 12.1 67.8
Spain 3.9 8.8 2.1 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.5 71.9
France 3.0 3.6 2.3 0.0 4.0 0.0 7.4 79.7
Italy 4.7 6.3 2.5 0.0 4.6 0.0 8.9 73.0
Luxembourg 1.3 4.9 0.8 0.0 7.5 0.0 1.9 83.6
Hungary 3.8 1.0 6.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 30.5 57.3
Netherlands 1.1 3.2 1.5 0.0 3.8 0.0 4.5 85.8
Austria 2.5 2.8 2.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 5.8 82.3
Poland 6.4 4.3 3.8 0.1 3.0 0.1 18.6 63.7
Portugal 4.5 4.8 4.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 14.4 67.6
Slovenia 3.5 4.3 1.9 0.0 3.0 0.0 11.0 76.2
Slovakia 4.9 2.5 2.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 18.0 70.0
Finland 2.2 4.1 1.3 0.0 5.1 0.3 4.7 82.3
Sweden 1.0 5.3 0.9 0.0 5.2 0.1 1.9 85.5
United Kingdom 2.6 6.5 2.1 0.2 5.9 0.1 8.3 74.4
Iceland 0.9 4.1 0.6 0.0 3.4 0.0 4.9 86.1
Norway 1.5 3.4 0.8 0.1 4.3 0.2 2.8 86.9
NB: Students are omitted from the population.
Reading note: In Austria, the population share that is classified as materially deprived, and also as poor according to disposable income (EU) and 
extended income (NA) definition, equals 2.5 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB October 2012 and OECD data.
8.5 Conclusions
This chapter analysed the distributional impact of 
public welfare services in 23 European countries 
by using an equivalence scale that accounts for dif-
ferences in needs of public services; i.e. the scale 
accounts for the fact that different public services 
are associated with needs profiles that differ from 
the profile exhibited by the EU scale for disposable 
income. The most common income definitions for 
analysing income inequality and poverty are dispos-
able income and extended income, normally adjust-
ed by the EU scale. However, both income defini-
tions prove to be biased as measures of economic 
living standards in a community where the welfare 
state provides substantial transfers in-kind to the 
households. These biases arise due to the fact that 
disposable income is obtained by subtracting taxes 
used to finance public welfare services but without 
including the value of received services, while us-
ing the EU scale for extended income assumes that 
needs for public services do not differ from needs 
for disposable income. A major aim of this chapter 
was to account for economies of scale in private con-
sumption as well as for heterogeneity in needs for 
publicly funded services by using a theoretically jus-
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tified needs-adjusted equivalence scale (NA scale). 
The NA scale reflects the fact that elderly have rela-
tively high needs for healthcare and long-term care 
and children for childcare and education.
The empirical results show that the at-risk-of-poverty 
estimates are reduced by 40 % and the estimated 
Gini coefficients by approximately 20 % when the 
extended income (NA) definition is used. The rank-
ing of countries by estimates of overall inequality 
(Gini) and poverty is however only slightly affected 
by the choice between the EU scale and the NA 
scale, whereas poverty estimates by household 
types are significantly affected by the choice of 
equivalence scale. Reliable information of the origin 
of income inequality and poverty is however crucial 
for the design of welfare and tax systems in Europe-
an countries.
Finally, Table 8.5 extends our understanding of the 
well-documented modest overlap between income 
poverty and material deprivation. It shows, for ex-
ample, that in a certain number of countries, taking 
into account transfers in-kind increases the popula-
tion share that is neither income-poor nor materially 
deprived.
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9.1 Introduction
Conventional estimates of individual economic 
well-being (alternatively named ‘equivalised in-
come’), including the EU at-risk-of-poverty indicator 
(see Chapter 3 in this volume), are measured on the 
basis of two fundamental assumptions: the first is that 
all the incomes received by all the household mem-
bers are pooled and consumed jointly; the second is 
that this pooled income, enhanced by economies of 
scale, is equally shared between all household mem-
bers (including children) (91). Under these assump-
tions, all the members of a given household achieve 
the same level of economic well-being, and all the 
members of a given household are thus either at 
risk of poverty or not. But in fact, not much is known 
about the actual extent of income pooling and shar-
ing within households, and assuming that incomes 
are fully pooled and equally shared may result in bi-
ased estimates of individual economic well-being, 
with important implications for the assessment of 
inequality between individuals, especially between 
men and women. This chapter investigates an al-
ternative approach allowing for incomplete income 
(90) French National Statistical Institute (INSEE). The author thanks 
Anthony B. Atkinson for comments at early steps of this work, 
Rolf Aaberge for his discussion of a later draft presented at 
the 2014 Net-SILC2 Conference in Lisbon, and Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier, Olga Rastrigina and Holly Sutherland for 
additional comments. This work has been supported by 
the Net-SILC2 Network, funded by Eurostat. The European 
Commission and INSEE bear no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the author. Any error 
would be her own. Email address for correspondence: sophie.
ponthieux@insee.fr.
(91) Technically, the equivalised income is measured as the 
household total income divided by the number of ‘equivalent 
adults’ living in the household. The equivalence scale used in 
EU statistics is the so-called ‘modified-OECD scale’ (see Chapter 
3 in this volume).
pooling within households. Using the EU-SILC 2010 
thematic module on ‘Intra-household sharing of re-
sources’, the first large scale dataset addressing the 
issue of the distribution of resources within house-
holds, it explores a ‘modified’ approach to individual 
equivalised incomes allowing for the possibility that 
the household members keep some of their incomes 
separate from the common pool. The exploration is 
applied to couple-households with a focus on gen-
der inequality.
The key information used in the chapter is based 
on a question of the module, which asks from each 
household member aged 16 or above: ‘What propor-
tion of your personal income do you keep separate 
from the common household budget?’ (question 
PA010). Over the 21 EU countries where the question 
was asked from all the adults in multi-person house-
holds (whether couple-households or any house-
hold with two or more adult members), significant 
proportions reported keeping at least some of their 
personal income separate. Once their responses are 
combined at household level, the proportion of ‘full 
pooling’ households, i.e. households where no adult 
reported keeping any of their personal income sep-
arate, was only about 45 % on average (Ponthieux, 
2013, p. 22). This suggests that the assumption of full 
income pooling could be inappropriate for a signifi-
cant proportion of households. Couple-households 
are more likely to pool all their incomes than other 
types of multi-person households, but not all cou-
ples report pooling all their incomes. A traditional 
division of work between spouses increases the like-
lihood of full income pooling; on the contrary, du-
al-earner couples are less likely to report full income 
pooling, as well as unmarried couples or, ‘patchwork’ 
families (see Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen, 2007; Bur-
9
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goyne and Morison, 1997; European Commission, 
2012; Hamplova and Le Bourdais, 2009; Heimdal 
and Houseknecht, 2003; Heikel et al., 2010; Kenney, 
2006; Laporte and Schellenberg, 2011; Lyngstad et 
al., 2011; Ponthieux, 2012; Vogler et al., 2006; Yodanis 
and Lauer, 2007). Since most multi-person house-
holds are couples, these analyses make the issue of 
intra-household distribution of income even more 
serious: considering the trends of decreasing mar-
riage, increasing cohabitation, increasing divorces 
and recomposed families, and the increasing pro-
portions of dual-earner couples, there are reasons 
to think that the share of ‘full pooling’ households is 
likely to go down.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as fol-
lows: Section 9.2 presents a brief survey of the re-
lated literature, Section 9.3 describes the data and 
the methodology used for the proposed (tentative) 
‘modified’ equivalised income, Section 9.4 compares 
the estimates of gender inequality obtained with 
the standard and the ‘modified’ approaches, and 
Section 9.5 discusses the interest and also the limits 
of the exercise.
9.2 Theoretical framework 
and related literature
Concern about the lack of knowledge of the dis-
tribution of income within households and its im-
plications for the measurement of inequality and 
poverty are not new: Young (1952, p. 305) deplored 
that ‘In place of knowledge, the assumption has often 
been made, though not stated, that the family […] can 
still be treated as a unit for the purposes of spending. 
It has been taken for granted that some members of 
a family cannot be rich while others are poor. […].’ He 
also warned that ‘To replace assumption by informa‑
tion is no small venture.’ 40 years later, Jenkins (1991) 
addressed the same issue, underlining that standard 
poverty measurement still ignores intra-household 
distribution. Two decades later, individuals’ eco-
nomic well-being is still conventionally measured on 
the basis of household level information, relying on 
the assumptions that incomes are fully pooled and 
equally shared within households.
These assumptions of full income pooling and equal 
sharing within households refer to the so-called ‘uni-
tary’ approach to household economic behaviour. In 
this approach, the household is assumed to behave 
as if it was a single entity, precisely a rational con-
sumer maximising a unique utility function under 
a single budget constraint. For households to func-
tion ‘as if’ they are individuals, two main assumptions 
are then needed: first, individual preferences have to 
converge one way or the other, so that the house-
hold can be considered a single decision unit; and 
secondly, household members’ resources have to be 
pooled so that there is only one budget constraint. 
In this framework, income pooling then means that 
how the income is used depends only on the level of 
the pooled income and the household’s preferences. 
The fact that individuals’ preferences may diverge is 
ignored, and issues of intra-household distribution 
are bypassed. Individuals are then not discernible 
within the household which operates as a ‘black box’. 
This model, criticised from a theoretical perspective 
(Chiappori, 1992) is now generally considered as 
unsatisfactory. In addition, empirical results tend to 
show that household allocation of resources may dif-
fer depending on who receives an income (e.g. the 
emblematic paper of Lundberg et al., 1997) — while, 
in principle, this should not happen since house-
hold decisions are expected to result only from the 
household budget constraint (the pooled income) 
irrespective of whose income it is. Since the 1980s, 
alternative models have been developed (see a sur-
vey by Donni and Chiappori, 2009). These non-uni-
tary models consider that each household member 
(most models consider two decision-makers) has 
his/her own utility function and incomes are not as-
sumed to be pooled. But estimating these models 
is also quite complex and clearly not an operational 
option for statistical purposes.
Statisticians may well be aware of these develop-
ments, and also of the fact that deriving indicators 
of inequality from variables collected at household 
level and based on an assumption of equal sharing 
may conceal intra-household inequalities. But once 
the issue is acknowledged, the argument is still held 
that it is preferable to assume that incomes are ful-
ly pooled and shared rather than the contrary (e.g. 
Förster and Mira d’Ercole, 2009, p. 7). However, while 
it is not questionable that sharing occurs within 
households — especially within families (between 
9Intra-household pooling and sharing of resources: a tentative ‘modified’ equivalised income
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  177
partners and between parents and children) — as-
suming that it entails no intra-household inequality 
is debatable. As highlighted by Jenkins (1991), this 
may result in seriously biased estimates of the in-
cidence of poverty risk, and more generally biased 
estimates of inequality.
It is then relevant to investigate the extent of this 
bias. Not knowing much about the actual distribu-
tion of income within households, one way to assess 
the impact of the standard assumptions is to imple-
ment alternative assumptions on the extent of pool-
ing/sharing, and compare the outcome to that ob-
tained with the standard assumptions. This has been 
the strategy of a number of studies seeking to ex-
plore the impact of these assumptions on gender in-
equality in poverty rates (Borooah and McKee, 1994; 
Davies and Joshi, 1994; Phipps and Burton, 1995; 
Findlay and Wright, 1996; Fritzell, 1999), on gender 
inequality in individual income (Sutherland, 1997) or 
on gender gaps in financial autonomy (Meulders and 
O’Dorchai, 2010).
The general principle of these studies is to adopt 
assumptions other than intra-household equality. In 
most studies, the ‘unequal’ distribution of income 
is based on direct assumptions on the extent of in-
come sharing: Davies and Joshi (1994), Phipps and 
Burton (1995), or Meulders and O’Dorchai (2010) 
apply a form of minimal sharing restricted to the 
household’s non-labour income; Findlay and Wright 
(1996) assume unequal transfers of income between 
the household members; Borooah and McKee (1994) 
assume an unequal sharing of the household market 
income. Sutherland (1997) compares the distribution 
of household incomes and individual incomes com-
puted using microsimulation, making different pool-
ing assumptions by source of income. Fritzell (1999) 
resorts to modelling the extent of income pooling. 
All these studies, whatever the year, country or meth-
odology, find that departing from the standard as-
sumptions results in dramatic changes in the level of 
the indicator examined: women’s shares of income 
tend to be dramatically lower, their rank in the dis-
tribution of incomes sinks to the bottom quantiles, 
their poverty risk rate is much higher whereas that of 
men is significantly reduced.
Such results might be expected, but the magnitude 
of the differences between the standard and the al-
ternative estimates is convincing enough to suggest 
that deriving measures of inequality between indi-
viduals from household-level income fails to capture 
individual disparities within households (92). Not only 
does it understate overall inequality but also gender 
inequality in particular.
9.3 Methodology: 
definitions and 
construction of a ‘modified’ 
equivalised income
As in the studies briefly reviewed above, the purpose 
of the tentative measure of individual ‘modified’ 
equivalised income proposed in this chapter is to ex-
plore the impact of the standard and alternative as-
sumptions on the assessment of gender inequality. 
However, contrary to these studies, only the assump-
tion of full income pooling is challenged, meaning 
that the assumption that pooled incomes are equally 
shared is not addressed. The basis of our approach is 
a breakdown of the household income into ‘pooled’ 
and ‘separate’ incomes; this breakdown is based on 
the ‘observed’ shares of personal incomes that are 
kept separate as reported in the variable PA010 (see 
above) of the EU-SILC module. The first advantage of 
using this information is that it allows one to avoid 
making extreme assumptions, such as full income 
pooling or complete income separation. A second 
advantage is that, instead of assuming that all indi-
viduals adopt one or another type of arrangement 
as in most previous papers, it allows for a variety of 
individual behaviour — including different arrange-
ments within a given household. In this chapter, the 
use of an EU-wide source (EU-SILC) offers the advan-
tage of making it possible to compare the impact 
of a large diversity of national contexts, especially in 
terms of women’s participation in the labour mar-
ket (and subsequent gender inequality in personal 
incomes) and in terms of a departure from the as-
sumption of full income pooling.
Our main assumption in relation to income sharing 
(as mentioned above, we do not analyse this aspect 
in this chapter) is that incomes kept separate may 
(92) Not pooling income does not mean that consumption 
is unequal (and vice versa); below, we come back to the 
relationship between income and consumption in this context.
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not be used in the same way as pooled incomes, 
because they are available only to those who keep 
them. This is, obviously, a restrictive interpretation 
because how incomes are actually used (whether 
pooled or separate) remains unobserved in the sur-
vey: the income that a person keeps separate may 
be used exclusively for him/herself or (also) for ex-
penditures benefiting one or more other household 
members. So, we adopt the straightforward view 
that incomes kept separate are not considered as 
‘common’. This means that in our modified approach, 
these separate incomes are not ‘equivalised’ and dis-
tributed equally between the household members.
The analysis is restricted to couples (married or co-
habitant, with or without children), i.e. households 
with a maximum of two decision-makers. House-
holds with more than one couple, couples with 
active children (aged between 18 and 24 years old 
and economically active) or with adult children (old-
er than 24) are excluded. Obviously, couples where 
the value of variable PA010 is missing for one or both 
partners cannot be included (this results in exclud-
ing all the countries using a ‘selected respondent’ 
approach to data collection: Denmark, Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Finland and Sweden). France is excluded 
too because the question on the share of income 
kept separate was not asked with the exact same 
meaning as in other countries (93). We also exclude 
couples with a negative disposable income (or cou-
ples in which one partner’s personal income is neg-
ative). Finally, given the focus on gender inequality, 
same sex couples are excluded. The resulting pop-
ulation of couples is referred to as ‘targeted cou-
ples’ (94). We refer to ‘husband’, ‘wife’, spouses and 
partners, regardless of the type of union.
This section presents firstly the central variable un-
derlying the computation, then the steps taken in 
the measurement of individual ‘modified’ equiva-
lised incomes.
(93) The formulation was more restrictive, referring exclusively to 
the share of personal income the person uses for her/himself, 
hence a different meaning.
(94) In increasing order, the national sample sizes (number of 
targeted couples) are as follows: Malta (1 623), Estonia (1 916), 
Austria (1 953), Cyprus (1 965), Ireland (2 050), Latvia (2 072), 
Slovakia (2 079), Bulgaria (2 233), Lithuania (2 342), Portugal 
(2 432), Luxembourg (2 772), Belgium (3 077), Romania (3 147), 
Greece (3 313), United Kingdom (3 385), Poland (3 709), Hungary 
(4 165), Czech Republic (4 348), Spain (6 133), Germany (6 859) 
and Italy (8 281).
9.3.1 To what extent do couples 
pool their personal incomes?
As mentioned earlier, the key information for the 
computation of individual ‘modified’ equivalised 
incomes is based on individual responses to a ques-
tion asking about the share of their personal incomes 
that each partner keeps separate (question PA010). 
Six possible answer categories were proposed:
1. all my personal income
2. more than half of my personal income
3. about half of my personal income
4. less than half of my personal income
5. none
6. no personal income (95).
Table 9.1 displays the responses of men and women 
in target couples.
The distribution of men and women who have 
a personal income is very similar. The most striking 
difference is in the proportion of men/women who 
report having no personal income which, with 
a few exceptions, is considerably higher among 
women than among men.
The fact that responses of men and women living 
in couples are close to each other does not imply 
that, within couples, both partners report the same 
behaviour: when both have a personal income, both 
may keep none of it, one may keep some and the 
other none, etc. And when one has no personal in-
come, the other may pool/keep more or less of his/
her personal income. Once the partners’ responses 
are combined at couple level, three main pooling 
regimes can be distinguished: ‘full income pooling’ 
corresponds to the case where neither of the part-
ners keeps any of his/her personal income separate. 
In Table 9.2, which shows the distribution of couples 
in the different pooling regimes, the full income 
pooling is either the case where both partners have 
personal income and both do not keep it separate 
(column a) or the case where only one partner has 
(95) In Ireland, the modality ‘no income’ was not proposed, 
because the question was asked the other way: people were 
asked about the share of personal income contributed to the 
common pool, meaning that people with no income were 
then included among those who keep none of their personal 
income.
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Table 9.1: Distribution of men and women living in couple‑households by the share of personal 
income he/she keeps separate from the common pool, 2010
(%)
With a personal income No personal income
Men Women
Men Women
all >50 % 50 % <50 % none all >50 % 50 % <50 % none
Belgium 11.6 3.3 3.2 8.5 73.4 12.1 4.3 3.7 8.8 71.1 4.1 20.4
Bulgaria 5.1 2.3 2.9 15.0 74.7 5.7 1.2 2.4 12.1 78.6 5.4 12.2
Czech Republic 4.6 6.7 6.9 10.3 71.5 6.8 5.8 6.8 8.0 72.6 0.9 3.9
Germany 3.5 6.5 4.2 7.0 78.8 5.4 6.7 6.4 6.7 74.7 1.3 11.1
Estonia 12.6 5.0 10.3 22 50.2 13.0 4.5 10.4 20.4 51.8 7.2 6.6
Ireland 2.0 5.5 8.7 17.9 65.9 13.9 5.7 8.8 12.4 59.3 n.a. n.a.
Greece 9.2 4.1 5.4 25 56.3 7.9 4.6 5.8 23.9 57.9 1.4 26.5
Spain 1.4 1.6 3.0 4.2 89.7 1.5 1.4 3.8 4.8 88.4 2.3 27.8
Italy 3.9 2.6 4.8 26.6 62.0 4.7 3.2 6.2 25.3 60.6 3.5 31.7
Cyprus 2.0 3.2 3.1 44.1 47.6 2.6 4.0 5.2 41.2 47.0 2.8 24.4
Latvia 4.3 5.1 5.3 44.0 41.3 5.4 4.2 4.4 41.9 44.1 13.3 15.0
Lithuania 2.4 3.4 2.8 8.3 83.1 3.6 2.3 4.5 7.4 82.2 4.8 5.7
Luxembourg 5.2 6.2 4.2 9.7 74.8 8.7 5.9 5.2 10.4 69.8 0.9 21.4
Hungary 1.0 1.5 1.7 12.4 83.5 1.5 1.1 1.2 10.6 85.6 1.3 3.9
Malta 2.8 4.0 9.6 59.8 23.8 5.2 6.5 10.9 53.4 24.1 1.3 39.4
Austria 0.3 9.9 14.7 26.6 48.5 2.9 12.9 16.2 21.9 46.2 0.3 12.8
Poland 7.5 2.4 2.0 13.3 74.7 8.3 2.6 2.2 11.2 75.7 2.3 13.4
Portugal 7.5 3.1 2.8 11.2 75.4 8.4 2.7 2.0 10.1 76.8 3.0 16.6
Romania 9.0 4.5 4.0 48.7 33.8 9.3 4.2 4.8 46.3 35.5 2.2 20.3
Slovakia 3.6 4.3 3.8 45.4 43.0 4.5 4.0 3.9 40.7 46.9 2.6 4.8
United 
Kingdom 6.2 5.2 5.5 20.0 63.1 9.3 5.9 6.4 16.6 61.8 2.1 3.9
Mean % 5.0 4.3 5.2 22.9 62.6 6.7 4.5 5.8 20.7 62.4 3.1 16.1
NB: ‘n.a.’ means not available. Population: men and women in targeted couples. The mean is the arithmetic mean of the national percentages.
Reading note: Over the 21 countries analysed, the mean percentage of men living in targeted couples who report having no personal income is 
3 %; among those with a personal income, 5 % report keeping all their income separate from the common budget, whereas 62.6 % declare to 
keep none of their personal income separate from the common household budget.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
income and he/she does keep none of it separate 
(column e). At the opposite, ‘no pooling’ corresponds 
to the case where both partners keep all their per-
sonal incomes separate (column c) or the case where 
only one partner has a personal income and keeps it 
separate (column g). In between, the other configu-
rations can be grouped under a label ‘partial pooling’, 
including cases where both partners keep some of 
their personal incomes (column b), cases where part-
ners report different behaviours (e.g. one keeps all 
and the other some or none — column d (‘other cas-
es’)), and cases where only one partner has personal 
income and keeps a share separate (column f). When 
one partner has no personal income, the couple’s 
pooling regime is defined by the share of his/her per-
sonal income kept by the partner who has a personal 
income. The few cases where neither partner has an 
income are included in ‘full income pooling’.
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Table 9.2: Distribution of couples by pooling regime, 2010
(%)
Both partners have personal 
incomes
One partner has no 
personal income Couple’s pooling regime (**)
and both keep: and the other keeps (**): Full Partial No
none(*) some all other cases none some all
pooling pooling pooling
a b c d e f g a+e b+d+f c+g
Belgium 56.4 11.8 7.2 5.5 15.0 1.2 2.9 71.5 18.5 10.1
Bulgaria 62.9 12.0 3.5 7.2 10.5 3.9 73.4 22.2 4.4
Czech Republic 66.1 18.6 3.4 7.5 4.4 69.6 26.5 3.8
Germany 61.9 13.6 1.8 10.7 11.0 1.1 72.9 25.1 2.1
Estonia 39.1 27.5 9.0 12.0 8.1 4.2 47.2 42.1 10.6
Ireland 55.0 24.1 21.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 55.0 45.0
Greece 36.2 21.1 4.8 10.3 17.3 8.0 2.3 53.6 39.4 7.1
Spain 61.1 6.7 2.8 27.9 1.5 88.9 9.9 1.2
Italy 36.7 18.9 1.7 10.2 21.3 10.0 1.2 58.0 39.1 2.9
Cyprus 30.3 33.3 10.6 13.8 11.9 44.2 55.8
Latvia 30.0 35.3 2.3 10.5 11.0 11.0 40.9 55.6 3.5
Lithuania 70.2 10.0 1.6 7.9 10.3 79.4 18.5 2.1
Luxembourg 52.4 15.6 4.1 5.8 19.9 2.1 72.3 23.3 4.3
Hungary 79.5 11.5 5.5 3.6 82.5 17.5
Malta 13.0 41.9 6.0 10.7 28.5 23.6 76.4
Austria 31.8 37.7 17.5 9.4 3.6 0.0 41.2 58.8
Poland 59.8 11.2 4.5 9.3 11.5 1.9 1.8 71.3 22.3 6.3
Portugal 59.0 10.4 4.5 8.1 13.8 2.6 1.6 72.8 21.1 6.1
Romania 23.5 40.2 5.4 9.7 7.9 11.0 2.4 31.4 60.9 7.7
Slovakia 35.7 40.9 2.3 15.2 3.0 2.9 38.7 58.5 2.8
United 
Kingdom 53.0 22.6 4.3 14.8 3.7 1.6 56.7 38.4 4.9
Mean % 48.3 22.1 3.1 9.7 11.6 5.1 1.0 59.3 36.6 4.1
NB: (*) Including the few cases where neither partner has a personal income. (**) When there are less than 40 observations, breakdowns are not 
provided. Population: targeted couples. ‘n.a.’ means not available.
Reading note: In Belgium, 10.1 % of targeted couples do not pool any of their personal income; this consists of 7.2 % of couples where both 
partners have a personal income and both keep all of it separate (column c) and of 2.9 % of couples where one partner has no personal income 
and the other keeps all of his/her personal income.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
In 14 of the 21 countries analysed in this chapter, 
the majority of couples correspond to the standard 
assumption of full income pooling: neither partner 
reports keeping any of her/his personal income 
separate — or one or the other of the partners has 
no personal income (most often the wife (3.1 % vs 
16.1 %); see Table 9.1) and the other partner con-
tributes all his income to the common pool (96). 
But other pooling regimes are frequent enough 
(96) The very low share of full pooling in Malta seems ‘suspect’; but 
since the objective is to test a methodology, not to provide 
statistics, we have considered that it was interesting as an 
extreme case of deviation from the standard assumption.
in all countries (the average proportion over the 
21 countries is about 40 %) to justify our analysis, 
i.e. which is to test the impact of not assuming full 
income pooling systematically.
9.3.2 Computing individual 
‘modified’ equivalised incomes
The principle of the ‘modified’ equivalised income 
is simple: it consists of applying the standard ap-
proach, but only to the pooled income instead of 
the total disposable income. So the standard and the 
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‘modified’ approaches result in the same equivalised 
income in the case of ‘full income pooling’ couples. 
In the other cases, when one or both partners keep 
at least some of their personal incomes separate, 
the two measures will differ in two ways. First, the 
size of economies of scale will be lower since only 
the pooled income is ‘equivalised’ (97). Secondly, the 
partners’ individual ‘modified’ equivalised incomes 
will not necessarily be equal; the difference will 
come from the respective amounts of personal in-
come kept separate by each partner. The first part of 
this section presents the shift from standard to mod-
ified approach; the second part discusses a point 
about data limitations and the third part describes 
the full sequence of computation of the individual 
‘modified’ equivalised income.
From the standard to the ‘modified’ 
approach
In the standard approach, the household equivalised 
income (Y
eq
) is computed as the household dispos-
able income (D) adjusted for the size and composi-
tion of the household:
Y
eq 
 = D / N
eq
where D is the sum of all the cash income received in 
the household (earnings, pensions, capital income, 
social benefits and allowances, inter-household 
transfers) net of the social contributions and taxes 
paid. N
eq
 is the equivalised size of the household, 
obtained with the OECD modified equivalence scale 
(see above), to account for the economies of scale 
resulting from shared consumption (e.g. sharing 
a dwelling, a car, appliances and so on). The equiv-
alised income is assigned to each household mem-
ber; then, using subscripts W for the wife, H for the 
husband and K for each dependent child, one can 
write:
Y
eqW
  = Y
eqH
  = Y
eqK
  = Y
eq
This equivalised ‘individual’ income represents the 
average potential consumption available to each 
household member — i.e. the income a person liv-
(97) As mentioned above, we do not know how the income kept 
separate is actually used. Economies of scale may still result 
from joint consumption of separate incomes (for instance, if 
rent or fuel bills are equally shared and paid out of income kept 
separate, the total amount paid by the partners remains lower 
than if they lived separately).
ing alone would need to achieve the same equiv-
alised income. The implicit assumption is that any 
initial difference of income between the household 
members is counterbalanced by transfers from the 
‘richer’ to the ‘poorer’ household members (be-
tween partners and from parents to children).
The modified approach takes into account the pos-
sibility that personal incomes can be kept separate 
from the household common pool. It results in indi-
vidual ‘modified’ equivalised incomes that may differ 
between household members. We start by detailing 
the couple’s disposable income (D) as the sum of the 
partners’ personal incomes (Y
W
 and Y
H
) and a set of 
common incomes (Y
C
), net of social security contri-
butions and taxes (T):
D  = Y
W
 + Y
H 
+
 
Y
C 
–
 
T
Then, we introduce the information on the share of 
his/her personal income each partner keeps sep-
arate from the common pool, and re-write D (the 
total disposable income) as the sum of the part-
ners’ ‘separate incomes’ (noted y
W
 and y
H
) and the 
household pooled income (P), equal to the sum of 
common incomes (Y
C
) and the amounts of personal 
incomes pooled by the partners (the difference be-
tween their personal income and the amount they 
keep separate):
D  = P + y
W
 + y
H,
 with P  = (Y
W
– y
W
) + (Y
H
– y
H
) + Y
C
 – T
The equivalised household income (Y
eq-mod
) is then 
computed as in the standard approach but only on 
P, the amount of pooled incomes:
Y
eq-mod
  = P / N
eq
If the partners keep none of their personal incomes 
separate, P = D and all the household members get 
the same ‘amount’ of Y
eq-mod
 as in the standard ap-
proach. If one partner keeps some of his/her per-
sonal income separate, he/she gets Y
eq-mod
 plus the 
amount of his/her personal income kept separate.
Dealing with data
The principle is quite simple, but its implementation 
requires some adaptations because not all income 
components are available at individual level in the 
data. There are three main problems to be dealt with:
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1. EU-SILC, as almost all large scale income surveys, 
does not collect all income components at indi-
vidual level.
2. Both ‘separate’ and ‘pooled’ components of 
the household total disposable income have 
to be measured net of taxes; but in EU-SILC the 
amount of social security contributions and in-
come tax is available only as an aggregate and at 
household level, while the amounts of incomes 
available at individual level are gross amounts.
3. The information on the shares of personal in-
comes kept separate is not as precise as one 
would wish.
In EU-SILC, earnings, pensions, and most benefits 
(unemployment, disability, education-related allow-
ances) are provided at individual level. All the other 
components of the household disposable income (Y
C
 
above) are available only as household-level aggre-
gates. These components include: other market in-
comes (incomes from property, interests, dividends, 
etc.), inter-household transfers (including alimonies), 
some state transfers (family benefits, housing al-
lowances, other benefits from social assistance, and 
parental leave allowances), taxes on wealth, social 
contribution and taxes on income (to which we 
come back below). The problem is that these var-
ious income components may concern only one 
partner (depending on the couple’s marital status, 
pre-marital arrangements, possible former unions, 
etc.). For instance, it is likely that one partner only re-
ceives/pays alimony from/to an ex-partner; parental 
leave allowances are most often received by women; 
incomes from financial investments are not neces-
sarily ‘common’ in unmarried couples (or in married 
couples who keep their assets separate — and taxes 
on wealth, if any, may not be pooled). One option is 
to impute a share of these ‘common’ components 
Figure 9.1: Distribution of partners’ personal incomes, 2010
(%)
NB: Only couples where both partners have a personal income are taken into account.
Reading note: In Estonia, wives’ personal incomes represent 40 % of the sum of partners’ personal incomes.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
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to each partner, either a share proportional to their 
relative personal incomes (with the drawback of im-
puting no income to partners with no personal in-
come) or a share equal to half the ‘common’ incomes 
(with the drawback of assuming a form of sharing). 
Neither of these solutions is satisfactory and we have 
therefore chosen the simple (and simplistic) solution 
of assuming that these income components are 
pooled (98).
So, personal incomes are measured only partly, on 
the basis of what is available at individual level in 
EU-SILC, essentially work-related incomes and pen-
sions. Figure 9.1 shows the distribution between 
partners of these personal incomes.
The other important issue is related to the fact that 
social security contributions and taxes on income 
are provided in one single household level varia-
ble in the micro-data made available to research-
ers through the Users’ Database (UDB). In order to 
ensure consistency between the net personal in-
comes and the rest of the household disposable in-
come, the total amount of social security contribu-
tions and taxes on income is distributed between 
the partners’ personal incomes (Y
W
 and Y
H
) and the 
household common income (Y
C
) proportionally to 
the respective share of each of these components 
in the household total gross income (Y
W
 + Y
H
 + Y
C
). 
This does not change either the partners’ relative 
personal incomes or, of course, the total amount 
of social security contributions and income tax 
paid by the household, and allows net incomes 
to be kept consistent at individual and household 
level. But it is not satisfactory, because we have to 
treat social contributions and taxes on income as 
a whole, and because we apply a same implicit flat 
tax rate to all categories of incomes; in addition, 
given that female personal incomes are lower, this 
treatment may result in a downwards bias of the 
female/male net income ratio as it neglects the ef-
fect of progressive taxation (see Figari et al., 2011).
Finally, another limitation of the exercise is that ques-
tion PA010 does not provide directly usable shares of 
(98) We have also included in the common incomes the income 
received by children aged under 16 (variable HY110). It would 
have been more consistent to assign them as ‘separate 
incomes’ to the children who earned these incomes, but it 
would have entailed complex assumptions about how they are 
shared between children if there are several children; we have 
therefore opted for a more simple solution.
personal income kept separate, but answer catego-
ries which have to be ‘translated’ into coefficients in 
order to compute separate incomes. This translation 
is quite straightforward for categories 1, 3 and 5 (cor-
responding to 100 %, 50 % and 0 % of the personal in-
come kept separate, respectively). For the remaining 
modalities (more than half and less than half) there 
are many possibilities since the interval is quite large 
between 100 % and 50 % on one side and between 
0 % and 50 % on the other. To keep things simple, we 
have set a value at mid-interval, i.e. 75 % for category 
‘more than half’, and 25 % for category ‘less than half’. 
Each partner’s separate income is then computed 
by applying an individual coefficient of ‘separation’ 
(pa10) to their personal income; the set of possible 
values of this coefficient is then (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 100).
Sequence of computation
This section describes the sequence of computation 
of the individual ‘modified’ equivalised income step 
by step (99).
1) Personal incomes net (Ynet
i
)
We note t
i
 (with i for W,H) the share of social con-
tributions and income tax each partner has to pay 
(see above), with t
W
  = Y
W
 / (Y
W
 + Y
H
 + Y
C
) and t
H
  = Y
W
 
/ (Y
W
 + Y
H
 + Y
C
). 
Net personal incomes are then computed as:
Ynet
i
  = Y
i
 (1 – t
i
).
2) Separate incomes (y
i
) and pooled income
Separate incomes are measured by applying to each 
partners’ net personal income his/her coefficient of 
‘separation’ pa10
i
 as defined above.
Then for each partner y
i
  = Ynet
i
 * pa10
i
The amount contributed to the household pool is 
equal to Ynet
i
 – y
i
If pa10
W
  = 0 and pa10
H
 = 0, our approach gives the 
same result as the standard approach.
3) Household ‘modified’ equivalised income 
(Y
eq-mod
)
(99) The programme (in SAS) is available from the author on 
request.
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Only the pooled and common incomes are equiva-
lised (using the OECD modified scale):
Y
eq-mod
  = [(Ynet
W
 – y
W
) + (Ynet
H
 – y
H
) + Ynet
C
] / N
eq
4) Individual ‘modified’ equivalised incomes
The last step consists in adding the amount of his/
her private income to each partner. Children, if any, 
get only the household ‘modified’ equivalised in-
come (necessarily lower than the standard equiv-
alised income if the parents do not pool all their 
incomes (100):
• the wife gets y
eq-modW
  = Y
eq-mod
 + y
W
• the husband gets y
eq-modH
  = y
eq-mod
 + y
H
• each child gets Y
eq-mod
9.4 Standard and ‘modified’ 
measures of individual 
equivalised income
This section compares the results of the two ap-
proaches. First, by looking between spouses at 
‘intra-household’ level; then, at aggregated level by 
looking at differences between men and women liv-
ing in (targeted) couples.
9.4.1 Intra‑household distribution 
of individual equivalised income
At intra-household level, the expected outcome of 
the modified approach is to highlight a difference in 
the partners’ individual equivalised incomes which 
does not appear when using the standard approach. 
Figure 9.2 displays the distribution of wives’ and hus-
bands’ shares (101) of ‘modified’ incomes.
(100) This almost automatically results in children having less 
individual income than their parents if the parents keep 
significant shares of their personal incomes from the pool. As 
our focus is on gender inequality between partners, we do not 
analyse further the impact of this problematic issue.
(101) The wife’s (husband’s) share is measured as the ratio of her (his) 
income to the sum of the two partners’ income.
As expected, in all countries we observe a differ-
ence (even though extremely small and not statis-
tically significant in most cases) between the wives’ 
and husbands’ shares of modified equivalised in-
come, instead of no difference with the standard 
approach where both partners’ shares would be 
exactly 50 %. On average, wives’ shares tend to be 
smaller with the ‘modified’ measure than with the 
standard approach (it is of course exactly the op-
posite for men). The difference between the two 
measures results from the combined effect of dif-
ferences in personal incomes and in the shares of 
income kept separate by each partner: intra-couple 
differentials in personal incomes are more or less 
counterbalanced by the distribution of couples’ 
pooling regimes. At one extreme, there is virtually 
no difference in Lithuania, where the difference be-
tween the partners’ personal incomes is relatively 
small (the smallest of the 21 countries, see Figure 
9.1), and where a large share of couples (about 80 %, 
see Table 9.2) keep none of their personal incomes 
separate; at the other extreme, in Malta, the large 
difference in partners’ personal incomes combined 
with a large share of couples where personal in-
comes are kept (at least partly) separate result in 
a significant difference in the individual equivalised 
incomes between wives and husbands.
The difference between the two measures is rela-
tively small in most countries because, as we have 
seen above, large shares of couples report pooling 
all or a large part of their personal incomes and also 
because personal incomes may be under-estimated 
due to the fact that some income components are 
collected at household rather than individual level 
(and we have considered these as equally shared be-
tween partners). Yet, the result is no less illustrative of 
the potential bias in the standard approach.
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Figure 9.2: Intra‑household distribution of modified equivalised income between partners, 2010
(%)
NB: Population: targeted couples.
Reading note: In Malta, wives get on average 43 % of couples’ modified equivalised income, instead of 50 % with the standard approach.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
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Figure 9.3: Gender income ratios (women/men), 2010
NB: Countries ordered by the gender ratio of equivalised modified incomes. Population: men and women of the targeted couples.
Reading note: In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Austria and Romania, the ratio (women to men) of modified equivalised 
income is 10 to 12 percentage points lower than the ratio of standard equivalised incomes, with ratios of personal incomes standing between 
0.45 and 0.60.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
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9.4.2 Comparing gender 
inequality in equivalised incomes 
and in poverty risk
We turn now to measures of gender inequality at 
national level, computed not between partners 
within couples, but on average (at the aggregated 
level) between men and women living in targeted 
couples (102). We look first at the ratio of women’s to 
men’s mean incomes (see Figure 9.3) and then at the 
ratio of women’s to men’s rate of poverty risk (see 
Figure 9.4).
In the standard approach, the ratio of women’s to 
men’s mean incomes equals one for adults living 
in couples, by construction (i.e. due to the equalis-
ing effect of this approach). With the modified ap-
proach, this ratio is in all countries lower than one, 
(102) This population is very much distorted, since it excludes 
children and other types of households.
from barely in Lithuania (where the difference is not 
statistically significant) to substantially in Malta (see 
Figure 9.3). Again, the difference between the two 
measures (standard and modified) of equivalised 
income is small; the gender ratio of individual equiv-
alised incomes is much larger than that of personal 
incomes, but the interest of the ‘modified’ measure is 
to highlight some of the inequality observed among 
personal incomes, which is completely concealed 
with the standard approach.
As for the gender income ratio, the gender ratio of 
poverty risk is by construction equal to one in the 
standard approach since within each couple, the 
same equivalised income is imputed to both part-
ners. In contrast, because the modified approach 
allows for differences in equivalised incomes with-
in couples, men’s and women’s ‘modified’ poverty 
risk — measured with the usual methodology but 
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Figure 9.4: Gender ratio (women/men) of ‘modified’ poverty risk, 2010
NB: Countries ordered by size of the gender ratio of at-risk-of-poverty rates. Population: adults of the targeted couples.
Reading note: In all countries except Lithuania, the women to men ratio of at-risk-of-poverty rates is greater (e.g. by 20 % in Portugal) than 1, 
which is the ratio obtained with the standard measure of equivalised incomes (represented by the horizontal line).
Source: Author’s computation, UDB 2014.
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using modified equivalised incomes (103) — may 
differ (see Figure 9.4).
In all countries (again with the exception of Lithua-
nia), women’s ‘modified’ poverty risk appears higher 
than men’s. The difference is substantial in a number 
of countries (Malta, Greece, Austria, Romania, Czech 
Republic, Italy — 20 % or more). This result is compa-
rable to those obtained in previous research, show-
ing that deviating from the standard assumptions, 
here by allowing for the possibility that incomes are 
not fully pooled, results in higher poverty risks for 
women than for men.
9.5 Conclusions
By construction, the assumptions underlying the 
standard approach to individual equivalised income 
limit the possibilities of assessing gender inequality 
(and inter-individual inequality in general). In this 
chapter, we have explored the effect of departing 
from one of these assumptions (full pooling of per-
sonal incomes) on the assessment of inequality, with 
a focus on gender inequality. For this, we have made 
use of the information provided in the EU-SILC 2010 
module on ‘Intra-household sharing of resources’, 
which allows identifying the proportion of incomes 
that partners keep separate from their household’s 
common budget.
Our results do not show dramatic differences be-
tween the standard approach and our ‘modified’ 
approach, but these differences are large enough to 
encourage further work in this direction. The relative-
ly small differences between standard and ‘modified’ 
estimates result partly from various data limitations, 
one being that for a number of income components, 
the amounts are only provided at household level. 
Even though the major sources of personal incomes 
(earnings and some social transfers, including pen-
sions) are available at the individual level, it is clear 
that not being able to assign precisely the other in-
come components is a serious limitation, and may 
result in under-estimating the share of incomes kept 
separate.
(103) On the basis of a threshold equal to 60 % of the median of the 
distribution of the OECD modified equivalised incomes in the 
population of adults of the targeted couples.
If incomes are not actually fully pooled and distrib-
uted equally within households, what does this im-
ply in terms of public policies? Many social transfers 
are targeted at households (families, fiscal units), or 
conditioned by resources assessed at household 
level, under the implicit assumption that meeting 
the needs of individuals is achieved by meeting the 
needs of households. How this may affect individual 
economic well-being within households is difficult 
to assess precisely because conventional measures 
of economic well-being and policy targets are de-
rived from household-level information. But poli-
cies which condition what an individual is entitled 
to with the resources of another member of his/her 
household can reinforce inequalities between indi-
viduals and particularly the imbalance of resources 
between women and men (see Bennett and Suther-
land, 2011). This would lead to recommendations for 
an individual-based right to social transfers.
One difficulty faced by any assessment of the ex-
tent of biases resulting from unmeasured inequality 
within households is the lack of data on individual 
income in EU-SILC: some income variables are ag-
gregated at household level even though based on 
individual-level information. This is the inheritance 
of a conceptualisation of the household as a black 
box, assuming that incomes are pooled and equally 
shared. As Woolley and Marshall (1994, p. 429) wrote, 
‘The standard approach solves the problem of meas-
uring resource distribution within households by 
ignoring it’. In EU-SILC, a blatant example is that of 
social security contributions and taxes, which are 
most often applied to individual earnings, but which 
are not made available at individual level. More in-
dividual-level information would avoid the situation 
in which the measurement of individual economic 
well-being and the analysis of inequality between 
individuals are conditioned in the first place by the 
assumption of equality within households.
This said, it does not mean that the issue is an easy 
one and that it is only a question of data availability: 
transfers between partners can take place without 
income pooling, hence no pooling does not mean 
no sharing; conversely, income pooling does not 
necessarily entail equal or fair sharing. From the per-
spective of statistics, the appeal of developing ‘pool-
ing’ questions as a tool to account for intra-house-
hold inequality does not solve questions that can 
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be raised about the meaning and interpretation of 
‘the share of personal income kept separate from 
the common pool’: is it to be understood as the 
amount available to a person, or rather in terms of 
command over resources or in terms of autonomy? 
One may also wonder whether the pooling regime 
identified on this basis actually corresponds to the 
income pooling assumption of the theory. Caution is 
then required. Conceptually, the crux of the issue is 
the lack of a paradigm for analysing the ‘intra-house-
hold’ level and this entails being able to combine 
individual-level and household-level information in 
order to avoid replacing the neglect of individuals 
within households of the past by a neglect of the 
household dimension of individual well-being. As 
pointed out by Bennett et al. (2012), the recognition 
of interdependence within households is essential. 
Actually, incomes received by individuals may be 
poor indicators of economic well-being in terms of 
consumption and expenditure, but being able to 
assess unequal command over resources within the 
household is crucial for the assessment of econom-
ic autonomy, beyond a narrow notion of economic 
well-being in terms of consumption.
The conventional measure of equivalised incomes 
conflates individuals and households incomes and 
makes individual situations difficult to compare. 
With the perspective of gender inequality, this calls 
for a change of framework: when women’s labour 
market outcomes are less favourable than men’s, 
as is still the case, the standard approach conceals 
gender inequality. By the same token, it conceals 
inter-individual inequality in general, and may result 
in biased estimates of the risk of poverty. The EU-SILC 
2010 module on intra-household sharing, by allow-
ing the investigation of some unknown aspects of 
what takes place in the household’s black box, is 
a first step in the right direction, and the imperfec-
tions of the module should not discourage further 
efforts.
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indicator: impact on 
size and composition 
of deprived population
Anne‑Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier (104)
10.1 Introduction
Since 2009, the portfolio of social indicators used 
by EU countries and the European Commission for 
monitoring progress towards the EU social protec-
tion and social inclusion objectives (see Chapter 1 in 
this book) includes measures of material deprivation 
(MD) (105). These MD measures have been endorsed 
at EU level as a response to the need to complement 
EU income poverty and social exclusion indicators 
with indicators that better reflect differences in actu-
al standards of living across the EU — a need which 
had become even more urgent after the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements.
Based on the limited information available from the 
EU-SILC data-set and building on the work by Guio 
(2009), the ‘standard’ EU MD rate is currently defined 
as the proportion of people living in households 
(104) Anne-Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier are from LISER 
(Luxembourg). We are grateful to Tim Goedemé for very 
useful statistical advice and to Marco Pomati and Karel Van 
den Bosch for discussing a previous draft of this chapter. 
This work has been supported by the second Network for 
the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat as 
well as by the ‘Poverty reduction in Europe: social policy 
and innovation (imPRoVe)’ FP7-funded research project. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email 
address for correspondence: Anne-Catherine.guio@liser.lu.
(105) On the EU social objectives and the related EU portfolio 
of social indicators, see Chapter 1 in this book. And on the 
use of EU social indicators as well as the methodological EU 
framework under which these are developed, see: Atkinson et 
al. (2002), Marlier et al. (2007) and Social Protection Committee 
(2015).
who are confronted with at least three of the follow-
ing nine lacks:
1. they cannot face unexpected expenses;
2. they cannot afford 1 week annual holiday away 
from home;
3. they cannot avoid arrears (in mortgage or rent, 
utility bills or hire purchase instalments);
4. they cannot afford a meal with meat, chicken, 
fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day;
5. they cannot keep their homes adequately warm;
6. they cannot afford a washing machine (enforced 
lack) (106);
7. they cannot afford a colour TV (enforced lack);
8. they cannot afford a telephone (enforced lack); 
9. they do not have access to a car/van for personal 
use (enforced lack).
Since June 2010, when EU leaders launched the 
Europe 2020 strategy and set in this context an EU 
social inclusion target, the importance of EU MD in-
dicators has grown considerably. Indeed, this target, 
which consists of lifting at least 20 million people 
out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion in the 
EU by 2020, is based on three indicators (see Chap-
(106) Enforced lack means that the household (or the person in 
the case of items related to individual persons rather than 
households) would like to possess/ have access to the item but 
cannot afford it; put differently, the lack is not a choice of the 
household (person).
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ters 1 and 3 in this book). One of them is a measure 
of ‘severe’ MD, which is built in the same way as the 
‘standard’ measure but with a threshold set at four 
rather than three lacks.
Even though the current EU indicators of MD rep-
resented a major step forward in the measurement 
and monitoring of non-monetary poverty at Mem-
ber States’ and EU levels, they have also been crit-
icised (see in particular: Guio, Gordon and Marlier 
(2012), Nolan and Whelan (2011)). Main criticisms 
relate to the weak reliability of some of these items. 
This is a primary reason why a thematic module on 
MD was added to the 2009 Wave of EU-SILC (107).
Guio et al. (2012) have suggested two new MD indi-
cators: one for the whole EU population (i.e. people 
aged 0+; see also Chapter 21 in this book and Guio 
et al. (2016)); and one specifically focused on children 
(defined here as people aged 1-15; see Chapter 11 in 
this book). For identifying the final optimal list of MD 
items to be included in these indicators, they consid-
ered four aspects:
1. The suitability of each MD item, in order to check 
that citizens in the different EU countries (as well 
as the different population sub-groups within 
each country) perceive them as necessary for 
people to have an ‘acceptable’ standard of living 
in the country where they live. ‘Suitability’ should 
thus be understood as the ‘face validity’ of the 
measure among EU citizens.
2. The validity of individual items, to ensure that 
each item exhibits statistically significant relative 
risk ratios with independent variables known to 
be correlated with MD (income poverty, subjec-
tive poverty and health problems).
3. The reliability of the MD scale, to assess the in-
ternal consistency of the scale as a whole — i.e., 
how closely related the set of MD items are as 
a group. This assessment was done on the basis 
of the Cronbach’s Alpha statistic and a Classical 
(107) A second equally important reason is the need to respond to 
the willingness of EU countries and the European Commission 
to complement the current set of EU social indicators with 
additional measures reflecting the situation of children. See 
inter alia Chapter 11 in this book, de Neubourg et al. (2012), 
Gábos et al. (2011), Guio et al. (2012), Watson et al. (2012) and 
Whelan (2012) for proposals for comparative indicators of child 
deprivation.
Test Theory (CTT) framework (Nunally, 1978), and 
complemented with additional tests on the reli-
ability of each individual item in the scale based 
on Item Response Theory (IRT), see for example 
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2007.
4. The additivity of items, to check whether a per-
son with a MD indicator score of ‘2’ is in reality 
suffering from more severe MD than a person 
with a score of ‘1’, i.e. that the MD indicator’s 
components add up.
Only the MD items that successfully passed these 
four steps were considered eligible for being aggre-
gated into a MD indicator. Among the nine items 
included in the current EU MD indicators, six items 
successfully passed them, namely the incapacity for 
a household to:
1. face unexpected expenses;
2. afford 1 week annual holiday away from home;
3. avoid arrears (in mortgage or rent, utility bills or 
hire purchase instalments);
4. afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetar-
ian equivalent every second day;
5. keep their home adequately warm; 
6. have access to a car/van for personal use (en-
forced lack).
Among the items collected in the 2009 MD mod-
ule, seven also satisfactorily met the criteria; each of 
these items contributes to a robust measure of what 
can be seen as a common underlying concept of MD 
across the EU. Five of these new items are enforced 
lacks which adult household members are confront-
ed with. In the households concerned, a majority (108) 
(108) So, for each of these five items collected for adults aged 16 
or above a household MD variable is computed as follows: a 
household (i.e. all its members, adults and children) is deprived 
of an item if at least half of the adults living in the household 
cannot afford this item. Guio et al. (2012) opted for this 
approach in order to ensure the within-household consistency 
of the MD status in line with the EU indicators of poverty risk 
and (quasi-)joblessness included in the Europe 2020 social 
inclusion target (see Chapter 1 of this volume). An alternative 
approach would consist of using this adult information to make 
the MD indicator gender- and age-sensitive. This approach was 
explored by A.-C. Guio, D. Gordon, H. Najera and M. Pomati in 
the context of a Eurostat grant aimed at revising the EU MD 
variables based on an in depth analysis of the 2014 EU-SILC 
Wave. The results of this and other analyses funded through 
this grant will be summarised in various articles which should 
be published in 2017.
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Figure 10.1: Cronbach’s alpha by country, 2009
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NB: The Cronbach’s Alpha statistic measures the internal consistency of a scale, i.e. how closely related a set of items are as a group. A ‘high’ value 
of Alpha is often used as evidence that the set of items measure a ‘latent’ construct. An Alpha of 0.70 or higher is considered as ‘satisfactory’ in 
most social science research situations.
Reading note: The Cronbach’s attains 0.86 in Belgium for the 13-item scale and 0.69 for the 9-item scale.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
of members aged 16 or above cannot afford (but 
would like to):
1. replacing worn-out clothes by some new ones;
2. having two pairs of properly fitting shoes (in-
cluding a pair of all-weather shoes);
3. spending a small amount of money each week 
on him/herself;
4. having regular leisure activities; 
5. getting together with friends/family for a drink/
meal at least monthly.
The other two new items consist in the incapacity for 
the household to afford (enforced lack):
6. replacing worn-out furniture; 
7. having a computer and an internet connection.
The reliability of the 13-item scale proposed by Guio 
et al. is very high, for the EU-27 as a whole and also 
for each EU Member State. The Cronbach’s Alpha 
statistic, which measures the internal consistency 
of a scale, is 0.85 for the pooled EU-27 dataset and 
ranges from 0.75 in Sweden to 0.86 in Belgium (see 
Figure 10.1). The fact that in each country, the relia-
bility largely exceeds the 0.70 acceptability threshold 
(Nunally, 1978) is a major improvement on the cur-
rent (9-item) indicator. This means that the alterna-
tive 13-item MD indicator is (much) more reliable for 
the EU as a whole and in all EU countries and, there-
fore, measures deprivation with greater precision 
than the current MD indicator.
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10.2 Choice of the threshold
As explained above, the current EU measure of MD is 
defined as the proportion of people living in house-
holds who cannot afford at least three (standard MD) 
or four (severe MD) items out of a list of nine items. 
The severe measure of MD is used for the Europe 
2020 social inclusion target, in combination with 
the EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ indicator (see Chapter 3 in 
this book) and a measure of (quasi-)joblessness (see 
Chapter 16 in this book).
Guio et al. (2012) tested different MD thresholds 
(common to all countries) and compared the result-
ing values to the ‘standard’ and ‘severe’ MD indica-
tors. A threshold of at least five items lacked (out of 
13) leads to a MD rate for the EU-27 weighted aver-
age that is very close to that provided by the current 
standard EU-27 MD indicator (3+ items out of nine; 
hereafter ‘EU MD’). And a threshold of at least seven 
items lacked (out of 13) leads to an EU-27 MD rate that 
is slightly higher than the current EU severe MD indi-
cator (4+ items out of 9; hereafter ‘EU SMD’). In view 
of the purpose of our chapter, we have opted for 
these two different thresholds, which we refer below 
to as ‘MD 5+’ and ‘MD 7+’. There are two main reasons 
for this choice. First, we consider that the closeness of 
the results at EU level makes it easier to compare the 
national figures provided by the alternative meas-
ures proposed by Guio et al. with those produced 
by the current EU measures. Second, we believe that 
this choice is likely to allow for a smoother transition 
between the two measures, which is especially im-
portant for the severe MD indicator given its political 
prominence in the Europe 2020 strategy.
10.3 Impact of the definition 
change on the incidence of 
material deprivation in the EU
10.3.1 Impact on the Standard EU 
MD indicator
Figure 10.2 compares the proportion of people de-
prived according to the current ‘standard’ MD indi-
cator (EU MD) and the alternative 13-item MD indica-
tor with a threshold set at 5+ deprivations (MD 5+). 
Figure 10.3 presents for each country the confidence 
intervals for the difference (expressed in percentage 
points) between these two indicators. All confidence 
intervals presented in this chapter are computed on 
the basis of Goedemé (2013) and Osier et al. (2013) 
(see also Chapter 26 in this book). Confidence inter-
vals refer to the accuracy of the estimates. Yet, even 
though it is a pre-requisite that the observed perfor-
mances are different, we have also to ask about the 
differences which are of interest to the user. Suppose 
that in a country the level of MD according to the 
alternative indicator is x percentage points higher 
than that shown by the current indicator. How large 
does x have to be for this country to consider that the 
situation reflected by the two indicators is different 
and may then require different policy interventions? 
In other words, which difference should be interpret-
ed as ‘socioeconomically’ (as opposed to statistical-
ly) significant? Here, we consider that only impacts 
higher than two percentage points are significant 
from a socioeconomic point of view.
As can be seen from Figure 10.3, in a majority of 
countries (16) moving from the current EU MD indi-
cator to the alternative MD 5+ indicator has either no 
statistically significant impact on the proportion of 
people deprived (Slovenia, Spain, Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Belgium, France) or this impact is maximum two 
percentage points (in Estonia, Greece, Sweden, Italy, 
Denmark, United kingdom, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania as well as for the EU-27 average). 
In five countries (Germany, Malta, Portugal, Bulgaria, 
Romania), the alternative indicator produces dep-
rivation levels which are higher by more than two 
percentage points. By contrast, deprivation levels are 
lower by more than two percentage points in Cyprus, 
Ireland, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic and Finland.
10.3.2 Impact on the Severe EU MD 
indicator
Figure 10.4 compares the proportion of people 
deprived according to the current ‘severe’ MD (EU 
SMD) indicator and the alternative MD indicator with 
a threshold set at 7+ deprivations (MD 7+).
Moving from the current severe EU SMD indicator 
to the alternative MD 7+ indicator has no statistically 
significant impact on the proportion of people se-
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Figure 10.2: People deprived, using either the current EU standard MD indicator (3+ items out 
of 9) or the alternative MD indicator (5+ items out of 13), 2009
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Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
verely deprived in five Member States: Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria (see Figure 
10.5). This impact is statistically higher than 2 percent-
age points in Cyprus (MD 7+ lower than EU SMD) and 
in Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Portugal and Romania 
(MD 7+ higher than EU SMD).
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Figure 10.3: Difference between the proportion of people deprived using the current EU 
standard MD indicator (3+ items out of 9) and the proportion of people deprived using the 
alternative MD indicator (5+ items out of 13), 2009
(percentage points with 95 % confidence intervals)
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Reading note: In Cyprus, the proportion of people deprived using the alternative MD indicator (5+ items out of 13) is 9.2 percentage points lower 
than the proportion of people deprived using the current EU standard MD indicator (3+ items out of 9). The interval comprised between 7.6 % 
and 10.8 % has 95 % probability of containing the ‘true’ difference between these two indicators.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Figure 10.4: People deprived, using either the current EU severe MD indicator (4+ items out of 9) 
or the alternative MD indicator (7+ items out of 13), 2009
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Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
Figure 10.5: Difference between the proportion of people deprived using the current EU severe 
MD indicator (4+ items out of 9) and the proportion of people deprived using the alternative MD 
indicator (7+ items out of 13), 2009
(percentage points with 95 % confidence intervals)
Reading note: See Figure 10.3.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Figure 10.6: Intersections of the Europe 2020 ‘At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE)’ 
indicator, using either the current EU severe MD indicator (normal font) or the alternative MD 7+ 
indicator (bold and italics font), EU‑27, 2009
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Reading note: 9.9 % of the total population at EU level is ‘only’ income-poor (i.e. neither severely deprived nor living in a (quasi-)jobless 
household), if the MD criterion chosen for the AROPE target is the current severe MD indicator (EU SMD); this figure is 9.7 % if the MD criterion 
chosen is the alternative MD 7+ indicator proposed by Guio et al. (2012). The proportion of people in the EU who combine income poverty and 
severe material deprivation (but not (quasi-)joblessness) is 2.4 % with EU SMD as opposed to 2.6 % with MD 7+.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
10.3.3 Impact on the Europe 2020 
social inclusion target
Figure 10.6 compares the levels of the ‘at-risk-of-pov-
erty-or-social-exclusion’ (AROPE) indicator used for 
the Europe 2020 social inclusion target (see Chapter 
1 in this book for more details on the AROPE indica-
tor) when computed with the alternative MD 7+ in-
dicator rather than the current ‘severe’ MD (EU SMD) 
indicator. The total proportion of AROPE people at 
EU level is 23.7 % according to the alternative indica-
tor versus 23.1 % according to the current indicator. 
This very small difference is mainly due to the slight 
increase in the proportion of people ‘only’ deprived 
(from 3.8 % (EU SMD) to 4.4 % (MD 7+)). At the coun-
try level (Figure 10.7), the proportion of AROPE peo-
ple increases by more than two percentage points 
only in Portugal, Hungary and Romania if we switch 
to the alternative definition. In the other 24 coun-
tries, the difference is either not statistically signifi-
cant (Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Spain and Belgium) or is less than two points.
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Figure 10.7: Difference between the people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, using either 
the current EU severe MD indicator or the alternative MD 7+ indicator, 2009
(percentage points with 95 % confidence intervals)
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Reading note: See Figure 10.3.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
10.4 Overlap between the 
current and alternative 
indicators
The previous results provide the overall changes in 
the level of MD due to the definition change but 
do not tell us anything about the degree of over-
lap between the alternative MD indicators and the 
current EU MD indicators. Figure 10.8 shows that 
the composition of people deprived may change, 
even in countries where the definition change has 
no statistically significant impact on the total pro-
portion of people deprived.
So, at the EU level, 13.1 % of people are deprived 
according to both the current EU ‘standard’ 
MD (3+ lacks out of 9) indicator and the alterna-
tive MD 5+ indicator (5+ lacks out of 13). Around 
9 % of people are identified as deprived either by 
the alternative indicator or by the current EU MD 
indicator but not by both indicators at the same 
time — i.e., they are EU MD ‘only’ (4.0 %) or MD 
5+ ‘only’ (4.6 %). Put differently, this means that at 
EU-27 level 74 % of those deprived according to 
the alternative MD 5+ indicator are also deprived 
according to the current EU MD indicator (13.1/
(13.1+4.6)). This proportion varies a lot between 
countries, as highlighted in Figure 10.8. In Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Ireland, Czech Re-
public and Finland, it exceeds 80 %. At the other 
extreme, this proportion is around 50 % in Malta 
and Luxembourg. In the remaining countries, it var-
ies between 60 % and 80 %.
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Figure 10.8: Overlap between the current EU standard MD indicator (EU MD, i.e. 3+ lacks out of 
9) and the alternative MD 5+ indicator (5+ lacks out of 13), 2009
(%)
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NB: The MD 5+ ‘only’ category refers to those who suffer from 5+ lacks according to the alternative MD 5+ indicator but are not deprived 
according to the current EU MD indicator. The EU MD ‘only’ category refers to those who suffer from EU MD but are not deprived according to 
MD 5+. Finally, the ‘Both’ category consists of those who are deprived according to both MD indicators (EU MD and MD 5+).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Table 10.1: Distribution of those suffering from MD 5+ ‘only’ (5+ items lacked in the alternative 
13‑item MD indicator), EU MD ‘only’ (3+ items lacked in the current 9‑item indicator) or from 
deprivation on both the alternative and current indicators, by level of MD (9‑item scale), 2009
(%)
Number of items lacked from 
the current 9‑item list EU MD ‘only’ MD 5+ ‘only’ Both
0 0 2 0
1 0 17 0
2 0 82 0
3 89 0 40
4 11 0 33
5 0 0 18
6 0 0 7
7 0 0 2
8 0 0 1
9 0 0 0
Reading note: 82 % of those deprived ‘only’ according to the alternative 13-item indicator (MD 5+ ‘only’) lack two items from the current 9-item 
list.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
Table 10.1 highlights three interesting results:
1. 82 % of those deprived ‘only’ according to the 
alternative 13-item indicator (MD 5+ ‘only’) 
lack two items from the current 9-item list. So, 
these people lack at least three items out of the 
‘new’ seven items (as they lack in total at least 
five items out of the 13 items of the alternative 
list). It is therefore important to include them in 
a standard indicator of deprivation.
2. An extremely large proportion (89 %) of those 
EU MD ‘only’, i.e. those who are not included 
in the alternative MD 5+ indicator, are also not 
severely deprived: they lack exactly three items 
from the current 9-item list (not four). Moreo-
ver, additional analysis shows that these people 
lack none or only one of the seven ‘new’ items 
included in the alternative scale (as they do not 
reach the ‘at least 5 out of 13’ threshold).
3. Those suffering from both forms of MD are by 
far the most deprived in terms of the number 
of items lacked, with almost 30 % of people 
lacking five items or more out of the current 
9-item list. As can be seen from Figure 10.9, this 
group suffers from the highest incidence of 
deprivation for the whole list of items used in 
both scales.
Additional analysis shows that among those cur-
rently identified as severely deprived, the propor-
tion of those not included in the MD 5+ indicator is 
negligible: less than 0.5 % at EU level and less than 
1 % in all countries, except in Poland (1.4 %).
A crucial question that we need to explore now is 
whether or not those identified by the current and 
alternative indicators share the same characteris-
tics. This is what we do in the next section.
10.5 Impact of the 
definition change on the 
characteristics of people 
deprived
This section compares the composition of those 
who are ‘added’ to the population currently identi-
fied by the standard indicator (those MD 5+ ‘only’) 
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Figure 10.9: Proportion of people lacking each of the 16 items comprised in the current 9‑item 
scale and/or in the alternative 13‑item scale, for those suffering from MD 5+ ‘only’, EU MD ‘only’ 
or from both MD 5+ and EU MD, and for those who are not deprived on both, 2009
(percentages with 95 % confidence intervals)
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NB: The MD 5+ ‘only’ category refers to those who suffer from 5+ lacks according to the alternative indicator but are not deprived according to 
the current EU MD indicator. The EU MD ‘only’ category refers to those who suffer from EU MD but are not deprived according to the alternative 
(5+) indicator. Finally, the ‘Both’ category consists of those who are deprived according to both MD indicators (EU MD and 5+ MD according to 
the alternative scale). Items with one star are those that are included only in the alternative scale, those with two stars are common to the two 
scales and those without a star are only in the 9-item scale.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
with those who are ‘dropped’ (the EU MD ‘only’) 
and those who are ‘kept’ because they suffer from 
both forms of deprivation. Here, we only look at 
the standard deprivation indicators (MD 5+ and EU 
MD) in order to have a sufficiently large sample size 
in each group.
The explanatory variables we use in this section 
contain a set of individual and household socioec-
onomic characteristics often identified in the litera-
ture as having an impact on the risk of deprivation 
(see for example Fusco, Guio, Marlier (2010)), i.e. var-
iables that can affect the resources or needs of the 
individual — such as their income, their age, their 
household type, the presence of individuals in bad 
health in their household, the work attachment of 
their household members, their educational level 
or their country of birth.
We have applied a multinomial logistic regres-
sion to analyse (at EU level) the marginal impact 
of these factors on the probability of belonging 
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to one of the four groups, namely ‘being both MD 
5+ and EU MD’, ‘being only MD 5+’, ‘being only EU 
MD’ and ‘being neither MD 5+ nor EU MD’. The mo-
dality ‘being only EU MD’ is used as the reference 
category so that all the results are expressed in re-
lation to it. Table 10.2 shows the results in terms of 
relative risk ratios. These ratios are computed as the 
exponentiated considered coefficient. They meas-
ure the probability of belonging to one group rel-
ative to the probability of belonging to the group 
of reference for a unit change in the independent 
variable considered. For example, the relative risk 
ratio for people living in single parent households 
is the ratio between the following two relative risks:
• the relative risk for people in single parent 
households; 
• the relative risk of the related ‘reference’ that has 
been chosen — i.e., in our case: the rest of the 
population.
Each of these two relative risks measures the prob-
ability of belonging to the group of interest (one 
of the three risks modelled in this chapter: MD 5+ 
‘only’, both forms of deprivation (EU MD and MD 5+) 
and neither MD 5+ nor EU MD), relatively to the ref-
erence group EU MD ‘only’. So, the fact that the rel-
ative risk ratio of suffering from both forms of dep-
rivation is 1.45 for single parents means that the risk 
for people living in single parent households of be-
ing in the ‘both’ category, relatively to being EU MD 
‘only’, is 1.45 times higher than for other households.
Table 10.2 shows that once the effect of the other 
explanatory variables is controlled for the following:
• Most variables have no significant impact on 
the risk of being in the MD 5+ ‘only’ group, 
which shows that EU MD ‘only’ and MD 5+ ‘only’ 
people broadly share the same socioeconomic 
characteristics. Nevertheless, some variables 
(having a low income, a bad health or living 
alone) do increase significantly the risk of being 
Table 10.2: Multinomial regression, estimation of the relative risk ratio of being MD according 
to the EU 9‑item MD indicator (EU MD) and/or MD according to the alternative 13‑item MD 
indicator (MD 5+), people aged 0‑59, EU‑27, 2009
Exponentiated coefficients EU MD ‘only’ Both MD 5+ ‘only’ None
Single parent households 1.00 1.45*** 1.03 0.44***
One‑person households 1.00 1.06 0.53*** 0.49***
Log equivalised income 1.00 0.61*** 0.84*** 2.71***
Primary education or less 1.00 1.21** 0.91 0.46***
Lower secondary 1.00 1.43*** 1.04 0.50***
Upper secondary 1.00 1.09*** 1.09 0.64***
Born in a non‑EU country 1.00 1.35*** 0.99 0.50***
(Quasi‑)joblessness 1.00 1.71*** 1.12 0.56***
Bad health 1.00 1.47*** 1.19** 0.64***
N 444 655
pseudo R² 0.193
Ll -268 432.9
chi2 32 339.1
NB: Unweighted, exponentiated coefficient (relative risk ratios); *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; reference category of the dependent variable: EU MD 
‘only’ (3+ items lacked in the current 9-item indicator). The maximal level of education attained by the person is divided into four categories: 
lower educational level (i.e. those who have reached primary level or less), lower secondary level, upper secondary level, and the rest of the 
population. People in bad health are people having ‘limitations’ or ‘strong limitations’ in daily activities because of health problems. People 
living in (quasi-)jobless households are people aged 0-59 living in households where, on average, adult members aged 18-59 have worked less 
than 20 % of their total work potential during the income reference period.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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MD 5+ ‘only’ relatively to being EU MD ‘only’, 
which is an interesting ex post validation of the 
alternative indicator. These results also show 
that for single-adult households the relative risk 
of being MD 5+ ‘only’, relatively to being ‘EU MD 
only’, is lower than for other households.
• Most of the variables do have a statistically 
significant impact on the risk of suffering from 
both forms of deprivation (relatively to being EU 
MD ‘only’). Having a low income, a bad health, 
living in a single parent household, in a (quasi-)
jobless household or being a migrant increase 
the risk of cumulating both forms of deprivation.
• As expected, all these characteristics decrease the 
probability to be in the category who manages 
to avoid any form of deprivation (the ‘none’ 
category), relatively to those EU MD ‘only’.
10.6 Conclusions
Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012) have proposed 
a theory-based analytical framework for develop-
ing robust (i.e. suitable, reliable, valid and additive) 
aggregate indicators that could be used for analyt-
ical and monitoring purposes at national and EU 
levels. They have applied this framework to EU-SILC 
data collected in 2009, and as a result of their sys-
tematic item by item analysis carried out at both 
EU and country levels, they have suggested an al-
ternative MD indicator for the whole population. 
This alternative indicator consists of 13 items — six 
are common to the current 9-item MD indicator 
and seven are new. Using a broad range of statisti-
cal techniques, they have demonstrated that their 
proposed 13-item MD indicator produces a (much) 
more robust measurement of deprivation than the 
current EU MD indicator.
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that 
this alternative 13-item indicator:
• ‘adds’ to the population identified by the current 
standard EU MD indicator a group of people 
who cumulate a large number of deprivations, 
encompassing ‘basic’ and ‘social’ items;
• ‘drops’ from the population identified by the 
current standard indicator a group of people 
who have a high probability to suffer from 
a small number of deprivations and who are not 
severely deprived;
• ‘keeps’ the more vulnerable population, either in 
terms of the number of items lacked (whatever 
the scale used) or in terms of the probability to 
lack each individual item in the list.
In terms of the characteristics and exposure to 
other risks, those ‘added’ and those ‘dropped’ are 
quite similar, except for a few differences which 
offer an interesting ex post validation of the alter-
native indicator (especially, the closer link of the 
alternative indicator with low income and with bad 
health compared with the current indicator). All in 
all, those identified by both the current and alterna-
tive indicators are the most vulnerable, i.e. they are 
more likely to suffer from other risks (low income, 
bad health, (quasi-)joblessness, etc.) and are pro-
portionally more numerous among single parents, 
migrants and low educated people.
The impact of the definition change on the pro-
portion of people deprived (standard definition) 
or severely deprived is small at the EU level, but it 
varies across countries. As six items are common 
to both indicators, the incidence of the seven new 
items, the probability of cumulating them and also 
the way they interact with the ‘old’ six items ex-
plain the differences between the two aggregated 
indicators.
Finally, the total proportion of people targeted 
at EU level is 23.1 % according to the current EU 
severe MD indicator and 23.7 % according to the 
alternative (MD 7+) indicator. At the country level, 
using the alternative (MD 7+) indicator instead of 
the current EU severe MD indicator increases the 
proportion of people targeted by more than 2 % in 
Portugal, Hungary and Romania.
So, whereas the move from the current EU MD 
definition to the alternative one results in a more 
robust indicator, the impact of this improved sta-
tistical robustness on the size and socioeconomic 
composition of the deprived population is limited 
in most countries and for the EU as a whole.
This analysis could only be performed at one point 
in time (2009). The seven additional items needed 
for calculating the alternative indicator were col-
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lected again in the 2013 Wave of EU-SILC in most 
countries, on the basis of a gentlemen’s agreement 
between Eurostat and the Member States, and on 
a compulsory basis in the 2014 Wave in all coun-
tries. These new data are currently being analysed, 
which will allow for change over time analysis (in-
cluding longitudinal analysis for those countries 
that have collected these data in both 2013 and 
2014 (109) and additional tests of the robustness of 
the indicator proposed by Guio et al.
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11.1 Introduction
The fight against child poverty and the importance 
of investing in children’s well-being has been high on 
the EU political agenda for many years. In February 
2013, a major step forward was taken when the Eu-
ropean Commission published a Recommendation 
on ‘Investing in children, breaking the cycle of disad-
vantage’ (European Commission, 2013). The recom-
mendation follows a series of steps taken by some 
EU Presidencies, the EU Social Protection Committee 
(SPC) and the Commission.
In 2007, an EU Task-Force on Child Poverty and 
Child Well-Being was established by the SPC. Its re-
port (Social Protection Committee, 2008) spelled 
out a number of recommendations for developing 
and monitoring indicators and for the use of a com-
mon framework in the analysis of child poverty and 
well-being. Following these guidelines, Tárki and 
Applica (2010) prepared a report on Child pover-
ty and Child Well-being in the EU for the European 
Commission.
This political commitment was taken forward during 
the 2010 Belgian Presidency of the EU, which high-
lighted three important policy areas for future action: 
income support, active inclusion and a children’s 
rights approach. Subsequently, the 2011 Hungarian 
(110) Anne-Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier are from LISER 
(Luxembourg) and David Gordon from Bristol University (UK). 
This work has been supported by the second Network for 
the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat and 
the ESRC Grant RES-060-25-0052. The European Commission 
bears no responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, which 
are solely those of the authors. We would like to thank Eldin 
Fahmy, Viliami Fifita, Shailen Nandy and Marco Pomati (Bristol 
University) who, through providing us with in-depth data 
analyses, contributed significantly to this chapter. Email for 
correspondence: anne-catherine.guio@liser.lu.
Presidency proposed a set of possible EU indicators 
of child well-being and improved monitoring instru-
ments to track changes in child poverty (Tárki, 2011). 
This was followed by a second EU Task-Force and the 
SPC report on ‘Tackling and preventing child poverty, 
promoting child well-being’ (2012), with the aim of 
contributing to the aforementioned 2013 Commis-
sion Recommendation. An important element of this 
Commission Recommendation is a call on Member 
States to ‘reinforce statistical capacity […] where 
needed and feasible, particularly concerning child 
deprivation’.
Children’s needs change as they grow older and their 
needs are often different from those of adults (e.g. 
educational needs). Therefore, material deprivation 
(MD) indicators are required which are age and gen-
der appropriate and which are specific to children’s 
needs. The 2009 ad hoc EU-SILC module on MD (see 
Chapter 10 in this book) included child-specific MD 
items, allowing the development of specific child MD 
indicators.
This chapter provides the main results of the in-depth 
analysis of the 2009 EU-SILC data on child MD carried 
out by Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012). A key pur-
pose of the study by Guio and her colleagues was to 
identify an optimal set of children MD items among 
those collected in 2009 in order to recommend 
a child MD indicator for use by EU Member States 
and the European Commission. Detailed analyses, in-
cluding all underlying national and EU figures can be 
found in this report.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 11.2 
presents the data, Section 11.3 discusses the need for 
a holistic approach to measuring child deprivation, 
Section 11.4 presents the methodological framework 
11
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and the results of the analysis, Section 11.5 presents 
the aggregated indicator and its value added, Sec-
tion 11.6 concludes.
11.2 Data on child 
deprivation in EU‑SILC
Data relating to the living conditions of children 
are not collected from the children themselves but 
from the adult answering the ‘household ques-
tionnaire’ (referred to as the ‘household respond-
ent’). According to the survey protocol, if, in a giv-
en household, at least one child does not have an 
item, it is then assumed that all the children in that 
household also lack the item (see Eurostat, 2011). 
This assumption has been made for pragmatic 
reasons. Ideally, it would be preferable to know 
the deprivation levels of each child in a household 
separately as it would then be possible to study 
differences in child deprivation within each house-
hold as well as between each household (e.g. if 
girls suffer more deprivation than boys, or teenag-
ers more than younger children living in the same 
household).
In addition to the MD information collected about 
households and adults, the following list of chil-
dren’s MD items was collected in the 2009 EU-SILC 
module on MD: The household cannot afford for at 
least one child...
1. some new (not second-hand) clothes (enforced 
lack; see chapter 10 in this book);
2. two pairs of properly fitting shoes, including 
a pair of all-weather shoes (enforced lack);
3. fresh fruits and vegetables daily (enforced lack);
4. three meals a day (enforced lack);
5. one meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian 
equivalent daily (enforced lack):
6. books at home suitable for the children’s age 
(enforced lack);
7. outdoor leisure equipment (enforced lack);
8. indoor games (enforced lack);
9. a suitable place to do homework;
10. to consult a dentist when needed (‘optional’, i.e. 
countries were allowed not to collect this item);
11. to consult a general practitioner (gp) when 
needed (optional);
12. regular leisure activities (sports, youth organisa-
tions, etc.) (enforced lack);
13. celebrations on special occasions (enforced lack);
14. to invite friends round to play and eat from time 
to time (enforced lack);
15. to participate in school trips and school events 
that costs money (enforced lack);
16. outdoor space in the neighbourhood to play 
safely;
17. 1 week annual holiday away from home (option-
al) (enforced lack).
The majority of these children’s items were adapted 
from the 1999 Poverty and Social Exclusion survey of 
Britain (Gordon et al., 2000; Pantazis et al., 2006). For 
most items, the information was gathered for chil-
dren aged between 1 and 15 (i.e. they were collect-
ed in households with at least one child in this age 
bracket). Therefore, our suggested child-specific MD 
indicator covers only children aged between 1 and 
15. For reasons of consistency, we had to exclude all 
children aged less than one from our calculations 
related to the child-specific indicator, even though 
information was available for some of them (where 
they have brothers/sisters aged between 1 and 15). 
Due to inconsistencies with the way some countries 
coded the children’s MD data, we have also chosen 
to drop from our calculations all children aged one 
or two who were flagged as ‘not applicable’ (be-
cause their households were erroneously consid-
ered as not having any children aged between 1 
and 15). It is important to highlight that, as a result 
of the way data were collected in the 2009 EU-SILC 
module, ‘children’ here do not refer to the same 
population as the one covered by the existing EU 
social protection and social inclusion indicators: 1-15 
as opposed to 0-17 (in EU-SILC, teenagers aged 16 
and 17 are interviewed individually on the basis of 
the adult questionnaire).
Two children’s MD items were collected only in 
households with at least one child attending 
school (school trips and place to do homework) 
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and are therefore less relevant for younger children. 
We have considered that children living in house-
holds where no child is attending school, by defini-
tion, do not lack these two items.
The child holiday question was optional and we 
have therefore used the household ‘holiday item’ 
(used in the EU indicator on MD; see Chapter 10 in 
this book) as a proxy in the nine Member States that 
did not collect this child deprivation item, despite 
the fact that, in countries where both variables are 
available, the correlation is not necessarily high.
11.3 Need for a holistic and 
life‑cycle approach
In our suggested MD child indicator, we have tested 
the children’s items collected in the 2009 module, 
as well as the MD items collected at household lev-
el (111). Our choice is motivated by the fact that we 
believe (in line with scientific evidence, see below) 
that, in order to adequately measure children’s MD, it 
is necessary to look not only at MD that solely affects 
children but also at the MD that affects the house-
holds in which they live and that is likely to impact 
on the children’s living conditions. The whole set of 
items affecting children’s living conditions should 
therefore be included in a child MD indicator (Gor-
don et al., 2003), regardless of the statistical unit it 
refers to (which, in many cases, primarily reflects 
a choice made on the basis of data collection rather 
than conceptual considerations).
As highlighted by Atkinson and Marlier (2011), close 
links are required between the design of social in-
dicators and the questions they are intended to an-
swer. If the aim of a child MD indicator is to measure 
intra-household transfers or within-household dif-
ferences in living standards, then all household level 
items would need to be removed from the MD indi-
cator. By contrast, if the aim of a child MD indicator is 
to measure and compare the living standards of chil-
dren in different households (as we want to do here), 
(111) See also de Neubourg et al. (2012) for a similar choice of 
including household items in a child deprivation measure. In 
contrast, the choice of limiting the set of items to child-specific 
items was done in some other analyses of the 2009 EU-SILC MD 
module — see Gábos et al. (2011), Watson et al. (2012), Whelan 
(2012). 
then the relevant household level MD items that 
have a direct effect on children’s living conditions 
need to be included in the child MD indicator. This 
is particularly true where there is scientific evidence 
that these deprivations have worse or different ef-
fects on children than on adults (Marsh et al., 2000).
The inclusion of household items in a child indicator 
has to be interpreted from a holistic and life-cycle 
point of view: we include items that directly impact 
on children’s well-being (e.g. inadequate warmth 
in home, enforced lack of a car/van, etc.) and also 
items which may have an indirect or future impact 
on their well-being. For example, the inability to 
face unexpected expenses may have an impact on 
children’s living conditions in the near future (in the 
case of an accident, an illness, an inability to replace 
a car in a remote area, etc.). Qualitative studies have 
also shown that children in households suffering 
from financial strain often do not ask their parents 
for the things they need which cost money in order 
to try to protect their parents from stress and feel-
ings of guilt (Ridge, 2002 and 2011; Observatoire de 
l’Enfance, de la Jeunesse et de l’Aide à la jeunesse 
and Sonecom, 2010).
11.4 Methodological 
framework
As with the development of a new EU MD indi-
cator for the whole population (see Chapter 10 in 
this book), the conceptual approach we followed 
for measuring child MD was inspired by Peter 
Townsend’s research during the 1950s and 1960s 
on poverty and deprivation and succinctly de-
scribed in 1979:
Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consist‑
ently only in terms of the concept of relative depriva‑
tion. […] Individuals, families and groups in the popu‑
lation can be said to be in poverty when they lack the 
resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the 
activities and have the living conditions and amenities 
which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or 
approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their 
resources are so seriously below those commanded by 
the average individual or family that they are, in effect, 
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excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs or ac‑
tivities. (Townsend, 1979, p. 31)
The analytical framework used in this chapter 
draws extensively on the 1999 Poverty and Social 
Exclusion Survey deprivation indicator construc-
tion methodology. An important aspect of this 
methodology is that it facilitates the identification 
and selection of an optimal sub-set of MD items 
from the initial list of available items. We have en-
sured a robust selection of items, by considering 
the four following aspects to identify the final op-
timal list of MD items: 1) suitability of the items; 2) 
validity of the items; 3) reliability of the items; and 
4) additivity.
11.4.1 Suitability of the items
The suitability of each MD item was examined, in 
order to check that citizens in the different Member 
States (as well as the different population sub-groups 
within each Member State) consider them necessary 
to have an ‘acceptable’ standard of living in the coun-
try where they live. Here, ‘suitability’ is understood 
as a measure of face validity amongst the EU pop-
ulation. A high proportion of people having and/or 
wanting an item provides a measure of the ordinary 
living patterns, customs or activities which is a key 
criteria in Townsend’s sociological definition of pov-
erty (Townsend, 1979). As Perry (2002) suggested, we 
defined the degree of ‘importance’ of each item, at 
EU and country levels, as the proportion of people 
‘wanting’ an item (which encompasses both people 
who have the item AND people who would like it 
but cannot afford it). Our analysis shows that, for chil-
dren’s MD items, the proportion of ‘wanting’ is very 
high (for detailed results, see Guio, Gordon and Mar-
lier, 2012). This is true not only for basic items (food, 
clothes and shoes) but also for other items such as 
the availability of games, celebration, books or out-
door equipment. See Table 11.1 for a summary of the 
results of our tests. No items failed the suitability test.
11.4.2 Validity of the items
All items in a MD index/indicator need to be valid 
measures of MD. An individual MD item can be 
considered to be valid if it exhibits positive statis-
tically significant relative risk ratios with a set of in-
dependent variables known to be correlated with 
the latent construct of deprivation. We tested this 
by running binary logistic regressions for each MD 
item (dependent variable) against independent 
variables known to be correlated with MD: income 
poverty (112) and subjective poverty, i.e. (great) diffi-
culties in making ends meet.
An item showing non-statistically significant re-
lation with both income and subjective poverty 
in more than two Member States was rejected as 
non-valid. See Table 11.1 for a summary of the re-
sults to our tests (Sweden was excluded from this 
criterion because of the large proportion of miss-
ing data for all MD module items (around 40 %)).
11.4.3 Reliability of the items
Reliability was tested using Classical Test Theory 
and Item Response Theory models. Classical Test 
Theory provides information on the reliability of 
a MD scale as a whole. This can usefully be comple-
mented with Item Response Theory that provides 
additional information on the reliability of each in-
dividual item in the scale.
Classical test theory
The Cronbach’s Alpha statistic measures the internal 
consistency of a scale, i.e. how closely related a set of 
items are as a group. A ‘high’ value of Alpha is often 
used as evidence that the set of items measure an 
underlying (or ‘latent’) construct. An Alpha of 0.70 
or higher is considered as ‘satisfactory’ in most so-
cial science research situations (Nunally, 1978). We 
identified which items if omitted (one by one) would 
increase the reliability of the deprivation index (i.e. 
increase Cronbach’s Alpha — analysis performed at 
both country and EU levels). In line with our validity 
tests, the criterion we applied is that an item is con-
sidered unreliable if it is unreliable in three countries 
or more. The Cronbach alpha of the final list of items 
which passed all our tests attained 0.90 at the EU 
level, i.e. far more than the usual 0.70 criterion (see 
Figure 11.1).
(112) Both Peter Townsend (1979) and Mack and Lansley (1985) used 
the size of the correlation between income and MD to select 
their items.
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Item Response Theory
Item Response Theory, also known as Latent Trait 
Analysis, is a set of statistical models which describe 
the relationship between a person’s response to 
questionnaire items and an unobserved latent trait 
such as knowledge of biology, level of happiness 
or amount of material deprivation. Item Response 
Theory is often used for the selection of questions in 
educational assessment and for psychological test-
ing. It has also been used for developing measures 
of poverty.
Table 11.1 shows the items which did not pass the 
reliability tests.
11.4.4 Additivity of the items
Additivity tests aim to ensure that the MD indica-
tor’s components add up, i.e. to check that, say, 
someone with a MD indicator score of ‘2’ is in real-
ity suffering from more severe MD than someone 
with a score of ‘1’ or a score of ‘0’. This was checked 
using an ANOVA model (second order interactions 
of MD items by level of equivalised disposable 
household income). These models assume that 
children who suffer from two deprivations (e.g. 
those who cannot afford both clothes and shoes) 
should live in households with (on average) signif-
icantly lower net equivalised incomes than those 
who only suffer from one deprivation (clothes or 
shoes deprivation ‘only’) or no deprivations. Simi-
larly, those children suffering from one deprivation 
should have lower incomes than those with no 
deprivations. This should hold for all possible com-
binations of MD items. See Table 11.1 for a summary 
of our results.
The MD items that successfully passed these four 
steps can thus be considered to be suitable, valid, 
reliable and additive candidates for being aggre-
gated into a child-specific MD indicator.
11.5 Final list of children 
MD items
The final list of items retained in the MD indicator 
related to the children (aged 1-15 years) population 
consists therefore of the following 13 ‘children’ and 
5 ‘household’ items:
1. child: some new clothes (enforced lack);
2. child: two pairs of properly fitting shoes (en-
forced lack);
3. child: fresh fruits and vegetables daily (enforced 
lack);
4. child: meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equiva-
lent daily (enforced lack);
5. child: suitable books (enforced lack);
6. child: outdoor leisure equipment (enforced 
lack);
7. child: indoor games (enforced lack);
8. child: place to do homework;
9. child: leisure activities (enforced lack);
10. child: celebrations (enforced lack);
11. child: invite friends (enforced lack);
12. child: school trips (enforced lack);
13. child: holiday (enforced lack);
14. household: replace worn-out furniture (en-
forced lack);
15. household: arrears;
16. household: computer and internet (enforced 
lack);
17. household: home adequately warm;
18. household: car/van (enforced lack).
The Cronbach’s alpha for the 18 items retained for 
our suggested child MD indicator is 0.90 for the 
pooled EU-27 dataset. The national Alphas range 
from 0.68 in Finland to 0.93 in Bulgaria (see Figure 
11.1).
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Table 11.1: Outcomes of suitability, validity, reliability and additivity tests, child population, 2009
The household cannot afford for at least one child: Problems
Some new clothes (enforced lack) √
Two pairs of properly fitting shoes (enforced lack) √
Fresh fruits and vegetables daily (enforced lack) √
Three meals a day (enforced lack) Validity and Reliability
Meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent daily (enforced lack) √ 
Suitable books (enforced lack) √
Outdoor leisure equipment (enforced lack) √
Indoor games (enforced lack) √
Place to do homework √
To consult a dentist (optional) Validity and Reliability
To consult a GP (optional) Validity and Reliability
Leisure activities (enforced lack) √ (Suitability)
Celebrations (enforced lack) √
To invite friends (enforced lack) √
School trips (enforced lack) √
Outdoor space to play Reliability
Holiday (enforced lack) (optional) √
The household’s dwelling suffers from:
Lack of basic amenities Validity and Reliability
Shortage of space Reliability
Darkness Reliability
Noise Validity and Reliability
Pollution Validity and Reliability
Crime Validity and Reliability
Leaky roof, damp, etc. Reliability
Inadequate warmth in home √
High housing costs (>40 % of total household income) Reliability
Overcrowding Reliability
Litter lying around Validity and Reliability
Vandalism Reliability
The household cannot afford:
To replace worn-out furniture (enforced lack) √
To face unexpected expenses Additivity
To avoid arrears √
A telephone (enforced lack) Validity and Reliability
A colour TV (enforced lack) Validity and Reliability
A computer and Internet (enforced lack) √
A washing machine (enforced lack) Validity and Reliability
A car/van (enforced lack) √
The household has a (very) difficult access to:
Public transport Validity and Reliability
Postal/banking services Validity and Reliability
NB: An item has validity problems if the results of the logistic regressions are not statistically significant in both validity tests. It is ‘invalid’ if it 
has validity problems in more than 2 out of 27 Member States. Due to the huge proportion of missing cases for all module items in Sweden 
(around 40 %), this country is not taken into account in the count. For reliability tests, the same logic is followed. The reliability/ additivity tests 
are considered successful if reliability/ additivity problems are observed in no more than two countries. An item is kept in the proposed indicator 
if it does not violate any of the five criteria we have retained in our analytical framework (suitability, validity, reliability (Classical Test Theory), 
reliability (Item Response Theory) and additivity). √=successful on all criteria.
Reading note: The child item related to the affordability of having three meals a day did not pass both the Validity and Reliability tests.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Figure 11.1: Cronbach’s alpha by country, child population, 2009
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NB: The Cronbach’s Alpha statistic measures the internal consistency of a scale, i.e. how closely related a set of items are as a group. A ‘high’ value 
of Alpha is often used as evidence that the set of items measure a ‘latent’ construct. An Alpha of 0.70 or higher is considered as ‘satisfactory’ in 
most social science research situations.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
A heat map highlights the national patterns in Ta-
ble 11.2. The incidence of each individual MD item 
retained in our proposed final child MD list is com-
pared with the EU-27 average. A ratio higher than 
one indicates that the national proportion of peo-
ple deprived for a particular item is higher than the 
EU-27 average.
Some countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, Finland and Sweden) have consistently 
low rates of child deprivation (40 % of the EU-27 
weighted average or less for at least 14 out of the 
18 MD items). However, it should be noted that, in 
Luxembourg, the proportion of children lacking 
a place to do homework is 1.9 times that observed 
for the EU as a whole. By contrast, in Romania and 
Bulgaria, child MD levels are all at least twice the EU 
average; for more than 11 items, they are more than 
four times higher than the EU-27 average.
We tested different thresholds for our child-specific 
MD indicator. A threshold of 3+ items lacked (out of 
18) leads to an EU-27 child MD rate of 21 %, which 
is the figure that is closest to the 2009 EU MD rate 
(20 %). A threshold of 6+ items lacked (out of 18) 
leads to an EU-27 child MD rate of 9 %. This figure 
is effectively identical to the current EU severe MD 
indicator computed on the population aged 1-15 
in 2009.
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Figure 11.2 provides the distribution of national 
MD rates calculated on the basis of the indicator 
with a threshold set at three deprivations as well 
as the distribution of national income poverty rate 
(EU definition; see Chapter 3 in this book). The pro-
portion of deprived children varies hugely across 
EU countries, from 3-7 % in Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland to more 
than 70 % in Bulgaria and Romania. The range for 
national income poverty rates is much smaller — 
from 11 % (Denmark, Finland and Slovenia) to 33 % 
(Romania) (113).
(113) It is important to highlight that in most Member States the 
income poverty rate for children (aged 1-15) is higher than the 
income poverty rate for the total population. In 2009, it is in fact 
lower only in four EU-27 countries (Denmark, Germany, Cyprus 
and Finland). It is equal or almost equal (i.e. the difference 
between both rates is less than one percentage point) in three 
countries (Latvia, Slovenia and Sweden). In all other countries, it 
is higher and often much higher.
National MD rates hide large variations by socio-
economic groups within countries. Figures 11.3 to 
11.5 present the breakdown of the child MD rate 
according to a set of risk factors, such as living in an 
income-poor household, living in a (quasi-)jobless 
household (EU definition; see Chapter 16 in this 
book) compared with a very high work intensity 
household, and living in lone parent families or in 
large households (compared with the total popula-
tion of children).
Figure 11.3 shows that living in income poverty in-
creases the risk of child deprivation, in all countries. 
The degree of overlap is far from perfect, as already 
highlighted in many studies (see, among others, Fus-
co et al., 2010). In countries where MD is widespread 
(see the right-hand side of Figure 11.3), the difference 
in deprivation is smaller between (income) poor and 
non-poor children. This is partly due to the use of 
Figure 11.2: Children lacking at least 3 out of 18 MD items and children at risk of poverty, 2009
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NB: For a definition of the EU ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator, see Chapter 3 in this book. Countries are ranked by their national child specific MD rate.
Reading note: At EU level, 21.2 % of children aged between 1 and 15 years lack at least 3 out of the 18 items retained in the MD child-specific 
indicator; the proportion of income-poor children is 19.6 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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both a relative measure of income poverty (the in-
come poverty threshold defined on the basis on the 
national median income) and a more ‘absolute’ con-
cept of deprivation which captures differences in liv-
ing standard both between and within countries. At 
the other extreme, even the best performing coun-
tries (with the exception of Sweden) do not manage 
to protect income-poor children from MD: in Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland and the 
UK between 21 and 27 % of income-poor children 
are materially deprived. The situation is even more 
serious in Austria, France and Belgium, where this 
proportion varies between 47 % and 60 % whereas 
the total child MD rate is lower than the EU average 
(much lower in the case of Austria; see Figure 11.2).
Figure 11.4 compares the child MD rate between 
QJ households and very high work intensity 
households and illustrates the impact of par-
ents’ employment on child deprivation. The child 
MD rate of QJ households is high, even in coun-
tries where the total child MD is low. Looking at 
the composition of child deprivation, additional 
analysis shows that the proportion of deprived 
children who live in a QJ household is more than 
40 % in Belgium, Ireland and the UK. These are the 
countries where the share of QJ households is the 
highest in the EU.
The impact of family composition on the level of 
MD is also considerable. As shown by Figure 11.5, 
living in a lone parent household is a very impor-
tant risk factor. This is especially true in Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Swe-
den, where children living in a single parent family 
have an MD risk that is at least three times higher 
than that of the total population, although the total 
child MD rate is much lower than the EU average.
Figure 11.3: Children lacking at least 3 out of 18 items, by income poverty status, 2009
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NB: Countries are ranked according to the MD level of all children.
Reading note: At the EU level, 48 % of income-poor children aged between 1 and 15 years also suffer from deprivation.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Figure 11.4: Children lacking at least 3 out of 18 items, by work intensity status, 2009
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NB: Children in QJ households are those living in households where, on average, adult members aged 18-59 have worked less than 20 % of their 
total work potential during the income reference period (see Chapter 16 in this book). Children in very high household work intensity are those 
living in households with a work intensity higher than 0.85. Countries are ranked according to the MD level of all children.
Reading note: At EU level, 55 % of children aged between 1 and 15 years living in QJ households also suffer from deprivation.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
Figure 11.5: Children lacking at least 3 out of 18 items, total, single parents and large families, 2009
(%)
NB: Countries are ranked according to the MD level of all children.
Reading note: At EU level, 35 % of children aged between 1 and 15 years living in a single parent family suffer from deprivation.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Table 11.3: Comparison of the composition of the proposed child‑specific MD indicator and the 
proposed MD indicator for the whole population, 2009
Child‑specific indicator (CH‑MD) Whole population indicator (MD)
The household cannot afford for at least one child
Some new clothes 
Two pairs of properly fitting shoes 
Fresh fruits and vegetables daily 
Meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent daily 
Suitable books 
Outdoor leisure equipment 
Indoor games 
Place to do homework 
Leisure activities 
Celebrations 
To invite friends 
School trips 
Holiday 
The household cannot afford
To keep home adequately warm To keep home adequately warm
To replace worn-out furniture To replace worn-out furniture
A car/van A car/van
To avoid arrears To avoid arrears
A computer and Internet A computer and Internet
 A meal with meat, fish, vegetarian equivalent every second day
 1 week annual holiday
 To face unexpected expenses
At least half of the adults living in the household cannot afford
 Some new clothes
 Two pairs of properly fitting shoes
 Some money for oneself
 Drink/meal monthly
 Leisure activities
NB: For the alternative scale proposed to be used for the whole population, see Chapter 10 in this book.
Source: Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012).
An important question is whether our proposed 
child-specific deprivation scale (CH-MD) identi-
fies children that have the same characteristics as 
those identified by the scale proposed to be used 
for the whole population (MD) (see Chapter 10 in 
this book). Table 11.3 compares the items included 
in the two indicators. 
At EU level, when the threshold is set at 3+ items for 
the child MD indicator (CH-MD 3+) and at 5+ items 
for the whole population MD indicator (MD 5+), the 
proportion of children deprived is effectively iden-
tical: 21 % in both cases. Table 11.4 illustrates the 
degree of overlap between the two populations 
identified by these indicators. The proportion of 
children deprived according to both indicators is 
16 %. A substantial proportion of children are iden-
tified as deprived by only one measure.
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Table 11.4: Overlap between the proposed child‑specific MD indicator (CH‑MD 3+) and the 
proposed whole population MD indicator (MD 5+), EU‑27, child population, 2009
(%)
Both CH‑MD 3+ and MD 5+
(1)
None
(2)
CH‑MD 3+ ‘only’
(3)
MD 5+ ‘only’
(4)
16 74 5 5
NB: CH-MD: child-specific scale (see Table 11.3 first column); MD: scale defined for the whole population (see Table 11.3 second column).
Reading note: 16 % of the children aged between 1 and 15 years suffer from both forms of deprivation (i.e. according to the child MD indicator 
(CH-MD 3+) and the whole population MD indicator (MD 5+)).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
Figure 11.6: Living conditions of children suffering from CH‑MD 3+ ‘only’, MD 5+ ‘only’ or both 
CH‑MD 3+ and MD 5+, EU‑27, child population, 2009
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NB: CH-MD: child-specific scale (see Table 11.3 first column); MD: scale defined for the whole population (see Table 11.3 second column). The ‘MD 
5+ only’ category encompasses the children suffering from deprivation according to the whole population MD indicators (lack at least 5 items) 
but not from CH-MD 3+. The ‘CH-MD 3+ only’ category includes those who suffer from CH-MD 3+ but not from MD 5+. The ‘Both’ category 
encompasses those who suffer from both MD. Results related to children holidays need to be interpreted with caution given the large amount 
of missing data and the fact that this item was not collected for children in nine countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden); in these countries, we have used the ‘holiday item’ collected at the household level.
Reading note: Among the children (aged between 1 and 15 years) identified by both indicators, 80 % live in a household who declares having 
(great) difficulties in making ends meet. This proportion is around 55 % for those suffering from ‘only’ one form of deprivation.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
11 Measuring child material deprivation in the EU
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe222
Figure 11.7: CH‑MD 3+ and MD 5+ indicators, child population, 2009
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In order to highlight the differences between the 
children identified as deprived by the two different 
scales, Figure 11.6 compares the living conditions of 
those lacking 3+ items from our proposed child-spe-
cific MD indicator and 5+ items from the proposed 
whole population scale discussed in Chapter 10 in 
this book (applied to the population aged between 
1 and 15 years). Contrarily to the children identified 
by the two indicators, the two groups of deprived 
children suffering from ‘only’ one form of deprivation 
have very similar levels of income poverty and sub-
jective poverty but differ a lot on almost all the other 
aspects of living conditions considered in the figure. 
The children identified by the child-specific MD indi-
cator who were not identified by the whole popula-
tion MD indicator are more likely to lack the children 
items than those identified ‘only’ by the whole pop-
ulation indicator. Despite the deprivations they suf-
fer from, these children were not captured through 
the whole population deprivation index.
The impact of using the child-specific indicator 
(CH-MD 3+) rather than the whole population in-
dicator (MD 5+) varies a lot between countries (see 
Figure 11.7). In Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal 
and Romania the situation of children is far more 
problematic once their specific situation is taken 
into account (the differences between the two 
rates vary between +4 and +11 percentage points). 
The reverse is true in the UK and Germany, with dif-
ferences between 5 and 6 percentage points.
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11.6 Conclusions
As a result of our various tests, the 18 items retained 
for our proposed child-specific material depriva-
tion indicator can be said to be suitable, valid, re-
liable and additive measures of MD in all EU coun-
tries. The very high level of reliability of the final list 
needs to be highlighted.
In view of the careful and systematic analytical 
framework used to identify these items, we are 
confident that these items (and the related aggre-
gate indicator) are robust and statistically validated 
and that they capture the essence of the problem 
— a requirement for EU social indicators used for 
monitoring purposes at EU and national levels in 
the context of EU cooperation in the field of social 
protection and social inclusion.
Our analysis shows that a non-negligible proportion 
of children identified as deprived according to our 
proposed child-specific indicator are not captured 
by the whole population deprivation indexes, which 
highlights the importance of complementing the 
EU portfolio of social indicators with indicators fo-
cusing on the specific living conditions of children.
This analysis could only be performed at one point 
in time (2009). The items needed for calculating the 
proposed child-specific indicator were collected 
again in the 2014 Wave of EU-SILC. These new data 
are currently being analysed, which will allow for 
change over time analysis and additional tests of 
the robustness of the indicator proposed by Guio, 
Gordon and Marlier (2012).
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12.1 Introduction
Methodologies of multidimensional poverty meas-
urement that draw on the ‘counting’ approach have 
been used in policy applications since the 1970s, 
and are gaining greater momentum (Townsend, 
1979; Erikson, 1993; Atkinson, 2003; Nolan and 
Whelan, 2011; and Alkire et al., 2015, Chapter 4 for 
reviews). To date many studies have focused on un-
derstanding the structure among deprivations, and 
on identifying the normative, policy, and statistical 
tools that can best justify the collection of data on 
distinct indicators (Atkinson et al., 2002; Marlier et 
al., 2007; Atkinson and Marlier, 2010a and the refer-
ences therein). Others have used statistical meth-
ods to address a different but related issue: why in-
dicators might be aggregated into a single indicator 
covering one relevant dimension such as material 
deprivation (OECD, 2008 and Guio et al., 2012). But 
how do we measure and analyse the interrelation-
ships among explicitly diverse dimensions, each of 
which contributes to poverty? Drawing upon pre-
vious studies, this chapter presents a set of experi-
mental indices of multidimensional poverty which 
use an adjusted headcount ratio M
0
 that builds on 
(114) Sabina Alkire is with the Oxford Poverty and Human Poverty 
Initiative (OPHI, University of Oxford) and the George 
Washington University. Mauricio Apablaza is with OPHI 
and the Universidad del Desarrollo (Chile). We are deeply 
grateful to Anthony B. Atkinson, Anne-Catherine Guio, and 
Eric Marlier for patient comments that consistently helped 
us to improve this analysis, to James Foster, Bertrand Maître, 
Brian Nolan and Nicholas Ruiz for insightful conversations 
and/or technical support, and to Saite Lu, Garima Sahai and 
Euijin Jung for research assistance. All errors remain our own. 
This work has been supported by the second Network for 
the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email: 
sabina.alkire@qeh.ox.ac.uk and mapablaza@udd.cl.
a counting-based dual-cut-off methodology (Alkire 
and Foster, 2011, 2011a). We show how these meas-
ures can be used to provide diverse and specific de-
scriptive analyses, and why they may complement 
existing measurement approaches.
The methodology is flexible in that different indi-
cators, cut-offs and weights can be used, including 
binary, ordinal and ordered categorical variables as 
well as those that are cardinal or ratio-scale. Unlike 
the headcount ratio which has been traditionally 
used with counting-based measures in both Eu-
rope and Latin America, the Alkire-Foster (AF) fam-
ily of measures incorporate the joint distribution 
of deprivation and include a new feature of inten-
sity — which shows the percentage of weighted 
indicators in which the average poor person is de-
prived. Incorporating intensity into the measure it-
self enables the multidimensional poverty measure 
to be broken down by indicator (after identifica-
tion), to show the levels and composition of depri-
vations poor people experience. This is not possi-
ble with counting-based headcount ratios but is 
important for designing policies to reduce multidi-
mensional poverty. Measured poverty also chang-
es if intensity changes, which creates policy incen-
tives to address those that are not near-poor only. 
Where data permit, the measure and each of its 
consistent indicators can be further broken down 
by subgroups such as gender, age, social groups 
or regions. The global Multidimensional Poverty 
Index (MPI) which is released by UNDP’s Human 
Development Reports and covers 110 countries in 
2015 is based on this methodology (Alkire and San-
tos, 2010, 2014; UNDP, 2010), as are official national 
MPIs, such as those of Colombia, Chile, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan and Armenia.
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Among OECD countries, there have been academic 
efforts and in some cases political interest to estimate 
a multidimensional poverty index. Mexico and Chile 
have official multidimensional poverty indices using 
the AF method. One of the first applications of the AF 
method in Europe was implemented using the 2009 
EU-SILC dataset by Whelan, Nolan and Maître (2014). 
This chapter extends Whelan et al.’s work by con-
structing AF poverty measures across time periods 
2006-2012, using, necessarily, a more limited set of 
indicators. In doing so, we demonstrate the analysis 
of the multidimensional poverty indicator in one pe-
riod and across time, and report its associated partial 
indices: headcount ratio, intensity, and indicator-spe-
cific indices. This chapter thus illustrates the kinds of 
analyses that could be done using this methodology. 
It does of course require that a set of dimensions and 
indicators be agreed upon by a legitimate process, 
and that fully consistent and comparable variable 
definitions and data sources be used.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 12.2 briefly 
situates this topic in the literature and Section 12.3 
introduces the AF methodology. Section 12.4 intro-
duces the data then presents an experimental index 
of multidimensional poverty, using cross-sectional 
EU-SILC data and the individual as unit of analysis to 
construct and describe a set of deprivations. Section 
12.5 presents the AF results, first showing a series of 
poverty cut-offs across time to illustrate the likely 
robustness of analyses. On the basis of a particular 
cut-off, it then presents the overall results across all 
countries having data in all periods as well as compo-
nent partial indices: the headcount ratio or percent-
age of the population identified as multi-dimension-
ally poor (H), and the intensity, or average percentage 
of weighted deprivations experienced by poor peo-
ple (A), and censored headcount ratios for each com-
ponent indicator (115). Section 12.6 concludes.
12.2 Brief literature review
Multidimensional approaches to poverty and dep-
rivation have a long and distinguished history in 
conceptual and philosophical work (Sen, 1992). The 
(115) Censored headcount ratios show the percentage of people 
who are identified as poor and are deprived in each particular 
indicator.
late 1960s and early 1970s saw the entrance of policy 
applications, with the 1968 Swedish Level of Living 
Study (Allardt and Uusitalo, 1972 and Johannsson, 
1973); Jacques Delors’ 1971 Les indicateurs sociaux and 
P.Ch. Ludz’s Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 
(1971), each providing independent impetus in differ-
ent countries and across Europe for this effort.
In more recent literature, significant attention has 
been paid to the relationship among deprivations, 
and to methodologies to validate indicators used in 
multidimensional indices (Nolan and Whelan, 1996, 
2010, 2011; Layte et al., 2001; Atkinson et al., 2002; 
Gordon et al., 2003; Saunders and Adelman, 2006; 
Whelan, 2007; Marlier et al., 2007; OECD, 2008 and 
Alkire et al., 2015). Drawing on the 2004 EU-SILC 
data, Guio (2005) proposed a multidimensional 
indicator of material deprivation (MD), which re-
flected deprivations such as poor housing, lack of 
durable assets, and economic strain. Based on Guio 
et al. (2009), MD indicators were adopted in the EU 
portfolio of social indicators in 2009. Two indicators 
were adopted: the first indicator provided the pro-
portion of people lacking at least three items out of 
nine items covering different aspects of econom-
ic strain and lack of durables (housing deprivation 
was included in the EU portfolio as a separate in-
dicator). The second indicator reflected the intensi-
ty of deprivation (i.e. the average number of items 
lacked by deprived people). At the EU level, MD 
indicators gained in importance in 2010 when EU 
leaders launched the Europe 2020 strategy and set 
in this context an EU social inclusion target: to lift at 
least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion in the EU by 2020 (see Chapter 1 in 
this book). The Europe 2020 indicator of ‘at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ on which the target is 
based includes a ‘severe’ MD indicator which is built 
using a threshold set at four rather than three items. 
These MD indicators at EU level were based on the 
limited information available in the core EU-SILC. To 
enlarge the available information, a thematic mod-
ule on MD was collected in 2009. Using this module, 
Guio et al. (2012) propose a revised version of the 
official EU MD indicators, with a view to enlarge the 
set of items and their reliability (see Chapter 10 in 
this book). The revised set includes 13 deprivation 
items, i.e. six items included in the current EU MD 
indicator and seven items covering new aspects. 
A set of parallel papers explored the 2009 themat-
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ic module with respect to child deprivation (Brad-
shaw, 2009; Gábos et al., 2011, Guio et al., 2012, and 
Adamson, 2012; see also Chapter 11 in this book).
Whelan (2007) used the Irish component of the 
2004 EU-SILC dataset to develop an 11-item ‘con-
sistent poverty’ index (combining MD and income 
poverty); and Whelan and Maître (2009) use a range 
of statistical methods such as correlation and factor 
analysis; goodness of fit tests like root mean square 
error of approximation; and reliability tests like Cron-
bach’s Alpha, to identify three dimensions of MD 
(consumption, household facilities, and neighbour-
hood environment) and examine their relationship 
to income poverty. Coromaldi and Zoli (2012) clarify 
the added value of nonlinear principal component 
analysis, NLPCA, to these techniques. Naturally, this 
deep analysis of the structure of deprivations result-
ed in a set of empirical and policy studies on the re-
lationship between income and other deprivations 
(Verbist and Lefebure, 2008; Whelan and Maître, 
2009; Jana et al., 2012) and also gave rise to applied 
AF multidimensional measures (Whelan et al., 2014).
The EU-SILC dataset has also been used to illustrate 
other multidimensional poverty measurement 
methodologies (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2006; 
Bossert et al., 2013, among others). Brandolini (2007) 
explored Atkinson’s (2003) counting approach us-
ing data for France, Germany and Italy and a head-
count ratio associated with the minimum propor-
tion of deprivations a person has, and compared 
the various deprivation measures with income pov-
erty measures. He drew attention to the sensitivity 
of cross-national comparisons to weights, and to 
the deprivation cut-off. This chapter adds to this al-
ready substantial recent literature by illustrating the 
rich variety of analyses that can be accomplished 
using one particular methodology able to capture 
the multiple dimensions of poverty.
12.3 The Alkire Foster (AF) 
methodology
This section briefly introduces the M∝ class of meas-
ures M
0
 developed by Alkire and Foster (AF) that 
build on the Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) index 
(Alkire and Foster, 2011). There are a total of n per-
sons (rows) and the well-being of each is measured 
in a total of d dimensions (columns). When referring 
to a particular person we call them i, and a particular 
dimension j. The whole dataset is collected in a ma-
trix where each cell represents the achievement lev-
el of individual i (from 1 to n) in dimension j (from 
1 to d). So looking across a row of the matrix gives 
the full picture of achievements for one person, and 
looking down a column gives the full picture for 
a given dimension.
To focus on deprivations, at the top of each column 
of the matrix, we set a cut-off z
j
 for that dimension 
of deprivation. For each dimension, an individual i 
is deprived in dimension j if her achievement level 
is lower than the dimension cut-off (z
j
). A depriva-
tion matrix (g0) compiles this information, assigning 
a 1 if individual is deprived in dimension and a 0 
if the individual is not deprived. So looking across 
a row of the matrix gives the full deprivation pro-
file for one person, and looking down a column 
gives the deprivations for a given dimension. For 
each person we now look at the row and add up 
the positive entries weighting each dimension by 
its value (w
j
) where values sum to 1. The weighted 
sum (c
i
) shows the deprivation score, or percentage 
of weighted deprivations suffered by person i.
Next, we identify who is multi-dimensionally poor. 
A person is identified as poor if their weighted dep-
rivation score c
i
 is higher than the poverty cut-off 
k. For example, if a person is deprived in 40 % of 
the dimensions (that is their weighted deprivation 
score is 40 %) and the poverty cut-off is 20 %, that 
person is identified as poor because 40 % > 20 %. 
This has been called an intermediate or dual cut-off 
identification method, because it uses the depriva-
tion cut-offs z
j
 to determine whether a person is 
deprived or not in each dimension, and the pov-
erty cut-off k to determine who is to be considered 
multidimensionally poor (116).
Having identified the poor, we construct a cen‑
sored deprivation matrix g0(k) that contains solely 
the weighted deprivations of those persons who 
have been identified as poor, and replaces depri-
(116) This identification strategy can also be represented, following 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), by an identification 
function ×Rd+ R {0,1}
d
++ρ: , which maps from person i’s 
achievement vector ∈yi R
d
+  and cut-off vector z in R
d
++  to an 
indicator variable in such a way that ;yi zρ( ) = 1 if person i is poor 
and ;yi zρ( ) = 0 if person i is not poor.
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vations of non-poor people with zeros. The cen-
sored deprivation matrix is the basis of the AF 
multidimensional poverty measure and its associ-
ated dimensional partial indices. For example, the 
censored headcount ratios are simply the mean 
of its columns. The measure M
0
 is the mean of the 
matrix times d, or equivalently, the mean of the 
censored vector of deprivation scores (c
i
(k)). M
0
— 
which in other studies is called MPI to signify it is 
a multidimensional poverty index — can also be 
expressed as the product of the (multidimensional) 
headcount ratio (H) and the average deprivation 
share among the poor (A). H is simply the propor-
tion of people that are poor, or q/n where q is the 
number of poor people. A is the average share of 
weighted deprivations poor people experience 
(A=  ci (k)/q) and reflects the intensity of multi-
dimensional poverty (117).
For tracking changes across time, the number, lev-
el and significance of changes in multidimensional 
poverty measures and their associated partial in-
dices can be directly compared, and absolute and 
relative rates of change can be analysed. Alkire et al. 
(2015, Chapter 9) provides a systematic presentation 
of different methodologies for assessing poverty 
dynamics (see also Apablaza and Yalonetzky, 2013).
12.4 Data and measurement 
design
This chapter uses EU-SILC data to generate and 
compare a multidimensional poverty measure 
made from 12 indicators across time and space. It 
is important to note that this illustrative measure is 
limited by variable definition (comparable variables 
must be present across time periods and must be 
accurate at the unit level rather than only on aver-
age) as well as by data availability (missing values in 
any variable must be low).
The indicators of these measures are data con-
strained. EU-SILC indicators tend to be defined in the 
(117) M
0
 satisfies a number of useful axioms, specifically: replication 
invariance, symmetry, poverty focus, deprivation focus, weak 
monotonicity, non-triviality, normalisation, dimensional 
monotonicity, subgroup decomposability, dimensional 
breakdown, ordinality and weak re-arrangement (Alkire and 
Foster, 2011, 2013).
space of resources, in the case of at-risk-of-poverty 
indicator (‘AROP’, relative income (see Chapters 1 
and 3 in this book for definitions)), severe material 
deprivation or housing — or common proxies for 
functionings, such as levels of schooling and em-
ployment status. Particular challenges are evident 
in the educational indicator, because the years of 
schooling that correspond to primary education 
vary across EU-SILC countries as may educational 
quality. Some indicators draw upon self-assess-
ments — for example, evaluations of noise and 
safety and health — which may not reflect the ob-
jective risk of violence or noise vibrations in a neigh-
bourhood or objective health status. If a measure is 
intended to reflect deprivations in the functionings 
or capabilities that poor people experience (Sen, 
1992), then it would be necessary to examine in 
what way each indicator could be interpreted to 
proxy functionings and the anticipated accuracy of 
such proxies for diverse individuals. Rather than do-
ing so, in this case we draw upon the rich existing 
literature justifying the EU-SILC indicators (Atkinson 
and Marlier, 2010).
Where aggregate figures are reported, these in-
clude information only from countries with data 
available across all years. The aggregate figures 
include (population-weighted) data of Austria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and United Kingdom. On grounds of incomplete 
information across years (118), we excluded from the 
aggregate results information of Belgium (2012), 
Bulgaria (2006), Croatia (2006-2010), Ireland (2012), 
Malta (2006-2007), Romania (2006) and Switzerland 
(2006-2007). Additionally, due to irregularities in the 
education variable PE040 (Highest ISCED level at-
tained), Finland (2007) was also excluded. Finland 
shows that all individuals have primary education 
across all years except in 2007. In 2007, 18 % of the 
population did not have primary education. For na-
tional results, we include all countries (119).
(118) In cases of incomplete information, missing years by country 
are presented next to each country in parenthesis.
(119) We also observed uncommon changes in housing in 
Hungary (2008) and Bulgaria (2007-2008) and unmet Medical 
Needs in Portugal (2007) but numbers were contrasted and 
corroborated with official statistics.
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In this analysis, we have adopted a rigorous approach 
to the treatment of missing values. At the country 
level, we excluded countries with unavailable or 
inconsistent data across periods from aggregate re-
sults. At the individual level, we drop respondents 
having a missing value in any indicator. For a sub-
set of register countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden), which 
only collect individual information for one adult in 
the household (i.e. ‘the selected respondent’), the 
measure is constructed only from respondents with 
information in all indicators and using the specific 
sampling weight for this subgroup of selected re-
spondents (PB060). EU-SILC data for the retained 
sample are then adjusted for missing observations 
using sampling weights. By reweighting the re-
tained sample, we maintain the original population 
of each country. Regarding the analysis of standard 
errors, we followed Goedemé (2010, 2013).
12.4.1 Unit of analysis
Different units of analysis are possible using the 
EU-SILC dataset: individual adults, adults, or chil-
dren by household, and households. Here we use 
the individual as a unit of analysis, i.e. persons aged 
16 years or more, for which the individual question-
naire was collected. That is, the individual’s achieve-
ments in health and education are used to identify 
their own deprivations. Household level variables 
are used to identify individuals as deprived or 
non-deprived in terms of at risk of income pover-
ty, severe MD, (quasi-)joblessness, housing, noise, 
crime and pollution. This way of proceeding is use-
ful because the resulting measures can be disag-
gregated by gender and age. However normatively 
using the individual adult as a unit of identification 
overlooks (and does not foster) intra-household 
sharing and caring in the individually measured 
dimensions. For example having a chronic disa-
bility in a household which can effectively care 
for such a person is very different than having the 
same health condition and living alone. Some pol-
icy aims support a household focus, but we have 
chosen an individual focus for several reasons. In 
the EU-SILC dataset, a household approach gener-
ates a larger sample drop because of missing varia-
bles, particularly in register countries. Furthermore, 
household structures vary across Europe (Iacovou 
and Skew, 2010). Also, the appropriate ‘cut-off’ for 
household level indicators built with individual 
education and health data would require separate 
analysis (120). Finally, in the EU-context, social rights 
tend to be individually based. For that reason, in 
this experimental measure the individual is taken 
as a unit of identification, with the consequence of 
not including child poverty.
It would be possible to use the household as a unit 
of analysis with EU-SILC data in non-register coun-
tries. In this case, all household members would 
be deprived in education and health indicators, 
depending upon the joint deprivations of those 
household members (which might include chil-
dren) for whom data were available. This meth-
od — which was used for example in the global MPI 
(Alkire and Santos, 2014) — can reflect intra-house-
hold sharing and child deprivations. In this case, the 
results still can be aggregated using individual sam-
pling weights such that the unit of analysis (individ-
ual) reflects the proportion of people who are poor.
12.4.2 Dimensions, indicators and 
weights
The dimensions and indicators of deprivation in this 
chapter draw upon three earlier papers in which 
we implemented more than seven experimental 
measures, each having three to six dimensions and 
a variety of differently defined indicators (Alkire, 
Apablaza and Jung, 2012, 2014, 2014a). The exper-
imental index presented in this chapter has six 
equally weighted dimensions, and each indicator 
within a dimension is likewise equally weighted. Di-
mensions of health and education and some form 
of economic welfare are present in most descrip-
tions of multidimensional poverty (Alkire, 2002). 
Drawing on the arguments provided in Whelan et 
al. (2014) and Guio and Maquet (2006), our measure 
adds to these a dimension of the living environ-
ment, which includes housing and neighbourhood 
considerations: noise, pollution and safety. In this 
measure, each indicator related to the Europe 2020 
social inclusion target becomes its own separate 
(120) The aggregation of intra-household data and the setting of 
deprivation cut-offs require normative, policy, and empirical 
exploration to justify. Assumptions of intra-household sharing 
must be considered (Alkire and Santos, 2014).
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dimension and education, health, and the living 
environment each enter as separate dimensions 
making a total of six dimensions, with 50 % of the 
weight on Europe 2020-related indicators.
Terminologically, dimensions are organising con-
cepts that in this case govern the weights attached 
to indicators. They may also be used to communi-
cate the results in public. Once again, the discus-
sion of the appropriate dimensions to organise the 
measurement of deprivation has a long history, 
which can inform present discussions. Because the 
index is experimental we do not provide an ex-
tensive normative justification of the dimensions 
drawing on people’s own values, the theoretical 
literature, the policy purpose of the measure, and 
other considerations. Such an extensive justifica-
tion is provided in the case of official multidimen-
sional poverty measures. Alkire, Apablaza and Jung 
(2012) provide a set of dimensions and in some cas-
es indicators that have been used in the European 
context (see also Atkinson et al., 2002).
Table 12.1 describes each component indicator of 
the experimental measure, its deprivation cut-off 
and evolution over time. Several notes may be in 
order. First, other studies have not necessarily includ-
ed education, perhaps due to country differences in 
the definition of levels of education. These measures 
retain education because of its importance, and 
consider a person to be deprived if they have not 
completed primary school. But the indicator is not 
necessarily comparable, because the same levels of 
education may correspond to differing number of 
years in different countries. As for the Europe 2020 
severe MD indicator, because of data limitations we 
are not able to implement the 2009 severe MD in-
dex with improved indicators proposed in (Guio et 
al. 2012). In our indicator, people severely deprived 
are those living in a household that experiences at 
least four out of the nine following deprivation items 
— the household cannot afford (i) to pay rent or util-
ity bills, (ii) to keep home adequately warm, (iii) to 
face unexpected expenses, (iv) to eat meat, fish or 
a vegetarian equivalent every second day, (v) to have 
a week holiday away from home during the year, (vi) 
to have access to a car/van for personal use, (vii) to 
have a washing machine, (viii) to have a colour TV, 
or (ix) to have a telephone. For income poverty and 
MD our indicators are constructed following the Eu-
rope 2020 multidimensional poverty measure com-
ponent indicators. The at-risk-of-poverty indicator 
follows the Europe 2020 standards, and considers 
a person at risk of poverty (AROP) if their household 
income is less than 60 % of the national median 
equivalised disposable income. The lack of detailed 
information regarding part-time jobs before 2009 
renders impossible the precise replication of the 
Europe 2020 (quasi-)joblessness indicator, but does 
provide comparability across years for a similar indi-
cator. In our (quasi-)joblessness indicator, we extend 
the (quasi-)joblessness condition to all members of 
the household. Households that exclusively contain 
persons out of the reference group are considered 
non-deprived. In other words, we identify all individ-
uals in jobless households as deprived; and identify 
households with only elderly people, or only stu-
dents as non-deprived.
12.4.3 Uncensored headcount 
ratios of deprivations in each 
indicator
The deprivation rates in all indicators in the years 
2006 and 2012 are reported in Table 12.1. The table 
includes all deprivations of all individuals for whom 
no data on any indicator is missing, and covers EU 
countries with consistent data between 2006 and 
2012. There are several points to note. First, the AROP 
percentages roughly match those published in other 
sources (e.g. Eurostat website and Nolan et al., 2010).
Second, in the aggregate data, of the three indi-
cators used in the Europe 2020 poverty and social 
exclusion measure, deprivations in income tend to 
be the highest although this varies by country. The 
indicators that tend to have the highest incidence 
overall are perceptual data of chronic health status, 
and the self-reported incidence of noise. However 
incidence varies considerably across countries. The 
challenges inherent in interpreting the subjective 
indicator levels and trends are that these may be 
affected by biases from personality, and adaptive 
preferences or knowledge asymmetries and such 
biases may evolve over time. The fact that these 
indicators carry a lighter weight may ease interpre-
tation of the trends somewhat.
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b) Multidimensional poverty M
0
 by years and poverty cut‑offs
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NB: Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Croatia, Malta, Romania, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are not included.
Reading note: Graph a) compares levels of multidimensional poverty across European geographic areas. Graph b) shows the evolution of 
multidimensional poverty for all possible poverty cut-offs across years for countries with available and consistent data.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB March 2014.
Figure 12.1: Multidimensional Poverty by UN regions (2012) and years (2006‑2012)
(level of multidimensional poverty)
a) Multidimensional poverty M
0
 by regions and poverty cut‑offs (2012)
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 %
Eastern EUNorthern EU Southern EUWestern EU EU
12Multidimensional poverty in Europe 2006-2012: illustrating a methodology
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  233
In education we merely remind the reader that 
educational deprivations depend in part upon 
the definition of primary school, and the duration 
thereof varies across the included countries.
Several empirical techniques that are useful to un-
derstand the interrelationships between indicators 
have been explored in the longer papers but are 
not detailed here (Alkire Apablaza and Jung, 2014, 
2014a). It may only be worth mentioning headline 
results from a measure of redundancy represented 
by the percentage of the population experiencing 
both deprivations, divided by the lower of the two 
marginal headcount ratios of deprivation (Alkire et 
al., 2015). For example: in the case of (quasi-)jobless-
ness and at-risk-of-poverty, only 27 % of the people 
who are (quasi-)jobless are also at-risk-of-poverty. 
The highest redundancy value of 55 % is found 
between morbidity and health — that is, 55 % of 
those who are deprived in terms of morbidity have 
low self-reported health, but in 45 % of cases, per-
sons who report deprivations in morbidity do not 
experience low self-reported health, and for this 
reason, both variables are retained.
12.5 Results
Before identifying who is poor and constructing 
a poverty measure, we first describe some region-
al trends for multiple poverty cut-offs. Figure 12.1a 
compares the level of multidimensional poverty in 
2012 of four geographic regions according to Unit-
ed Nations’ definitions across a range of poverty 
cut-offs (121). Clearly, Northern and Western Europe 
are significantly the two least poor regions (respec-
tively) regardless the year and cut-off. Southern Eu-
rope is the poorest region up to the 50 % cut-off. At 
50 % and more, differences between Eastern and 
Southern Europe are not significant.
Figure 12.1b analyses the pooled information of EU 
countries with consistent and available information 
for multiple poverty cut-offs. We display results for 
a range of plausible poverty cut-offs 15 % to 35 %. 
It can be useful to consider trends in two periods: 
(121) http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/
m49regin.htm. United Nations classify Cyprus as Western Asia; 
however, we included it into Southern Europe as otherwise 
Cyprus would have been excluded.
2006-2009, and 2009-2012. As expected multidi-
mensional poverty was reduced in the pre-crisis pe-
riod, with significant reductions in 2006 and 2007. 
The beneficial trend was brought to an end by the 
crisis. After 2008, dominance is not clear and the 
reduction of multidimensional poverty is almost 
insignificant 2009-2012, with significant change 
only in 2012. For poverty cut-offs above 40 %, there 
is no clear dominance in any pair of consecutive 
years. Aggregate results hide significant differences 
in regional trends (Figure 12.1a). In Eastern Europe 
poverty reduction is faster during the first years. 
Southern Europe shows a parsimonious reduction 
only until 2010 and an insignificant increase in mul-
tidimensional poverty from 2010 onwards. West-
ern Europe does not show any significant change 
in any period except 2010-2012. Northern Europe 
presents slight ups and downs 2006-2008 and no 
significant changes subsequently (Alkire, Apablaza 
and Jung, 2014 present full results).
In what follows we have selected a poverty cut-off 
of 34 % which require a person to be poor in strictly 
greater than two dimensions or the equivalent sum 
of weighted deprivations drawn from several dimen-
sions. This definition coheres with popular under-
standings of ‘multidimensional’ poverty (122).
Between 2006 and 2009, the level of multidimen-
sional poverty drops from 0.048 to 0.041 mainly 
based on reductions in the share of poor individ-
uals and not necessarily in the intensity of poverty. 
From 2009 onwards, there are no significant chang-
es (2010-2011) or there are significant increments 
(2011-2012). Across consecutive years, the intensity 
only shows insignificant changes. As before, results 
seem to follow two different trends. From 2006 to 
2009, there is a reduction in multidimensional pov-
erty based on a lower percentage of poor individu-
als and the intensity of poverty. From 2009 to 2012, 
on the other hand, there are significant increments 
in the level of multidimensional poverty. In particu-
lar, the intensity of that poverty is statistically high-
er in 2012 compared to 2009, showing that each 
poor person experiences more simultaneous dis-
advantages. Regarding the percentage contribu-
tion of each dimension, the Europe 2020 indicators 
(122) We are grateful to Anthony B. Atkinson for suggesting that 
this conceptual issue needs to be addressed and, when the 
purpose of the measure permits, satisfied.
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contribute more than 50 % to multidimensional 
poverty with the income poverty (AROP) indicator 
contributing most. Education contributes — on 
average — around 15 %, environment 10 % and 
health, 12 % to overall poverty in 2012 (for detailed 
results see Table 12.2). It is this indicator-specific 
analysis that provides information for policy design.
12.5.1 Results per country
This section presents and discusses national results. 
For each measure, we present the level of Multidi-
mensional Poverty M
0
 as well as its associated par-
tial indices (H) and (A). Results show a significant 
dispersion across countries. Bulgaria and Greece 
consistently are the poorest and Iceland the least 
poor according to the level of multidimensional 
poverty. However, intensity is not necessarily high-
est in the countries with highest poverty, a finding 
that contrasts with other studies.
As highlighted in Table 12.3, Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic and France — had the largest 
absolute reduction in poverty (M
0
) between 2006 
and 2012, followed by Cyprus. Lithuania, Hungary 
and Luxemburg had insignificant reductions. Ger-
many, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Finland, UK, Iceland, Denmark, Austria and Norway, 
on the other hand, remained stable without signifi-
cant changes. Greece showed the highest increase 
in poverty. Portugal and Sweden, also, presented 
significant poverty increments. As before we see 
different trends in two clear periods. Between 2006 
and 2009, sixteen of the countries experienced sig-
nificant reductions in their poverty levels but six 
(Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Portugal and 
Sweden) have higher multidimensional poverty 
levels. During the period between 2009 and 2012, 
only twelve countries reduced their poverty levels, 
eight did not have significant changes and other 
four increased marginally poverty. Some of this ap-
parent decrease may be due to drops in the relative 
income poverty rates (AROP) due to the financial 
crisis, illustrating the need for care in interpreting 
relative indicators, or a switch to (more) absolute 
indicators. Patterns vary considerably by country.
Table 12.2: Multidimensional Poverty in Europe 2006‑2012, k=34 %
(level and percentage of individuals in EU countries with consistent data — linearised std. errors in 
brackets)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Multidimensional Poverty (M0)
0.0484 0.0443 0.0418 0.0413 0.0419 0.0424 0.0429
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Headcount Ratio (H)
10.04 % 9.24 % 8.77 % 8.63 % 8.67 % 8.75 % 8.81 %
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Intensity of Poverty (A)
48.18 % 47.99 % 47.73 % 47.80 % 48.30 % 48.45 % 48.62 %
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Contribution of each dimension to total multidimensional poverty
Income 24.23 % 24.58 % 25.23 % 25.67 % 25.36 % 25.25 % 25.33 %
Employment 18.40 % 18.69 % 18.31 % 18.69 % 19.88 % 19.63 % 19.45 %
Material Deprivation 16.13 % 15.83 % 15.56 % 14.97 % 15.31 % 16.43 % 17.92 %
Education 17.94 % 17.46 % 17.90 % 17.38 % 16.86 % 16.22 % 15.44 %
Environment 11.80 % 12.07 % 11.34 % 11.58 % 11.16 % 10.77 % 10.39 %
Health 11.50 % 11.38 % 11.66 % 11.72 % 11.42 % 11.70 % 11.48 %
NB: Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Croatia, Malta, Romania, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland not included.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB March 2014.
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Figure 12.2: Evolution of Multidimensional Poverty in EU countries (2006‑2009‑2012), k=34 %
(percentage of multi‑dimensionally poor people (H) and Intensity of Poverty (A))
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Reading note: This figure shows the percentage of poor people (H) in the x-axis and the intensity of the poverty (A) in the y-axis. The size of each 
circle represents the population of the country. For full details, see Table 12.3.
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Normally the poverty analyses are undertaken at 
the country level to facilitate national policy design. 
However it can be quite interesting to look across 
countries, and see where the people who are iden-
tified as poor live, and what proportion of poverty 
each country contributes to the whole. Due to their 
size, Italy, France, Spain, Poland and Germany dom-
inate multidimensional poverty trends in Europe. 
The proportion of European poverty for which Italy 
is responsible falls during the whole period except 
2011. France’s and Spain’s contribution consistently 
falls only from 2010.
The percentage contribution of education varies 
greatly across countries and is strikingly higher in 
the poorer countries. This reflects differences in 
achievements, but also in definitions of primary 
school, so unfortunately is not strictly compara-
ble. The relative contribution of (quasi-)joblessness 
declines as overall multidimensional poverty in 
a country increases, as do the relative contribu-
tions of the health variables. In general, in the least 
poor countries the relative contribution of edu-
cational deprivations is lower and of Europe 2020 
indicators (with some exceptions) is higher. This 
interesting finding draws attention to the need to 
consider non-Europe 2020 indicators, particular-
ly in the countries that are poorest by the Europe 
2020 measures themselves. Their double-burden 
of economic and social deprivations can be more 
accurately depicted and addressed using such 
a multidimensional poverty measure.
12.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented an experimental AF 
multidimensional poverty index, which has been 
implemented with the EU-SILC datasets for seven 
waves from 2006-2012. The aggregate data across 
Europe show that multidimensional poverty de-
creased between 2006 and 2009 which resulted 
from a fall in the percentage of multi-dimensionally 
poor people. This trend then came to an end, and 
from 2009 to 2012, there were marginal increases 
in poverty due to an increase in the intensity of 
poverty among poor people. Results show that 
the poorest region is Southern Europe followed by 
Eastern Europe. Results also show that Northern Eu-
rope is consistently the least poor region regardless 
of the cut-off. Evidence coincides with the aggre-
gate results. There is a stronger reduction in pov-
erty during the first triennium. Regional subgroup 
decompositions show that the variability of the 
aggregate measure is mainly explained by changes 
in East Europe and South Europe, and country spe-
cific trends provide a more detailed analysis.
Across countries, results show the heterogene-
ous behaviour of the countries. Across the entire 
period, sixteen countries reduce poverty and six 
show an increase. However, reductions are statis-
tically significant (95 % of confidence) in only five 
countries (Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Poland 
and Slovenia) and increments in three countries 
(Greece, Portugal and Sweden).
Results suggest two patterns of poverty alleviation 
before and after 2009. Between 2006 and 2009 the 
average reduction reached 14.6 %. On the other 
hand, between 2009 and 2012, there is an average 
increment of 4.9 %. Only Poland shows a consistent 
and substantive improvement across most years. On 
the extremes, Portugal, Greece and Bulgaria vie for 
the position of the poorest country in the includ-
ed datasets. Norway and Iceland are the least poor 
countries. Regarding the composition of poverty, 
we explored the relevance of the construction and 
the implication for the analysis. The relative contri-
bution of education increases as overall poverty in 
a country increases, pointing out the need for multi-
dimensional analyses to consider the indicator com-
position of poverty, as well as its levels (for detailed 
tables see Alkire, Apablaza and Jung, 2014b).
This study also drew attention to incomparabili-
ties in definitions of the educational variables, and 
subjective issues in health and environment indi-
cators. It would be desirable for EU-SILC to include 
comparable indicators for non-economic dimen-
sions of poverty that cohere with poor people’s 
understandings of social exclusion as well as with 
policy priorities. Such measures could be used 
for policy design as well as for monitoring, analy-
sis, and evaluation. The analysis contained in this 
chapter has sought to provide a very brief overview 
of how a multidimensional poverty measure, and 
its consistent partial indices, could contribute to 
reducing poverty and social exclusion in its many 
dimensions.
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13.1 Introduction
Most evidence-based policy initiatives aimed at im-
proving living standards tend to measure poverty 
relatively within the society, using income as a yard-
stick. However, there is an argument that income is 
not sufficient as a sole measure of poverty, particu-
larly if poverty is seen in terms of achieved stand-
ards of living (124). Ultimately, a household satisfies 
its wants through the consumption of goods and 
services over time. Because of this, consumption is 
arguably a more important determinant of econom-
ic well-being than income alone. Indeed, Brewer and 
O’Dea (2012) and others (see Noll, 2007, for a review) 
argue that it is preferable to consider the distribution 
of consumption rather than income on both theo-
retical and pragmatic grounds.
On a theoretical ground, income can be subject 
to fluctuations, due to such events as short-term 
unemployment. However, these fluctuations in in-
come are not likely to be matched by corresponding 
downturns in living standards and often those on 
the lowest incomes do not have the lowest levels of 
consumption (Brewer and O’Dea, 2012). In fact, the 
capacity of a household to meet its consumption 
(123) Richard Tonkin and Paola Serafino are from the UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). This work has been supported by 
the second network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), 
funded by Eurostat. The European Commission and ONS bear 
no responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, which are 
solely those of the authors. The authors would like to thank Rolf 
Aaberge, Anthony B. Atkinson, David Gordon, Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier and Marco Pomati for their helpful 
comments and discussions. Email address for correspondence: 
hie@ons.gsi.gov.uk.
(124) As well as considering poverty in terms of an individual’s 
standard of living, other approaches are possible, such as 
considering poverty in terms of a right to a minimum level of 
resources (see Atkinson et al. (2002) for a discussion).
needs does not depend only on its short-term or 
current income, but also on any accumulated wealth, 
as well as the ability to access financial support either 
informally from family or friends or more formally 
through loans. This finding leads to Friedman’s ‘per-
manent income hypothesis’, which suggests that de-
cisions made by consumers are based on long-term 
income expectations rather than their current in-
come. Furthermore, it has been argued that con-
sumption is a better indicator of permanent income 
than is current income (Cutler and Katz, 1991). This 
view is supported in a number of studies (e.g. Jor-
genson and Slesnick, 1987 and Meyer and Sullivan, 
2011) which find stronger relationships between 
consumption and subjective well-being than be-
tween income and subjective well-being measures.
Beyond these conceptual arguments, there is also 
the practical consideration that evidence from 
a range of countries suggests a general tendency 
for income to be under-reported by households 
with low levels of resources, whilst reporting of ex-
penditure by this group is relatively accurate (e.g. 
Meyer and Sullivan, 2011 and Brewer and O’Dea, 
2012), though other evidence suggests that ex-
penditure of higher income households may be 
under-reported (Sabelhaus et al., 2011).
In economic and social research, data on house-
hold expenditure are typically used as a proxy 
for consumption. These data are often collect-
ed through the use of diary studies. However, it 
should be noted that expenditure is an imperfect 
measure of consumption as the amount spent by 
a household in a given period may differ from con-
sumption, due to households making use of goods 
purchased previously or the purchase of consumer 
durables. In addition, consumption also includes 
13
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inter-household in-kind transfers of gifts and ser-
vices and social transfers in kind. However, these 
aspects of consumption are generally excluded 
from data due to the challenges of collecting this 
type of information.
Overall the evidence indicates that while income 
can be a good proxy for material living standards, 
it is better when supplemented with a wider range 
of measures. This is consistent with the recommen-
dations of the Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009) as well as 
the OECD Framework for Statistics on the Distri-
bution of Household Income, Consumption and 
Wealth (2013).
The aim of this chapter is to compare people’s expo-
sure to poverty in a range of countries using three 
different measures: income, expenditure and mate-
rial deprivation (MD). However, there is currently no 
data source which provides joint information on all 
of these variables for households or individuals. As 
a result, it was necessary to first statistically match 
expenditure from the 2010 round of the House-
hold Budget Survey (HBS) with income and MD 
contained within EU-SILC (125). Matched datasets for 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Austria, Finland and the 
(125) The 2010 HBS round for Austria was conducted predominantly 
in 2009. As a result, the analysis for Austria was conducted 
using 2009 EU-SILC data. The 2010 HBS round in Finland was 
conducted in 2012, so the analysis for Finland was conducted 
using the 2012 EU-SILC data.
United Kingdom (126) were produced and used for 
the joint analysis of income and expenditure based 
poverty and other measures of disadvantage, in-
cluding MD presented below.
13.2 Statistical matching
Statistical (or synthetic) matching is a broad term 
used to describe the fusing of two datasets. In this 
context, the datasets are of households sampled 
from the same population. The usual approach is 
to define one data set as the recipient, in this case 
EU-SILC, and one as the donor, HBS. The recipient 
data contains a variable Y, in this case MD, which is 
not found in the donor, while variable Z, expend-
iture, is only contained within the donor. The aim 
is to use information contained within the set of 
variables common to both datasets, X, for exam-
ple, age, gender and income, to link records from 
the donor to the recipient. Therefore, expenditure 
is linked to EU-SILC, which contains information on 
income, MD and work intensity (see Chart 13.1).
The countries chosen for inclusion were limited 
by the ability to sufficiently reconcile the EU-SILC 
and HBS datasets to make matching viable. Three 
approaches to statistical matching were used: 
(126) The selection of countries was constrained by both restrictions 
on access to HBS microdata and the suitability of the two data 
sources for statistical matching.
Chart 13.1: Recipient, donor and matched datasets
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hotdeck (non-parametric), parametric and mixed 
methods. These methods and the other steps 
involved in statistical matching are described in 
Webber and Tonkin (2013). For the six countries for 
which statistical matching was completed, analysis 
of the joint distributions of the matching variables 
with imputed and actual expenditure indicated 
that the statistical matching was effective across all 
the methods, with the mixed approach marginally 
more effective overall. (Serafino and Tonkin (2017) 
provide full details of the methods and results of 
the statistical matching of the data used in this 
chapter.)
13.3 Headline poverty 
indicators
The expenditure poverty measure used is defined 
in comparable terms to the standard income pov-
erty indicator: the share of people with an equiv-
alised household expenditure less than 60 % 
of the national median equivalised household 
expenditure.
Figure 13.1 shows how the estimates of income 
and expenditure poverty compare between the 
HBS and the matched EU-SILC datasets. In general 
there is a relatively close correspondence between 
estimates of expenditure poverty in the two data-
sets. The country with the largest divergence is the 
UK, where the HBS produces lower estimates of ex-
penditure poverty than EU-SILC (15.0 % and 19.8 % 
respectively). The estimates of income poverty on 
the two datasets are less consistent, with the UK, 
Spain and Austria showing the largest divergences. 
While EU-SILC is the main source of income data for 
many EU countries, the HBS is primarily focussed 
on expenditure data. As a result, income variables 
are not necessarily collected to the same level of 
detail in the HBS, which may account for these 
differences.
Figure 13.1: Income poverty and expenditure poverty in matched EU‑SILC and HBS, 2010
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Reading note: The figures compare the percentage of the total population of each country in a) income poverty and b) expenditure poverty 
on the HBS with those on the matched EU-SILC dataset. The solid lines indicate where the points should lie if both surveys produced identical 
estimates for these measures.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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Table 13.1: Sample sizes, poverty estimates and standard errors for matched EU‑SILC datasets
Sample size 
(number of 
individuals)
Income poverty Expenditure poverty Material deprivation
Estimate 
(%) SE (pp)
Estimate 
(%) SE (pp)
Estimate 
(%) SE (pp)
Belgium 14 592 12.6 0.7 13.0 0.3 9.9 0.8
Germany 27 684 14.4 0.4 12.4 0.1 11.1 0.3
Spain 34 807 21.9 0.6 17.2 0.2 14.4 0.6
Austria 13 596 11.3 0.5 15.6 0.1 8.8 0.5
Finland 25 370 10.9 0.4 11.5 0.2 6.3 0.3
United Kingdom 18 275 16.0 0.6 19.8 0.5 13.5 0.6
NB: Standard errors of the EU-SILC variables in this table and throughout were calculated using the method presented in Chapter 26 of this 
volume. In the absence of details on the stratification of the German EU-SILC sample, standard errors were calculated assuming a simple 
random sample, which will affect the accuracy of these estimates. The standard errors presented for expenditure poverty reflect the 
variation in the estimates produced by each iteration of the mixed methods approach. ‘pp’ means ‘percentage point’.
Table 13.1 shows the number of individuals in each 
of the matched EU-SILC datasets and the estimates 
of income poverty, expenditure poverty and MD 
for each of the countries, with their associated 
standard errors. Individuals are classed as being 
materially deprived if they have an enforced lack of 
at least three out of the list of nine MD items (see 
Chapter 10 of this volume). The table shows that, 
of the countries examined, the highest levels of 
expenditure poverty were found in the UK, with 
Spain having the highest levels of both income 
poverty and MD. Finland had the lowest levels of 
poverty across all three measures.
13.4 Overlap of income and 
expenditure poverty and 
material deprivation
Figure 13.2 shows the percentage of the popula-
tion experiencing poverty on one or more of the 
measures and the overlap between them.
This figure shows that the degree of overlap be-
tween the three measures varies across the coun-
tries examined, with the difference between the 
UK and Germany particularly prominent. In the UK, 
35 % of people experienced poverty on at least 
one of the three measures, while 12 % were in 
poverty on two or more of the measures and just 
over 2 % were in poverty on all three. In Germany, 
the degree of overlap between the measures was 
higher: despite the proportion of people in pov-
erty on at least one of the three measures being 
lower, at 24 %, a similar proportion were in poverty 
on two or more of the measures (11 %) and almost 
double the proportion were in poverty on all three 
(almost 4 %).
Looking more closely at the degree of overlap be-
tween income and expenditure poverty, Figure 
13.3, shows again how this varies across the coun-
tries examined. In Finland and Austria, only around 
40 % of those in income poverty are also expend-
iture-poor, whereas the overlap between the two 
measures is slightly higher in the UK (43 %), Spain 
(46 %) and Belgium (49 %), and higher still in Ger-
many (55 %).
A very similar pattern across countries is observed 
when looking at the proportion of expenditure-poor 
individuals who were also income-poor (Figure 13.4). 
The lowest levels of overlap are evident in Austria 
where only 29 % of expenditure-poor individuals are 
also income-poor, with slightly higher levels for the 
UK (35 %) and Finland (38 %). The highest levels of 
overlap are evident for Belgium (48 %), Spain (58 %) 
and Germany, where 64 % of those who are expend-
iture-poor are also income-poor.
In all countries, there is a greater overlap between 
MD and income poverty than MD and expenditure 
poverty, with a higher proportion of those who are 
materially deprived also being in income poverty 
(see Figure 13.5). However, the degree to which this 
is the case varies considerably. For the UK this dif-
ference is negligible, while for Germany and Spain 
it is considerable.
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Figure 13.2: Breakdown of population by poverty status, 2010
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Reading note: The figures show the percentages of the population experiencing each form of poverty and MD for each of the countries and how 
these overlap with one another. ‘Deprived’ refers to ‘materially deprived’.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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Figure 13.3: Percentage of income‑poor individuals experiencing expenditure poverty, 2010
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Reading note: The figure shows the relative proportion of income-poor individuals that also experience expenditure poverty.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
Figure 13.4: Percentage of expenditure‑poor individuals experiencing income poverty, 2010
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Reading note: The figure shows the relative proportion of expenditure-poor individuals that also experience income poverty.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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Figure 13.5: Percentage of materially deprived individuals experiencing income and 
expenditure poverty, 2010
(%)
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Reading note: The figure shows the relative proportion of materially deprived individuals that also experience income and/or expenditure 
poverty.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
If expenditure does provide a better measure of 
material living standards than income, it might be 
expected that the relationship between expendi-
ture poverty and measures such as MD would be 
stronger than that between income poverty and 
such measures. To begin to examine this point, Fig-
ure 13.6 shows for each poverty measure, the per-
centage of people in poverty and not in poverty 
who are experiencing MD.
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Figure 13.6: Material deprivation by poverty status, 2010
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Reading note: The figure shows the percentage of those in income and expenditure poverty and those not in income or expenditure poverty 
that are materially deprived; for example, for the UK the yellow bar shows that almost 30 % of the income-poor population in the UK are 
materially deprived.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
For all countries studied, there appears to be 
a stronger relationship between income poverty 
and MD than expenditure poverty and MD, though 
to varying degrees. For Austria, the relationship be-
tween income poverty and MD would appear to 
be much stronger than the relationship between 
expenditure poverty and MD. This also seems to be 
the case for Finland, though to a lesser degree. In 
contrast, for Germany and Spain, the relationship 
between expenditure poverty and MD is almost 
as strong as that between income poverty and 
MD. However, in both countries the MD rate is still 
slightly higher for those who are income-poor than 
for those who are expenditure-poor.
Figure 13.7 shows the percentage of those with 
different experiences of poverty that are unable 
to afford each of the individual items that are used 
to measure MD across the EU. The patterns seen 
in this figure are similar to those seen for MD as 
a whole (see Figure 13.6). As with MD overall, across 
all the key items, there is a stronger relationship 
between inability to afford most of the items and 
income poverty than there is with expenditure 
poverty. Similarly, there appears to be a stronger 
relationship between expenditure poverty and in-
ability to afford these items in Germany and Spain 
than in some of the other countries, particularly 
Austria and Finland.
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Figure 13.7: Population unable to afford key material deprivation items by poverty status, 2010
(% population)
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Reading note: These figures compare the percentage of those in income and expenditure poverty with those not in income or expenditure 
poverty that are unable to afford the 9 items used to measure MD. For example, for the UK the yellow bar shows that just over 10 % of the 
income-poor population in the UK cannot afford to keep their homes adequately warm.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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13.5 Housing‑related deprivation
Figure 13.8: Population experiencing additional poor living conditions (housing, local 
environment) by poverty status, 2010
(%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Belgium
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Spain
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Austria
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
D
am
p
Pr
iv
at
e 
ba
th
Pr
iv
at
e 
to
ile
t
D
ar
k
N
oi
sy
Po
llu
ti
on
C
rim
e
Finland
Income poor Non-income poor
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
D
am
p
Pr
iv
at
e 
ba
th
Pr
iv
at
e 
to
ile
t
D
ar
k
N
oi
sy
Po
llu
ti
on
C
rim
e
United Kingdom
Expenditure poor Non-expenditure poor
Reading note: These figures compare the percentage of those in income and expenditure poverty with those not in income or expenditure 
poverty that experience poor housing conditions. For example, for the UK the yellow bar shows that just over 20 % of the income-poor 
population in the UK live in a house that is damp or has a leaking roof.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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In addition to the items that are used in the main 
MD measure, EU-SILC also includes a number of 
variables that are indicative of poor housing condi-
tions. These include living in a home that is subject 
to damp or a leaking roof, that is dark or excessively 
noisy, that is in an area that suffers environmental 
problems or high levels of crime, or without sole 
use of bathing facilities or an indoor flushing toilet.
Figure 13.8 shows the relationship of these varia-
bles with income and expenditure poverty. The re-
sults are more variable. While for Belgium and Ger-
many there is evidence of a relationship with both 
measures of poverty, it is generally weaker com-
pared with the MD indicators presented above; for 
the remaining countries there is less evidence of 
a strong relationship between these indicators of 
housing related deprivation and either measure of 
poverty. In general, where there is evidence of a re-
lationship between poverty and one of these con-
ditions, it generally appears slightly stronger for the 
income-poor than the expenditure-poor; though 
when taking into account the precision of the es-
timates, this difference is not always statistically 
significant. Furthermore, there are instances where 
the expenditure-poor are more affected by one of 
these measures, for example living in a home that 
is subject to damp or a leaking roof in Germany and 
living in an excessively noisy house in the UK.
The analysis also suggests that some issues around 
poor housing conditions are not directly related 
to relative low income or expenditure poverty in 
a number of these countries. For example, there 
is no evidence of a direct relationship between 
poverty and living in an excessively noisy home or 
Figure 13.9: (Quasi‑)joblessness by poverty status, 2010
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Reading note: The figure shows the percentage of those in income and expenditure poverty and those not in income or expenditure poverty 
that have (quasi-)joblessness status. For example, for the UK the yellow bar shows that 33 % of the income-poor population in the UK have 
(quasi-)joblessness status.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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one subject to environmental problems for those 
in Spain, or living in an area afflicted by crime in 
Austria.
13.6 (Quasi‑)joblessness
The third component of the EU social inclusion 
target is (quasi-)joblessness. Figure 13.9 shows for 
income and expenditure poverty, the percentage 
of those in poverty and not in poverty that are liv-
ing in (quasi-)jobless households. The figure shows 
a strong relationship between (quasi-)joblessness 
and income poverty in all the countries. Addition-
ally, a relationship between expenditure poverty 
and (quasi-)joblessness is also evident for all the 
countries although the relative strength of the rela-
tionship appears to vary across the countries. Rates 
of (quasi-)joblessness are in excess of 30 % for both 
the income- and expenditure-poor in Germany, 
whilst the relationship between (quasi-)joblessness 
and relative low expenditure appears to be weaker 
in Finland and Austria.
13.7 Characteristics of those 
in expenditure poverty
Figure 13.10 compares the activity status of the 
household reference person (127) of the expendi-
ture-poor with the non-expenditure poor for the 
countries examined. Figure 13.11, shows a similar 
comparison of household type. (For comparisons of 
other characteristics of the expenditure-poor and 
the non-expenditure poor, see Table A.13.1).
(127) For all countries except Finland, the household reference 
person, also referred to as the head of the household, is the 
person with responsibility for the accommodation; for Finland, 
the household reference person is the person with the highest 
income, or where two or more people have the same income, 
it is the eldest.
In all countries, perhaps unsurprisingly, expendi-
ture-poor households are characterised by a high-
er proportion of unemployed heads of house-
hold. Across the board, a lower percentage of the 
expenditure-poor are headed by householders in 
employment than non-expenditure poor house-
holds, though in Austria and the UK, over half of 
the expenditure-poor are in households headed by 
someone in work.
In Finland, retired household heads account for 
a large proportion of the expenditure-poor house-
holds (46 %), in contrast with the other countries 
where retired householders are more characteristic 
of non-expenditure poor households. Expendi-
ture-poor households in Finland also show slightly 
different characteristics to the other countries when 
considering the household composition; single adult 
households (without children) make up a consider-
ably larger proportion of expenditure-poor house-
holds (42 %) than non-expenditure poor (17 %), 
a finding also observed in Germany, though to a less-
er degree (30 % of expenditure-poor households 
compared with 18 % of non-expenditure poor).
The analysis by household type also revealed that sin-
gle parent households make up a larger proportion 
of the expenditure-poor than the non-expenditure 
poor in all the countries examined, except Finland. 
This was particularly the case in Belgium (16 % of the 
expenditure-poor and 5 % of the non-expenditure 
poor), Germany (14 % of the expenditure-poor and 
4 % of the non-expenditure poor) and the UK (12 % of 
the expenditure-poor and 6 % of the non-expenditure 
poor). This contrasts with households with two adults 
which make up a lower proportion of the expendi-
ture-poor than the non-expenditure poor across all 
the countries studied.
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Figure 13.10: Comparison of those in expenditure poverty (inner ring) with those not in 
expenditure poverty (outer ring) by activity status of the household reference person, 2010
United Kingdom
Other inactive
GermanyBelgium Spain
Austria
Employed
Finland
Unemployed Retired
Reading note: The figure compares the repartition of people in expenditure poverty (inner ring) with those not in expenditure poverty (outer 
ring) by activity status. In all countries, expenditure-poor households are characterised by a higher proportion of unemployed heads of 
household.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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Figure 13.11: Comparison of those in expenditure poverty (inner ring) with those not in 
expenditure poverty (outer ring) by household type, 2010
United Kingdom
2 adults + children More than 2 adults + children
GermanyBelgium Spain
Austria
1 adult 2 adults
Finland
More than 2 adults
1 adult + children
Reading note: The figure compares the repartition of people in expenditure poverty (inner ring) with those not in expenditure poverty (outer 
ring) by household type. In all countries, expenditure-poor households are characterised by a lower proportion of households with 2 adults.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 (Austria), 2010 and 2012 (Finland): EU-SILC UDB; HBS 2010: Eurostat/ONS.
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13.8 Conclusions and 
recommendations
On one level, the results of this analysis do not ap-
pear to directly support the assertion that expend-
iture provides a better measure of material living 
standards than income, at least for the countries 
examined. Comparisons with MD and a number of 
other related measures of living conditions in gen-
eral suggest a slightly stronger relationship between 
these measures and income poverty than expendi-
ture poverty (128).
Nevertheless, there is still evidence of a clear rela-
tionship between expenditure and other measures 
of living standards; in many cases this relationship is 
a strong one, particularly for certain countries. Fur-
thermore, the fact that these measures do not entire-
ly overlap with one another in terms of the people 
they include highlights the importance of each in 
identifying different groups that are vulnerable to 
poverty and disadvantage.
There are a number of reasons that the measures may 
not overlap. These include the difficulty in measuring 
them, particularly for certain groups. Income can be 
difficult to measure for households where it varies, 
for example among the self-employed. In addition 
evidence suggests that the quality of income data 
may be lower for low income households. While 
expenditure data are arguably of better quality, the 
expense of data collection results in smaller, more ir-
regular samples. Furthermore, expenditure is not the 
same as consumption. Finally, MD is measured using 
relatively subjective questions and is subject to indi-
vidual preferences.
However, there are other explanations for the lack of 
overlap between these measures. Where a house-
hold is income-poor but is maintaining expendi-
ture and is not materially deprived (those in income 
poverty only), this may indicate that the household 
is able to draw on savings or access loans either in-
formally or formally to maintain living standards. 
(128) It is possible that the apparently weaker relationship 
between MD and expenditure poverty may be an artefact 
of carrying out statistical matching with a relatively limited 
pool of harmonised variables (see Serafino and Tonkin, 2017). 
Repeating this exercise with datasets designed for ex ante 
matching may provide slightly different results.
In some cases, such behaviour may be driven by 
knowledge or expectation that household income 
will increase in the near future, for example, those 
starting a new job soon or students. However, many 
households of this type will remain vulnerable to 
poverty as the resources they are relying on are finite 
and the situation cannot continue indefinitely.
Expenditure poverty in the absence of either income 
poverty or MD can be seen as an indicator of uncer-
tainty over future income levels and a lack of accu-
mulated wealth or assets which could be used to 
maintain living standards if income does drop. This 
may occur in employment that has no guaranteed 
future income, for example those in short-term em-
ployment and the self-employed. The analysis has 
shown considerable differences in the proportion of 
those experiencing just expenditure poverty in the 
different countries which could reflect differences 
in national labour market policies in these coun-
tries. A 2010 study into self-employment across the 
EU (European Commission, 2010) found that, while 
many countries had adopted measures to encourage 
self-employment in response to the economic crisis, 
the exact nature of these measures varied; these are 
likely to provide differing levels of employment secu-
rity to the self-employed in different countries. Ad-
ditionally, an important phenomenon in the labour 
market, at least in the UK, are so-called ‘zero hours’ 
contracts; under such arrangements the employer 
is not obliged to provide the worker with any min-
imum working hours, and the worker is not obliged 
to accept any of the hours offered. These provide 
flexibility for both parties, but also provide no guar-
antee of levels of future income, which could result 
in people adjusting their expenditure to account 
for such uncertainty. Unfortunately, the information 
available from EU-SILC is not currently sufficient to 
identify individuals with this type of contract, lim-
iting the opportunities to examine further the rela-
tionship between them and expenditure poverty.
Material deprivation may be high in the absence 
of a low income and low consumption because 
the household is able to afford consumption of 
day-to-day goods but is in debt and cannot afford 
the additional material goods key to social inclusion. 
Conversely, a household may not be materially de-
prived, despite having a low income and low con-
sumption, because they have low needs, either be-
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cause they already own the items used to measure 
MD, or because they choose not to have these items.
The analysis has highlighted the unique importance 
of each of these measures in capturing the entirety 
of poverty and disadvantage. Each of the specific in-
dicators currently used by the EU as part of the over-
all AROPE measure (income poverty, severe MD and 
(quasi-)joblessness; see Chapter 1 of this volume) al-
ready provide distinct information about the extent 
and nature of social exclusion. However, this work 
has clearly demonstrated the additional value in 
these measures being supplemented with a meas-
ure of expenditure poverty. While expenditure vari-
ables are not currently included in the EU-SILC data 
collection, precluding the routine estimation of ex-
penditure poverty, the proposed 6-yearly module 
on consumption and wealth may provide new op-
portunities. As Stiglitz et al. (2009), OECD (2013) and 
others have recommended, only by using multiple 
measures can all aspects of poverty and disadvan-
tage be adequately captured.
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Extensive versus 
intensive margin: 
changing perspective 
on the employment rate
Andrea Brandolini and Eliana Viviano (129)
14.1 Introduction
During the 1990s, the European economic policy 
discourse saw a significant shift of emphasis from 
the ‘unemployment rate’ toward the ‘employment 
rate’. The shift can be probably traced back to the 
‘White Paper on growth, competitiveness and em-
ployment’ prepared by the Delors Commission, 
which focused primarily on unemployment re-
duction and job creation, but explicitly stated that 
policy should ‘raise levels of employment and not 
just lower levels of unemployment’ (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1993, p. 129). Increas-
ing the employment rates, especially of women 
and elderly people, has since become a central 
concern of the European Employment Strategy, 
launched at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in 1997 
and translated into specific targets in the Lisbon 
agenda in 2000 (Goetschy, 1999). The Europe 2020 
strategy sets that 75 % of the population aged 20-
64 ‘should be employed’ by 2020 (European Com-
mission, 2010).
(129) Bank of Italy, Directorate General for Economics, Statistics 
and Research. We thank Anthony B. Atkinson, Vincent Corluy, 
Francesco D’Amuri, Giuseppe Ferrero, Anne-Catherine Guio, 
Eric Marlier, Marco Paccagnella, Sophie Ponthieux, Alfonso 
Rosolia, Wiemer Salverda, Frank Vandenbroucke and Roberta 
Zizza for valuable comments. This work has been supported 
by the second Network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), 
funded by Eurostat. The European Commission and the Bank 
of Italy bear no responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, 
which are solely those of the authors. Email address for 
correspondence: andrea.brandolini@bancaditalia.it.
Focusing on employment rates means account-
ing for the work potential of economically inactive 
persons in addition to the unemployed who are 
actively searching for a job. There are intuitively ap-
pealing reasons for this broadening of the scope of 
employment policies: reducing under-utilisation of 
resources to raise growth potential; counteracting 
the negative effects of an ageing population for 
the sustainability of social security systems; foster-
ing social inclusion and gender equality (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1998, pp. 4-5). 
Yet, while fighting unemployment means creating 
conditions by which those wanting to work can 
more easily find the job they are looking for, raising 
employment means creating conditions by which 
a certain (minimal) proportion of people in work-
ing age actually work. The first objective takes as 
given people’s decision whether to work or not, 
whereas the second objective implies influencing 
the decision of people to participate in the labour 
market in order to push more of them to work. 
Clearly, this shift implies significant changes in the 
underlying normative views (Brandolini and Vivi-
ano, 2015). However, there are no less important 
statistical issues.
According to the definition of the employment 
rate set by the International Labour Office (ILO), 1 
hour of work during a reference week is sufficient 
to be classified as employed. This is very crude. In 
the face of the wide diversity of working times and 
contract durations, should we not have a more nu-
anced approach to the measurement of employ-
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ment levels, differentiating across the various work 
arrangements? In part, this is done by the European 
Commission (2012) when it reports information on 
‘full-time equivalent employment’ and ‘very low 
work intensity’. The full-time equivalent employ-
ment rate assigns part-time workers a weight low-
er than one and equal to the ratio of the average 
number of hours worked in part-time jobs to the 
average number of hours worked in full-time jobs. 
It adjusts for part time, though not for overtime 
work. People hired on a temporary basis are count-
ed as employed only if they are working in the ref-
erence period. However, the overall time worked 
during a year by somebody hired on a fixed-term 
basis may be lower than that worked by somebody 
hired on a permanent basis, since temporary jobs 
often last for short periods and may alternate with 
non-employment spells. Work intensity can ac-
count also for this aspect by measuring the fraction 
of total work potential actually worked by an adult 
during the whole year, but this indicator is only 
used to identify the (quasi-)jobless households in 
the calculation of the individuals who are ‘at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) in the Europe 
2020 strategy (see Chapters 1 and 3 of this volume 
for definitions). Neither the allowance for part time 
nor the notion of work intensity is used to adjust, or 
to qualify, the European employment target, which 
is framed as a pure headcount ratio for individuals.
In this chapter, we argue that it is worth supple-
menting the partial information conveyed by the 
standard headcount employment rate with a rate 
that adjusts the employment status for the total 
time worked by an individual during a year (nor-
malised by the average annual hours of work of 
a person employed full-time throughout the year). 
Indeed, a glimpse at the official figures for the EU 
shows that, between 2001 and 2011, the employ-
ment rate of the population aged 15 to 64 years 
rose from 62.6 to 64.3 %, but the corresponding rate 
adjusted for part time only marginally increased 
from 58.3 to 58.6 %; and these numbers may fail to 
account for the shorter work periods of employees 
hired on a fixed term basis, whose share rose from 
12.4 to 14.1 % (European Commission 2012, p. 403). 
Something is clearly missing if we evaluate the per-
formance of EU labour markets only in terms of the 
standard employment rate. The broader measure 
of employment adjusted for work intensity bet-
ter captures the variety of working time arrange-
ments, but it also accounts for the different value 
judgement where work intensity, rather than hav-
ing a job, has intrinsic value. Work intensity has the 
further advantage that it can be straightforwardly 
aggregated across individuals to calculate the cor-
responding household-level indicator. The con-
struction of an intensity-adjusted employment rate 
for households can shed new light on the puzzling 
little association between household jobless rates 
and relative income poverty ratios (de Beer, 2007; 
Frazer and Marlier, 2010; Ponthieux, 2010; Cantillon, 
2011; de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 2011; Vandenbroucke 
and Vleminckx, 2011; Marx, Vandenbroucke and 
Verbist, 2012; Vandenbroucke and Diris, 2014; Chap-
ter 15 of this volume).
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 14.2 
we derive our measures of work intensity for indi-
viduals and households. In Section 14.3 we show 
how to calculate work intensity from EU-SILC, while 
in Section 14.4 we compare the evidence from 
EU-SILC with that from the European Labour Force 
Surveys (EU-LFS) which is the benchmark for labour 
market statistics. In Section 14.5 we examine the 
distribution of work intensity among individuals 
and households. In Section 14.6 we present the es-
timates of the weighted employment rate for both 
individuals and households in the EU countries. We 
conclude in Section 14.7. Tables are gathered at the 
end of the chapter.
14.2 Accounting for work 
intensity
The standard employment rate ER, as defined by 
the ILO, is the average over a given population of 
size P of the indicator E
i
 that takes value 1 if person 
i, with i=1,…,P, has worked for at least 1 hour during 
the reference week and 0 otherwise:
(1) ∑ == iPi EPER 1
1
.
ER is computed over the working-age population. 
It measures the ‘extensive’ margin of labour, but 
ignores its ‘intensive’ margin: people working just 
1 hour per week are treated as people working 
40 hours. In the same vein, those working for just 
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1 day during the reference period enter with unit 
weight in the computation of ER just like those em-
ployed on a permanent basis.
The employment rate can be adjusted for differ-
ences in the intensive margin by weighting the in-
dividual indicator E
i
 by a measure of person i’s work 
intensity, ω
i
. The weighted employment rate WER 
can be defined as:
(2) ∑ ω= = iiPi EPWER 1
1
.
See Brandolini and Viviano (2015) for a more gen-
eral treatment of the adjustment for work intensi-
ty, allowing also for a broader range of normative 
values.
We define work intensity ω
i
 as the total number of 
(paid) hours worked by person i during a year as 
a ratio to the average number of hours worked 
yearly by a full-time full-year employed. (The choice 
of the time span for work intensity is arbitrary but 
inconsequential.) The information on annual hours 
of work is rarely collected in income and labour 
force surveys, but information may be available on 
the fraction of a year spent in employment (meas-
ured in months in EU-SILC) and the average work-
ing time for a certain time unit. Thus, we may write 
work intensity as the product of three terms:
(3) ⎟⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛=θυμ=ω
m
H
hii
iiii
wi
4.312 .
The term μ
i
 is the fraction of months worked dur-
ing the year, where m
i
 is the number of months 
worked by i. The term υ
i
 is the number of weeks 
worked per month w
i
 relative to its maximum value 
4.3 (=30/7). The term θ
i
 indicates the hours worked 
in the reference week, normalised by a benchmark 
level H. As discussed by Brandolini and Viviano 
(2015), H can be set with reference to physical limits, 
legal and customary norms, or actual behaviours. 
We fix H at 40 hours, which is the median number 
of hours usually worked per week by employed 
working-age persons in the period 2007-2011 in the 
EU as a whole. As shown in Figure 14.1, this is the 
median value in the large majority of EU Member 
States. Thus, the benchmark annual hours worked 
by the standard person is assumed to be 2 064 
(=12×4.3×40). This value exceeds actual hours of 
work as it does not correct for any paid absence 
from work, like holidays and sickness absence, but 
any other fixed value would only change propor-
tionately all estimates, leaving unaffected coun-
try rankings and relative indices. The choice of 
a unique benchmark for all EU countries allows for 
cross-country comparisons.
Neither the EU-LFS nor the EU-SILC collects all 
the information necessary to compute (3). In the 
EU-LFS, it is not possible to derive an annual meas-
ure of time spent working. In EU-SILC, we have 
an estimate of m
i
 and we can extrapolate h
i
 from 
the information on the average number of hours 
worked per week, under the assumption that the 
length of the working week is constant during the 
previous calendar year and is the same as the one 
observed at the date of the interview. Lacking any 
information, we assume that w
i
 equals 4.3, i.e. that 
all employed persons work for the whole month. 
This may understate the work intensity of the 
self-employed, who typically enjoy fewer days of 
holidays than employees, and produce biased esti-
mates of the work intensity of people employed for 
less than a full month, as in EU-SILC people work-
ing for at least 2 weeks are recorded as working for 
the whole month, while those working less than 
2 weeks are recorded as not working at all. This im-
plies that our measure of work intensity is (unfor-
tunately) more precise for those who have a stable 
dependent employment and it is probably biased 
for those with unstable working time.
To sum up, we estimate the weighted employment 
rate in EU-SILC as:
(4) 
∑
∑
∑
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 ,
where by definition ω
i 
equals 0 for people who do 
not work. If all employed work exactly 40 hours 
per week throughout the year, ω
i
 equals 1 for all 
i and WER coincides with ER. If they instead work 
more than 40 hours, the average ω
i
 exceed 1 and 
WER is higher than ER. By construction, the index (4) 
does not depend on the size of the population. It is 
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homogenous of degree 1 in h
i
: as the benchmark 
value H is kept constant at 40 hours, the weight-
ed employment rate doubles whenever hours of 
work double for all employed, hence signalling an 
increase in the workload.
In (4), the dichotomous individual employment in-
dicator E
i
 used to compute ER is replaced by the 
continuous intensity-adjusted employment indica-
tor ω
i 
E
i
, or simply ω
i
. It is then possible to analyse its 
distribution across the population using standard 
tools like inequality indices. Moreover, the indica-
tor ω
i
 can be aggregated across individuals at the 
household level, establishing a link with measures 
of household joblessness.
Figure 14.1: Distribution of usual weekly hours in all jobs of working‑age employed (16‑64) in 
2007‑2011 by country (pooled years)
(number of hours)
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NB: Countries are ranked in ascending order of median weekly hours for all employed population.
Reading note: Each point corresponds to the median of the national distribution of weekly usual working time calculated for the pooled years 
2007-2011; each point denoted by ´ corresponds to the 25th or 75th percentile of the distribution (for some countries, not shown because of the 
overlapping with the median value).
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC UDB May 2013.
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The jobless household rate JHR is the fraction of 
households where no one works according to the 
1-hour-per-week criterion (e.g. Gregg and Wad-
sworth, 1996, 2008; Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth, 
2010). Similarly to the ER, the JHR is insensitive to the 
number of hours worked by those employed with-
in the household; but it is also insensitive to how 
many household members work, provided that at 
least one is in employment. This is not the case for 
the Europe 2020 indicator of (quasi-)joblessness (i.e. 
very low work intensity), which considers the pro-
portion of months worked by all adult household 
members. This idea underlies the extension to the 
household level of the index (4). If K
f
 is the number 
of potential workers in household f, we can com-
pute the work intensity ω
f
 of household f by aver-
aging the work intensity of all these K
f 
members:
(5) ∑ = ω=ω
fK
i ifif
f
f EK 1
1
,
where the sub-index if indicates member i of 
household f. Averaging across all households gives 
the household work-intensity-adjusted employ-
ment rate:
(6) 
∑ ∑∑ = == ω=ω=
F
f
K
i ifif
f
F
f f
f E
KFF
HWER
1 11
111
,
where F is the number of households in the ref-
erence population. The indicator ω
f
 can be inter-
preted as the share of total work from which each 
household eligible member can benefit even if he 
or she does not directly supply any work. As for the 
individual index, for a jobless household ω
f
 equals 
0.
Despite the close relationship between (4) and (6), 
the two indices differ for the reference population: 
for individuals employment rates are calculated for 
the working-age population, whereas for house-
holds they are computed for a sub-group of this 
population. As for the AROPE sub-indicator on 
(quasi-)joblessness, we consider eligible house-
holds those having at least one member aged 
between 18 and 59 who is not a dependent child, 
where dependent children are students younger 
than 25 years still living with at least one parent. 
We define potential worker any individual between 
18 and 59 who is not a dependent child.
14.3 Calculation of work 
intensity from the EU‑SILC 
data
The number of months worked in the year and 
the number of hours worked per week are the 
two EU-SILC variables that we use to estimate 
the weighted employment rate WER. We use the 
cross-sectional files. For worked months, we follow 
two slightly different procedures, owing to survey 
differences. For the period 2004-2007, we com-
pute the number of months worked in the year 
prior to the interview as the sum of the variables 
pl070 (number of months spent at full-time work) 
and pl072 (number of months spent at part-time 
work). As in some months the main activity status 
is missing, we follow Eurostat’s (2008) recommen-
dation and calculate work intensity as the ratio of 
the number of worked months to the number of 
‘workable’ months, i.e. the sum of pl070, pl072, pl080, 
pl085, pl087 and pl090 (after setting to zero any 
missing value in these variables). This implies im-
puting the work intensity recorded for the months 
where the activity status is known to the months 
where it is missing. For the period 2008-2010, this 
problem does not arise as the information on the 
number of months worked can, in principle, be 
computed as the sum of the variables from pl073 
through pl076. These variables record the number 
of months spent at work as full-time employee, 
part-time employee, full-time self-employed or 
family worker, and part-time self-employed or fam-
ily worker, respectively. We retain all observations 
where up to three of these variables are missing, 
by setting equal to 0 the missing value(s), but we 
drop observations which have missing values for all 
four variables. For the total hours of work per week, 
in all years we calculate the sum of the variables 
pl060 (usual hours in the main job) and pl100 (usual 
hours in all other jobs), which refers to the year of 
the interview. Although this may exacerbate the 
misalignment between the timing of hours of work 
and that of months worked, we prefer trying to ac-
count for the total hours of work because it may 
be important for individuals who are forced to cu-
mulate job positions to reach the desired working 
time. If the variable pl100 is missing we set it equal 
14 Extensive versus intensive margin: changing perspective on the employment rate
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe266
to zero. Finally, for all estimates we use the prop-
er personal cross-sectional weights, either pb040, 
which sum to the country population of household 
members aged 16 and over, or rb050, which sum to 
the country population of household members of 
any age.
The proportion of missing values for months and 
hours of work is reported in Table 14.1. In most cas-
es, this proportion is reassuringly low, but there are 
exceptions. For worked months, in all years but one 
missing values account for between 5 and 10 % of 
observations in Poland, and for more than 10 % in 
the United Kingdom. For weekly working time, the 
proportion of missing values exceeds 5 % in Portu-
gal in all years and in three other cases. We do not 
attempt any imputation for these missing values 
but we instead exclude from our sample all individ-
uals reporting them. This might bias our results in 
countries where missing values are more frequent.
14.4 Comparing the 
evidence from EU‑SILC and 
the EU‑LFS
In this chapter, we use EU-SILC because it contains 
information on the number of months worked 
during the year. By its continuous structure, also 
the EU-LFS employment rate captures some of the 
fragmentation of work experiences during the year, 
as the probability that an individual is classified as 
employed correlates positively with the fraction of 
the year spent at work. However, the EU-LFS does 
not allow us to estimate the level of work intensity 
for each individual which is necessary for distribu-
tive analysis and to calculate household-level indi-
ces. As the EU-LFS is the benchmark for labour mar-
ket statistics, in this section we compare estimates 
from EU-SILC with the corresponding values from 
the EU-LFS drawn from the Eurostat web-database 
(data accessed on 18 July 2013).
Estimates from the two sources may diverge first 
of all because definitions differ. Following the ILO 
guidelines, in the EU-LFS persons are classified 
as employed if during the reference week they 
worked at least 1 hour or had a job from which they 
were temporarily absent, for instance due to illness. 
In EU-SILC, it is possible to derive at least two meas-
ures of the extensive-margin employment rate, 
both based on the occupational status declared by 
respondents: i) the situation at the time of the inter-
view (variable pl030 until Wave 2008, variables pl030 
or pl031 for Waves 2009-10, and pl031 for Wave 2011); 
ii) the working condition in the previous year. While 
the first measure is likely to be more comparable 
with the EU-LFS measure (as both refer to a current 
situation), only the second is fully consistent with 
WER, which refers to work intensity in the previous 
year. In both cases, the self-reported status may 
lead to underestimate employment, as many peo-
ple working few hours at the time of the interview 
may not perceive themselves as employed. Sim-
ilarly, defining the employment status in EU-SILC 
on whether a person has worked at least 1 month 
during the year may overstate employment levels 
because persons working for just 1 month count 
as those working for the whole year. Weekly work-
ing time is defined as actual worked hours in the 
EU-LFS and usual hours in EU-SILC, with a distinc-
tion in both surveys between main job and other 
jobs. (The EU-LFS collects usual working time only 
for the main job, and reports second jobs only if 
carried out in the reference week.) Differences be-
tween the two concepts arise from the treatment 
of sickness absence, holidays, extra hours worked 
due to a demand peak, or a shorter working time 
caused by demand slackness. Besides definitions, 
other causes for divergence between the two 
sources relate to the reference population (the 
lowest age for an employed person is 16 years in 
EU-SILC vis-à-vis 15 years in the EU-LFS), the time 
frame (the EU-LFS is conducted continuously and 
the reported estimates are yearly averages, while 
EU-SILC is carried out once per year) and the sam-
ple size (considerably smaller for EU-SILC than for 
the EU-LFS).
These differences show up in the employment 
statistics for the working-age population (see Fig-
ure 14.2). To ease comparison between the two 
surveys, in Figure 14.2a we report the EU-LFS em-
ployment rate, based on the ILO definition, and the 
EU-SILC rate, based on the current self-reported sta-
tus, while in Table 14.2, we report also the EU-SILC 
measure based on the 1-month-in-the-year crite-
rion. In 2011, in almost two thirds of cases, EU-SILC 
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(self-reported, current working condition) employ-
ment rate is lower than the EU-LFS figure; in eight 
countries, the absolute difference exceeds 5 % (see 
Figure 14.2a and Table 14.2). Except for two cases, 
hours worked per week in all jobs are higher in 
EU-SILC than in the EU-LFS, with discrepancies larg-
er than 5 % in six countries (see Figure 14.2b and 
Table 14.3): given the focus on usual hours in the 
former and actual hours in the latter, this result may 
be expected in a year of poor economic conditions 
in many countries such as 2011. The share of people 
that declare to have more than one job is, some-
what counter-intuitively, understated in EU-SILC rel-
ative to the EU-LFS in almost all countries, in twelve 
cases by more than a third (see Figure 14.2c and 
Table 14.4). Jobless household rates (calculated on 
the basis of the current self-reported status) turn 
out to be higher in EU-SILC in all countries but two, 
and by more than a fifth in about half of the cases 
(see Figure 14.2d and Table 14.4). (The share of job-
less households is consistently calculated for both 
sources as the ratio to the total number of private 
households of the number of households where no 
adult is working, excluding units composed solely 
Figure 14.2: Labour market statistics in the EU‑LFS and EU‑SILC in 2011
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of students or solely inactive aged 65 and over.) In 
part, this result reflects the use of the self-reported 
status to define the working condition in EU-SILC. 
For employment rates and worked hours, the 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients 
are generally high, around 0.8-0.9, and somewhat 
improving in more recent waves. In brief, the cor-
respondence between EU-SILC and the EU-LFS for 
the examined statistics is far from perfect, but it is 
all in all acceptable, especially in the light of differ-
ences between the sources.
Due to the lack of alternative series, it is not pos-
sible to perform any comparison for the number 
of months worked in the year, which is also the 
variable used to derive the Europe 2020 AROPE 
sub-indicator on (quasi-)jobless households. 
Changes over time show a few large variations from 
one year to the next, although some of them may 
be explained by cyclical conditions (last columns 
of Table 14.1). As compared to the EU-LFS, the em-
ployment rate calculated on the basis of this vari-
able does not differ much from the self-reported 
employment status, suggesting that the different 
definitions possibly matter less than other survey 
differences (see Table 14.2).
14.5 The distribution of 
work intensity in selected 
EU countries
Figure 14.3 compares the kernel density estimates 
of the distributions of individual and household 
work intensity in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom in 2010. 
These countries are selected as representative 
of different labour market and social protection 
regimes, but they also differ in other relevant re-
spects such as the demographic and household 
structures. For individuals (solid lines), the distribu-
tion is bimodal (except Sweden), with a first spike 
at 0 indicating the incidence of non-or very low 
employment, and a second spike around 1 indicat-
ing the share of standard-time workers (40 hours 
per week for the whole year). The Netherlands and 
Sweden exhibit low shares of non-employed but 
also of people working more than standard time; 
conversely, the incidence is high for work intensi-
ties comprised between 0 and 1. The shapes of the 
distributions are fairly similar in Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, but the mass around zero is 
much higher in Italy while the distribution is more 
spread out in the United Kingdom. The distribu-
tion is far more polarised in Poland, where both 
the shares of those who do not work and that of 
those working full time throughout the year are 
very high.
For households (dashed lines), the distribution of 
work intensity is approximately trimodal by virtue 
of the combination of the different employment 
patterns within the households. In addition to 
the two spikes at 0 and 1, there is also some mass 
around 0.5, which is the work intensity that typi-
cally corresponds to couples, with or without de-
pendent children, where only one adult works. This 
third mode is especially evident in Italy and Poland.
14.6 Weighted employment 
rates in European countries
Table 14.5 compares the headcount employment 
rates ER, based on the 1-month-in-the-year criteri-
on, with the intensity-adjusted employment rates 
WER; the comparison for 2010 is also shown in the 
left panel of Figure 14.4. Henceforth, we switch to 
the 1-month-in-the-year criterion to calculate the 
extensive-margin of the employment rate because 
our focus on the difference between the extensive 
and the intensive margins of employment requires 
that the indices refer to the same time frame. Few 
figures appear to be somewhat odd, especially 
in early years (e.g. the United Kingdom in 2004), 
suggesting that EU-SILC has likely become more 
reliable over time, at least for some countries. Fo-
cusing on more recent years, as expected WER 
is considerably lower than ER in all countries. On 
average the discrepancy is close to 10 percentage 
points, but in Finland and the Netherlands it rais-
es to 16-18 points and in Sweden it is well above 
20 points, as shown in Figure 14.4. The ranking 
of countries changes considerably. Sweden falls 
from 1st to 8th position, Finland from 2nd to 13th, 
the Netherlands from 5th to 20th. On the contra-
ry, some Eastern European countries jump to the 
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Figure 14.3: The distribution of work intensity of individuals and households in selected EU 
countries in 2011 (reference period 2010)
(kernel densities)
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a student younger than 25.
Reading note: The figure shows, for each country, the kernel density estimations of the distribution of work intensity of individuals and 
households, calculated according to equations (3) and (5) in the text.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC UDB May 2013.
top of the list: Slovakia moves up from 21st to 10th 
position, Poland from 18th to 7th, and the Czech 
Republic from 13th to 1st. This reshuffling implies 
that, after 2007, the coefficient of variation for WER 
is systematically below that for ER. Accounting for 
work intensity narrows cross-national differences: 
the Nordic nations and the Netherlands converge 
to the (unweighted) mean from above, the Eastern 
nations converge from below, while the gap rela-
tive to the average remains virtually unaltered for 
Southern countries.
The two alternative measures do not show dra-
matically divergent time patterns, but there are in-
teresting differences during the Great Recession of 
2008-2009. In several countries, ER reaches a peak 
in 2008 and then falls, or slows down, in the next 2 
years, but WER shows an anticipated turning point, 
in 2007 instead of 2008. In part, this may reflect the 
statistical inconsistency stemming from combining 
the usual hours of work recorded at the time of the 
interview with the months worked in the previous 
calendar year. In part, however, it might also capture 
a fall in hours worked per employed in response to 
the economic downturn at the end of 2008, which 
in several countries was facilitated by the adoption 
of work-sharing schemes.
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Figure 14.4: Individual and household employment rates in EU countries in 2011 (reference 
period 2010)
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Table 14.5 reports the household employment 
rates HWER and the shares of households with at 
least one person employed 1–JHR, both comput-
ed from EU-SILC for the same reference popula-
tion and using the 1-month-in-the-year criterion 
for employment. The adjustment for worked hours 
is even larger for households than for individuals: 
HWER is systematically lower than 1–JHR by 10 to 
30 percentage points. The right panel of Figure 14.4 
compares the two indices for 2010, using the same 
ranges on the horizontal and vertical axes of the left 
panel. This serves to illustrate that the employment 
rate for households is higher than for individuals, 
which means that many non-employed people live 
in households where somebody else is employed. 
This effect is particularly strong in Eastern Europe, 
but also in Belgium, Italy, France and Luxembourg. In 
2010, the index HWER ranges from 55.8 % in Greece 
to 77.5 % in the Czech Republic: it exceeds 70 % in 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and many East-
ern EU countries, falls to 68-69 % in Germany, Austria 
and France, and to between 60 and 66 % in Spain, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Italy, 
Belgium and Finland. In general, cross-national dif-
ferences in employment rates appear to be lower 
than for individuals, especially between the North 
and South of Europe. In Southern countries the low-
er individual work participation is partly offset by 
the work of other household members.
Cantillon (2011, p. 439) notes a discrepancy be-
tween the trends in employment and poverty in 
the EU in 2004-2008 and shows that it can reflect 
both the fact that ‘rising employment benefited 
workless households only marginally’ and the fact 
that ‘at-risk-of-poverty rates for households with 
low work intensity increased’. This observation 
suggests that adjusting for work intensity may in-
crease the responsiveness of the household em-
ployment rate to changes in employment relative 
to a joblessness measure, and then lead to a some-
what stronger correlation with relative poverty. In 
Figure 14.5, we plot the share of individuals at risk 
of poverty in each country in 2010 (using a cut-off 
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at 60 % of the overall median equivalised income 
(EU definition)) against 1–JHR, in the left panel, and 
HWER, in the right panel. The relative poverty rate 
is computed for the same household population 
considered in the two employment indices. While 
the correlation is weakly negative for both indices, 
it is statistically significant only for HWER (at 5 %).
14.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have shown how the employ-
ment rate can be modified to measure not only 
how many people work but also how much they 
work. The adjustment for work intensity is based 
on an estimate of total annual hours of work as ap-
proximated by the number of months worked per 
year and the number of hours worked per week. 
This measure sheds new light on the cross-country 
comparison of employment rates for both individ-
uals and households. After adjusting for work inten-
sity, the gap between Northern Europe and South-
ern and Eastern Europe in the amount of labour 
supplied by individuals narrows. Differences are 
even smaller for households. Our estimates could 
be improved in many respects. Yet, they highlight 
the importance of finding new flexible measures of 
labour market phenomena and, consequently, the 
need to enrich the informational basis on which 
these measures are estimated.
Figure 14.5: Household employment and relative poverty in EU countries in 2011 (reference 
period 2010)
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15.1 Introduction
Is employment the best recipe against income 
poverty of people of working age? At the level of 
individual citizens and the households in which 
they live, participation in the labour market signifi-
cantly diminishes the risk of income poverty. How-
ever, what seems evident at the level of individuals 
and households is less evident at the country level.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Lisbon strategy 
could be regarded as a qualified success in the field 
of employment, at least if one assumes there to 
have been causal relationships between the Lisbon 
agenda and growing employment rates across Eu-
rope. On the other hand, though, the Lisbon strate-
gy largely failed to deliver on its ambitious promise 
concerning poverty and social exclusion. Notwith-
standing generally higher employment rates many 
Member States did not succeed in bringing back 
their poverty and social exclusion records. We do 
not observe a general conversion of employment 
policy success in less income poverty. Hence, it is 
important to understand the missing links between 
employment policy success (or failure) and inclu-
sion policy success (or failure). We explore those 
(130) Frank Vandenbroucke is affiliated to the University of 
Amsterdam (UvA); both authors are affiliated to the University 
of Antwerp (CSB). We thank Anthony B. Atkinson, Andrea 
Brandolini, Bea Cantillon and colleagues at the Herman 
Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, Anne-Catherine Guio, Eric 
Marlier, Brian Nolan, Wiemer Salverda, Eliana Viviano and all 
participants at the December 2012 Net-SILC2 conference 
in Vienna for precious comments. This work has been 
supported by the Net-SILC2 Network, funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analysis 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. All 
errors remain our own. Email address for correspondence: 
f.i.g.vandenbroucke@uva.nl.
missing links, relying on EU-SILC and the EU Labour 
Force Survey (EU-LFS).
In this chapter, we explore (i) if the difference be-
tween changes in individual employment and 
changes in household employment offer an ade-
quate explanation for changes in income poverty 
and (ii) how we can decompose these different 
changes in underlying factors, such as polarisation 
of employment. This hypothesis builds on the ar-
gument put forward in Vandenbroucke and Vlem-
inckx (2011) and Cantillon (2011), to wit that the dis-
appointing income poverty trend during the ‘good 
economic years’ is partly attributable to a failure to 
reduce the number of individuals living in jobless 
households, despite increasing individual employ-
ment rates. Our time frame for the analysis of in-
come poverty is EU-SILC 2005-2012 (which refer to 
income years 2004-2011). We study the trajectory of 
24 EU welfare states (131) during the ‘good econom-
ic years’ and during the ‘crisis period’.
The analysis of the (income) poverty trends pro-
ceeds in two steps. The first step considers the dis-
tribution of individual jobs over households, thus 
establishing a link between individual employ-
ment rates and the configuration of household 
employment. Following the work by Gregg, Scute-
lla and Wadsworth (2008, 2010), a ‘polarisation in-
dex’ is defined in terms of the difference between, 
on the one hand, the actual share of individuals 
living in jobless households and, on the other, the 
hypothetical share of individuals living in jobless 
households assuming that individual employment 
is distributed randomly across households. This 
(131) Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania were not yet available 
in the 2005 EU-SILC Wave and are excluded from the trend 
analysis.
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benchmark of ‘random distribution of jobs’ allows 
us to signal an avoidable suboptimal situation for 
a welfare state (in case of positive polarisation). Not 
only is the (skewness of the) relation between in-
dividual and household employment of interest 
for our analysis, but even more important are the 
changes in this relation.
The second step in the analysis integrates the two 
missing links we explore (the link between indi-
vidual employment rates and the configuration of 
household employment; the link between the con-
figuration of household employment and income 
poverty) into one single analysis. Therefore, we 
decompose changes in the income poverty rates 
on the basis of (i) changes in the poverty risks of 
jobless households, (ii) changes in the poverty risks 
of other (non-jobless) households, (iii) changes in 
household joblessness due to changes in individual 
employment rates and changing household struc-
tures, and (iv) changes in polarisation. In principle, 
this method would allow assessing the impact on 
income poverty rates of changes in individual em-
ployment rates, all other things being equal, and 
the impact on income poverty rates of changes in 
polarisation, again all other things being equal.
The proposed technique yields interesting in-
sights into the trajectories that EU welfare states 
have followed over the past 10 years. The analysis 
uncovers a puzzling combination of convergence 
and disparity within the EU. The configuration of 
individual and household employment is driven 
by forces of modernisation that affect all European 
welfare states in the same direction, such as declin-
ing household size, feminisation of labour markets 
and increasing proportions of tertiary educated in-
dividuals. Nevertheless, the configuration remains 
very different from country to country. Changes in 
the distribution of employment over households 
and decreasing household sizes constitute impor-
tant structural background features for evolving EU 
welfare states. However, their impact on the expla-
nation of differences in the Member States’ per-
formance with regard to the reduction of income 
poverty over time is rather limited and disperse, 
both before and after 2008.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 15.2 
describes the (mathematical) relation between in-
dividual and household employment and explores 
the distribution of jobs over households over the 
timespan 1995-2012. This empirical analysis is 
based on EU-LFS microdata and uses an ILO (Inter-
national Labour Organisation) concept of employ-
ment. Section 15.3 integrates the missing links be-
tween labour market trends and at-risk-of-poverty 
changes, introducing EU-SILC estimates. It explores 
whether the upward convergence towards a more 
unequal distribution of jobs is a determining factor 
in the analysis of income poverty evolutions. Sec-
tion 15.4 concludes.
15.2 The distribution of jobs 
over households
In this chapter, we use an ILO concept of employ-
ment. According to this definition, an individual is 
in work if employed for at least 1 hour in the week 
before the survey. The household is jobless if no 
working age adult is in employment, so defined. In 
this chapter, ‘joblessness’ is the opposite of employ-
ment, i.e. it refers both to situations of registered 
unemployment, invalidity, or inactivity for any oth-
er reason. Hence, our concept of a jobless house-
hold differs from the EU definition of ‘(quasi-)job-
less households’, which is based on a fine-grained 
measure of the work intensity of adult households 
members (in most countries during the year before 
the survey year), and applies a cut-off of ‘very low 
work intensity’. Different definitions of household 
employment are discussed in Corluy and Vanden-
broucke (2013, Section 3 and Appendix 3). For an 
elaboration on those concepts, see also Chapters 
14 and 16 in this volume. As a short cut, we will use 
‘household joblessness (rate)’ to refer to the share 
of individuals living in jobless households (132).
15.2.1 Trends in individual and 
household employment
We first focus on trends in individual and house-
hold joblessness in 11 old EU Member States (i.e. 
(132) The age reference group is 20-59 years with exclusion of 
full-time students, both when we count the members of the 
household who are in employment (to classify the household 
as ‘jobless’ or ‘not jobless’), and when we define the population 
for which we calculate the household joblessness rate. 
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the Southern, Anglo-Saxon and Continental mem-
bers of the EU-15, excluding Germany (133)) for 
which EU-LFS data and household variables are 
available from 1995 to 2012 (see Figure 15.1) (134). 
Changes are presented separately for the period 
before and after 2008.
In all countries, the gap between changes in indi-
vidual joblessness and changes in household job-
lessness is negative. In those countries where indi-
vidual joblessness is higher at the end of the period 
than at the start (Portugal and Greece), increases 
(133) German LFS data are only available from 2001 onwards.
(134) The years in the text refer to the survey year, both for EU-SILC 
and EU-LFS. Measures of employment are based on an ILO 
definition and refer to the identical survey year. Observations of 
poverty relate to the entire income year prior to the survey year 
(except in Ireland and in the United Kingdom).
in household joblessness over the same period are 
always stronger. In most countries where individual 
joblessness is lower at the end of the period also 
household joblessness has decreased, but for the 
same reason, at a slower pace. Two countries (Spain 
and Ireland) are confronted with negative changes 
in individual joblessness and positive changes in 
household joblessness (when comparing the end 
of the period with the start). But also here holds 
the finding that changes in individual joblessness 
are always bigger than changes in household job-
lessness. Although the sign of the gap between 
changes in individual and household joblessness 
is always negative, the size of the gap shows sub-
stantial variation over countries. In three countries 
(United Kingdom, Portugal and Greece) the gap is 
small. In all other 11 EU-15 countries, we observe 
Figure 15.1: Changes in individual (ind) and household (hh) joblessness for 11 EU countries, 
1995‑2008‑2012, EU‑LFS
(percentage points)
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NB: Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage point difference in household joblessness between 1995 and 2012.
Reading note: This figure presents the changes in individual and household joblessness for 11 EU countries over three periods. Yellow bars 
present changes between 1995 and 2008, light green bars present changes between 2008 and 2012. The blue squares show changes in 
household joblessness over the entire period 1995-2012.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-LFS UDB 1995-2012.
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gaps of comparable magnitude, with only Luxem-
bourg being an outsider. Also in Spain the differ-
ence between changes in joblessness at individual 
and household level is rather big.
These trends are in part explainable by a pure 
‘mathematical’ effect, reflecting the pooling of in-
dividual risks in households. We illustrate this in Fig-
ure 15.2 with the Spanish case. Figure 15.2 shows 
the distribution of Spanish working-age individuals 
among jobless and ‘full employment’ households 
(households where all adult members are in em-
ployment). Between 1995 and 2008, the actual 
share of individuals living in jobless households 
decreased by 6.5 percentage points, while the ac-
tual share of individuals living in ‘full employment’ 
households increased by 24 percentage points. Be-
tween 2004 and 2008 ‘household full employment’ 
was the median situation in Spain. The dotted lines 
in Figure 15.2 show how the household distribu-
tion would have been, if all Spanish households 
would have consisted of 2 working-age adults and 
jobs would have been distributed randomly over 
households. Given the rise in individual employ-
ment rates, the decrease in household jobless-
ness would have been 11.2 percentage points and 
the increase in the ‘full employment households’ 
share would have been 21.8 percentage points. 
The spectacular increase in the share of individuals 
in ‘full employment households’ is in essence the 
mathematical corollary of the substantial rise in in-
dividual employment rates. However, the relatively 
Figure 15.2: Distribution of the population by household employment status, Spain, 1995‑2012, 
EU‑LFS
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small decrease in household joblessness is only in 
part explainable as ‘expected’ given the pooling of 
unemployment risks in households. The gap be-
tween the actual decline of household joblessness 
(6.5 percentage points) and the decline that would 
have been expected if jobs were distributed ran-
domly over 2-adult households (11.2 percentage 
points) calls for substantial, additional explanations. 
This brings us to household size structure and ‘po-
larisation’. Before 2005 the actual share of Spanish 
individuals living in jobless households was lower 
than what one would expect if jobs would be dis-
tributed randomly. This is rather exceptional in the 
EU. Specific individual joblessness rates can be con-
sistent with a range of different household jobless-
ness rates, depending on how employment is dis-
tributed. Since 2005 actual household joblessness 
grows faster than expected household joblessness, 
causing positive and growing levels of polarisation.
15.2.2 The concept of polarisation
Based on the binary distinction between jobless 
households and other households we construct 
and decompose a polarisation index. Later (in Sec-
tion 15.3.2), we integrate this measure in the de-
composition of income poverty rates (using the EU 
‘at-risk-of-poverty’ concept; see Chapter 3 in this 
volume for a definition of the relative approach to 
income poverty used at EU level).
Gregg and Wadsworth, op. cit., propose a coun-
terfactual to evaluate polarisation in the distribu-
tion of employment. Like the benchmark used in 
the Lorenz curve, the counterfactual or predicted 
household joblessness rate is the one that would 
occur if jobs were randomly distributed in the pop-
ulation, given the specific household size structure 
in a country. Polarisation is defined as the difference 
between the actual and the predicted household 
joblessness rate. So it measures the extent to which 
there are more (or fewer) jobless households than 
predicted in the case of a random distribution of 
employment across individuals, given the national 
household size structure.
All other things being equal, the probability of hav-
ing no-one in work is higher in a smaller household 
than in a larger one. Consequentially, if the share 
of smaller households increases, a given rate of 
individual joblessness may be expected to lead 
to higher household joblessness. In what follows, 
households are distinguished on the basis of size 
only. Hence, in this analysis, the ‘predicted rate’ of 
household joblessness is a function of (i) the rate 
of individual joblessness and (ii) the structure of 
households in terms of size:
(1) 
e
it ititP  =jl    - jl , where
itP   is the level of polarisation in household jobless-
ness in country i in year t
itjl   is the actual share of individuals living in house-
hold joblessness
itjl  
e
 is the expected share of individuals living in 
household joblessness in country i in year t.
We should emphasise that the expression ‘polari-
sation’ does not carry a normative meaning for us. 
We do not consider the benchmark used to define 
the concept — a random distribution of jobs over 
households, given the household size structure — 
as a normative ideal. However, in a context of lim-
ited job opportunities ‘positive polarisation’ might 
be seen as a kind of ‘Matthew effect’. It reflects 
a concentration of additional advantage (say, a sec-
ond job for the partner of someone who is already 
employed) for those who already have some ad-
vantage (compared with a household where both 
partners are jobless). ‘Negative polarisation’ might 
be appreciated as a form of solidarity, i.e. a fair 
distribution of scarce employment opportunities. 
However, we do not suggest that either ‘negative 
polarisation’, or the benchmark of ‘randomly dis-
tributed jobs’ serve a normative ideal.
15.2.3 Trends in the distribution 
of individual employment over 
households
In Figure 15.3, actual (X) and predicted (Y) house-
hold joblessness rates are presented.
If employment is randomly distributed, then the 
predicted and actual household joblessness rates 
are identical. So, the level of polarisation is zero 
and the country estimates appear on the diagonal. 
Countries above the diagonal encounter negative 
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polarisation and those under the diagonal positive 
polarisation. The distance to the diagonal reflects 
the magnitude of the cardinal measure of polarisa-
tion. At the start of the sample period, all Southern 
European countries (most saliently Spain) as well 
as Luxembourg had negative polarisation rates. 
Negative polarisation of work is consistent with 
theories of the gender division of non-work (Dan-
ziger and Katz, 1996) and added worker theories 
(Cullen and Gruber, 2000). All other old Member 
States exhibited limited positive polarisation, with 
only the UK displaying strong positive polarisa-
tion. In all countries, with exception of the United 
Kingdom, polarisation became more positive over 
time, meaning that the distribution of employment 
grew more unequal. The United Kingdom, Belgium 
and Ireland display the highest levels of polarisa-
tion, with household joblessness respectively 3.27, 
3.87 and 4.12 points higher than would be the case 
if work were evenly distributed across households. 
Southern European countries and Ireland encoun-
ter increasing household joblessness rates in com-
bination with increasing levels of polarisation.
Why should changes occur in the level of polarisa-
tion? At any point in time, the observed household 
joblessness rate diverges from the predicted rate if, 
within certain household size subgroups, the rate of 
household joblessness is higher or lower than what 
one would expect on the basis of a random distri-
bution. Over time, these divergences can decrease 
or increase in one or more household subgroups. 
This type of change is referred to as ‘within-house-
hold polarisation’. There may also be a structural 
shift towards household subgroups where polar-
isation is relatively higher, without change in the 
subgroup degree of polarisation itself. This is re-
ferred to as ‘between-household polarisation’.
Combining this insight with earlier assertions 
about the determinants of ‘predicted household 
employment rates’, the observed changes in the 
actual household joblessness rate can be decom-
Figure 15.3: Actual (X) and predicted (Y) household joblessness, 1995 and 2012, EU‑LFS
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posed into four terms: (i) changes in the individual 
non-employment rate that affect the predicted rate; 
(ii) changes in the household size structure that af-
fect the predicted rate; (iii) within-household po-
larisation and (iv) between-household polarisation. 
Such a shift-share analysis is presented in Table 15.1. 
The decomposition has the following form (from 
Gregg and Wadsworth, 2008):
(2) 
i∆ jl = + +(i)
+(ii)
+(iii)
(iv)
∑ ∆n [0.5pi 0.5pi ]Кκ = 1 κ, t+1κ, t
κ
]κ +∑ ∆pi [0.5n 0.5nКκ = 1 t
κ
t+1κ
+- 0.5( jl - n )t
κ
t+1κ κ
κ ]n   )∑ ∆pi [0.5( jlКκ = 1 κ
+ 0.5pi ]κ, t+1κ, tκ
κ∑ ∆ ( jl - n )[0.5piКκ = 1
with
n  = individual non-employment rate of work-
ing-age adults
k  = household size (number of working age adults)
K  = maximal size of households in a country
π
k
 = share of working-age adults living in a house-
hold with size k
jl
k
 = observed household joblessness rate of work-
ing-age adults in households with size k.
The first and the second term in the decomposi-
tion add up to changes in the ‘predicted’ rate of 
household joblessness jle. The third and fourth 
term determine total changes in polarisation.
Over the period 1995-2012, household joblessness 
should have fallen in almost all countries (except 
for Portugal and Greece), given the rising individ-
ual employment rates in each country (column 3). 
Changes towards smaller household structures ex-
ert upward pressure on household joblessness rates 
(column 4). The impact of changing household 
structures on the predicted household joblessness 
is much smaller than the influence of declining in-
dividual joblessness. But, in the United Kingdom 
and Spain more than half of the expected decrease 
in household joblessness due to decreasing indi-
vidual joblessness is offset by the emerging share 
Table 15.1: Decomposition of changes in household joblessness rate for 11 EU countries, 1995‑
2012, EU‑LFS
(percentage points)
actual 
change
total 
predicted 
change
of which: predicted 
change (unconditional) total 
polarisation 
change
of which: polarisation
due to ∆ 
non‑employ‑
ment
due to ∆ 
household 
shares
between 
households
within 
households
Netherlands -3.5 -4.5 -5.3 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6
United 
Kingdom -2.1 -0.7 -1.4 0.7 -1.5 0.4 -1.8
Belgium -1.3 -2.5 -3.7 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.7
Italy -0.8 -2.5 -4.3 1.9 1.7 -0.3 1.9
France -0.7 -1.6 -2.8 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.7
Austria -0.2 -1.5 -2.6 1.1 1.3 0.2 1.1
Luxembourg -0.2 -3.0 -5.5 2.5 2.8 0.1 2.7
Ireland 1.9 -0.8 -1.8 1.0 2.7 0.1 2.6
Spain 2.0 -2.0 -4.2 2.2 4.0 -0.4 4.5
Portugal 3.1 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.6
Greece 6.7 4.2 3.1 1.1 2.5 0.3 2.2
NB: EU-11 countries are EU-15 countries minus Denmark, Germany, Finland and Sweden. Countries are presented in increasing order of actual 
changes in household joblessness.
Reading note: Actual change  = total predicted change + total polarisation change (column 1  = column 2 + column 5); Total predicted change  = 
change due to changes in non-employment rate + change due to changes in household shares (column 2  = column 3 + column 4); Total 
polarisation change  = between-household polarisation + within-household polarisation (column 5  = column 6 + column 7).
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-LFS UDB 1995 and 2012.
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of singles. In most countries, the contribution of 
polarisation to the change in the jobless household 
rate is larger than the household structure compo-
nent. This means that most of the divergence be-
tween household and individual joblessness stems 
from an increasingly skewed distribution of em-
ployment across households. In Ireland and Spain, 
changes in household size structure and changing 
levels in polarisation entirely offset (small) improve-
ments in individual employment rates. So despite 
better outcomes at the individual level, outcomes 
at the household level deteriorated. Most polarisa-
tion is within household types. Only in the United 
Kingdom changes in polarisation are negative over 
time, due to more equally distributed employment 
within households and notwithstanding the grow-
ing share of household types already undergoing 
high polarisation.
Table 15.2 provides an overview of the results of 
the decomposition for a shorter period. Restriction 
of the period under consideration to 2000-2012 
allows an increase of the number of countries to 
23 (the EU-28 minus Denmark, Croatia, Malta, Fin-
land and Sweden). Between 2000 and 2012 indi-
vidual non-employment decreased in most coun-
tries, except for those where economic downturn 
hit strongest, i.e. Southern European countries 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) and Ireland 
and Romania. However, in all countries except 
Latvia and Romania, diminishing average house-
hold size reduced the impact of the decreasing 
non-employment rates on household jobless rates. 
Polarisation of jobs over households had a diver-
gent impact. In the United Kingdom and most of 
the new Member States (except Cyprus, Lithuania 
and Romania), changes in observed household 
joblessness are larger than predicted changes be-
cause changes in polarisation have the same sign. 
In old European countries (and most strongly in 
Southern European countries) predicted changes 
in household joblessness are offset by changes in 
polarisation. Combinations of the different trends 
of the components in this decomposition of actual 
changes in household joblessness offer five emerg-
ing clusters of countries for the period 2000-2012 as 
shown in Table 15.2.
15.2.4 Has the distribution of jobs 
become more unequal over time?
In the 11 countries examined we observe an upward 
convergence of the levels of polarisation. The pattern 
is one of both beta-convergence (a catch-up pro-
cess) and sigma-convergence (a reduction in the dis-
persion of values). In 1995, the average value of the 
polarisation index was 0.40, with a particularly large 
positive value in the United Kingdom and negative 
values in Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and Greece (see 
Figure 15.4). By 2012 the average value of the po-
larisation index increased to 1.96 (135). In the United 
Kingdom, positive polarisation diminished. In Lux-
embourg and Italy, negative polarisation character-
ising the beginning of the period was reduced close 
to zero. Spain, Greece and Ireland are confronted 
with steep increases in the level of polarisation, with 
most substantial changes in the period 2008-2012. 
Ireland and Belgium end up with the highest levels 
of positive polarisation in 2012. For all 11 EU coun-
tries considered in this analysis (hereafter EU-11) we 
observe a consistent, upward trend in polarisation, 
without a fundamental shift in patterns around 2008 
(see also Duyver, 2013).
(135) Beta-convergence is identified by a negative correlation of 
-0.83 between the initial values in 1995 and the changes 
over the period 1995-2012; sigma-convergence is identified 
by the standard deviation decreasing from 2.16 to 1.26. The 
sigma-convergence is quite sensitive to outliers, unlike the 
beta-convergence. Omission of the UK reduces the decline 
of standard deviation from -0.86 to -0.50; it also reduces the 
negative correlation from -0.82 to -0.67.
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Table 15.2: Decomposition of changes in household joblessness rate, 2000‑2012, EU‑23, EU‑LFS
(percentage points)
 actual change
total 
predicted 
change
of which: predicted 
change (unconditional) total 
polarisation 
change
of which: polarisation
due to ∆ 
non‑employ‑
ment
due to ∆ 
household 
shares
between 
households
within 
households
Slovakia -2.18 -0.63 -1.89 1.26 -1.55 0.23 -1.78
Czech Republic -1.42 -0.33 -1.41 1.08 -1.09 0.32 -1.40
Hungary -2.09 -0.88 -1.04 0.17 -1.21 0.06 -1.28
Latvia -3.71 -2.69 -1.66 -1.04 -1.02 -0.01 -1.01
Bulgaria -1.81 -1.02 -3.67 2.66 -0.79 0.16 -0.95
Estonia -0.59 -0.12 -1.77 1.64 -0.47 0.37 -0.84
Poland -3.95 -3.29 -4.07 0.78 -0.66 0.16 -0.83
Germany -1.95 -2.18 -2.86 0.68 0.24 0.15 0.08
France -0.52 -0.97 -1.88 0.90 0.45 0.18 0.27
Austria -1.55 -2.14 -2.63 0.49 0.59 0.11 0.47
Netherlands -0.33 -1.06 -1.47 0.41 0.73 0.19 0.54
Luxembourg -0.36 -1.93 -2.71 0.78 1.57 -0.08 1.65
Slovenia -0.29 0.43 -0.25 0.68 -0.72 0.30 -1.03
United Kingdom -0.28 0.44 0.16 0.29 -0.73 0.16 -0.89
Belgium 0.05 -0.45 -1.10 0.65 0.50 0.29 0.21
Italy 0.16 -1.18 -2.97 1.79 1.34 -0.46 1.80
Romania 1.54 1.52 1.94 -0.42 0.02 0.15 -0.13
Cyprus 1.55 0.52 0.10 0.41 1.03 0.26 0.77
Lithuania 3.18 0.83 -1.73 2.56 2.35 0.52 1.83
Portugal 4.82 4.04 2.99 1.05 0.78 0.27 0.52
Spain 7.46 3.72 1.91 1.80 3.75 -0.48 4.23
Greece 7.63 5.80 4.40 1.40 1.82 0.00 1.82
Ireland 7.74 4.75 3.92 0.83 2.99 0.03 2.96
NB: EU-23 countries are EU-28 countries minus Denmark, Croatia, Malta, Finland and Sweden. Countries are presented in clusters with similar 
decomposition terms.
Reading note: Actual change  = total predicted change + total polarisation change (column 1  = column 2 + column 5); Total predicted change  = 
change due to changes in non-employment rate + change due to changes in household shares (column 2  = column 3 + column 4); Total 
polarisation change  = between-household polarisation + within-household polarisation (column 5  = column 6 + column 7).
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-LFS UDB 2000 and 2012.
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Figure 15.4: Level of polarisation (P), 1995‑2000‑2008‑2012, EU‑24, EU‑LFS
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NB: Countries are presented in increasing order of levels of polarisation in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States clusters. ‘New’ Member States are those 
countries that joined the EU in May 2004 or after.
Reading note: In this figure we present levels of polarisation for ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States for 4 different years. EU-24 countries are EU-28 
countries minus Denmark, Croatia, Finland and Sweden.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-LFS UDB 1995, 2000, 2008 and 2012.
If one restricts the period under consideration to 
2000-2012, the number of countries can be in-
creased to 24 (the EU-28 minus Denmark, Croatia, 
Finland and Sweden). Between 2000 and 2008, one 
again observes beta and (albeit less robustly) sig-
ma-convergence, both for the group of 24 EU Mem-
ber States and for the 11 for which data availability 
stretches back to 1995 (136). There is no real upward 
convergence in the levels of polarisation across the 
24 EU Members: the average value of the polarisa-
tion index for the group under review increased 
(136) The beta-convergence is more robust than the 
sigma-convergence when eliminating outliers. The negative 
correlation between starting values for P, signalling 
beta-convergence, is -0.56 for the EU-24 and -0.53 for the EU-11.
from 1.62 in 2000 (with a standard deviation of 
1.76) to 1.95 (with a standard deviation of 1.17). In 
the smaller group of 11 countries for which data are 
available from 1995 onwards, the upward move-
ment is more evident: in 2000 the average value 
of the polarisation index for these Member States 
was 0.73 (standard deviation 1.88) increasing to 1.98 
(standard deviation 1.26) by 2012. This trend seems 
to have been driven mainly by the declining size of 
households and the rising female participation in 
the labour markets of Spain, Italy and Greece. The 
ten new Member States under examination were 
characterised by high levels of polarisation in 2000 
(with an average polarisation index of 2.72); in this 
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respect their starting position in the beginning of 
the Lisbon era was very different from that of Spain, 
Italy and Greece, which were still characterised by 
negative polarisation in 2000 with extended fami-
lies still pooling unemployment risks.
The choice of the first year of this shorter peri-
od, 2000, is dictated primarily by data availability. 
However, it appears that 2000 is a useful cut-off in 
describing the evolution of polarisation for some 
countries. For instance, in Spain and Ireland, the 
increase in polarisation accelerated after 2000; in 
Belgium, and to a lesser extent France, the year 
2000 marked the beginning of a deceleration or 
even a standstill in polarisation. Hence, if one takes 
account of the timing, there appears to be no uni-
form pattern of evolutions across the EU, apart 
from the general trend of upward convergence. 
The difference in pace at which women entered 
the labour market offers part of the explanation.
A first approach to gaining an understanding of 
the underlying societal trends that affect polari-
sation consists in the construction of ‘conditional 
counterfactuals’. We construct a variety of counter-
factual household employment rates and allow in-
dividual employment rates to vary by gender, age 
and educational level of working-age household 
members. One can then compare the ‘uncondi-
tional polarisation’ index (the counterfactual being 
based on household size only) with various ‘condi-
tional polarisation’ indices (see Gregg et al., 2010). 
Subsequently one can calculate the share (as a per-
centage) of the absolute level of the unconditional 
polarisation index that is explained by gender, age, 
education, etc., or by combinations of those fac-
tors. Applying this approach shows that the level of 
polarisation is predominantly explained by gender. 
A second approach applies regression techniques. 
A simple regression for the EU-11 over 1995-2012 
shows that the changes in the ratio of female and 
male employment rates have a significant and sub-
stantial impact on changes in the unconditional 
polarisation index, while changes in the structure 
of educational attainment of the population seem 
to have no significant impact.
These findings reflect fundamental societal trends 
in Europe, some of which follow a clear pattern of 
convergence, whereas others — surprisingly — 
show no prima facie convergence at all. The ratio 
of female and male employment rates displays 
very strong beta and sigma-convergence in the 
EU-11 over these years. However, there is neither 
beta-convergence nor sigma-convergence with 
regard to the proportion of the population with 
post-secondary education (International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 5-6) in the 
EU-11 over this period (the correlation between 
starting values and change is actually positive, 
and the dispersion increases); with regard to the 
proportion of the population with lower than sec-
ondary education (ISCED levels 0-2), the correlation 
between starting values and change is mildly neg-
ative, but the dispersion is not reduced.
Other results show that ‘increased homogamy’ (in-
creased matching of couples on the basis of edu-
cation attainment of the partners) is not an explan-
atory factor for increasing polarisation since 1995, 
that is, there is no increasing gap between the de-
gree of homogamy one sees in reality in couples 
and the degree of homogamy one would expect if 
couples are formed at random.
15.3 Relationship between 
changes in labour markets 
and poverty risks
15.3.1 Relationship between 
poverty risk and employment 
rates
On a cross-country level, national rates of individ-
ual and household employment calculated on the 
basis of EU-SILC correlate in a different way with na-
tional poverty risks. Table 15.3 shows that both in-
dividual and household joblessness correlate posi-
tively with pre-transfer poverty (risk) rates over the 
entire period 2005-2012. The correlation is strongest 
when employment is measured at the household 
level. Looking at post-transfer poverty (risk) rates, 
individual joblessness correlates positively over the 
entire period, whilst household joblessness corre-
lates only positively from 2009 onwards. Here, the 
correlation is strongest at the individual level. As 
expected, household ‘full employment’ rates cor-
relate negatively both with pre- and post-transfer 
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poverty rates, but the correlation is substantially 
larger for post-transfer poverty rates.
Given our earlier assertion that one should study 
the link between employment and poverty 
through household employment, it may be rath-
er surprising that, levels of individual employment 
rates correlate negatively with post-transfer pov-
erty rates, whilst household joblessness rates show 
no correlation with post-transfer poverty rates 
during the ‘good economic years’. During the eco-
nomic downturn an increasing positive correlation 
emerges between household joblessness and 
post-transfer poverty rates. The stronger relation 
between household joblessness and post-transfer 
poverty during the economic downturn is entire-
ly caused by those countries that were confront-
ed with a strong unemployment crisis (causing 
increasing levels of pre-transfer poverty) and that 
lack a sufficient welfare state structure to reduce 
post-transfer poverty (137).
(137) Elimination of Southern European countries from the 
correlation matrix brings correlation between proportion 
of individuals living in jobless households and post-transfer 
poverty around zero, also during the period of economic 
downturn.
Different factors explain this prima facie counterin-
tuitive result (138). First, household joblessness cor-
relates positively with pre-transfer poverty, but the 
impact of household joblessness on post-transfer 
poverty is mitigated by social spending. Second, 
national pre-transfer and post-transfer pover-
ty rates are also influenced by the poverty rates 
prevailing in ‘non-jobless’ households, which car-
ry a large weight in the overall poverty record of 
many countries. Higher individual employment 
rates are associated with lower levels of pre-trans-
fer poverty among the ‘non-jobless’ households. 
The ‘non-jobless’ segment in a country enclos-
es two groups of individuals, i.e. those living in 
‘mixed employment’ households and those living 
in ‘full-employment’ households. When individu-
al employment improves, the relative proportion 
of ‘full employment’ households increases in the 
non-jobless segment (see also Section 15.2.1). Be-
(138) This observation contradicts an earlier result by the OECD 
(2001, pp. 59-61), that no significant correlations are found 
between aggregate employment rates and poverty measures. 
This result may have inspired Gregg and Wadsworth (2008), 
Dickens and Ellwood (2002) and Nickell (2004) to focus on 
household joblessness. The OECD’s result relates to a different 
sample of countries (European Community Household Survey 
(ECHP) countries and Canada and the USA), a different database 
(ECHP) and a different time than the correlations displayed in 
Table 15.3.
Table 15.3: Cross‑sectional correlations of post‑ and pre‑transfer poverty risk and individual and 
household concepts of employment, 2005‑2012, EU‑24, EU‑SILC
Correlations of post‑transfer 
poverty risk rates and …
… employment
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 ∆ 05‑12
… individual joblessness 0.58 0.51 0.48 0.40 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.46
… ‘jobless’ households 0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.48 0.56
… ‘mixed employment’ households 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.61 -0.20
… ‘full employment’ households -0.62 -0.53 -0.53 -0.48 -0.60 -0.62 -0.64 -0.70 -0.30
Correlations of pre‑transfer poverty 
risk rates and …
… employment
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 ∆ 05‑12
… individual joblessness 0.36 0.27 0.37 0.53 0.52 0.62 0.53 0.58 0.79
… ‘jobless’ households 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.89
… ‘mixed employment’ households -0.13 -0.15 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.14 -0.05
… ‘full employment’ households -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.28 -0.29 -0.40 -0.29 -0.39 -0.63
NB: EU-24 countries are EU-28 countries minus Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania. In mixed employment households working and 
non-working adults live together.
Reading note: In this table we show the relation between at-risk-of-poverty rates (both pre- and post-transfers) and employment rates (both at 
individual and household level). These correlations do not imply causality, nor significance; they merely serve to structure our data.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC UDB 2005 (version 5), 2006 (version 4), 2007 (version 6), 2008 (version 6), 2009 (version 2), 2010 (version 2), 
2011 (version 2) and 2012 (version 2).
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cause individuals in ‘full employment’ households 
have lower poverty risks compared to individu-
als living in ‘mixed employment’ households, the 
pre-transfer poverty of the non-jobless segment 
decreases with improving individual employment 
rates. Hence, higher individual employment rates 
reduce pre-transfer poverty rates both because of 
their impact on household joblessness (individual 
and household employment correlate with each 
other) and because of their impact on pre-transfer 
poverty among the ‘non-jobless’ segment. Finally, 
higher individual employment rates are associated 
with higher levels of spending on working-age cash 
benefits. Higher levels of spending are associated 
with a larger extent of poverty reduction through 
social transfers, both within the jobless and the 
non-jobless segment of the population. Together, 
all these elements explain why in a cross-country 
comparison post-transfer poverty correlates with 
individual joblessness but not (or to a smaller ex-
tent) with household joblessness.
With regard to changes in at-risk-of-poverty rates 
between 2005 and 2012, both individual and house-
hold joblessness correlate positively with changes 
in poverty rates, as can be inferred from Table 15.3 
(a correlation coefficient of 0.46 for changes in in-
dividual joblessness and 0.56 for changes in house-
hold joblessness). These macro-level correlations 
ask for more in depth analysis. In the next section 
we apply a decomposition analysis to disentangle 
the relation between changes in employment and 
changes in poverty for EU-28 countries separately.
15.3.2 Integrated decomposition 
of labour market trends and 
poverty risk changes
In Section 15.2.4 we described an ‘upward conver-
gence in polarisation’ with regard to the distribu-
tion of jobs over households. This ‘upward conver-
gence’ had a substantial impact on the evolution of 
household joblessness, certainly in relative terms. 
The question now is whether polarisation is also 
an important factor in the analysis of poverty risk 
trends.
We examine this question by decomposing chang-
es in the poverty risk rates on the basis of (i) chang-
es in the poverty risks of jobless households, (ii) 
changes in the poverty risks of other (non-jobless) 
households, (iii) changes in household joblessness 
due to changes in individual employment rates 
and changing household structures and (iv) chang-
es in polarisation. We integrate the two missing 
links we explore in this chapter (the link between 
individual employment rates and the configura-
tion of household employment; the link between 
the configuration of household employment and 
poverty) into one single analysis. In principle, this 
would enable us to assess the impact of changes in 
individual employment rates on at-risk-of-poverty 
rates, all other things being equal, and the impact 
on at-risk-of-poverty rates of changes in polarisa-
tion, again all other things being equal. In practice, 
data challenges make such an integrated analysis 
not easy (139).
Formally, the second step in this integration ex-
ercise proceeds as follows. The at-risk-of-poverty 
rate can be written as a weighted average of the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate of individuals in jobless 
households and the at-risk-of-poverty rate of indi-
viduals in the non-jobless households. The poverty 
risk of individuals in jobless households (jl) is much 
higher than the poverty risk in other households 
(njl) in all EU Member States. Labelling these other 
households as the ‘non-jobless’ (the share of indi-
viduals in non-jobless households njl  = 1 – jl), we 
can write:
(3) it it it itit pov = jl pjl njl pnjl+  with
pjl
it
 = the at-risk-of-poverty rate for individu-
als in jobless households
pnjl
it
 = the at-risk-of-poverty rate for individu-
als in non-jobless households
Changes over time can be decomposed as:
(4) 
i i i i iii i  ∆ pov = + + −jlnjl ∆ pnjl ∆ pjl ∆ jl( pjl pnjl )  
with, for a change from t  = 0 to t  = 1,
(139) First, the differences between the moment of observation for 
employment (survey year) and for poverty (survey year — 1) 
may cause an unintended bias between both indicators. 
Second, as shown in Section 15.2.3, the changes in the index of 
polarisation are driven by changes in demographic, structural 
and cultural balances. Hence, this indicator only changes slowly 
over time. EU-SILC data series are rather short to incorporate 
substantial changes in levels of polarisation.
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i = −∆pov i1pov i0pov
i0 i1i = +0.5jl 0.5jljl  , etc.
In this way, the change in the overall poverty risk 
is decomposed into three subcomponents or con-
tributory factors:
• a contribution by the change in the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate of individuals in jobless 
households;
• a contribution by the change in the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate of individuals in 
non-jobless households;
• a contribution by the change in the share of the 
population living in jobless households.
This mechanical approach should be interpreted 
with due caution (see also de Beer, 2007). It simply 
calculates by how much a decomposable variable 
changes if one of the factors informing the decom-
position changes, all the other factors being equal. It 
is only an accounting device, which does not imply 
any causality. Moreover, changes in one subcom-
ponent may be intrinsically linked to changes in 
other subcomponents of the decomposition. For 
instance, reducing the share of people living in 
jobless households may be achieved by means of 
a deliberate policy of increasing the poverty risk of 
people in jobless households through stricter con-
ditionality and less generosity in unemployment 
benefits. Or increasing employment may push up 
the median income, to the effect that a decreas-
ing share of jobless households and higher pov-
erty rates go hand in hand. Conversely, jobless 
households may become non-jobless because 
their members accept jobs that are at the lower 
end of the pay scale, thus marginally increasing the 
average risk of poverty of the non-jobless group. 
Diverging evolutions in household size structure 
between the jobless and the non-jobless, imply-
ing changes in the relative median poverty risk 
gap (see Chapter 3 in this volume for definition) 
between the two categories, may also be at play. 
These examples do not invalidate the decomposi-
tion as such, but rather illustrate a general caveat 
concerning its interpretation.
Using equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), it is possible to 
integrate the decomposition of changes in house-
hold employment and changes in poverty on the 
basis of the following equation:
(5) 
i i i i i i
e
ii i  ∆pov = + + +−jlnjl ∆pnjl ∆pjl (∆jl ∆p )(pjl pnjl  )
This requires that the data used to decompose 
changes in individual and household employment 
and changes in poverty are consistent. Since we 
have to rely on EU-SILC to establish a link between 
employment and income, it is only possible to 
pursue this integrated decomposition from 2005 
onwards. For some countries, there are considera-
ble differences between individual and household 
employment data obtained through EU-LFS and 
EU-SILC (also discussed in de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 
2011). Hence, circumspection is called for when 
connecting this analysis based on EU-SILC with the 
employment analyses presented in the previous 
sections based on EU-LFS. In order to allow some 
comparison on a conceptual level, in this section 
we apply the same ILO definition of joblessness (as 
defined in Section 15.2) and the same age refer-
ence group as in the EU-LFS analysis, even though 
EU-SILC makes it possible to define joblessness on 
a retrospective basis for the 12 months prior to the 
survey.
Figure 15.5 summarises the integrated decompo-
sition of changes in household joblessness and 
poverty risks over the period 2005-2012. The un-
derlying estimates (with statistical significance of 
the decomposed changes) and a further division in 
two periods before and after the economic down-
turn are presented in Table 15.4.
The poverty record of EU Member States during 
the period 2005-2012 is decomposable in quite 
different trajectories, which seem in part linked to 
different policy trajectories and in part related with 
the effects of the economic downturn.
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Figure 15.5: Decomposition of changes in poverty risks, 2005‑2012, EU‑24, EU‑SILC
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NB: EU-24 countries are EU-28 countries minus Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania. Countries are presented as in Table 15.4.
Reading note: This figure summarises the integrated decomposition of changes in household joblessness and poverty risks over the period 2005-
2012. This decomposition exercise is not a causal analysis. It simply calculates by how much at-risk-of-poverty rates change if one of the factors 
informing the decomposition (level of polarisation, individual employment rate, household size structure, poverty rate of jobless households, 
poverty rate of non-jobless households) changes, all the other factors being equal.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC UDB 2005 (version 5) and 2012 (version 2).
Southern European welfare states (but also Den-
mark and Slovenia) are confronted with increasing 
household joblessness rates. Individual joblessness 
rose sharply after 2008 and improvements in indi-
vidual employment prior to 2008 are entirely offset. 
The rise in household joblessness is also partly driv-
en by growing levels of polarisation over the en-
tire period. Also decreases in poverty rates within 
jobless and non-jobless households prior to 2008 
are wiped out by substantial increases in subgroup 
poverty risks after 2008. Over the period 2005-2008 
all separate components increased translating in 
growing overall at-risk-of-poverty rates. In conti‑
nental welfare states household joblessness did not 
change over time. Despite (limited) growing levels 
of polarisation (not affected by the economic crisis) 
the net change in individual joblessness is negative 
(but also small). Decreases in individual jobless-
ness prior to the crisis are only marginally affected 
by (some) small increases during the economic 
downturn. However, both before and after 2008, 
poverty grew in jobless and non-jobless house-
holds. These subgroup increases in poverty risks 
also drive country level increases in poverty, most 
explicitly in Germany (140) and Sweden. In Belgium, 
the relative contribution of increasing poverty in 
the jobless household segment to overall changes 
is the largest. Ireland (and to a certain extent also 
Lithuania) are confronted with huge challenges 
in their labour markets. Prior to the crisis they re-
(140) We have doubts concerning the quality of the German EU-SILC 
data, which yield a picture that is very different from that 
provided by the German SOEP data for crucial components of 
this analysis. (See also Frick and Krell, 2010.)
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corded decreasing individual joblessness and de-
creasing poverty rates, but after 2008 both levels 
of polarisation and unemployment increased. But 
contrary to Southern European countries, increas-
ing household joblessness is offset by the strong 
generosity of social protection. Decreasing poverty 
risks of both jobless and non-jobless households 
counterbalanced changes in the labour market 
and translated in fairly stable poverty records over 
the entire period under study. However, decreasing 
poverty rates in the jobless subgroup stem mainly 
from the period before 2008. In most of the new 
Member States (notably Hungary, Estonia, Cyprus 
and Latvia) economic growth in the period before 
2008 led to substantial increases in individual em-
ployment rates and decreases in household job-
lessness (helped by decreasing polarisation, except 
in Estonia and Latvia). This contributed to signifi-
cant improvements in overall poverty risks in the 
20-to-59 age cohort. After 2008, these effects have 
eroded due to increasing individual joblessness. 
Moreover, poverty risks for the elderly increased 
in these countries, sometimes very substantially. 
So, their trajectory is not only employment and 
growth-based, but also shows an intergenerational 
shift. In other new Member States (Poland, Slovakia 
and Czech Republic, but also in the Netherlands) 
decreasing levels of polarisation translated in de-
creasing household joblessness. Together with 
decreasing at-risk-of-poverty in non-jobless house-
holds, overall poverty rates decreased significantly 
over the entire period 2005-2012.
On the basis of this analysis, we can begin to verify 
one of the hypotheses put forward in Vandenbro-
ucke and Vleminckx (2011) and Cantillon (2011) to 
explain the disappointing poverty trends in the EU. 
They state that this disappointing outcome is partly 
attributable to a failure to reduce the number of 
individuals living in jobless households, despite 
increasing individual employment rates. We find 
that differences among EU Member States in levels 
of polarisation and household size do play a role 
in explaining the diversity of configurations of in-
dividual employment, household employment 
and at-risk-of-poverty rates. But, in a rather short 
time frame, one may conclude that the impact of 
changes in employment polarisation in explaining 
changes in poverty rates was very limited and dis-
parate. In some countries the factor of polarisation 
as such added slightly to the decline in poverty 
realised over the given period (Poland, the Nether-
lands, Czech Republic and Slovakia). In others, most 
notably Spain, Greece and Ireland polarisation de-
teriorated an already very challenging situation of 
increasing poverty due to rising unemployment 
and eroding protection of the jobless households. 
Also in Germany, polarisation apparently added to 
growing poverty (but important doubts exist con-
cerning the German EU-SILC figures).
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15.4 Conclusions
The configuration of individual employment rates 
and household employment rates proves to be 
relevant for differentiating EU welfare states. In this 
chapter, we used a binary concept to structure data 
on household employment, i.e. ‘household jobless-
ness’ based on an ILO definition of employment. 
This measure allows a decomposition on the basis 
of evolutions in individual joblessness, household 
size structure, and polarisation between and with-
in households. The configuration of individual and 
household employment is driven by forces of mod-
ernisation that affect all European welfare states in 
the same direction, such as declining household 
size, feminisation of labour markets and increasing 
proportions of tertiary educated individuals. Nev-
ertheless, the configuration remains very different 
from country to country. Further research is neces-
sary to understand these cross-country differences 
(see Corluy and Vandenbroucke, 2015, for a more 
thorough analysis of the Belgian case, both from 
a cross-country and an intertemporal perspective).
At the start of the Lisbon era, the individual/house-
hold employment configuration was rather differ-
ent in Spain, Greece and Italy from most other EU 
Member States, including new Member States. The 
level of polarisation was negative in Spain, Greece 
and Italy — a corollary of the pooling of non-em-
ployment risks in extended families — and became 
gradually less negative evolving towards positive 
polarisation at the end of the period studied in this 
chapter. Until 2008, their welfare states were still in 
a process of taking over from familial solidarity, but 
after 2008 losses in individual employment trans-
lated in stronger increases in household jobless-
ness (especially in Spain and Greece). In all EU-11 
Member States (no household data are available 
for Scandinavian countries) we observe a consist-
ent, upward trend in polarisation of employment. 
The pattern in the new Member States after 2000 
was very different. Gains in individual employment 
rates were enhanced by decreasing polarisation of 
jobs over households, i.e. by a more even distribu-
tion of jobs over households, thus additionally de-
creasing welfare state dependency. Experience in 
the United Kingdom suggests that the prevalence 
of jobless households, and thus the extent of ‘pos-
itive’ polarisation, can be influenced by policy: the 
drive to diminish the number of jobless lone par-
ents during the New Labour government was both 
influenced by analyses on polarisation in the British 
labour market, and contributed to its reduction.
However, changes in the share of jobless house-
holds cannot explain very much of the diversity 
in the changes in national at-risk-of-poverty rates, 
both during the period of economic upswing and 
the downturn. Or, to put it differently, it would be 
incorrect to attribute disappointing poverty trends 
during the employment boom years solely to the 
modest conversion of individual employment suc-
cesses in household employment successes, or 
more specifically to ongoing polarisation of jobs 
over households. But that does not reduce the im-
portance that national and EU policymakers should 
attach to the presence of high numbers of jobless 
households and polarisation, as possibly prob-
lematic conditions for welfare states. The multidi-
mensional Europe 2020 social inclusion target (see 
Chapters 1 and 3 of this volume), which includes 
the reduction of people living in (quasi-)jobless 
households, may find a justification here.
The decomposition of changes in poverty risks on 
the basis of ‘household joblessness’ suggests that 
the convergence in at-risk-of-poverty rates is the 
combined result of different evolutions. A number 
of countries recorded an overall poverty standstill, 
mainly because of opposite evolutions in overall 
poverty (and within household subgroups) before 
and after 2008. Some countries with historically 
low poverty rates (such as Sweden and Germany) 
followed a clearly inegalitarian trajectory (with in-
creasing poverty rates among jobless households 
over the entire period 2005-2012). In contrast, An-
glo-Saxon Member States successfully managed to 
reduce poverty during the economic upswing and 
kept poverty records more or less constant during 
the economic downturn, yet with a different policy 
emphasis in the United Kingdom (successful activa-
tion) and Ireland (much enhanced social protection 
generosity). Finally, Southern European Member 
States struggle with increasing at-risk-of-poverty 
rates, as a result of an unemployment crisis com-
bined with less intra-family protection leading to 
increasing levels of polarisation and eroding pro-
tection of jobless households.
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Economic and socio-demographic convergence 
was a dominant background condition, but the 
policy trajectories with regard to public social 
spending on working-age benefits (including child 
benefits) were quite different. These conclusions 
point simultaneously to the need to refuel eco-
nomic convergence in the EU, to allow the new 
Member States to reconnect on a sound basis with 
the ‘good years’ in terms of growth and employ-
ment creation, and to the necessary complemen-
tarity of employment creation and income poverty 
reduction through social transfers and inclusive 
labour market policies.
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16.1 Introduction
Fighting poverty and social exclusion is one of the 
headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. With-
in this framework, the key indicator is a measure 
of the size of the population ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or- 
social-exclusion’ (AROPE), i.e. the number of people 
living in households which are at risk of monetary 
poverty (AROP) and/or facing severe material dep-
rivation (SMD) and/or ‘(quasi-)jobless’. (See Chapters 
1 and 3 in this volume for a definition of the three 
AROPE component indicators.) The rationale for us-
ing several indicators of poverty and social exclu-
sion generally refers to poverty/social exclusion as 
a multifaceted or multidimensional phenomenon 
that cannot be captured by a single indicator. The 
novelty with the Europe 2020 AROPE indicator is to 
refer to an integrated measure combining several 
indicators. Among the three indicators combined 
in the AROPE measure, poverty risk and MD have 
been investigated at length, as well as their associ-
ation. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
advantages and disadvantages of the third indica-
tor of (quasi-)joblessness (hereafter ‘QJ-ness’) and 
to assess its contribution to the AROPE measure.
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QJ-ness refers to households with very low work 
intensity, i.e. where there is no (or almost no) em-
ployment. The QJ measure is a headcount of people 
living in these households — actually, not all peo-
ple living in these households: only those less than 
60 years old. Precisely, QJ people are ‘people of all 
ages (from 0‑59 years) living in households where the 
adults (those aged 18‑59, but excluding students aged 
18‑24) worked less than 20 % of their total combined 
work‑time potential during the previous 12 months’. The 
household total potential (the denominator of the 
ratio of work intensity) is ‘the total number of months 
that could, in theory, have been worked by adults in the 
same household’. Worked months (the numerator of 
work intensity) are measured in terms of full-time 
equivalent: ‘For persons who declared having worked 
part‑time, an estimate of the number of months in 
terms of full time‑equivalent is computed on the basis 
of the number of usually worked hours at the time of the 
interview’ (142).
From the perspective of analysing the risk of pov-
erty and social exclusion, QJ-ness, assessed at 
household level, may be of interest for a number 
of reasons:
• employment is the main source of regular 
income of working-age individuals and 
households;
• even though not a guarantee (on account of 
in-work poverty), employment is a prevention/ 
protection against the risk of poverty;
(142) Definition from the European Commission (2011, p. 155). See 
also Eurostat website:
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.
php/Material_deprivation_and_low_work_intensity_statistics.
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• employment (or joblessness) assessed at the 
individual level only does not allow to account 
for employment polarisation, the concentration 
of jobs (or absence thereof ) in some households 
— a phenomenon manifested by an increase in 
the levels of employment at individual level and 
in the share of workless households) pointed 
out by Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) and Gregg 
et al. (2010) (see also Chapter 15 in this volume);
• joblessness may affect not only the jobless 
person, who is excluded from the labour 
market, but also the other members of his/her 
household: in addition to the whole household 
being affected by economic insecurity 
(including the fact that various social benefits — 
pensions, healthcare — are derived from 
being employed), a long-term lack of contact 
with the world of work in a household may 
be detrimental in terms of social participation, 
health, and children’s well-being (see e.g. 
Pedersen et al., 2005; Atkinson et al., 2002).
Including an indicator of QJ-ness in an integrat-
ed measure of poverty and social exclusion also 
puts ‘the emphasis on labour market participation 
as a way of achieving social inclusion’ (European 
Commission, 2012, p. 105), and in turn allows mak-
ing links between the EU social and employment 
strategies — the employment rate is one of the 
other Europe 2020 headline targets (143).
However, the meaning of the QJ indicator and its 
integration in the key indicator of the Europe 2020 
social inclusion target has also been subject to 
a range of criticisms.
Copeland and Daly (2012, p. 281) question the un-
derlying concept as ‘another one of those elastic terms 
which cover a range of potential “problems”’ and the 
functions it serves as an indicator. They highlight 
the character of compromise of the AROPE target, 
reflecting various positions of the Member States 
between ‘social’ and ‘activation’ concerns. They 
identify three positions: Member States in favour of 
a target in terms of income poverty (AROP) only, 
Member States advocating a strong social compo-
nent, and Member States favouring the inclusion 
of an employment dimension, including Member 
(143) See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-
in-a-nutshell/targets/index_en.htm.
States particularly concerned with the issue of ben-
efit dependency (on this, see also Frazer et al., 2014).
Other researchers have questioned the rationale for 
combining the measure of QJ-ness with the two 
other components of AROPE (Nolan and Whelan, 
2011; Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 2011; Maître et al., 2012, 
2013). They do not question the usefulness of QJ as 
an analytical dimension, but rather its relevance as 
a component of an integrated measure which al-
ready includes both monetary and non-monetary 
elements. Maître et al. (2013) argue that combining 
too many dimensions in a single indicator might 
lead to confusion — a recurring criticism of aggre-
gate indicators. QJ households compose a very het-
erogeneous social group, in which significant pro-
portions are neither at risk of poverty nor severely 
materially deprived, raising questions about the na-
ture of the social exclusion faced by this population. 
Graaf-Zijl and Nolan (2011) while recognising that 
household joblessness may be an important con-
tributory factor in poverty and MD, and that welfare 
dependence and the transmission of disadvantage 
are clearly of concern, warn that the AROPE measure 
might include households which ‘may not be a suita‑
ble focus for anti‑poverty policy, and may distract from 
those most in need’ (Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 2011, p. 35).
From a more technical perspective, Ward and 
Özdemir (2013) raise several issues relating to the 
definition and implementation of the indicator. 
Their primary concerns are twofold: (1) that the 
definition of work potential (the denominator of 
the indicator) excludes people older than 59 years; 
and (2) that the threshold for identifying house-
hold QJ-ness is set at 20 %. According to the Euro-
pean Commission, this threshold of 20 % reflects 
‘the fact that, below that level of work intensity, 
household members experience very high rates of 
poverty and material deprivation’ (European Com-
mission, 2012, p. 155). Ward and Özdemir advocate 
raising the threshold to 30 %, arguing that the risk 
of poverty in households where work intensity is 
between 20 % and 30 % may, in some countries, be 
as high as the risk in workless households. However, 
raising the threshold could result in increasing the 
heterogeneity of QJ and making its interpretation 
more difficult. Ward and Özdemir also note that the 
measurement of work intensity mixes information 
from the reference period (year N‑1 in most coun-
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tries) and the current situation at the time of inter-
view (year N). This may be particularly problematic 
for people with loose attachment to employment, 
or in times of instability, that is when the individu-
al’s situation at time N is most likely to be different 
from the situation 1 year previously.
In the light of these critical analyses, this chapter 
assesses QJ-ness on the basis of a descriptive ap-
proach. Section 16.2 examines the population af-
fected by QJ-ness as defined above, with the aim of 
identifying, across countries, a specific social group. 
Section 16.3 examines the evolution of QJ over 
time and its marginal contribution to the Europe 
2020 integrated measure of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (AROPE). Section 16.4 concludes. It under-
lines difficulties of interpretation of both people in 
QJ households as a social group and the contribu-
tion of QJ to AROPE. It also raises some conceptual 
and methodological issues which may account for 
these difficulties, and suggests some revisions.
16.2 A statistical overview 
of (quasi‑)joblessness
In 2012 (144), about 39 million people lived in QJ 
households in the EU-27. This represents about 8 % 
of the EU-27 population aged 0 to 59, with most 
countries standing between 5 % and 10 % (see Fig-
ure 16.1). The exceptions are Sweden (below 5 %) 
and, at the other end of the scale, Greece, Belgium, 
Spain and Ireland (all above 10 %, with Ireland an 
outlier at close to 20 %).
Note that the QJ measure includes only people 
aged 0-59 living in QJ households, differing from 
the two other components of AROPE (AROP and 
SMD) which take into account all people irrespec-
tive of their age. The rationale for setting an upper 
age limit appears conceptually inconsistent: why 
include children but exclude persons aged 60+ 
who live in the same households? The upper lim-
it also entails difficulties for the analysis of QJ-ness 
(144) 2012 is the year of the dataset, not the year of the reference 
period (the period over which very low work intensity is 
assessed). The reference period is the previous civil year for 
all countries except Ireland and United-Kingdom, where it is 
a moving period (the 12 months preceding the date of survey). 
Note that this may entail some problems of comparability.
at individual level, because it links the evolution of 
QJ-ness with ageing — making both cross-country 
comparisons and the interpretation of variations 
over time difficult. Counting all the people, regard-
less of their age, in QJ households would of course 
increase the measure (see Figure 16.1); the differ-
ence would be relatively small at EU level, negligible 
in a few countries (Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark), but significant in a few others where 
multi-generational households are more common 
(especially Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain).
We now examine QJ-ness in terms of household 
composition, employment and work potential, 
and its association with poverty risk and material 
deprivation.
16.2.1 Household composition
There is a great deal of cross-country variation in the 
composition of the QJ population by household 
type (see Table 16.1, part A). The percentage living 
in one-adult households without dependent chil-
dren (145) ranges from about 5 % (Bulgaria, Portugal) 
to almost 50 % (Denmark); the percentage living in 
single-parent households ranges from 4.5 % (Greece) 
to 34 % (United Kingdom); and the percentage living 
in households with three or more adults ranges from 
1 % (Denmark) to almost 50 % (Bulgaria). The differ-
ences in the shares living in two-adult households 
are less pronounced.
The overall percentage of the QJ population living in 
households with dependent children is rather high in 
general, especially in Bulgaria, Ireland, Hungary and 
the UK, where it is over 65 %. However, it is difficult 
to attribute this specifically to QJ-ness, because the 
population examined is distorted by the absence of 
people older than 59 years. It is therefore more in-
formative to consider indicators of concentration, i.e. 
the ratios of the percentage of each household type 
among people of QJ households to the percentage 
observed among the total population aged 0-59; 
a ratio greater than 1 indicates over- representation, 
i.e. a higher risk of living in a QJ household than on 
average. These results are presented in Table 16.1, 
part B, and show a striking over-representation, in all 
countries, of people living in one-adult households 
(145) Dependent children are defined as children aged below 18 or 
aged from 18 to 24 and not economically active. 
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Figure 16.1: Individuals living in QJ households, 2012
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Reading note: In the EU-27 in 2012, about 8 % of people aged 0-59, and about 10 % of the total population lived in a QJ household.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
(particularly in single-parent households). This relates 
directly to QJ being assessed at household level: in 
one-adult households, the likelihood that an adult’s 
absence of worked months will be counterbalanced 
by another adult’s worked months is nil. No general 
pattern emerges on the share of people living in other 
types of households.
The other striking feature of the structure by house-
hold composition is, in all countries, the under- 
representation of people in two-adult households 
with dependent children, and in most countries of 
people in households of any type with dependent 
children, except Bulgaria and United-Kingdom. Then 
the share of people in QJ households with depend-
ent children is quite high (especially in Ireland (146) 
and Hungary), but not higher (even smaller in a num-
ber of countries) to the average observed among 
people aged 0-59.
(146) This could account for the very high share of QJ-ness in this 
country as underlined in a report from the Irish National 
Economic and Social Council (2014).
16.2.2 Employment and work 
potential in QJ households
According to the definition, a QJ household is 
a household where, during the reference peri-
od, the total number of months of employment 
(measured in full-time equivalent (147)) is less than 
20 % of the household total work potential (basi-
(147) That is 1 month in part-time work is weighted less than 1, 
the coefficient depending on the number of hours relative 
to full-time. Note that EU-SILC provides the number of hours 
of work only for the current job — if any — at the time of 
interview but not for the months of work in the period of 
reference. So, the coefficient is measured for the number of 
hours observed at the time of interview, and applied to all the 
months of part-time work observed in the reference period. 
This mixing of information from the reference period (N‑1 in 
most countries) and from the time of interview (in N, i.e. the 
year after) makes the estimate of full-time equivalent, and 
in turn of work intensity, somewhat fragile. This affects of 
course particularly countries where the incidence of part-time 
employment is high. Beside these technical drawbacks, one 
may also wonder whether, conceptually, it is relevant to refer to 
work in terms of full-time equivalent to assess exclusion from 
employment.
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cally, 12 times the number of working age adults, 
excluding students, in the household). We now ex-
amine QJ households in the perspective of these 
two constituents of work intensity.
A first question is that of the respective shares of 
‘Q’ and ‘J’. In all countries, most QJ households — 
about 87 % in the EU-27 in 2012 — are completely 
jobless, meaning that no adult (aged less than 60) 
in these households has spent even a single month 
in employment during the reference period (see 
Figure 16.2).
These large shares of completely jobless households 
mean that across the QJ population as a whole, the 
share of worked months relative to households’ work 
potential is extremely small: 3 % on average in the 
EU (see Figure 16.3). In addition, large proportions of 
these worked months are worked part-time, espe-
cially in Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland and France. 
Combining the small share of worked month and 
work being measured in terms of full-time equiva-
lent, the value of work intensity is finally extremely 
low on average, well below the 20 % threshold in all 
countries.
Table 16.1: Individuals in QJ households by household type (%) and concentration of QJ‑ness, 2012
A. Household type (%) B. Concentration
1 adult 2 adults 3 + Total All 1 adult 2 adults 3 + All
no 
kids
with 
kids
no 
kids
with 
kids
with
kids
no 
kids
with 
kids
no 
kids
with 
kids
with
kids
Belgium 22.5 22.8 16.2 24.5 14.1 100 54.4 2.1 2.8 1.1 0.5 0.9 0.8
Bulgaria 5.8 9.0 13.4 22.3 49.7 100 70.4 1.9 2.7 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.1
Czech Republic 15.0 16.1 25.2 21.3 22.4 100 49.0 2.5 3.0 1.6 0.4 0.9 0.8
Denmark 50.9 18.1 17.9 11.9 1.3 100 30.3 2.7 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.5
Germany 40.5 17.6 18.1 15.7 8.1 100 36.4 2.6 2.5 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6
Estonia 22.4 10.8 20.7 26.6 19.5 100 44.6 2.2 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.9 0.7
Ireland 8.2 20.5 11.0 35.6 24.8 100 69.3 1.8 2.1 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.9
Greece 6.7 4.5 17.9 23.4 47.5 100 39.5 1.3 2.6 1.6 0.5 1.5 0.6
Spain 9.4 6.7 18.3 31.2 34.4 100 53.4 1.6 2.0 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.8
France 18.7 17.9 23.4 27.2 12.7 100 51.9 1.9 2.3 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.8
Italy 11.6 9.7 18.8 22.1 37.8 100 44.8 1.5 2.2 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.7
Cyprus 8.9 11.1 25.4 27.9 26.7 100 49.9 1.8 2.9 2.0 0.6 0.8 0.7
Latvia 16.1 11.7 19.7 25.3 27.2 100 49.4 2.5 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.8
Lithuania 20.5 16.8 20.0 20.6 22.2 100 48.0 2.8 2.2 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.7
Luxembourg 24.3 15.5 23.6 21.3 15.3 100 43.4 2.3 3.2 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.6
Hungary 8.8 10.0 17.5 32.9 30.9 100 65.4 1.9 2.2 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0
Malta 16.1 24.8 19.5 16.4 23.2 100 51.9 3.6 6.8 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.9
Netherlands 41.3 23.0 15.8 14.8 5.1 100 39.7 3.2 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.6
Austria 29.4 11.6 21.4 22.3 15.4 100 39.0 2.6 2.3 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
Poland 15.3 8.0 26.1 17.3 33.5 100 44.0 3.9 3.1 2.2 0.5 0.7 0.6
Portugal 5.4 11.3 24.7 23.0 35.5 100 49.4 1.7 2.2 2.0 0.5 1.0 0.7
Romania 11.3 4.0 28.9 21.2 34.7 100 46.9 3.4 1.9 2.4 0.5 0.8 0.7
Slovenia 23.9 9.4 31.0 17.0 18.6 100 32.5 3.5 1.9 2.8 0.3 0.7 0.5
Slovakia 13.9 5.8 16.6 22.6 41.2 100 51.8 3.5 2.1 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.8
Finland 37.4 13.7 22.1 21.5 5.3 100 35.7 2.7 2.1 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.6
Sweden 33.4 23.3 13.9 24.8 4.7 100 50.8 2.7 2.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8
United Kingdom 15.8 34.1 12.1 24.2 13.7 100 65.5 2.0 3.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.1
NB: ‘Kid’ is used here for brevity and refers to dependent children.
Reading note: In Belgium, 22.5 % of people aged 0-59 living in QJ households live in a single-adult household without children; this is 2.1 times as 
high as on average among people aged 0-59.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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Figure 16.3: Worked months and work intensity in QJ households, 2012
(in % of households’ work potential)
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NB: Countries ordered by level of work intensity. Worked months are measured as a percentage of the household work potential.
Reading note: The share of worked months in the total work potential of QJ households is about 3 % on average in the EU, with months of 
full-time work representing about 0.8 % and months in part-time work about 2.2 %. The level of work intensity is around 1.5 %.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
Figure 16.2: Share of jobless households among QJ households, 2012
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NB: Countries ordered by share of jobless households.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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The next question relates to the composition of 
the other months, i.e. the ‘unused’ work potential 
of QJ households. A first striking fact is the relatively 
small share of unemployment: in most countries, it 
represents under half of the available (not worked) 
months and less than 25 % in Romania, Denmark, 
United-Kingdom and Malta (see Figure 16.4). There 
are wide variations between countries in the dis-
tribution of all the other statuses: for instance, the 
share of months reported as housework/care is es-
pecially large in Malta, especially small in Denmark 
and Finland, and also very small in a number of 
other countries. For months of disability, the share 
seems rather large in many countries considering 
that the household work potential is measured 
over a relatively young population (i.e. aged less 
than 60); the share is particularly large in the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia and Hungary.
The analysis of the unused work potential shows 
significant shares of months spent in education 
(especially large in Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Finland) and months of retirement (especially large 
in Romania, Slovenia, Austria). Students are techni-
cally identified by their status at the time of inter-
view, which may differ from their activity during 
the reference period, resulting in mismatches (see 
Ward and Özdemir, 2013). As for people aged 60+, 
the exclusion based on an age threshold leaves 
those aged less than 60 but already retired (or with 
months of retirement during the reference period) 
included in the household work potential. These 
‘false’ available months result in over-estimating 
the household work potential and under-estimat-
ing household work intensity; since not all coun-
tries are equally affected, it reduces both the com-
parability and interpretation of QJ-ness at EU level.
Figure 16.4: Composition of QJ households’ unused work potential, 2012
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work are not reliable in this version of the UDB.
Reading note: In the EU-27, the months spent out of work by the adults in QJ households during the reference period are composed roughly as 
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Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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An issue of a different nature but related to the no-
tion of work intensity, is the exclusion of workers 
and potential workers aged 60 years and over from 
the computation of household work intensity. This 
is problematic for two reasons. First, it goes against 
the evidence: significant shares of people aged 
60+ remain economically active and, moreover, are 
not even eligible to retire in a number of countries. 
Secondly, the notion of work intensity measured 
for people aged less than 60 years runs counter 
to other EU employment targets and notably the 
Europe 2020 employment target, set for the pop-
ulation aged from 20 to 64. It is also not consistent 
with the emphasis put on ‘active ageing’ in the EU 
(e.g. European Commission, 2012, 2013). All in all, 
the addition of a technical problem resulting in 
‘false’ workable months, as shown above, and the 
neglect of worked and/or available months of peo-
ple aged 60-64 affects the level of QJ, its scope and 
comparability, and its meaning.
16.2.3 Permanent or transitory?
We explore now the extent to which QJ-ness is 
a long-lasting or a transitory status, and the pro-
portion of people who escape QJ-ness. For this, we 
use the EU-SILC longitudinal UDB, a specific dataset 
consisting of the compilation of 4 years covering 
from year N back to year N‑3 (See Chapter 27 in this 
volume for a discussion of the research value of 
the longitudinal component of EU-SILC). Given the 
rotational design of EU-SILC, national samples are 
not large enough for computing accurate descrip-
tive statistics on people living in QJ households 
over a period of 4 years, so we limit the analysis 
to a 3-year balanced panel, then covering 2010 to 
Figure 16.5: People living in QJ households in 2012 by QJ status, 2010 and 2011
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Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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2012 (2009 to 2011 in terms of reference period). 
Not all EU-27 countries are taken into account: first, 
Germany, Ireland, Romania and Slovakia are not 
available in the longitudinal UDB 2012; secondly, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland and 
Sweden cannot be included in the analysis be-
cause the variables required for the computation 
of work intensity are not available in the EU-SILC 
longitudinal UDB. Thirdly, Estonia and Cyprus could 
not be included due to too small sample sizes. With 
these various limitations, the description below has 
mostly an exploratory value: the samples are rela-
tively small, only 3 years are observed and, for those 
living in a QJ household the first year, we do not 
know since how many years.
Duration is examined for people in QJ households 
in 2012 (year of data collection), looking at their QJ 
status in 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 16.5).
In the 16 countries considered, the majority of peo-
ple in QJ households in 2012 had been in this situa-
tion since 2011, and since 2010 in 12 of the 16 coun-
tries examined (within the limits mentioned above: 
2010 is the first year observed, not necessarily the 
first year of QJ-ness). On average, people in QJ 
households in 2012 have spent from 2.1 to 2.5 years 
in this status in a 3-year period. On the basis of 
this relatively short period of observation, QJ-ness 
could then be said to be an enduring situation.
Nevertheless, some people get out of QJ-ness. 
Among people in QJ households in 2010, the share 
of those in a not-QJ household in 2011 runs from 
18 % (Lithuania) to 46 % (Italy) (see Table 16.2). At 
the horizon of 2012, a large majority of these exits 
appear ‘definitive’ (that is they do not re-enter the 
status in 2012). The exit rate is in general lower for 
those in a QJ household 2 years in a row (here in 
2010 and 2011); it is conversely in general higher for 
those who experienced only 1 year of QJ, prior to the 
exit (QJ in 2011 but not in 2010). This suggests that 
‘long lasting’ QJ-ness reduces the chance of exit; it 
is not counter-intuitive, but the narrow window of 
observation does not allow very robust conclusions.
Table 16.2: Exits from QJ‑ness in 2011 and 2012 and share of people aged 59 prior to the exit
(%)
QJ in 2010
QJ in 2010 and 2011
Exit rate in 2012
QJ in 2011 only
Exit rate in 2012
Aged 59 before 
the exit
(% of all exits)
Exit rate 
in 2011
In which: 
definitive
Belgium 22.1 84.1 19.7 44.4 18.1
Bulgaria 23.7 82.8 16.6 42.0 25.6
Czech Republic 28.7 98.5 16.1 49.9 34.6
Greece 28.8 94.5 17.0 23.0 16.7
Spain 30.2 67.1 21.0 47.5 14.7
France 28.6 84.0 30.8 50.7 24.1
Italy 46.2 83.3 24.9 50.7 13.5
Latvia 41.1 73.8 31.9 40.6 7.0
Lithuania 18.4 90.9 18.4 45.8 24.8
Luxembourg 28.3 96.8 25.2 39.8 29.4
Hungary 26.6 77.8 23.2 39.8 24.6
Malta 22.4 89.7 19.9 45.6 33.1
Austria 34.3 90.8 22.4 51.8 23.6
Poland 38.5 84.4 25.7 51.1 29.5
Portugal 31.0 78.9 16.5 43.2 26.5
United Kingdom 34.2 85.5 16.2 42.6 10.1
Reading note: In Belgium, 22.1 % of people in QJ-ness in 2010 are no longer in this status in 2011 and 84.1 % of them remain out of QJ-ness in 
2012. The exit rate in 2012 is 19.7 % among those in QJ-ness in 2010 and 2011, and 44.4 % among those in QJ-ness only in 2011. In 18.1 % of the 
total number of exits, the person is 59 years old the year prior to the exit.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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As for why some escape QJ-ness, it may result from 
any factor resulting in an increase in the household 
work intensity (e.g. an unemployed household 
member getting a job, a change in the household 
composition), or from the person herself moving to 
another household with better labour market at-
tachment. Another potential factor is ageing: since 
the age threshold is set at 59 years for the headcount 
of people in QJ households, individual ‘QJ-ness’ au-
tomatically disappears at the 60th birthday; these au-
tomatic exits range from 7 % (Latvia) to 35 % (Czech 
Republic) of all the exits (see Table 16.2, last column).
16.2.4 Poverty risk and material 
deprivation in QJ households
We now look at the incidence of the risk of poverty, 
severe material deprivation and their combination 
within the QJ population (see Figure 16.6). In 2012 
in the EU-27, about 65 % of people in QJ house-
holds were also either at risk of poverty (AROP) 
or facing severe material deprivation (SMD); this is 
about three times higher than in the average pop-
ulation, indicating that people in QJ households 
face, on average, a greater risk of poverty and social 
exclusion than the general population. People in 
QJ households are, on average, more often at risk 
of poverty (about 58 %) than materially deprived 
(about 32 %), with the exceptions being Bulgaria 
and Hungary where it is the opposite.
As underlined previously (see Section 16.1), there 
are also significant shares of people in QJ house-
holds which are neither at risk of poverty nor facing 
severe MD: about one third across the EU-27 (see 
Figure 16.6), and a much higher percentage in Lux-
embourg, Denmark or Netherlands, where more 
than half the population in QJ households is neither 
Figure 16.6: Poverty risk and material deprivation, people living in QJ households, 2012
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65 % are AROP and/or SMD and about 45 % neither AROP nor SMD.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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at risk of poverty nor materially deprived. This can, 
at least partly, be related to a possible overestima-
tion of household QJ-ness due to overestimating 
the denominator (the months available for work, 
see above). These households who are QJ but nei-
ther AROP nor SMD might also be barely above the 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold (‘line thickness’); this 
is however not the case, as most of these house-
holds are significantly above the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold and more than one third of them across 
the EU-27 are in the upper half of the income distri-
bution (see Figure 16.7).
This raises some questions, which we discuss lat-
er, on the meaning of the inclusion of this group 
among people defined as being at risk of social ex-
clusion. It is certainly a limitation, particularly given 
the variation of both the share of QJ households 
who are ‘neither/nor’ and, among them, the size-
able percentage in the upper part of the income 
distribution. It is also a sign of fragility of the no-
tion and/or its implementation; at a minimum, it 
suggests that QJ-ness may capture quite different 
phenomena across countries.
16.3 QJ in AROPE over time
In this second part of our statistical review, we turn 
to the evolution of QJ over time (2008-2012) and its 
contribution to AROPE.
In 2012, the share of people aged 0-59 living in QJ 
households is barely higher, at the EU level, than 
in 2008 (see Figure 16.8). In about half the coun-
tries, this share is either broadly unchanged or 
Figure 16.7: QJ households neither at risk of poverty nor deprived in the income distribution, 2012
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Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
16 Risk of poverty or social exclusion over time: a focus on (quasi-)joblessness
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe310
even slightly lower in 2012 than in 2008 (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania, Germany). In countries 
where it is higher, the increase occurred in most 
cases between 2008 and 2010 (that is, in terms of 
reference period, between 2007 and 2009) except 
in Spain, Greece and Bulgaria where the increase 
from 2010 to 2012 was significant too.
How does QJ contribute to the evolution of AROPE? 
To answer this question, we compare what would 
have been the evolution of AROPE without QJ as 
a specific component, and the observed evolution 
of AROPE. As seen above (see Figure 16.6), QJ can be 
broken down into people at the intersection of QJ 
with AROP or SMD and people who are ‘QJ-only’, that 
is living in QJ households neither AROP nor SMD.
In terms of headcount, the difference between 
what the level of AROPE would be without QJ as 
a specific component and its observed level results 
exclusively from ‘QJ-only’, since the other part of 
QJ (people who are either QJ and AROP or SMD) 
is already included in the group of people who 
are AROP and/or SMD. This does not mean that 
QJ-ness has no effect on the risk of poverty or se-
vere MD; but this effect is already accounted for 
in the intersection of QJ with AROP or SMD. Thus, 
not having a specific QJ component would affect 
AROPE only insofar as a proportion of QJ house-
holds are neither AROP nor SMD. Subsequently, 
the contribution of QJ to AROPE is relatively small 
in most countries (148), the highest (around 25 %) in 
Denmark, Netherlands and Ireland (see Figure 16.9).
(148) In addition, people who are ‘QJ only’ are also all less than 60 
years old, since the QJ measure counts only people aged 0-59. 
For this same reason, the intersection of AROP, SMD and QJ 
automatically excludes people aged 60+.
Figure 16.8: People aged 0‑59 living in QJ households, 2008, 2010 and 2012
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Figure 16.9: Composition of AROPE, 2012
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Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
The specific contribution of changes in QJ to the 
evolution of AROPE over time is also exclusively 
due to this ‘QJ-only’ part of QJ (since the remaining 
part of QJ is already included in AROP and/or SMD). 
This contribution appears very small at the EU-27 
level (149); in the annual variations of the period 
2008-2012, changes in the level of AROPE attribut-
able to changes in the level of ‘QJ-only’ are barely 
different from zero, at most 1 % in 2010 (see Figure 
16.10). The contribution appears nevertheless more 
pronounced in some countries/years (especially in 
Ireland, Luxembourg and United-Kingdom). The 
contribution can also be negative, then meaning 
that adding QJ as a specific component results in 
a reduced change in AROPE relative to what the 
change would have been if determined only by 
AROP and SMD.
(149) This is consistent with the results of a cluster analysis by Lelkes 
and Gasior (2012), which shows that AROPE is primarily driven 
by AROP and SMD rather than QJ.
16.4 Conclusions and 
suggested way forward
In this chapter, we have proposed an assessment of 
QJ-ness, as defined in the AROPE framework, from 
two perspectives:
First, we have compared the characteristics of the 
population living in QJ households across countries. 
Based on the analysis of QJ-ness and people in QJ 
households, cross-country differences seem to be 
more remarkable than common patterns in many 
of the dimensions examined. We found two fea-
tures common to all countries: the overrepresenta-
tion of one-person and one-parent households (the 
mechanical effect of very low work intensity being 
assessed at household level); and the absence of 
overrepresentation of children less than 18 years 
old. Another feature common to most but not all 
16 Risk of poverty or social exclusion over time: a focus on (quasi-)joblessness
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe312
Figure 16.10: Contribution of changes in QJ to annual variations in AROPE between 2008 and 2012
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countries, about which much caution is needed giv-
en data limitations, is that QJ-ness would be rather 
a ‘permanent’ (i.e. lasting at least 2 years) than a tran-
sitory status. As for the other dimensions examined, 
there are striking differences between countries, and 
no grouping immediately suggests itself. The com-
position of QJ households’ unused work potential in 
terms of activity status shows large discrepancies in 
the shares of unemployment, house/care work and 
disability. There are also unexpected occurrences of 
education or retirement, in substantial proportions 
in some countries, which is in contradiction with the 
definition (students and people older than 59 are to 
be excluded). In all countries, the at-risk-of-poverty 
and severe MD rates among people living in QJ 
households are much higher than national averages 
(especially the at-risk-of-poverty rate). But in a num-
ber of countries, non-negligible shares of people 
in QJ households are neither at-risk-of-poverty nor 
materially deprived, with significant shares in fact in 
the upper part of the income distribution. It is finally 
difficult to draw a clear profile of the population liv-
ing in QJ households, the addition of discrepancies 
suggesting that QJ-ness captures different phenom-
enon in different countries.
Secondly, we have examined, in terms of headcount, 
the evolution of QJ over time and its contribution to 
AROPE. No general trend appears in the evolution of 
QJ from 2008 to 2012: its level remains unchanged 
in some countries, while it increases in others and 
decreases in a few countries. The contribution of QJ 
to AROPE is, by construction, entirely due to the part 
of QJ with no intersection either with AROP or with 
SMD; between 2008 and 2010, the contribution of 
changes in the level of QJ to annual changes in the 
level of AROPE appears small in most countries; how-
ever, this contribution is problematic since the part 
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of QJ with no intersection either with AROP or with 
SMD is also rather difficult to interpret.
In the course of the statistical analysis, we have also 
uncovered some technical problems. One affects 
the measurement of household work intensity: ‘false’ 
available months are counted in households’ work 
potential, resulting in underestimated work intensity. 
The other is the implementation of employment in 
terms of full-time equivalent without the informa-
tion that would be necessary to obtain a reliable 
estimate.
We also came up against a number of issues of 
consistency:
• the 59-year age threshold for the measurement 
of household work potential, which is incoherent 
with the Europe 2020 employment target;
• the reference to employment in terms of full-time 
equivalent when, if QJ is taken as a measure 
of lack of contact with the world of work, it is 
participation, not the number of hours, that 
matters;
• the 59-year age threshold for the QJ headcount, 
resulting in a population interpretable neither 
as the number of people who should/could be 
employed (it includes dependent children) nor as 
a particular form of social exclusion affecting all 
household members (it excludes people above 
59 years old who live in the same households).
Finally, from our point of view, there is a very prob-
lematic conceptual issue: the interpretation of 
the type of social exclusion faced by people in QJ 
households neither at-risk-of-poverty nor materially 
deprived. The crux of the issue is that QJ households 
either at-risk-of-poverty or materially deprived are al-
ready accounted for in the union of AROP and SMD 
without needing an explicit QJ component; then 
adding QJ households neither at risk of poverty nor 
materially deprived necessarily increases the hetero-
geneity of the target and reduces its interpretability. 
By the same token, since there are finally two sorts 
of QJ-ness (i.e. QJ-ness only and QJ-ness combined 
with AROP and/or SMD) probably driven by different 
factors, the QJ component of AROPE is problematic 
too from a policy point of view.
To sum up, from a methodological point of view, QJ 
hardly meets the ‘Principles of indicator construc-
tion’ agreed upon for EU social indicators (150). In its 
current formulation, the meaning of the indicator is 
unclear, its definition lacks consistency and its sta-
tistical implementation is fragile. In the remainder 
of this conclusion, we present a few alternatives to 
improve the definition/ implementation of the QJ 
measure. Even though we think these improvements 
would be useful, in our view none of them would 
solve the issue of the meaning of QJ as a component 
of the AROPE measure.
Substantial revisions of the current QJ indicator are 
possible in four directions:
• Alternative 1 (improved measurement of 
household work potential): we have seen that 
using the current activity status to exclude 
students and referring to an age threshold to 
exclude people assumed to be retired are not 
efficient, resulting in ‘false’ available months of 
education and months of retirement included 
in the household work potential and in turn 
pushing work intensity downwards and 
consequently the QJ measure upwards. To avoid 
this problem, we propose to select the adults 
eligible for the computation of work intensity not 
on the basis of their current status or their age, 
but on the basis of a measure of ‘main activity 
status in the reference period’, as computed 
for the indicator of in-work poverty risk, where 
‘in-work’ means at least 7 months of employment 
during the reference period. By analogy, we 
define ‘student’ as aged 18-24 with at least 7 
months in education, and ‘retired’ as any adult 
with at least 7 months of retirement.
• Alternative 2 (improved consistency with the 
Europe 2020 employment strategy): we suggest 
including people aged 60-64 (if they are not 
‘retired’ — see above) in the computation of 
household work intensity.
• Alternative 3 (improved measure of months 
worked): as mentioned above, EU-SILC does not 
provide the information on the hours of work 
required to compute worked months in full-time 
equivalent. To avoid imputations necessarily 
resulting in unreliable measures, one could 
(150) See Atkinson et al. (2002). See also ‘Methodology for the 
definition of EU social indicators’ online: http://ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?catId=756.
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count worked months regardless of whether it is 
full-time or part-time employment. By the same 
token, it would also gain consistency with the 
Europe 2020 employment target, which does not 
specify a target in terms of full-time or part-time 
employment.
• Alternative 4 (improved comparability with the 
scope of AROP and SMD): we have seen (see 
Section 16.2) that the scope of the QJ measure is 
not comparable to that of AROP and SMD, due to 
the age threshold set at 59 years. This threshold 
affects also the structure of QJ households and 
the evolution of QJ over time and at individual 
level (see Section 16.2.3). The alternative consists 
in not setting any age threshold for the headcount 
of people living in QJ households.
Table 16.3 indicates what the number of people in 
QJ and the number of people in AROPE would be 
in the EU-27 (151) using these alternative approaches 
for 2008 and 2012. First, we present the headcounts 
corresponding to each alternative, keeping the other 
elements of the definition unchanged, except that 
we systematically apply the improved measure of 
household work potential (alternative 1) which is 
purely technical. Secondly, we combine the alter-
natives — which gives three variants. The technical 
revision alone (alternative 1) would yield lower num-
bers of people in QJ households and lower numbers 
of people in the AROPE target. All the other alterna-
tives would result in greater numbers of people in 
QJ and in AROPE, with the exception of alternative 3 
where work intensity would be measured regardless 
of whether worked months are worked in full-time 
or part-time employment. In terms of evolution 
between 2008 and 2012, the increase in QJ would 
(151) Results at country level are available on request.
Table 16.3: Number of people (000) with alternative measures of QJ, 2008 and 2012
Main elements of the definition of QJ and changes
QJ AROPE
2008 2012 2012/ 2008 2008 2012
2012/ 
2008
Current
— people from 0-59 years old living in QJ households
— work intensity measured for the adults aged 18-59
— work intensity measured excluding those aged 18-24 in 
education at the time of interview
— work intensity measured on the basis of the number of 
worked months in terms of full-time equivalent 34 426.0 39 110.1 1.14 116 354.4 123 054.7 1.06
Alternative 1
— work intensity measured excluding those aged 18-24 ew 
mostly in education and those of any age mostly in retirement 
during the reference period 30 429.6 36 716.7 1.21 113 692.5 121 312.6 1.07
Alternative 2
— work intensity measured for the adults aged 18-64 35 547.4 42 355.5 1.19 116 989.9 124 666.6 1.07
Alternative 3
— work intensity measured on the basis of the total number of 
worked months in terms of full-time equivalent 28 777.2 34 626.5 1.20 113 084.6 120 601.2 1.07
Alternative 4
people of all ages living in households with very low work 
intensity 36 307.5 43 885.6 1.21 117 355.2 125 773.9 1.07
Variant A: combining (1), (2) and (3) 33 663.2 40 018.8 1.19 116 254.1 123 824.9 1.07
Variant B: combining (1), (2) and (4) 40 138.5 47 633.8 1.19 119 894.4 128 029.9 1.07
Variant C: combining (1), (2) and (3) and (4) 38 133.1 45 181.9 1.18 119 065.9 127 119.1 1.07
NB: Due to some unreliable variables for Ireland affecting the computation of the technical alternative (alternative 1), these results could be 
slightly different when computed using the next revised version of the 2012 UDB.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB August 2014.
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always be larger than with the current implementa-
tion: from +18 % to +21 %, depending on the alter-
native or variant implemented, instead of +14 % with 
the current implementation. However, the increase 
in AROPE would be almost unchanged: +7 % instead 
of +6 %, this relatively small impact of the alterna-
tive approaches on the change in AROPE highlight-
ing again the relatively small contribution of QJ to 
AROPE.
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17.1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the burden of the econom-
ic crisis begun in 2008 has not been equally shared 
by workers across the Euro Area (EA). According to 
the European Central Bank (2014, p. 51), ‘the marked 
rise in euro area unemployment over the course of 
the crisis has been heavily concentrated temporally, 
sectorally, demographically and by country. While 
virtually all euro area economies were affected to 
some extent during the first recession [global finan-
cial crisis], over the course of the second euro area 
recession [sovereign debt crisis] the brunt of the job 
losses was (almost exclusively) borne by the stressed 
economies’. As a consequence, as observed in the 
European Commission’s Employment and Social De‑
velopments in Europe 2014, ‘the convergence in terms 
of economic and social performance that had been 
under way across the EU over the past two decades 
came to a halt with the crisis, and reversed strong-
ly in the case of employment and unemployment 
rates. This particularly reflected the adverse impact 
of the crisis on Southern and peripheral EU-15 Mem-
ber States, while convergence did continue for most 
of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 or 
later’ (Bontout, 2014, p. 232).
The bulk of the analysis, in official documents as well 
as more academically oriented research, delves into 
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the impact of the crisis on employment and unem-
ployment. For instance, Bachmann et al. (2015) and 
Casado et al. (2015) investigate the effects on transi-
tions among labour market states, Jauer et al. (2014) 
and Beyer and Smets (2015) study the role of internal 
migrations as a response to the downturn, while oth-
ers try to disentangle structural from demand factors 
behind the increase in unemployment (e.g. Rosolia, 
2014a, for Italy). Less attention has been paid to the 
effects on wages and salaries. In part, this may re-
flect their sluggish adjustment during the crisis, due 
to nominal rigidities, staggered wage negotiations 
or compositional effects (e.g. D’Amuri, 2014, and Ro-
solia, 2014b for Italy). Indeed, as observed by an ad 
hoc team of the European System of Central Banks 
(2015, p. 60), ‘… the wage response in the euro area 
was rather limited during the first phase of the crisis; 
however, wages seemed relatively more responsive 
to unemployment in the second phase of the cri-
sis … [when] the downward rigidities seem to have 
become somewhat weaker, partly related to the im-
plementation of structural reforms in labour markets 
across a number of euro area countries, and/or to 
public sector wage restraint associated with fiscal 
consolidation’. However, these muted dynamics of 
wages in the EA are observed on average: they may 
be fully consistent with offsetting movements in the 
distribution of labour earnings among employees, 
both within and across countries.
In this chapter, we provide novel evidence on the ad-
justment of the EA labour markets during the recent 
economic crisis by investigating the evolution of the 
wage distribution in the EA as a whole. This analy-
sis supplements existing studies focusing on labour 
force participation by considering the adjustment 
occurring through ‘prices’ rather than ‘quantities’. The 
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evidence presented in this chapter suggests a per-
ceptible wage response, calling for some qualifica-
tion of the widely held view of downward wage ri-
gidity in many EA labour markets. As known from the 
extensive research on real wage cyclicality (see Abra-
ham and Haltiwanger, 1995, and Brandolini, 1995, for 
a survey, and Verdugo, 2016, for a recent analysis of 
EA countries), the sensitivity measured at the aggre-
gate level may be much less pronounced than that 
experienced by individuals, especially job-movers. 
The little change in the value of the means need 
not imply an immobile earnings distribution, as it 
may be accompanied by a reshuffling of workers’ 
positions along the wage ladder depending on their 
personal characteristics, labour contract or sector. In 
a monetary union, internal devaluations aimed at re-
covering competitiveness add a further dimension to 
the adjustment, as different wage responses across 
countries entail that national boundaries matter for 
the whole earnings distribution. In a fully integrated 
EA labour market, there would be no ‘country effect’ 
in the explanation of the overall earning distribution, 
except for the indirect effects due to differences in 
the sectoral, demographic and skill composition. 
Abandoning the customary approach of comparing 
national developments and looking instead at the EA 
as a whole allow us to see countries simply as an ad-
ditional dimension of the heterogeneity shaping the 
overall wage distribution. It implies a fundamental 
change of perspective, but one that should be natu-
ral in studying a monetary union.
In order to allow for a period of adjustment to the 
new monetary framework, we define the EA as 
comprising the twelve countries that had joined the 
union for some years before the start of the reces-
sion at the end of 2008. We divide these countries 
into two groups according to their exposure to the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012: following a debat-
able yet common practice, we label ‘periphery’ the 
group with the five countries hit by the crisis (Ire-
land, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal) and ‘core’ the 
group with the remaining seven countries (Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria and Finland). In Section 17.2 we describe the data, 
drawn from EU-SILC and the national accounts, which 
are used in the estimation of the distribution of real 
monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings (MEGE). 
In Section 17.3 we summarise the aggregate dynam-
ics of wages and employment in the EA using both 
the EU-SILC data and the national accounts. In Sec-
tion 17.4 we compare the MEGE distributions in the 
EA in 2007 and 2011. In Section 17.5 we sketch the de-
composition technique that we apply in Section 17.6 
to study the determinants of the MEGE distributions. 
We draw the main conclusions in the final section.
17.2 Data definitions
We base our analysis on data drawn from the EU-SILC 
Waves 2008 and 2012. This source provides informa-
tion on various definitions of labour earnings: cur-
rent gross monthly earnings; annual employee cash 
or near cash income in the previous year (2007 and 
2011), net or gross of taxes and social contributions 
deducted at source; social insurance contributions 
paid by employers, allowing for the calculation of 
total labour cost. The cash income is the employ-
ee’s compensation including wages and salaries and 
any other payment in cash (holiday, overtime and 
piece-rate payments, tips and gratuities, 13th month 
payment, bonuses, performance premia, allow-
ances for transport and work in remote locations), 
but excluding allowances and reimbursements for 
work-related expenses, severance and redundancy 
payments, and union strike pay. In spite of the ef-
forts of statistical agencies, definitions are not fully 
comparable across countries, as discussed in detail 
by Brandolini, Rosolia and Torrini (2010). The EU-SILC 
data have been used recently by Dreger et al. (2015) 
to study the evolution of wage dispersion from 2006 
to 2011 across the EU Member States.
In this chapter, we focus on annual (cash) earnings 
gross of social contributions and income taxes paid 
by the employee, the only variable which is available 
for all EA countries, while net annual earnings and 
current gross monthly earnings are often unavaila-
ble (see Brandolini, Rosolia, Torrini, 2012, for a thor-
ough discussion of this issue). As annual earnings 
reflect both the wage rate and the amount of time 
spent at work, to gauge the variation of the price of 
labour across countries, we compute full-time equiv-
alent monthly earnings by dividing the annual value 
(PY010G) by the number of months worked adjusted 
for part time. Because of data limitations, we use con-
sistent definitions of the number of months worked 
in full-time jobs and in part-time jobs which do not 
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distinguish between jobs worked as employee or 
self-employed (PL070 until Wave 2008 and the sum 
of PL073 and PL075 from Wave 2009, for full-time jobs; 
PL072 until Wave 2008 and the sum of PL074 and 
PL076 from Wave 2009, for part-time jobs; a month is 
spent at work if the respondent worked for 2 or more 
weeks). As this choice may lead to wrong estimates 
of wage rates when persons declare themselves to 
have been working both as employee and self-em-
ployed, we keep only observations without any in-
come from self-employment (PY050G_F equal to 0). 
To derive the number of equivalent months worked, 
the number of months in part-time jobs is scaled 
down by a country-year-sex specific factor equal to 
the ratio of median hours of work in part-time jobs 
to median hours of work in full-time jobs. Both the 
hours of work (PL060) and the job status (PL030 until 
Wave 2008 and PL031 from Wave 2009) refer to the 
employment status (with no distinction between 
salaried employment and self-employment) at the 
time of the interview. We restrict the attention to 
employees aged 20 to 69 years who report posi-
tive monthly values of the wage rate, which implies 
dropping observations with positive annual earnings 
but missing or nil months of work.
The personal cross-sectional weights (PB040) sum to 
the population of household members aged 16 and 
over. These weights ensure that the composition 
of the sample properly reflects the structure of the 
underlying population, but they do not take into ac-
count the number of months worked. Put differently, 
they ensure that area-wide aggregation is meaning-
ful, but treat equally employees working a different 
number of months. We then adjust these weights 
by multiplying them by the number of equiva-
lent months worked: this adjustment implies that 
the sum of the weights yields the total number of 
months, adjusted for part time, worked by the coun-
try’s employees, which is a measure of their aggre-
gate labour input in the year. Using these adjusted 
weights amounts to estimating the wage distribu-
tion among full-year full-time equivalent employees. 
An alternative way of interpreting this choice is that 
we are interested in studying the evolution of the EA 
distribution of the wage rate at a given moment in 
time; not rescaling by the number of months worked 
in the year would lead to an overrepresentation of 
short employment spells and, depending on the 
correlation of the wage rate with the length of em-
ployment spells, to overrepresentation of specific 
segments of the wage rate distribution. Indeed, 
a regression of the (logarithm of) the real wage rate 
on the number of months worked shows that each 
additional full time equivalent month worked is as-
sociated with a 4-5 % higher real wage rate. Thus, 
rescaling the personal cross-sectional weights by the 
number of equivalent months worked controls, in an 
admittedly simple way, for such correlation.
Earnings are expressed, as all other EU-SILC income 
variables, in euros. To transform nominal into real val-
ues, we apply a double correction. First, we deflate 
all current earnings by the Harmonised Index of Con-
sumer Prices for the whole EA (HICP) to express all 
values at the prices of 2010. Second, we account for 
cross-country differences in the cost of living by divid-
ing earnings by an index of Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPP), which adjusts for the relative national values of 
a fixed bundle of consumption goods and services 
(see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book). We take the PPP 
index for the household final consumption expendi-
ture (PPP-HFC), but consider also the index calculated 
for GDP (PPP-GDP), which is generally applied to de-
rive all national accounts variables expressed in Pur-
chasing Power Standard (PPS). Both indices are nor-
malised to 1 for the EA. Figure 17.1 displays, for the 2 
years considered, the percentage difference between 
the country’s price level and the EA average. Not only 
price levels differ across countries in a given year but 
also such differences have changed, substantially in 
some cases, during the crisis. For example, in 2007 
the gap between Finnish and Greek wages narrows, 
all else equal, by around 33 percentage points after 
accounting for price level differences; the adjustment 
falls below 30 points in 2011 because of the (relative-
ly) higher price level in Greece.
17.3 Aggregate dynamics of 
wages and employment
Figure 17.2 summarises the impact of the econom-
ic crisis on a selection of macroeconomic indicators 
for the EA as a whole and separately for the core 
and periphery countries. In 2014, the most recent 
available data at the time of writing, the EA real GDP 
per capita was 3.1 % lower than in 2007, before the 
crisis begun. The number of hours worked by em-
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ployees dropped more than GDP per capita (5.4 %), 
while real hourly wages rose by 4.7 %, engendering 
the impression of a very slow response of wage 
rates to the economic downturn. As suggested by 
the initial citations, the area-wide developments 
hide a variety of country-specific dynamics: on av-
erage, between 2007 and 2014 real GDP per capita 
and hours worked by employees fell considerably 
in periphery countries (-11.4 and -14.1 %, respec-
tively), but did not change much in core countries 
(-1.6 and 1.9 %, respectively); real hourly wages de-
clined in the former group of countries but rose in 
the latter (-4.5 and 5.8 %, respectively). The avail-
able EU-SILC data allow us to study the evolution 
of the wage distribution in the EA until 2011 only. 
Although they cannot capture the effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis which broke out in that year, 
they can shed lights on the divergence between 
core and periphery economies brought about by 
the global financial crisis.
Figure 17.1: Household final consumption expenditure purchasing power parities, 2007 and 2011
(percentage points)
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Reading note: The figure displays the percentage difference between country and EA price levels as measured by the Purchasing Power 
Standards for household final consumption expenditures.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Eurostat web-database, code prc_ppp_ind.
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Figure 17.2: Selected macroeconomic indicators in 2014
(percentage change since 2007)
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NB: For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: Each point in the figure is the cumulative percentage change between 2007 and 2014 of the corresponding variable for periphery 
countries, core countries and the EA as a whole.
Source: Authors’ computation from Eurostat web-database, code t_nama.
In Table 17.1 we report EU-SILC averages for salaried 
employment and real wages, and provide some 
comparisons with corresponding figures from the 
national accounts. The number of employees is 
4-5 % lower in EU-SILC than in national accounts, 
in the EA as well as in the two country groups. In 
part, the discrepancy may be explained by our 
restricting the EU-SILC statistics to the age class 
20-69 and to employees who do not receive any 
additional income from self-employment; the use 
of the national concept of employment, instead of 
the domestic concept underlying Table 17.1, does 
not make much difference. Variations between 
2007 and 2011 are qualitatively aligned, although 
they are somewhat more pronounced in EU-SILC 
than in national accounts for core countries. Total 
hours worked in the year cannot be computed 
from the EU-SILC data (see Chapter 14 in this book). 
However, their variations in national accounts are 
qualitatively similar to the changes in the EU-SILC 
number of equivalent months worked, a rough but 
acceptable approximation.
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Table 17.1: Salaried employment and real wages in national accounts and EU‑SILC, 2007 and 2011
Variable
Euro Area Core Periphery
2007 2011 Change (%) 2007 2011
Change 
(%) 2007 2011
Change 
(%)
National accounts
Employees (thousands) 123 619 122 428 -1.0 77 506 78 943 1.9 46 113 43 485 -5.7
Hours worked (millions) 187 041 182 438 -2.5 108 180 108 646 0.4 78 861 73 793 -6.4
Real monthly wage per employee 
(euros) 2 338 2 356 0.8 2 532 2 545 0.5 2 012 2 011 0.0
EU‑SILC (cross‑sectional weights)
Employees (thousands) 117 237 116 741 -0.4 72 972 74 942 2.7 44 265 41 800 -5.6
Equivalent months worked 
(millions) 1 226 1 202 -1.9 751 766 2.0 474 435 -8.2
Real monthly wage per employee 
(euros) 2 151 2 141 -0.5 2 373 2 390 0.7 1 785 1 694 -5.1
NB: For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The table compares employment and wage levels in 2007 and 2011 in periphery countries, core countries and the EA as a whole as 
recorded in national accounts and EU-SILC.
Source: Author’s computation from Eurostat web-database, code t_nama and EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
With both national accounts and EU-SILC data, we 
calculate the real monthly wage by dividing 1/12 
of total gross wages and salaries by the number of 
employees, and then deflating by the area-wide 
HICP. This definition of real monthly wage adjusts 
neither for part time, nor for cross-national differ-
ences in the cost of living. The EU-SILC estimates 
fall short of national accounts values by 8-9 % in 
the EA, but the discrepancy is more than double 
in periphery than core countries. Somewhat more 
worrisomely, a difference between the two sourc-
es arises for the change in real monthly wages be-
tween 2007 and 2011 in periphery countries: it is nil 
according to national accounts against a drop by 
5.1 % in the EU-SILC data.
All in all, the EU-SILC evidence confirms that the glob-
al financial crisis brought about a strong divergence 
in the performance of the EA labour markets already 
in the period 2007-2011, although it shows a much 
sharper divergence between the core and the pe-
riphery than national accounts. However, the severe 
drop in the EU-SILC per capita wage rates in periphery 
economies is at variance with the stability signalled 
by aggregate data. From the statistical viewpoint, the 
extant discrepancies between the two sources call 
for a thorough work of reconciliation (see also Bran-
dolini, Rosolia and Torrini, 2010, and Chapter 3 in this 
book). More importantly, the EU-SILC evidence sug-
gests that the conclusions on the lack of adjustment 
of wages during the crisis, reached on the basis of 
national accounts, needs careful scrutiny.
17.4 Evolution of the 
earnings distribution
We report several statistics on the distribution of 
the real monthly full-time equivalent gross earn-
ings (MEGE) among working-age full-year full-time 
equivalent employees in Table 17.2. The adjust-
ment for cross-country differences in the cost of 
living has virtually no impact on EA mean wages, 
but it narrows the gap between core and periph-
ery means, especially when the PPP index for GDP 
is used. Both adjustments reduce measured ine-
quality in the EA as a whole, as the Gini indices for 
PPP-adjusted wages are more than half a percent-
age point lower than those for wages in euros. An 
even stronger impact is found for the periphery 
group, but not for the core group, where adjust-
ing for price-level differences appears to increase 
measured inequality. The extent of the adjustment 
of wage levels for the cost of living is fairly stable 
over time, and it does not influence significantly 
the changes between 2007 and 2011.
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Table 17.2: Distribution of real monthly full‑time equivalent gross earnings (MEGE) among 
working‑age full‑time full‑year equivalent employees, 2007 and 2011
Variable
Euro Area Core Periphery
2007 2011 Change (%) 2007 2011
Change 
(%) 2007 2011
Change 
(%)
Real MEGE (EUR)
Mean 2 469 2 495 1.1 2 765 2 804 1.4 1 999 1 951 -2.4
Gini index (%, p.p.) 32.2 32.1 -0.1 31.1 30.8 -0.3 30.5 30.4 -0.1
Real MEGE (PPS, PPP‑GDP)
Mean 2 466 2 486 0.8 2 666 2 709 1.6 2 149 2 094 -2.6
Gini index (%, p.p.) 31.4 31.3 -0.1 31.5 31.0 -0.5 29.4 29.3 -0.1
Real MEGE (PPS, PPP‑HFC)
Mean 2 461 2 483 0.9 2 698 2 741 1.6 2 086 2 028 -2.8
Gini index (%, p.p.) 31.6 31.5 -0.1 31.5 31.0 -0.5 29.4 29.3 -0.1
1st decile 981 988 0.8 1 055 1 108 5.0 924 892 -3.5
2nd decile 1 360 1 357 -0.2 1 501 1 546 3.0 1 207 1 166 -3.4
3rd decile 1 611 1 629 1.1 1 775 1 822 2.6 1 422 1 375 -3.3
4th decile 1 845 1 876 1.7 2 060 2 107 2.3 1 618 1 583 -2.2
Median 2 109 2 144 1.7 2 360 2 419 2.5 1 812 1 777 -1.9
6th decile 2 421 2 470 2.0 2 695 2 743 1.8 2 024 2 003 -1.1
7th decile 2 794 2 843 1.7 3 087 3 137 1.6 2 314 2 296 -0.8
8th decile 3 301 3 349 1.5 3 604 3 677 2.0 2 725 2 685 -1.5
9th decile 4 197 4 207 0.2 4 555 4 606 1.1 3 446 3 346 -2.9
NB: Estimates computed using cross-sectional weights adjusted by the number of equivalent months worked. For the list of Core and Periphery 
countries, see Figure 17.1. PPP-HFC is the PPP index for the household final consumption expenditure and PPP-GDM the index calculated for GDP.
Reading note: The table shows the Gini indices and the wage levels at different points of the MEGE distributions in 2007 and 2011 in periphery 
countries, core countries and the EA as a whole.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
Using the PPP-HFC index, in 2007 the monthly 
full-time equivalent gross earnings in the EA as 
a whole were on average equal to EUR 2 461, at 
2010 prices; in periphery economies they equalled 
EUR 2 086, 23 % less than the EUR 2 698 recorded 
in core economies. In the following 4 years, the EA 
real wage went up by 0.9 % to 2 483, as a result of 
a rise by 1.6 % to 2 741 in the core and a fall by 2.8 % 
to 2 028 in the periphery. The gap between the two 
areas of the monetary union rose to 26 %. As meas-
ured by the Gini index, wage inequality does not 
appear to have changed much within each country 
group. Yet, the two distributions moved differently 
(see Figure 17.3). In core countries, there was a gen-
eral shift upwards: earnings increased throughout 
the distribution but far more intensely at the bot-
tom than at the top, and the relative frequency 
of low earners decreased to the benefit of that of 
middle earners. The opposite happened in periph-
ery countries, where the mass of the distribution 
moved downwards and the across-the-board drop 
of earnings was more pronounced at the bottom 
(and the very top) than in the middle.
In brief, the EU-SILC data show that the wage ad-
justment within the EA was substantially larger 
than that measured in national accounts, with 
periphery real monthly full-time equivalent gross 
earnings decreasing on average by over 4 % rel-
ative to core levels. However, the strikingly differ-
ent changes across the deciles of the respective 
earnings distributions imply that the relative costs 
of low wage labour have fallen far more in the pe-
riphery, by some 6 to 8 %.
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Figure 17.3: Distribution of real monthly full‑time equivalent gross earnings (MEGE) among 
working‑age full‑time full‑year equivalent employees in the EA, core and periphery, 2007 and 2011
(kernel densities)
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NB: Estimates computed using cross-sectional weights adjusted by the number of equivalent months worked. For the list of Core and Periphery 
countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The figure shows the density distribution functions of real monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings in the upper panels and 
their changes between 2007 and 2011 in the bottom panels in the EA, core and periphery countries.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
The evolution of the EA-wide distribution reflects 
the combination of within-country-group changes 
with the falling share in employment of the periph-
ery vis-à-vis the core. In the rest of the chapter we 
try to disentangle changes in the wage schedules 
from changes in the socio-demographic composi-
tion of the pool of employees.
17.5 Decomposition 
techniques
Intuitively, the change of a given statistic of the 
wage distribution between two periods can be 
split into a part due to the change in the compo‑
sition of the underlying population and a part due 
to the change of the wage of any given individual 
profile. To identify the two components we can 
construct a fictitious intermediate distribution in 
which each individual profile in a given year is as-
signed the same weight that the profile has in an-
other year. In this section, we sketch the reweight-
ing technique developed by DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), Biewen (2001) and Bover (2010), 
which we use to decompose the change between 
2007 and 2011 in the EA distribution of MEGE in the 
following section.
Let earnings w be distributed at time t according 
to the distribution )|,( txwF , where x is a vector 
of individual attributes. The density of earnings at 
time t can be written as:
∫∫ == )|(),|()|,()( txdFtxwftxwdFwft ,
where the conditional density of earnings 
)|,( txwf  is the wage schedule at time t. Under 
the assumption that it does not depend on the dis-
tribution of attributes, the conditional wage den-
sity at time t
0 
can be combined with the marginal 
distribution of attributes x at time t
1 
to generate the 
counterfactual wage distribution:
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∫= )|(),|()( 10 txdFtxwfwf
c
.
Counterfactuals can be derived by assuming differ-
ent marginal distributions for the individual attrib-
utes. If the vector x is split into the two sub-vectors 
x
a
 and x
b
, it is:
)|(),|()|,( txFtxxFtxxF bbaba =
and the marginal distribution of earnings at time 
t is:
∫ ∫
∫ ==
)|(),|(),,|(
)|,,()(
txdFtxxdFtxxwf
txxwdFwf
bbaba
bat
.
Specific counterfactuals can be constructed by 
choosing alternative periods for the three condi-
tional densities above. In practice, under appropri-
ate assumptions, the estimation of counterfactual 
distributions amounts to suitably reweighting the 
actual densities.
In our application in the next section, we include 
a limited set of observable attributes in the vector 
x: sex, age, education, citizenship and country of 
residence. We cannot consider other relevant indi-
vidual characteristics, such as sector of activity, job 
title and hours worked, because the correspond-
ing information collected in EU-SILC refers to the 
job held at the time of the interview, whereas 
earnings normally refer to the previous year. We 
denote by c the socio-demographic group de-
fined by the interaction of sex, age, education 
and citizenship, by k the country of residence, 
and by G the two country groups. If p
it
 indicates 
the weight of employee i at time t, as defined in 
Section 17.2, ∑ ∈= cGi itGct pQ ,  is the weight of 
the socio-demographic group c in country group 
G at t, ∑ ∈= ci itGt pQ  is the overall weight of coun-
try group G at t, and ∑= i itt pQ  is the sum of the 
weights across the EA. The (normalised) weight of 
employee i at t can be written as:
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
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⎟
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⎛
⎟
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⎝
⎛
=ω
t
Gt
Gt
Gct
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it
it
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
p
.
This expression guides us in defining the reweight-
ing to construct relevant counterfactual wage dis-
tributions. Specifically, we construct the two coun-
terfactual weighting schemes:
(CF1) 
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The reweighting scheme CF1 is applied to the 2011 
sample and preserves the 2011 density of wages 
conditional on (G, c), while imposing the 2007 mar-
ginal distribution of (G, c). Hence, the comparison 
of statistics computed on the actual 2007 distribu-
tion with those computed on the CF1 counterfac-
tual distribution returns the effect of changes be-
tween 2007 and 2011 in the wage schedules only, 
the wage effect; the difference between the wage 
effect and the overall change is the composition 
effect. The reweighting scheme CF2 is applied to 
the 2011 sample and preserves the 2011 density of 
wages conditional on (G, c) and the marginal distri-
bution of attributes c conditional on group G, while 
imposing the 2007 marginal distribution of em-
ployment between core and periphery. Therefore, 
the comparison of statistics computed on counter-
factuals CF1 and CF2 returns the effect of changes 
only in the distribution of attributes within each 
group G. The difference between this effect and 
the overall composition effect returns the effect on 
the EA wage distribution of changes in the distri-
bution of employees between core and periphery.
By using the estimated counterfactual distributions 
to decompose the deciles of the earnings distribu-
tion and denoting the d-th decile of MEGE comput-
ed on the distribution F j by jdθ ,  where dF jdj =θ )( ,  
and j=(2007, 2011, CF1, CF2) it follows that:
• ( )2007,2011, ddT θ−θ=∆  is the total change 
between 2007 and 2011;
• ( )2007,1, dCFdW θ−θ=∆  is the wage effect;
• ( )1,2011, CFddX θ−θ=∆  is the composition 
effect;
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• ( )1,2, CFdCFdG θ−θ=∆  is the composition 
effect net of changes in the distribution of 
employees between core and periphery.
With a slight abuse of notation, in the following we 
use Δh, with h = T, W, X, G to indicate the percentage 
differences rather than absolute differences of the 
deciles.
17.6 Decomposing changes 
in the earnings distribution 
in the EA
Table 17.3 shows the changes in the composition 
by sex, age, education, citizenship and country 
group of the EA employees between 2007 and 
2011. The employment share of core countries in-
creased by 1.9 percentage points; the weight of 
younger employees fell in both core and periph-
ery, although more markedly in the latter; the less 
educated suffered similarly in both country groups; 
the shares of females and natives declined only in 
the periphery. How did this different composition 
of salaried employment impact on the earnings 
distribution in the EA? And how did it interact with 
variations in the wage schedules?
Figure 17.4 displays the percentage change ∆T 
of each decile of the EA real MEGE distribution 
between 2007 and 2011 (orange line) and its de-
composition. Between the 3rd and 8th deciles 
real wages grew by 1-2 percentage points, while 
the two bottom deciles and the top decile were 
almost unchanged. (The values discussed here 
may slightly differ from those reported in Table 
17.2 because of the dropping of observations with 
missing values for individual characteristics.) The 
wage effect ∆W (dark green line) was consistently 
negative throughout the distribution, signalling 
Table 17.3: Changes in the socio‑demographic composition of the full‑time full‑year equivalent 
employees between 2007 and 2001in the EA
(percentage points)
Variable Euro Area Core Periphery
Sex
Male -1.7 -0.1 -1.6
Female 1.7 2.1 -0.4
Age class
20‑29 years -2.9 -0.8 -2.1
30‑39 years -1.4 -0.2 -1.2
40‑49 years 0.2 -0.2 0.4
50‑59 years 2.5 1.8 0.7
60‑69 years 1.5 1.3 0.2
Educational achievement
Compulsory schooling or less -4.1 -1.8 -2.3
High school 0.6 0.6 0.0
College or more 3.4 3.1 0.3
Citizenship
Native -1.6 0.8 -2.4
Foreign‑born 1.6 1.2 0.4
Total – 1.9 -1.9
NB: Figures may not add up exactly because of rounding. For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The table reports the change between 2007 and 2011 in the share of each socio-demographic group in the total EA salaried 
employment. The horizontal summation of the core and periphery figures yields the EA figures; the vertical summation by socio-demographic 
characteristic yields the figures in the last line for each country group.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
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a widespread adjustment of real wages. However, 
it was smaller in absolute value between the 3rd 
and 8th deciles (about 2 %) and larger, almost dou-
ble, at the bottom and top ends (around 4 %). On 
the contrary, the composition effect ∆X (light green 
line) was consistently positive and overall sustained 
real wages by 3-4 percentage points. These com-
position effects reflected only in part the different 
dynamics of employment among EA countries and 
the consequent reallocation of salaried employ-
ment across the area: the composition effect net of 
changes in the geographic distribution of employ-
ment ∆G (light red line) was less than one percent-
age point smaller than the total composition effect.
These results highlight a major adjustment of wage 
rates during the crisis in the EA as a whole, part-
ly masked by significant changes in the compo-
sition of employment, especially across personal 
characteristics.
Although the geographic dimension seems to add 
little to the evolution of the EA earnings disper-
sion, the job reallocation across countries implied 
changes in their relative position. To show this, 
we compute the shares of employees of core and 
periphery countries that fell within each fifth of 
the EA earnings distribution. If residence in either 
country group did not matter, we would expect 
these shares to be roughly 20 %. Thus, the ex-
Figure 17.4: Decomposition of the change of the deciles of the real MEGE distribution between 
2007 and 2011
(percentage points)
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Reading note: The figure shows the actual (observed) change of deciles between 2007 and 2011 and how it can be attributed to a wage effect, 
obtained holding sample composition constant at 2007, and a composition effect, obtained reweighting the 2011 sample with 2007 weights. 
The composition effect (excl. geo) is the part of the composition effect attributable to a change in the distribution across countries.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
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cess over 20 % (shortfall relative to 20 %) provides 
a measure of the extent to which the employees 
of the core and the periphery are over-represented 
(under-represented) in each EA fifth. This over- or 
under-representation is shown for 2007 by the pos-
itive and negative bars, respectively, in Figure 17.5. 
Unsurprisingly, periphery countries were over-rep-
resented in the bottom 40 % of the EA distribution, 
which contained more than half of the periphery 
employees, as a reflection of a substantial un-
der-representation in the top fifth, which hosted 
little more than a tenth of periphery employees. 
Conversely, core employees were over-represented 
in the top 40 % of the EA distribution by about 8 
percentage points. Figure 17.5 also shows how the 
over- or under-representation changed between 
2007 and 2011 because of the wage and compo-
sition effects. The change in wage schedules ac-
centuated the periphery-core divide: the dynamics 
of relative earnings further shifted periphery em-
ployees towards the bottom of the EA distribution, 
while pushing up core employees. The composi-
tion effects amplified the wage effect for periphery 
employees at the bottom, but mitigated the shift 
to the top fifths for core employees.
The above evidence captures the effect of the ad-
justment in the wage schedules, but is silent about 
the extent to which core and periphery contributed 
to this adjustment. We hence compute how the EA 
earnings distribution would have varied, had the 
only force in place been the wage adjustment in ei-
Figure 17.5: The position of core and periphery employees in the EA earnings distributions in 
2007 and 2011
(percentage points)
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NB: For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The bars represent the excess over 20 %, if positive, and the shortfall relative to 20 %, if negative, of the shares of core and 
periphery employees in each fifth of the real MEGE distribution in the EA in 2007. If employees from the two areas were equally spread along the 
overall EA distribution, these shares would equal 20 % and the bars would vanish. The lines represent the changes in these shares between 2007 
and 2011 due to the wage effects (blue) and composition effects (green).
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
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ther the core or the periphery: a suitable counterfac-
tual distribution is obtained by combining the actual 
2007 distribution for one country group with the 
counterfactual CF1 distribution for the other group. 
Figure 17.6 compares the observed change in deciles 
and the wage effect between 2007 and 2011 with 
the contributions to the wage effect attributable to 
core and periphery. Most of the EA wage adjustment 
is traceable to changes in the periphery wage sched-
ules, which explain the whole drop in the bottom six 
deciles. If the wage adjustment in core countries had 
been the only one occurring, earnings would have 
fallen slightly only for the top three deciles, while re-
maining almost untouched in the other parts of the 
distribution.
This last exercise only shuts down the wage ad-
justment in either country group. However, it fails 
to explain whether the difference between the 
periphery and the core reflects a geographic ef-
fect or simply the adjustment of wage rates of 
professional profiles relatively more represented 
in either country group. To answer this question, 
we apply the decomposition technique put forth 
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011). This method 
involves estimating Recentered Influence func-
tions to quantify (under appropriate identification 
assumptions) the effect of a given observable vari-
able on the unconditional quantile of the earnings 
distribution. In practice, we estimate a wage equa-
tion including dummies for education, sex and cit-
Figure 17.6: The core and periphery contributions to the wage adjustment between 2007 and 2011
(percentage points)
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NB: The total wage effect is obtained by holding sample composition constant at 2007; the periphery wage effect is obtained by holding sample 
composition and wage schedule in core countries constant at 2007; the core wage effect is obtained by holding sample composition and wage 
schedule in periphery countries constant at 2007. For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The figure shows the actual (observed) change of deciles between 2007 and 2011 and how its variation due to the total wage 
adjustments was accounted for by wage adjustments in core countries and periphery countries.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
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izenship, a quadratic in age and a dummy for the 
country group. This equation is estimated for the 
actual 2007 weighting scheme and the counter-
factual CF1. As by construction the average of the 
explanatory variables is the same for both weight-
ing schemes, the comparison of the estimated 
coefficients for variable x
a
 gives the contribution 
of the returns of x
a
 to the total wage effect. Figure 
17.7 displays the total wage effect, already shown in 
Figures 17.4 and 17.6, and the counterfactual wage 
effect obtained by neglecting the role of periph-
ery membership in the estimates of deciles, so that 
it only measures the effect of the changes in the 
returns to the other characteristics. Absent the ad-
justment in periphery countries, the overall wage 
effect would have been non-negative up to the 
6th decile, suggesting that the adjustment in the 
periphery was wider than that caused by the pro-
file-specific changes in returns. For example, the 
median wage would have been nearly unchanged 
against a 2 percentage point fall due to the wage 
effect in the periphery.
Figure 17.7: The total wage effect and the periphery wage adjustment, between 2007 and 2011
(percentage points)
−4
−2
0
2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Wage effect
Total Excluding wage effect in periphery
NB: For the list of Core and Periphery countries, see Figure 17.1.
Reading note: The figure displays the total wage effect and the counterfactual wage effect obtained by neglecting the role of periphery 
membership in the estimates of deciles.
Source: Authors’ computation from EU-SILC UDBs of January 2010 and May 2013.
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17.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored the evolution of 
the distribution of the EA wage rates during the 
global financial crisis and the determinants of this 
evolution using data drawn from EU-SILC. From 
a methodological viewpoint, our results confirm 
that the microeconomic evidence can qualify, if not 
reverse, the conclusions about the functioning of 
labour markets drawn from aggregate data. How-
ever, despite their high quality, the EU-SILC data 
used here are far from ideal for our purposes. There 
is a pressing need to improve the information on 
the earnings distributions in European countries as 
well as to reconcile micro and macro sources.
The EU-SILC data show that the wage adjustment 
within the EA between 2007 and 2011 was sub-
stantially larger than that measured in national 
accounts. Real monthly full-time equivalent gross 
earnings in periphery countries decreased on aver-
age by over 4 % relative to levels in core countries, 
but differences across deciles of the core and pe-
riphery earnings distributions are significant. These 
differences imply that the wage adjustment was far 
more pronounced at the bottom: the relative costs 
of low wage labour fell in the periphery by some 
6 to 8 %.
The changing composition of the pool of salaried 
employees boosted earnings growth along the 
whole EA wage distribution; only a minor part of 
these compositional effects are traceable to the 
relative shift of employment from periphery to 
core countries. Absent these compositional effects, 
the downward real wage adjustment would have 
been sizeable, and larger in absolute value at the 
low end of the wage distribution. The overall wage 
adjustment, net of compositional effects, reflected 
exclusively that of periphery countries until the 6th 
decile of the EA distribution, while from the 7th 
decile earnings fell in both country groups. The 
contribution of periphery to the overall EA wage 
adjustment does not simply reflect the changing 
wage rates of specific segments of the workforce 
more represented in the periphery, but a genuine 
‘country effect’, that is an across-the-board drop in 
wage rates. Against this sizeable adjustment in the 
periphery, core countries have not displayed any 
upward pressure on their wage rates.
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18.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the relationship between 
household structure and the three components of 
the ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ (AROPE) 
measure which is the basis for one of the headline 
targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. The AROPE 
measure consists of three components: income 
poverty, severe material deprivation, and (quasi-)
joblessness (on the AROPE measure, see Chapters 1 
and 3 of this volume; see also Eurostat 2015).
This chapter asks the following questions:
• what is the relationship between household 
structure and the incidence of poverty, severe 
material deprivation and (quasi-)joblessness?
• how are the three measures of disadvantage 
distributed within the different household 
types?
• does the relationship between the three 
measures of disadvantage vary according to 
household type?
Of the three components of the AROPE indicator, 
it is the measure of (quasi-)joblessness which is the 
most recently implemented, and which has at-
tracted the most criticism in terms of its ability to 
effectively identify households and individuals at 
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a high risk of disadvantage (Chapter 16 of this vol-
ume; Ward and Özdemir, 2013; Maître, 2013). Thus, 
an additional task of this chapter is to assess the 
usefulness of the (quasi-)joblessness measure.
18.2 AROPE and its three 
component subscales
The three component indicators of AROPE have 
been described in detail elsewhere in this volume 
(see inter alia Chapters 1 and 3 of this volume) and 
are briefly summarised here for reference.
At risk of poverty (AROP)
An individual is defined as being at risk of poverty 
if he or she lives in a household where the total 
equivalised disposable income is below 60 % of the 
national median equivalised disposable income. 
Because this indicator is benchmarked relative to 
the incomes of the general population in the coun-
try in question, it does not measure absolute levels 
of wealth or poverty, and thus may not be synony-
mous with a low standard of living. In this chapter, 
it is sometimes referred to as ‘income poverty’ or 
‘poverty’; these terms always refer to the AROP in-
dicator. (See Chapter 3 of this volume.)
Severe material deprivation (SMD)
This indicator is defined on the basis of living in 
a household which cannot afford items which the 
majority of people would consider it necessary or 
at least desirable to own. Severe material deprivation 
18
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(SMD) is defined as the inability to afford four or more 
of a list of nine items (see Chapter 10 of this volume).
The definition relates to the ability to afford the 
item, rather than whether or not a household 
chooses to own the item. In contrast to the AROP 
indicator, which is a relative measure, we expect 
the indicator of severe MD to be more directly as-
sociated with economic hardship, and we expect 
individuals living in less affluent countries and re-
gions to report higher levels of MD than those in 
more affluent areas. All of the analysis which fol-
lows examines severe MD (SMD). In the text, this 
is sometimes referred to for the sake of brevity as 
‘material deprivation’ or ‘deprivation’; these terms 
always refer to the SMD indicator used in the Eu-
rope 2020 social inclusion target.
(Quasi‑)joblessness
A household’s work intensity is defined as the total 
number of months worked during the preceding 
income reference year by all working-age members 
of the household (those aged 18-59 years, except-
ing students aged under 25), as a fraction of the 
total number of months which the working-age 
members of that household could potentially have 
worked during that year. Part-time work is weighted 
pro-rata, as a fraction of a nominal 35-hour full-time 
working week. Households with a very low work 
intensity (work intensity lower than 0.2) are defined 
as (quasi-)jobless households. Work intensity is not 
defined for households with no working-aged 
members, since the denominator of the calculation 
would be zero; members of such households are 
therefore omitted from this measure. Work intensi-
ty is, in fact, not defined for any individual aged 60 
or over, even if they live in a household with one 
or more working-aged people. However, children 
aged under 18, and students aged 18-24, are allo-
cated the work intensity of the other members of 
their household, even though they themselves have 
not been counted for the purposes of its calculation. 
(See Chapter 16 of this volume.)
18.3 Problems with the 
(quasi‑)joblessness measure
Of the three component subscales of AROPE de-
scribed above, the first two — the measures of in-
come poverty and severe MD — have been in wide 
use for several decades as indicators of disadvan-
tage. As such, their properties have been compre-
hensively investigated and their implementation 
refined. Neither constitutes a definitive measure of 
disadvantage, and both measures have their prob-
lems — income-based measures of poverty rely 
on the questionable assumption of income pool-
ing between household members (see Chapter 9 
of this volume; Jenkins, 1991; Alderman et al., 1995); 
they may be sensitive to the choice of equivalence 
scale used (Coulter et al., 1992; Jäntti and Danziger, 
2000); and because they are relative measures, they 
do not necessarily imply a low standard of living. 
Measures of MD are arguably more closely linked 
to a household’s actual standard of living (see 
Chapters 10 and 21 of this volume; Fusco, Guio and 
Marlier, 2010; Guio, Gordon and Marlier, 2012; Guio, 
2009), though they must be regularly updated to 
remain relevant through changing conditions.
The first two component subscales of the AROPE 
measure have stood the test of time, and to the 
extent that they present difficulties, these are well 
understood. The (quasi-)joblessness indicator, by 
contrast, has been introduced much more recently 
(in 2010), and has drawn criticism from a number 
of quarters. The various problems with the QJ in-
dicator are discussed in Chapter 16 of this volume 
and it is not necessary to revisit all of the potential 
problems in this chapter. However, some of these 
issues are directly relevant to the work in hand, and 
these do need to be discussed here.
The first problem is the definition of all persons 
aged 60 and over as not of working age. Ward and 
Özdemir (2013) note that this is inconsistent with the 
arrangements relating to pensionable age in most 
EU countries, and that this inconsistency is particu-
larly problematic in the light of legislative develop-
ments in many countries aimed at increasing the 
retirement age. A related but slightly different issue 
emerges in the analysis of the relationship between 
household structure and QJ, namely that all typolo-
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gies of household structure in current use distinguish 
between some notion of ‘prime-aged’ and ‘elderly’ 
households, and that the dividing line between the 
two is typically set at age 65 (see, e.g., United Nations, 
2006 and 2007). Thus, the mapping between the 
official definition of QJ and any useful typology of 
household structure is rather messy, with QJ not de-
fined for large numbers of households which would 
for other purposes be considered to be ‘prime-aged’ 
households.
Additional, and related, problems are (a) that the 
measure will be unstable around certain ages, in 
terms of the estimates which it produces, and in 
terms of the individuals over whom these estimates 
are defined; and (b) that the QJ measure is based on 
data on household members’ work histories over 
the preceding calendar year, and ages at the end of 
the reference year, while household structure would 
for most purposes be calculated using information 
collected on the number and ages of household 
residents at the time of the survey. This difference 
may mean that the work intensity measure does 
not ‘fit’ with the household structure measure. One 
possible solution, which I employ in this chapter, is 
to re-calculate a measure of household structure 
based on people’s ages at the end of the income 
reference year. However, this creates a new poten-
tial problem (ignored in this chapter), that the new-
ly defined household is in some cases a fictitious 
construct: not all the individuals who are currently 
living in a household may actually have been living 
together at the end of the reference year.
18.4 Data and methods
18.4.1 EU‑SILC
Analysis is based on the most recent release of the 
EU-SILC cross-sectional data files at the time of writ-
ing: the 2012 Wave of EU-SILC cross-sectional data 
(UDB 2012 Version 2, microdata release of August 
2014). The three AROPE component indicators are 
used as supplied in the data: HX080 for income pov-
erty, RX060 for severe MD, and RX050 for (quasi-)
joblessness. In addition, a number of alternatives to 
the QJ variable are tested, which extend the meas-
ure (a) to people between the ages of 60 and 64, 
and (b) to individuals for whom the official measure 
is not defined, because they are too old, but who 
live in a household with one or more individuals of 
working age. The features of EU-SILC relating to the 
calculation of household structure typologies are 
described in Iacovou and Skew (2011).
18.4.2 Weighting
All estimates presented in this chapter are weighted. 
The weights used are based on the cross-sectional 
weights provided with EU-SILC; however, some of 
the largest weights are ‘trimmed’, and in analysis 
where countries are grouped together (for exam-
ple, regional or EU-wide averages), countries are 
weighted according to the square root of their 
population (see Chapter 4 of this volume for the 
rationale underlying these procedures).
18.4.3 Country clusters
We present some results broken down by individ-
ual countries, but in the interests of legibility, we 
present several results disaggregated by region 
rather than country. We use the same regional 
clusters as in Chapter 4 of this volume; these are 
derived via a combination of theoretical consid-
erations (Esping-Andersen, 1990 and 1999; Ferre-
ra, 1996) and empirical analysis, using a minimum 
distance algorithm. More details on the regional 
typology are presented in Chapter 4; the typology 
used is set out in Table 18.1.
Table 18.1: Regional clusters used in the analysis
Nordic Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
North‑Western Belgium, Germany, Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, United Kingdom
Southern Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal
Eastern Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
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18.4.4 A typology of household 
structures
Ten household types are defined, according to the 
number and ages of people living in a household, 
and the relationships between them. These house-
hold types are listed in Table 18.2 and follow the 
typology of Iacovou and Skew (2011).
Note that the ‘other households’ category includes 
some households where all the members are from 
the same family, i.e. which properly should be con-
sidered as extended families, but for whom this in-
formation cannot be recovered from the informa-
tion available in EU-SILC, which does not provide 
a full household grid. As mentioned in Section 18.3, 
household structure is calculated not on the basis 
of the current ages of the individuals living in the 
household, but on the basis of their ages at the end 
of the income reference year. Thus, the distribution 
of household types is not identical to that used in 
Chapter 4 of this volume, though of course the two 
are very close.
The distribution of household types is shown in Ta-
ble 18.3. The top two panels show the distribution of 
household types across all households and individu-
als in the sample, regardless of whether the QJ meas-
ure is defined. The two lower panels show the dis-
tribution of household types for those households 
or individuals for which QJ is defined. The two distri-
butions are very different: there are no single-elderly 
households in the lower panel, while these account 
for 13 % of households and 5.3 % of individuals in 
the upper panel, and there are only very small num-
bers of elderly couple households in the lower panel, 
while these account for over 10 % of households and 
individuals across the whole sample.
18.5 Results
18.5.1 Eligibility for the measure 
of (quasi‑)joblessness
As highlighted above, the measure of (quasi-)
joblessness is unlike the other constituent measures 
of AROPE, in that it is not applicable to the entire 
population. In the case of households composed 
entirely of non-working-age individuals (children 
under 18, students aged 18-24, or people aged 60 
or over) the measure is not applicable to anyone 
in the household. In the case of households com-
posed of both working-age and non-working-age 
individuals, the measure is not defined for individu-
Table 18.2: Definitions of household types
Single person < 65 A single person under age 65
Single person > = 65 A single person aged 65 or over
Couple both < 65 A couple (married or cohabiting) both aged under 65
Couple, at least one > = 65 A couple (married or cohabiting), at least one of whom is aged 65 or over
Couple + child(ren) under 18 A couple with one or more of their own children, including at least one child aged under 18
Couple + adult child(ren) A couple living with one or more of their own children, all of whom are aged 18 or over
Lone parent + child(ren) under 18 A single adult plus one or more of his or her own children, including at least one child aged under 18
One parent + adult child(ren) A household consisting of one parent plus one or more of his or her own children, all of whom are aged 18 or over
Extended family
Non-nuclear households whose members all belong to the same family. Most of 
these are either three-generation families, or households including a parent and 
an adult child with a partner or spouse
Other households Other households, including lodgers, unrelated sharers, etc.
NB: Children are defined as people under 18 years of age, regardless of educational or labour market participation.
Source: Iacovou and Skew (2011).
18Household structure and risk of poverty or social exclusion
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  337
als aged 60 and over, but it is defined for the other 
non-working-age groups.
In practical terms, few children under the age of 
18 (0.2 % of the whole sample, and under 0.6 % in 
every country) live in households with no work-
ing-age members. The percentage of students un-
der 25 living in such households is higher (at 7.8 % 
overall), and varies more between countries (from 
under 1 % in Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slo-
vakia, to 27 % in Finland and Sweden). This has im-
plications for the comparability of the QJ measure 
between countries for this group.
Figure 18.1 divides the sample into the ten house-
hold types described in Section 18.4., showing, for 
each household type, the percentages of individu-
als (a) for whom the QJ measure is defined, and (b) 
who live in a household in which the QJ measure is 
defined for at least one individual. Of the 2 %, (b) is 
always equal to or larger than (a). As well as show-
ing these percentages for the official index which 
covers those aged up to age 59 (QJ_59), we show 
the same calculations for a measure which also 
defines those aged 60-64 as working-age (QJ_64). 
The percentages of individuals for whom QJ_64 is 
defined, or who live in households where QJ_64 is 
defined for at least one individual, are always equal 
to, or larger than, the corresponding percentages 
calculated using QJ_59.
For three household types, the definition of (quasi-)
joblessness makes no difference at all: by definition, 
no adults over age 64 are covered under either 
measure, while virtually all those living in house-
holds consisting of couples and children, or lone 
parents and children, are covered under both meas-
ures. The biggest difference between the coverage 
of QJ_59 and QJ_64 is in the case of single-person 
and couple-only non-elderly households. Under 
QJ_59, under 80 % of people in these households 
are covered; under QJ_64, 97 % of persons in single 
non-elderly households are covered (the remainder 
being students) while virtually all persons living in 
non-elderly couple households are covered.
Table 18.3: Distribution of household types by regional cluster, 2012
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Households — all
Nordic 18.0 11.4 18.5 15.3 24.2 3.9 4.0 1.9 0.3 2.6
Western 20.1 12.6 15.5 13.4 21.0 6.5 4.9 3.2 1.0 2.0
Southern 12.0 12.5 9.7 12.8 22.5 14.2 2.7 6.3 3.6 3.7
Eastern 11.6 14.3 11.6 10.3 18.1 12.6 2.5 7.2 8.9 2.9
Total 15.7 13.0 13.4 12.5 20.8 9.7 3.7 4.9 3.7 2.7
Households in which (quasi‑)joblessness (QJ_59) is defined for any household member
Nordic 20.1 0.0 23.9 1.3 36.5 5.9 6.0 2.7 0.4 3.3
Western 23.7 0.0 19.8 1.1 30.8 9.4 7.1 4.5 1.3 2.4
Southern 13.9 0.0 12.0 1.0 31.9 19.9 3.8 8.5 4.8 4.3
Eastern 12.0 0.0 14.1 0.8 25.9 17.9 3.5 9.9 12.5 3.5
Total 17.8 0.0 16.7 1.0 30.1 13.9 5.3 6.8 5.3 3.2
NB: Derived using individuals’ ages at the end of the income reference year. Estimates are weighted according to the procedure defined in 
Section 18.4.2.
Reading note: In the Nordic countries, 18 % of households consist of a single adult aged under 65; 20.1 % of households in which QJ_59 is defined 
are of this type.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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Figure 18.1: Coverage of the (quasi‑)joblessness measures (QJ_59 and QJ_64), by household 
type, EU‑28, 2012
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Reading note: In households consisting of a couple where at least one member is aged 65 or over, 3 % of individuals are covered under the 
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Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
Of the other household types (couples and lone par-
ents living with children over age 18, extended fam-
ilies, and ‘other’ households), the major differences 
in coverage are not between the QJ_59 and QJ_64 
indicators, but between coverage at the individual 
and household levels. For example, in households 
which consist of a lone parent and one or more chil-
dren over 18 (but no children under 18), only 74 % 
of individuals are covered under QJ_59, but 96 % of 
households are covered. Under QJ_64, only 81 % of 
individuals but 99 % of households are covered.
18.5.2 AROPE by household type
Figure 18.2 shows the incidence of the three 
AROPE measures by household type, aggregated 
across the EU-28. There are two major differences 
between the measure of (quasi-)joblessness and 
the other two measures. First, QJ is not defined at 
all for single persons over age 65, though this is 
group at a relatively high risk of poverty. Second, 
those at the very highest risk of QJ are people living 
in couple households where one partner is age 65 
or over (or rather, the minority of people in these 
households for whom work intensity is defined), 
whereas the risk of poverty or SMD for this house-
hold type is very low.
These differences aside, (quasi-)joblessness tends 
to be most prevalent among those household 
types where income poverty and SMD are also 
prevalent, namely single people under age 65, and 
lone parents with children. The rate of QJ is lowest 
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in couples with children; this is a group with rela-
tively modest risks of income poverty and SMD, 
though the risk of QJ in this household type is low-
er than the risk of either income poverty or SMD.
18.5.3 Single‑person and 
couple‑only households under 
age 65
In this section, we examine the incidence of the 
AROPE measures among single-person and cou-
ple-only households under age 65; we analyse 
how these measures vary with age, and in the case 
of single people, by gender. The incidence of the 
three AROPE indicators by age is shown for both 
household types in Figure 18.3. Profiles for each 
of the indicators are shown for the EU-28 and for 
the four country clusters separately. The figures 
underlying these graphs (and those appearing in 
similar figures throughout the rest of the chapter) 
were calculated on the basis of 2-year age bands, 
and smoothed using a simple variant of a Gaussian 
kernel smoother.
Single‑person households
Figure 18.2 showed that in single-adult households 
the rates of (quasi-)joblessness and income poverty 
are similar. However, as the left-hand panel of Figure 
18.3 shows, the three indicators have markedly dif-
ferent age profiles. Poverty is concentrated among 
those under age 30 (albeit with a slight increase at 
the upper end of the age range). (Quasi-)joblessness, 
by contrast, is concentrated among people at older 
ages, with the risk of QJ increasing after age 40, and 
much more steeply after age 50. The age profile for 
SMD is much flatter; in three of the four clusters of 
countries there is little variation in the risk of SMD 
with age; and variation with age is seen only in the 
Eastern European, where SMD increases after the 
age of 32).
Figure 18.2: The three measures of AROPE, by household type, EU‑28, 2012
(percentages of households)
0
10
20
30
40
50
At risk of poverty (AROP) Severe material deprivation (SMD) (Quasi)-joblessness (QJ_59)
Si
ng
le
 p
er
so
n 
< 
65
Si
ng
le
 p
er
so
n 
>=
 6
5
Co
up
le
 b
ot
h 
un
de
r 6
5
Co
up
le
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 6
5 
or
 o
ve
r
Co
up
le
 +
 c
hi
ld
(re
n)
un
de
r 1
8
Co
up
le
 +
 a
du
lt
ch
ild
(re
n)
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t +
ch
ild
(re
n)
 u
nd
er
 1
8
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t +
ad
ul
t c
hi
ld
(re
n)
Ex
te
nd
ed
 fa
m
ily
O
th
er
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
Reading note: Of households consisting of a lone parent plus child(ren) under 18, 34 % are AROP, 23 % suffer SMD, and 28 % experience (quasi-)
joblessness.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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In single-person households, the risk of QJ varies with 
age, but does not vary a great deal across clusters 
of countries. The Eastern European countries differ 
somewhat from the other regional clusters, in that the 
risk of QJ is particularly low for single people in their 
thirties, and particularly high for single people in their 
fifties, and there is some evidence that QJ is less prev-
alent among older people in the Nordic countries, but 
overall, the age profiles are reasonably similar. In terms 
of income poverty, the age profiles do differ between 
clusters of countries, but these differences are evident 
mainly in the case of younger adults. The risk of in-
come poverty among single people in their twenties 
is particularly high in the Nordic countries, and to 
a lesser extent across Western Europe; the same pat-
tern also holds in the Southern countries, those it is far 
less marked than in the Nordic and Western countries. 
Income poverty among single people in their twen-
ties is lower in the Eastern countries than elsewhere 
in Europe, and higher among people in their forties 
and fifties; thus, the young in Eastern Europe are still at 
an elevated risk of income poverty, but this risk is only 
slightly higher than the risk for people in their fifties.
Couple‑only households
Households composed of couples under age 64 are 
displayed in the right-hand panel of Figure 18.3. Here, 
the contrasts between the age profiles of the three 
indicators are if anything even starker than they are in 
the case of single people. The risk of QJ is very low for 
couple-only households in their twenties, thirties and 
forties; however, the risk increases dramatically in all 
clusters of countries after the mid-fifties, showing that 
QJ is highly concentrated among older people. There 
are differences between regions, with this pattern be-
ing most pronounced in the Southern countries, and 
much less pronounced in the Nordic countries, but 
the overall picture is of a concentration of QJ among 
older people. QJ is clearly not synonymous with pov-
erty: young adults have a low incidence of QJ but 
a high incidence of poverty, while the reverse is true 
for older adults; put another way, employment does 
not protect large numbers of young adults from pov-
erty (154), while many older adults are not catapulted 
into poverty because of a lack of employment.
(154) The relationship between poverty, (quasi-)joblessness and 
low wages for the young is discussed in Spannagel (2013) and 
Andress and Lohmann (2008).
As with single-person households, income poverty is 
concentrated among younger couples, falling from 
around 35 % of 20-year-old couples to under 10 % 
of 28-year-old couples, and remaining essentially flat 
throughout the rest of the life course. There are some 
regional differences: in the Nordic countries, young-
er couples are at a higher risk of poverty, and older 
couples are at a lower risk, than in other regions, but 
these regional differences are relatively small. Again, 
as with single-person households, the risk of SMD is 
fairly flat for couples across the age range, standing at 
around 5 % of those in their twenties, and rising only 
to around 7 % for those in their fifties. Once again, 
those in Eastern Europe are most likely to report SMD, 
particularly at older ages.
Gender in single‑person households
As well as differing by age, we may wonder wheth-
er the incidence of disadvantage differs by gender. 
Because the three AROPE measures are house-
hold-based, and the majority of couples consist of one 
man and one woman, none of the AROPE component 
indicators will differ by gender (155) in couple house-
holds. However, they may of course differ by gender 
in single-person households. Figure 18.4 shows age 
profiles for the three AROPE component indicators, 
by gender, across the EU-28. The shapes of the three 
profiles are remarkably similar for men and women, 
and indeed, their SMD and (quasi-)joblessness profiles 
are virtually indistinguishable by gender. The risk of 
poverty, however, is 4-5 percentage points higher for 
women during the early to mid-twenties, and about 
1-2 percentage points higher for men at older ages. 
Further investigations reveal that young women are 
more likely than young men to be poor in all regions, 
particularly in the Nordic and Eastern countries, where 
the difference between men and women is around 
7 percentage points in the under-26 age group. The 
more modest gender difference in poverty risks at 
older ages is driven by the Nordic and Eastern clusters.
(155) In fact, this assertion is not 100 % true: since women tend to be 
younger than their male partners, slightly more women than 
men in couples are covered by the QJ indicator. However, any 
difference arising from this is an artefact of the indicator and 
therefore of limited interest.
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Figure 18.4: AROPE, by age and sex: single‑person households under age 65, 2012
(percentages of individuals)
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Reading note: At age 20, 58 % of men and 62 % of women are at risk of poverty.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
18Household structure and risk of poverty or social exclusion
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  343
18.5.4 Couples and lone parents 
with children under 18
In this section, we examine the incidence of the 
three AROPE component indicators in households 
consisting of couples with children aged less than 
18, and lone parents with minor children (under 
18). In the previous section we analysed variations 
in the AROPE indicators by age. It makes less sense 
to do this for families with children, since over 90 % 
of parents in these households are aged between 
28 and 51, an age range across which there is lit-
tle variation in risk for the AROPE subscales. To the 
extent that any variations were evident by parental 
age, these would likely relate more to the age of the 
children than the age of the parents. We therefore 
analyse variations in the three AROPE indicators by 
the number of children in the family, and by the age 
of the youngest. We base the analysis in this section 
on the subset of households which consist only of 
parents and children (under 18), since the presence 
of adult children may complicate the analysis and 
its interpretation.
When investigating variations in AROPE with the 
number of children in a family, we also include 
childless couples and single people in the analysis, 
as ‘no-child’ families. Members of the comparison 
group are selected to be comparable with par-
ents on the basis of age: thus, for lone parents, the 
‘no-child’ comparison group consists of women be-
tween the ages of 26 and 54 who live alone, and for 
couples, the comparison group consists of mem-
bers of couple-only households aged between 27 
and 51. These comparisons are included only for 
interest and should not be interpreted as having 
any meaning beyond this; the comparison group is 
matched with parents only by age, and may differ 
systematically from people with children in many 
important respects.
For couples with children, results are shown for fam-
ilies with one, two, three and four or more children; 
as there are few lone parents with four or more chil-
dren, we combine these with three-child families. 
Figure 18.5 shows how the three AROPE measures 
vary with the number of children, for couples with 
children (left-hand panel) and lone parent house-
holds (right-hand panel). Across Europe as a whole, 
QJ is very uncommon for families with up to three 
children; however, the risk is higher among larger 
families, at 15 % across the whole of Europe. There 
is little variation between regions for families with 
one or two children, but larger families in the Nor-
dic countries have a lower probability of QJ, while 
those in Eastern Europe have a higher probability.
The risk of income poverty increases much more 
sharply with the number of children; across Europe, 
it increases from 14 % for couples with two children, 
to 34 % for couples with four or more children. 
This increase with the number of children is com-
mon across all regions, but is more marked in the 
Southern and (particularly) the Eastern countries, 
where poverty rates among couples with children 
are higher even among smaller families. Finally, we 
see that across Europe as a whole, the incidence 
of SMD across the number of children looks very 
similar to the incidence of QJ, albeit standing a cou-
ple of percentage points higher. However, the vari-
ation between regions is far higher than in the case 
of QJ: SMD rates among couples with children are 
extremely low in the Nordic countries for all family 
sizes; they are also low in the North/Western coun-
tries, rising to only 10 % for the largest families; but 
they are much higher in the Southern and Eastern 
countries, at almost 25 % and over 40 % respective-
ly, for the largest families.
Among lone-parent families, the incidence of all 
three measures of disadvantage is higher than 
for couple families. The overall incidence of QJ in-
creases from just under 25 % for lone parents with 
one child, to 48 % for lone parents with three or 
more children. QJ among lone parents is substan-
tially higher in the North/Western countries than 
elsewhere; this, combined with the fact that lone 
parent families are more numerous in this cluster 
of countries than elsewhere in Europe, means that 
the North/Western cluster dominates the EU aver-
age. QJ among lone parents is lowest in the Nordic 
countries, standing at only 25 % even among lone 
parents with the largest families.
Income poverty also increases with the number of 
children in a lone parent family, rising from a little 
over 20 % for lone parents with one child, to over 
45 % for lone parents with three or more children. 
Despite QJ being most common among lone par-
ents in Western Europe, income poverty is less 
common among the largest lone-parent families in 
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Western Europe than elsewhere: only 40 % of larg-
er lone-parent families in Western Europe are poor, 
compared with around 60 % in all other regions. 
The greatest divergence among all the indicators is 
in the case of SMD: the rates are far higher in East-
ern Europe, and far lower in the Nordic countries, 
than they are in the other two country clusters. The 
Nordic cluster is notable in that not only are lev-
els of SMD very low among lone parents, but they 
do not increase significantly with the number of 
children.
Figure 18.5: The three measures of AROPE, by number of children: couples with children 
(left‑hand panel) and lone parent households (right‑hand panel), 2012
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Reading note: The percentage of individuals at risk of poverty in the North-Western country cluster is 9 % in couples with one child, rising to 28 % 
in couples with four or more children.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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Variations by the age of the youngest 
child
We may expect the AROPE measures to vary accord-
ing to the age of the youngest child in a family, on 
the grounds that mothers are more easily able to 
engage in paid work as their children grow up. In 
fact, for couples with children, there is very little ef-
fect: the profiles for all three AROPE measures vary 
hardly at all with the age of the youngest child. For 
the QJ measure, this may be because most couple 
families are not in a situation of (quasi-)joblessness 
even if the mother has no job; in the case of poverty, 
this argument may also be valid, in addition to which 
children load more heavily onto the family’s equiva-
lence scale when they turn 14, and the older is the 
youngest child in a family, the fewer children in total 
are still likely to be living at home.
For lone parent households, however (see Figure 
18.6) the relationship is in the expected direction, 
with the risks of all three measures of disadvantage 
falling with the age of the youngest child. The reduc-
tion in the risk of QJ is particularly marked: across the 
EU-28 it falls from 50 % for mothers of the youngest 
children, to under 20 % for mothers with children 
aged 12 and over.
Among single-adult and couple households, the 
three measures of disadvantage tend to affect 
different groups, with poverty being concentrat-
ed among the young and QJ among the elderly. 
Among families with children, the three indicators 
tend to move together: families with more children 
tend to be at higher risk on all indicators, while 
lone-parent families with older children tend to 
have a lower risk on all three indicators, than those 
with younger children.
18.5.5 Multiple disadvantages
We have so far examined the three indicators of dis-
advantage separately; but it is, of course, possible to 
experience disadvantage on more than one dimen-
sion. Lelkes and Gasior (2012) examine the overlaps 
Figure 18.6: AROPE, by the age of the youngest child: lone parent households, 2012
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between the three AROPE indicators, finding the 
strongest links between poverty and QJ, and the 
weakest correlation between QJ and SMD. Figure 
18.7 shows, for each household type, the percentage 
reporting hardship on combinations of indicators. 
In order for the QJ indicator to cover as many indi-
viduals as possible, the QJ_64 indicator is used, and 
is extended to all those living in households where 
the QJ_64 indicator is defined for any household 
member. For members of ineligible households, the 
QJ_64 indicator is set to zero (156). Over all household 
types, almost three quarters suffer no hardship on 
any of the indicators; this ranges from only 49 % of 
lone parents to 79 % of couples with children, and 
80 % of couples over age 65 (note, though, that for 
(156) Another option would be to code the variable differently for 
households not covered by the QJ measure, but this would 
greatly complicate the presentation of results.
this latter category, the analysis may be complicated 
by the fact that the QJ indicator is only applicable to 
a minority of individuals). As well as being the least 
likely to suffer no hardship on any of the three in-
dicators considered, lone parents with children are 
also the most likely of any household type to suffer 
hardship on all three indicators, and to suffer disad-
vantage on two of the three measures.
Figure 18.8 uses countries instead of household 
types as the unit of analysis. The percentage suf-
fering none of the three hardships is highest in 
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland (all over 80 %). It is lowest in 
Bulgaria (at 50 %) followed by Romania and Latvia 
(57 % and 63 %). Bulgarians are also the most likely 
to suffer all three dimensions of hardship (6.6 %), 
the most likely to suffer on two of the three dimen-
Figure 18.7: Single and multiple disadvantages, by household type, EU‑28, 2012
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Reading note: Of lone-parent households with children under 18, 49 % report no disadvantage. 6.8 % report QJ only.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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sions (13 %), and by far the most likely to suffer SMD 
(25 %, in addition to those who have already been 
counted among those suffering from two or three 
deprivations).
In general, the percentages suffering on two or three 
dimensions of hardship are highest towards the left 
of the graph. Of those experiencing only a single 
dimension of hardship, more people suffer materi-
al hardship in the countries towards the left of the 
graph, where levels of hardship are generally high-
er, while more people suffer income poverty in the 
countries towards the right of the graph, where levels 
of hardship are generally lower. This broadly reflects 
the findings of Lelkes and Gasior, which was carried 
out using data from 2009, though some countries 
which have fared badly in the Great Recession, for 
example Greece and Spain, are by 2012 among the 
countries with the highest levels of disadvantage 
and multiple disadvantage.
Figure 18.9 repeats this exercise for lone parents, 
showing that in general, in the countries where the 
risks of hardship are higher in general, this is also the 
case for lone parents, and vice versa. However, this 
is not universally true: Croatia has high levels of dis-
advantage among the population in general, but its 
lone parent families are only moderately disadvan-
taged, and indeed less disadvantaged than lone par-
ents in Luxembourg, which is at the upper end of the 
distribution for the population in general.
18.5.6 The composition of the 
poor, severely deprived and QJ 
populations
The final analysis in this chapter relates to the com-
position of the three disadvantaged populations 
defined by the three measures considered in this 
chapter; the results in Figure 18.10 are analogous 
to those in Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4 of this volume.
Figure 18.8: Single and multiple disadvantages, by country, 2012
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Reading note: In Bulgaria, 50 % of households report no disadvantage on any of the dimensions; 1 % report QJ only.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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Figure 18.10 consists of four panels. The top left-hand 
panel shows household composition for the entire 
(weighted) sample. The top right-hand panel shows 
household composition for individuals living in 
households defined as income-poor (this informa-
tion is also shown in Figure 4.3). The bottom left- and 
right-hand panels show household composition for 
individuals living in households defined as severely 
deprived, and as (quasi-)jobless (using the QJ_64 
measure defined earlier, in order to conform better 
to the household composition typology).
One difference between the QJ and the other two 
measures is immediately obvious, namely that the 
QJ measure is not defined for any households con-
taining a single adult aged 65 or over. The QJ meas-
ure is also not comparable with the other measures 
for elderly couples, since it is defined for very few 
individuals living in such households. The QJ meas-
ure also behaves differently from the other meas-
ures in another respect: in all four country groups, 
non-elderly couples form a much higher proportion 
of the QJ population than of the general population, 
even though they form a very low proportion of the 
income-poor and severely deprived populations.
The explanation for this may be found in Figure 
18.3 of this chapter, which noted an increase in 
the incidence of QJ in the mid-fifties and early 
sixties, which is not accompanied by an increase 
in the other two measures of disadvantage. The 
mean age of people living in QJ couples is over 55, 
compared to a mean age of under 47 for those in 
non-QJ couples. By contrast, there is little variation 
in age between couples defined as disadvantaged 
or not disadvantaged, on the other two indicators.
Other differences between the three indicators in-
clude the fact that couples with children form a far 
Figure 18.9: Single and multiple disadvantages, lone parents, by country, 2012
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Reading note: Of lone-parent households with children under 18, in Bulgaria, 25 % of households experience none of the three deprivations 
considered, while 4 % experience QJ only.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB version 2012-2.
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smaller proportion of people in QJ households 
than in the general population, or indeed in the 
other types of disadvantaged household. In the 
Northern and North/Western countries, couples 
with children form a smaller percentage of the in-
come-poor and severely deprived population than 
of the general population, while in the Southern 
and Eastern countries, couples with children are 
more heavily represented in the poor population 
than in the general population. Aside from these 
differences, the three indicators move broadly in 
the same direction, with single adults under 65 and 
lone parents with dependent children being rep-
resented more highly among the disadvantaged 
populations than the general population. These 
two groups, together with couples living with 
dependent children, make up a large share of the 
income-poor, severely deprived and QJ popula-
tions (especially in the Nordic and the North-West 
regions); however, couples both under 65 are also 
important in the composition of the QJ population.
18.6 Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that 
all three components of AROPE vary by household 
type, with lone parent households being at a sub-
stantially higher risk of disadvantage on all three 
components. As well as being at an elevated risk of 
hardship on all indicators separately, lone parents 
are also at the highest risk of suffering disadvantage 
on multiple dimensions. Single-person households 
are also at a relatively high risk of hardship, particu-
larly income poverty, while couples, and couples 
living with their children, enjoy a relative degree of 
protection.
The incidence of disadvantage varies greatly 
within, as well as between, household types. In 
single-person and couple households, the three 
AROPE component indicators impact differently 
on different demographic groups, with income 
poverty being concentrated among the young, 
and (quasi-)joblessness being more common at 
Figure 18.10: The distribution of household types among the whole sample, and individuals 
living in a) income‑poor, b) severely deprived, and c) QJ households, 2012
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older ages. Among couples with children and lone 
parent households, by contrast, the indicators tend 
to move together, with all types of disadvantage 
more common among those with more children, 
and among lone parents with younger children.
One of the aims of this chapter was to assess the 
usefulness of the QJ indicator, which was adopted 
in 2010 as a target indicator in the Europe 2020 strat-
egy. The fact that in some cases, the QJ indicator 
‘picks up’ a very different demographic than either 
of the other AROPE indicators is not necessarily in-
dicative of problems; after all, if all the indicators 
were highly correlated for all demographic groups, 
one or more of them would be redundant. Two dis-
tinct problems emerge with the QJ indicator. The 
first, as highlighted by Ponthieux in Chapter 16 of 
this volume, is that the indicator appears to be pick-
ing up some individuals who cannot in any sense 
be said to be poor or socially excluded; the find-
ing in this chapter that QJ is particularly prevalent 
among couples in their late fifties, who have a very 
low incidence of hardship on the other indicators, 
supports this. The second issue which emerges in 
this chapter relates to the fact that many individuals 
are not covered by the QJ measure. This does not 
matter if the aim is simply to add individuals in QJ 
households to a headcount total of disadvantaged 
people in Europe, but it introduces difficulties in 
analysing hardship together with other socio-de-
mographic indicators (such as household type), and 
it also means that indicators of multiple disadvan-
tage are more difficult to analyse and interpret.
Extending the measure of QJ to those aged up to 
64 years would improve matters somewhat from 
the analytical perspective, and would make the QJ 
measure line up better with social policy. However, 
this would not entirely solve the problem of incom-
plete coverage and of the anomalies which may 
as a result be inherent in the measure. It may be 
worth retaining QJ as a component of the headline 
AROPE indicator, if it can be shown convincingly 
that it is a good proxy for a degree of current dis-
tress which is not picked up by measures of income 
poverty or material deprivation, or that it is a good 
predictor of difficulties in the future which are not 
predicted by the other two measures. This should 
be a priority for research efforts over the remainder 
of the decade.
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19.1 Introduction
The recent crisis has highlighted the importance 
of having timely and reliable data in order for pol-
icy-makers to be able to assess the impact of the 
economic downturn on poverty and income distri-
bution (Atkinson, 2013; Stiglitz, 2012). In March 2010, 
the alleviation of income poverty became officially 
part of the EU’s long-term strategy, by constituting 
one of the three components of the Europe 2020 
target for the reduction of poverty and social ex-
clusion (see Chapter 1 in this book for the defini-
tion of the target). Since that year EU-SILC has been 
used for monitoring the progress of Member States 
towards the achievement of these targets.
However, due to the complexity of micro-data col-
lection and processing, relevant income data only 
become available after a considerable delay. For in-
stance, micro-data from EU-SILC collected in year n, 
(157) Olga Rastrigina, Chrysa Leventi and Holly Sutherland are based 
at ISER, University of Essex. Jekaterina Navicke is based at Vilnius 
University, Faculty of Philosophy. The authors are grateful to 
Nuno Alves, Anthony B. Atkinson, Anne-Catherine Guio, Eric 
Marlier and Sophie Ponthieux for valuable comments and 
suggestions. We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of 
all past and current members of the EUROMOD consortium. 
The process of extending and updating EUROMOD is financially 
supported by the Directorate General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion of the European Commission (Progress 
grant no. VS/2011/0445). This chapter uses EUROMOD version 
G2.0. For Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania and Finland we make use of 
micro-data from EU-SILC made available by Eurostat under 
contract EU-SILC/2011/55 and contract EU-SILC/2011/32; for 
Spain and Austria we make use of the national EU-SILC data 
made available by respective national statistical offices. 
This work has been supported by the second Network for 
the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email 
address for correspondence: hollys@essex.ac.uk.
reporting incomes received in year n‑1, is released 
in March in year n+2 and Eurostat normally pub-
lishes indicators using these data about 6 months 
earlier. This results in the EU-SILC data being used 
predominantly for ex post analysis, which is not suf-
ficient in the context of high public concern about 
growing income inequality. This perspective was 
given special impetus by the then President-elect 
of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
in his July 2014 statement to the European Parlia-
ment when he proposed that ‘… in the future, any 
support and reform programme [should go] not 
only through a fiscal sustainability assessment; but 
through a social impact assessment as well. The 
social effects of structural reforms need to be dis-
cussed in public.’ (158)
The aim of this chapter is to present a microsimu-
lation-based methodology for nowcasting chang-
es in the distribution of income over a period for 
which EU-SILC statistics are not yet available, and 
assess the implications of these changes for the 
proportion of the population at risk of poverty (for 
a definition of this EU indicator, see Chapter 3 in this 
book). The term ‘nowcasting’ here refers to the es-
timation of current indicators using data on a past 
income distribution together with various other 
sources of information, such as macroeconomic 
statistics. This research builds on previous work on 
nowcasting indicators of poverty risk (Navicke et al., 
2013; Navicke et al., 2013a; Rastrigina et al., 2015) (159). 
It attempts to explain the rationale for embarking 
on such an exercise and illustrates its potential by 
(158) http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_
en.pdf
(159) In Rastrigina et al. (2015), very low work intensity (i.e. (quasi-)
joblessness) was also nowcasted. However, the nowcasting of 
this indicator falls outside the scope of this chapter.
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presenting estimates of the direction and size of 
the change in the at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) indi-
cator since the date of the most recently available 
official estimates (160).
The analysis makes use of EUROMOD, the micro-
simulation model based on EU-SILC data which 
estimates in a comparable way the effects of taxes 
and benefits on the income distribution in each 
of the EU Member States. For the purposes of the 
nowcasting exercise standard EUROMOD routines, 
such as simulating policies and updating market in-
comes, are enhanced with additional adjustments 
to the input data in order to capture changes in 
the employment characteristics of the population 
since the EU-SILC data were collected.
To illustrate the method it is applied to EU-SILC 
2010 data (2009 incomes) and AROP rates are es-
timated up to 2013. The method is evaluated by 
comparing nowcast and Eurostat estimates for in-
comes in the period 2010 to 2012, when both are 
available. The twelve EU countries that are included 
in the analysis are Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
France, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and Finland. Over the period in question, 
these countries experienced divergent economic 
conditions: some of them have suffered a serious 
reduction in economic activity and employment, 
some have entered the path to recovery, and some 
have been affected relatively little.
The most important results can be summarised as 
follows. First of all, median incomes in 2013 are esti-
mated to be significantly different (in the statistical 
sense) from their 2012 levels in all countries studied, 
with the exception of Spain and Austria. A substan-
tial reduction in the median household disposable 
income is expected in Greece (-10 %), while in the 
Baltic countries, Poland and Romania median in-
comes are projected to grow by between 3 and 7 %. 
Moderate changes are predicted in Germany and 
Finland (+1 %) as well as in France and Portugal (-1 %).
Despite substantial changes in the median, the 
changes in the overall AROP rates are found to be 
small and non-significant in most countries. Only 
in Germany and Latvia the AROP rate is predict-
(160) Note that the core analysis for this chapter was completed by 
January 2015. Hence, it does not include any Eurostat estimates 
published after that date.
ed to fall (significantly at the 90 % level). Greece 
is the country where the rise in income poverty is 
predicted to be the highest (although statistically 
non-significant). Changes in the AROP rates by age 
group are more pronounced. The elderly seem to 
be significantly improving their relative position 
in terms of income in Spain, France, Austria and 
Finland. The opposite is the case in the remaining 
countries, except of Germany. Latvia is the only 
country where a significant reduction in child pov-
erty is expected. On the other hand, child poverty 
is expected to rise in Austria. Income poverty in the 
working-age population is expected to decline in 
Latvia, Estonia and, to a lesser extent, Germany.
The structure of the chapter is the following: in 
Section 19.2 the nowcasting methodology is ex-
plained. Section 19.3 presents and discusses the 
predictions of the AROP rates. Section 19.4 reflects 
on the possible sources of divergence between the 
EUROMOD and Eurostat estimates for the period in 
which both are available. Finally, Section 19.5 con-
cludes by summarising the most important find-
ings and policy implications of this research.
19.2 Methodology
With an increasing demand for ex ante evaluation 
of the distributional and poverty impacts of poli-
cy reforms and broader economic developments, 
a number of different methodological approaches 
to estimate timely poverty and inequality indica-
tors have been developed.
The methods based on econometric techniques 
(e.g. Isaacs and Healy, 2012; Monea and Sawhill, 
2009) suggest using macro-level data, such as un-
employment levels, aggregate social benefit re-
ceipt/expenditure, historical trends of poverty and 
GDP, as explanatory variables to predict income 
poverty in the US. In the European context where 
the standard at-risk-of-poverty threshold depends 
on median income, developments affecting the 
whole of the bottom half of the income distribu-
tion must be modelled so such methods are un-
likely to give satisfactory results. More generally 
such econometric techniques do not allow the dis-
tinct effects of changes in income and household 
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circumstances at different points in the income dis-
tribution to be captured.
Microsimulation models have been widely used for 
assessing the distributional impact of current and 
future tax-benefit policy reforms, as well as the im-
pact of the evolution of market incomes, changes 
in the labour market and in the demographic struc-
ture of the population (161). Using microsimulation 
techniques based on representative household 
data enables changes in the distribution of mar-
ket income to be distinguished and the effects of 
the tax-benefit system to be identified taking into 
account the complex ways in which these factors 
interact with each other (Peichl, 2008; Immervoll et 
al., 2006).
Combined macro-micro modelling has also been 
used for analysing the impact of macroeconomic 
policies and shocks on poverty and income dis-
tribution. A detailed review is provided in Bour-
guignon et al. (2008) and Essama-Nssah (2005). In 
these studies the construction of the necessary 
macro-level data is usually based on Computable 
General Equilibrium models. These data are then 
fed into a microsimulation model.
Several national statistical offices, such as the 
Czech, the Danish and the Portuguese, have also 
tested a range of techniques that have the poten-
tial of improving the timeliness of EU-SILC based 
poverty estimates. These include the usage of pro-
visional income data (Šustová, 2014; Lauritsen and 
Quitzau, 2014) or the use of EU-SILC variables on 
current employees’ earnings and self-defined cur-
rent economic status combined with microsimula-
tion techniques (Junqueira et al., 2014).
The nowcasting methodology presented in this 
chapter is based on microsimulation techniques 
used in combination with the latest macro-level 
statistics. It differs from other country-specific ap-
proaches as it aims to develop a generic approach 
that can be applied to all EU countries in a straight-
forward, flexible and transparent way. By doing so, 
it ensures the comparability and consistency of re-
sults both across countries and through time.
(161) Some examples include Brewer et al. (2013) for the UK, 
Keane et al. (2013) for Ireland, Brandolini et al. (2013) for Italy, 
Matsaganis and Leventi (2013) for Greece and Narayan and 
Sánchez-Páramo (2011) for Bangladesh, Mexico, Philippines and 
Poland.
The microsimulation model EUROMOD is used to 
simulate changes in the income distribution within 
the period of analysis. The main advantage of using 
EUROMOD is its capacity to estimate in a compara-
ble way the effects of changes in taxes and benefits 
on income distribution for each of the EU Member 
States. Income elements simulated by the model 
include universal and targeted cash benefits, social 
insurance contributions and personal direct taxes. 
Income elements that cannot be simulated most-
ly concern benefits for which entitlement is based 
on previous contribution history (e.g. pensions) or 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. disability bene-
fits). These are read from the data and adjusted for 
changes in average level over time. Detailed infor-
mation on EUROMOD and its applications can be 
found in Sutherland and Figari (2013).
Changes in labour market characteristics are ac-
counted for by explicitly simulating the transitions 
between labour market states (Figari et al., 2011; 
Fernandez Salgado et al., 2014; Avram et al., 2011). 
Individuals are selected for transitions based on 
their conditional probabilities of being employed 
rather than being unemployed or inactive. The de-
pendent variable is derived from the self-defined 
current economic status reported in the EU-SILC 
data (PL031) (162). A logit model is used for estimat-
ing probabilities for working age (16-64) individ-
uals. In order to account for gender differences in 
the labour market situation, the model is estimated 
separately for men and women. Students, individ-
uals with permanent disability or in retirement and 
mothers with children aged below 2 are excluded 
from the estimation, unless they report employ-
ment income in the underlying data. Explanatory 
variables include age, marital status, education 
level, country of birth, employment status of part-
ner, unemployment spells of other household 
members, household size, number of children by 
age group, region of residence and urban (or rural) 
location. The exact specification of the logit model 
and the estimated coefficients are presented in Ra-
strigina et al. (2015).
The total number of simulated labour market 
transitions and their direction are determined by 
changes in employment observed in other availa-
(162) This variable is chosen because it is the most recent 
information on economic status available in EU-SILC.
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ble data: the net changes in employment rates by 
age group, gender and education (a total of 18 stra-
ta) as shown in the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (163). 
Macro level LFS statistics are used as the most 
up-to-date source of information on employment 
which is synchronised across the EU countries.
Changes from short-term to long-term unem-
ployment are modelled based on a similar selec-
tion procedure using LFS figures on the share of 
long-term unemployment (12 months or more) in 
total unemployment (164). This transition is critical 
due to its implications for eligibility and receipt of 
unemployment benefits. Transitions to and from 
inactivity are accounted for implicitly through re-
stricting eligibility for unemployment benefits, ac-
cording to the prevailing rules.
Labour market characteristics and sources of in-
come are adjusted for those observations that are 
subject to transitions. In particular, employment 
and self-employment income is set to zero for indi-
viduals moving out of employment; for individuals 
moving into employment, earnings are imputed 
by setting them equal to the mean among those 
already employed within the same stratum.
After modelling employment transitions, the next 
step for nowcasting poverty indicators with EURO-
MOD involves two tasks: updating non-simulated 
income beyond the income data reference period 
and simulating tax and benefit policies. Updating 
incomes is carried out in EUROMOD using factors 
based on available administrative or survey statis-
tics or forecasts (if other sources of information are 
not available). Specific updating factors are derived 
for each income source, reflecting the change in 
their average amount per recipient between the 
income data reference period and the target year.
All simulations are carried out on the basis of the 
tax-benefit rules in place on the 30th June of the 
given policy year. EUROMOD uses market incomes, 
labour market status, other individual and house-
hold characteristics, and the tax and benefit rules 
in order to simulate cash benefits, social insurance 
(163) Eurostat web-database: codes lfsa_ergaed and lfsq_ergaed, 
employment rates by sex, age and highest level of education 
attained (%), annual and quarterly.
(164) Eurostat web-database: codes lfsa_upgan and lfsq_upgal, 
long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage 
of the total unemployment, by sex and age (%), annual and 
quarterly.
contributions and personal direct taxes. An effort 
has been made to address issues such as tax eva-
sion and benefit non take-up in countries where 
these phenomena are known to be prevalent. 
However, such adjustments are not possible to im-
plement in all countries due to data limitations (165).
The last methodological step aims at accounting 
for differences between EUROMOD and EU-SILC 
estimates. AROP rates that are calculated using 
simulated incomes from EUROMOD may diverge 
from those calculated by Eurostat for the same in-
come data reference year. The main reasons for this 
are related to precision of tax-benefit simulations 
when information in EU-SILC is limited, issues of 
benefit non take-up and tax evasion, small differ-
ences in income concepts, as well as the possibility 
that some income components are under-report-
ed in EU-SILC (Figari et al., 2012; Jara and Leventi, 
2014).
In order to account for these discrepancies, a cali-
bration factor is calculated for each household 
which is equal to the absolute difference between 
the value of equivalised household disposable 
income in the 2010 EU-SILC (variable HX090) and 
the EUROMOD estimate for the same period and 
the same income concept. The calibration factors 
are applied to all later policy years. This is based 
on the assumption that the discrepancy between 
EUROMOD and EU-SILC estimates remains stable 
over time. Clearly, for any individual household this 
is not realistic but there is no obvious alternative 
approach that is both transparent and not arbi-
trary. It is likely that calibration will perform better 
if applied to countries or time periods with greater 
economic stability (166).
19.3 The nowcast
We test the nowcasting methodology for twelve 
EU countries using the EU-SILC 2010 data (2009 in-
comes) as a starting point. We nowcast the AROP 
rates up to 2013 (i.e. what the EU-SILC 2014 will 
(165) Detailed information on the scope of simulations, updating 
factors, non-take-up and tax evasion adjustments is 
documented in the EUROMOD Country Reports (see: https://
www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports).
(166) For more information on the calibration procedure, see Navicke 
et al. (2013a).
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show once it becomes available). At the time of 
writing the latest available EU-SILC indicators avail-
able from Eurostat were for 2013, referring to 2012 
incomes. Thus, in this illustrative exercise, the indi-
cators are predicted 1 year ahead, referring to 2013 
incomes. Using relatively old EU-SILC data for this 
exercise allows us to validate our method by com-
paring our estimates with actual EU-SILC estimates 
for a number of years. In principle it would be pos-
sible to apply the same methodology to the latest 
available EU-SILC micro-data to predict indicators 
2 years ahead of the indicators available from Eu-
rostat, i.e. to use EU-SILC data from year n (incomes 
for n‑1) to nowcast year n+2 at a point in time when 
Eurostat is publishing estimates for incomes in year 
n, assuming that uprating factors, macro-level LFS 
statistics and simulated policies are available for 
the nowcasted year (167).
Table 19.1 shows the nowcasted changes in equiv-
alised household disposable income and AROP 
rates between income years 2012 and 2013. The ta-
ble also reports initial levels for 2012 incomes based 
on EU-SILC 2013.
The reason for focusing on changes in indicators 
rather than their absolute values is mainly due to 
sampling and other errors that may lead to wide 
confidence intervals around point estimates of 
the AROP rates in EU-SILC (see Goedemé, 2010; 
Goedemé, 2013). Hence, the nowcasts of direction 
and scale of change are likely to be more reliable 
than the point estimates for each particular year. 
Using one dataset for microsimulation across all 
years, which is the case for the simulations in this 
chapter, involves a reduction in the standard er-
rors due to covariance in the data (Goedemé et al., 
2013). Changes in the value of indicators between 
2012 and 2013 that are statistically significant, tak-
ing into account the covariance in the data, are 
marked in Table 19.1.
The results show that both mean and median in-
comes in 2013 are significantly different from their 
2012 levels for the majority of countries. The ex-
ceptions are Spain and Austria where the changes 
in the median equivalised household disposable 
(167) For example, it should be possible to nowcast AROP rates for 
income year 2017 using EU-SILC 2015 (2014 incomes) when 
Eurostat is publishing estimates based on EU-SILC 2016 (2015 
incomes).
income are very small and non-significant. A sub-
stantial reduction in the median income is expect-
ed in Greece (-10 %). The median income is also 
expected to decline slightly in France and Portu-
gal (by 1 %). In the Baltic countries, as economies 
recover from the crisis, nominal median incomes 
seem to be growing fast: by between 4 and 7 %. 
Growth in median incomes is also predicted in Po-
land and Romania and, to lesser extent, in Germany 
and Finland.
On the other hand, changes in the total AROP rate 
are relatively small and not statistically significant 
in most countries. The only cases where the overall 
AROP rate in 2013 is found to be significantly differ-
ent from its 2012 level are Germany and Latvia. In 
both countries relative poverty is expected to fall 
(by 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points respectively). The 
country where relative poverty is predicted to in-
crease the most in this period is Greece, by almost 
0.8 percentage points. However, this increase is not 
statistically significant.
Contrary to the overall AROP rates, the AROP rates 
by age group reveal important developments for 
certain population categories. The nowcasted es-
timates show that the changes in the poverty risk 
of elderly people are expected to be substantial in 
all countries except Germany. In the Baltic coun-
tries, as well as in Poland, Portugal and Romania, 
AROP rates among the elderly are predicted to rise. 
This finding suggests that, while the incomes of 
those close to the 60 % poverty line are generally 
keeping pace with growth at the median, this does 
not apply to pensions’ indexation, as captured in 
EUROMOD. The gender differences in relative pov-
erty observed in the three Baltic countries are also 
most likely to be related to the increased poverty 
rates observed among elderly women, especially 
widows. Relative poverty for those aged more than 
65 is also expected to rise in Greece, despite the 
substantial drop in the median income. Worryingly 
enough, it seems that the welfare state is unable to 
compensate for people’s losses and act as a safety 
net of last resort.
In Spain, Austria, Finland and France the elderly are 
expected to improve their relative position in terms 
of income. In Finland growth in wages was relatively 
slow, while pensions and some basic benefits were 
indexed favourably (in order to compensate for an 
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Table 19.1: Eurostat levels and nowcast change in mean income, median income and AROP rates, 
2012‑2013 income years
(mean and median in euros per year, unless otherwise specified; nowcast change in mean and 
median income in percent; nowcast change in AROP in percentage points)
Household income At risk of poverty
Level and change in % Rate and change in percentage points
Mean Median All Male Female Children (<18)
Adults 
(18‑64)
Elderly  
(65+)
Germany
Eurostat level 2012 22 471 19 582 16.1 15.0 17.2 14.7 16.9 14.9
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 1.2*** 1.2*** -0.1* -0.2* -0.1 0.1 -0.3** 0.1
Estonia
Eurostat level 2012 7 846 6 579 18.6 17.2 19.9 18.1 17.3 24.4
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 6.5*** 6.9*** 0.0 -0.6** 0.6* -0.5 -0.6** 2.9***
Greece
Eurostat level 2012 9 303 8 371 23.1 22.4 23.8 28.8 24.1 15.1
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 -10.1*** -10.0*** 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.6 1.8**
Spain
Eurostat level 2012 15 635 13 524 20.4 20.9 19.9 27.5 20.4 12.7
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 -0.2* -0.5 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.4* -1.3***
France
Eurostat level 2012 24 773 20 954 13.7 13.0 14.3 18.0 13.6 8.7
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 -2.3*** -1.0*** -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -1.3***
Latvia
Eurostat level 2012 4 028 3 279 19.4 18.9 19.8 23.4 18.8 17.6
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 4.2*** 4.1*** -0.6† -0.8* -0.4 -1.4* -1.0** 1.8***
Lithuania (in LTL)
Eurostat level 2012 19 500 16 223 20.6 19.4 21.6 26.9 19.0 19.4
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 4.5*** 4.9*** 0.4 0.1 0.6* 0.2 0.0 2.3***
Austria
Eurostat level 2012 24 366 22 073 14.4 13.5 15.2 18.6 12.9 15.4
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 0.7*** 0.3 0.4 0.6* 0.2 0.8* 0.5* -0.5†
Poland (in PLN)
Eurostat level 2012 25 007 21 610 17.3 17.3 17.3 23.2 16.7 12.3
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 5.8*** 5.6*** 0.2 0.2 0.2† 0.1 0.2† 0.4**
Portugal
Eurostat level 2012 9 897 8 170 18.7 18.8 18.6 24.4 18.4 14.6
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 -2.4*** -1.1* 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.7*
Romania (in RON)
Eurostat level 2012 10 560 9 213 22.4 22.3 22.5 32.1 21.5 15.0
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 4.5*** 3.5*** -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 0.6***
Finland
Eurostat level 2012 25 901 23 272 11.8 11.3 12.3 9.3 11.3 16.1
Nowcast change 
2012-2013 1.1*** 1.2*** -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.0 -1.1***
NB: Eurostat levels for 2012 income reference period based on EU-SILC 2013. Estimated changes between 2012-2013 are statistically significant at 
the: † 90 % level, * 95 % level, ** 99 % level, *** 99.9 % level. Significance is tested using the DASP module for Stata. Information on the sample 
design of EU-SILC 2010 is derived following Goedemé (2010) and using do files Svyset EU-SILC 2010 provided at: http://timgoedeme.com/
eu-silc-standard-errors/. Only sampling error is taken into account.
Reading note: In 2012, mean household disposable income in Germany was 22 471 euros per year. Between 2012 and 2013 it is predicted to grow 
by 1.2 %. Overall AROP rate was 16.1 % in 2012 and it is expected to decline by 0.1 percentage points in 2013.
Source: Eurostat web-database, codes ilc_li02 and ilc_di03 (accessed on Jan 19, 2015), EUROMOD Version G2.0.
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increase in VAT rate). In Spain small pensions (below 
1 000 EUR) were indexed with a preferential rate in 
2013. In France, the AROP rate among the elderly is 
falling, but in the context of a falling median. This 
does not seem to have an effect on the AROP rate for 
working age and children, suggesting that pensions 
are being maintained relative to other incomes.
Latvia is the only country where a significant reduc-
tion in child poverty is expected (by 1.37 percent-
age points). This is likely to be related to the intro-
duction of a more generous childcare benefit and 
the removal of ceilings on parental leave benefits 
in 2013. In Austria, in contrast, child poverty is ex-
pected to rise (by 0.84 percentage points). A plau-
sible explanation for this development is the fact 
that child-related benefit amounts have been kept 
nominally constant over this period, causing the 
value of the benefits to erode both in real terms and 
relative to other incomes. Finally, income poverty in 
the working-age population is expected to decline 
in Latvia, Estonia and, to a lesser extent, Germany.
19.4 Discussion
The accuracy of the nowcasts depends on a num-
ber of factors. This section attempts to clarify these 
factors and describe the micro and macroeconom-
ic developments that the nowcasting estimates are 
meant to capture.
Figure 19.1 presents the nowcasted AROP estimates 
for income years 2009-2013 together with the actu-
al EU-SILC indicators for income years 2009-2012. It 
can be seen that in most cases the two estimates 
Figure 19.1: At‑risk‑of‑poverty rates (threshold: 60 % of median): Eurostat and nowcasted 
estimates 2009‑2012/2013 income years
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follow the same trends and fall within the bounda-
ries of the nowcasted confidence intervals. In some 
countries where this is not the case (most notably 
in Latvia, Lithuania and Austria), the discrepancies 
are most likely to have been caused by backward 
revisions in the EU-SILC data. This is also the reason 
for the discrepancies between the nowcasted and 
the Eurostat level of AROP in 2009. These revisions 
were performed by the national statistical offices 
in order to smooth out the effects of the structural 
breaks that occurred in the data series. EUROMOD 
does not include such revisions as the input data 
are usually based on early releases of EU-SILC. In 
these cases the estimates show the evolution of 
income poverty had the breaks not occurred.
The method that we have adopted attempts to 
account for the transitions that are likely to explain 
a major part of changes in the income distribution 
over the period 2009-2013: into and out of employ-
ment, and from short-term to long-term unemploy-
ment. The total number of simulated labour market 
transitions in the (EU-SILC based) EUROMOD input 
data and their direction are determined by chang-
es in employment as shown in the LFS. As noted 
in Rastrigina et al. (2015), employment dynamics do 
not always move in the same way over time in the 
LFS and EU-SILC. There are several reasons for the 
discrepancies between employment measures in 
the two surveys, such as differences in definitions, 
imputations, survey methodology, as well as op-
erational differences that may affect the nature of 
non-response and sampling errors. The magnitude 
of changes differs significantly in the case of Greece 
and Spain, and is considered as one of the main 
reasons for the observed discrepancies between 
the nowcasted and the Eurostat AROP estimations. 
In the case of Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Austria, 
Romania, and Finland employment dynamics in the 
two surveys move in a consistent way.
While changes in the labour market are carefully 
taken into account, no similar adjustments are made 
to account for demographic changes or changes in 
the composition of households. Usually such chang-
es are less critical within a short-term time frame, as 
major shifts are unlikely to happen. However, in Lat-
via and Lithuania (where the recent financial crisis 
has led to large emigration flows) and in Greece and 
Spain (where the composition of households has 
shifted towards the formation of larger households 
in order to share resources) the nowcast estimates 
have to be interpreted with caution.
Using a tax-benefit microsimulation model allows 
us to simulate the distributional effects of tax-ben-
efit policy changes with a high degree of accura-
cy. And yet, for all the effort put into capturing as 
much detail as possible, aspects remain which may 
still be too simplified. For example, an important 
factor that needs to be captured in a detailed way 
is the change in the distribution of market income, 
especially earnings. During periods of crisis wages 
might follow different trends across regions, sec-
tors, occupations, firms, etc. However, statistics on 
wage dynamics at such level of detail are usually 
not available or are available with a significant de-
lay. This limits the potential to model changes in 
the distribution of market income in EUROMOD. 
Thus, there is a strong case for improving the level 
of detail and timeliness of macro-level statistics on 
the evolution of earnings, and for investing in the 
harmonisation of such statistics at the EU level.
Finally, for the purposes of nowcasting EUROMOD 
results are calibrated to better match the poverty 
estimates from EU-SILC. As already discussed, AROP 
rates that are calculated using simulated incomes 
may diverge from those calculated by Eurostat 
for reasons of precision of tax-benefit simulations, 
benefit non take-up and tax evasion, small differ-
ences in income concepts and definitions, un-
der-reporting of income in EU-SILC, etc. (Figari et al., 
2012; Jara and Leventi, 2014). Calibration factors are 
calculated for 2009 and are then applied to all lat-
er years based on the assumption that EUROMOD 
estimates for disposable income deviate from the 
equivalent EU-SILC estimates in a fixed way across 
time. This assumption does not necessarily hold for 
all households. However, in most cases the predict-
ed changes in the AROP rates shown in Table 19.1 
are not affected by the calibration procedure.
19.5 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate how 
microsimulation can be used to estimate more 
timely indicators of income distribution for all EU 
countries in a comparable setting. As a demonstra-
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tion of this method, AROP rates were estimated for 
2009-2013 for a total of 12 EU countries. The perfor-
mance of the method was assessed by comparing 
the predictions with actual EU-SILC indicators for 
the years for which the latter are available.
The microsimulation model EUROMOD was used to 
simulate direct tax and benefit policies in each coun-
try and year that is considered. Building on Navicke 
et al. (2013a) and Rastrigina et al. (2015), changes in 
the labour market were taken into account by sim-
ulating transitions between labour market states. 
A logit model was used for estimating probabilities 
for working age individuals in the EU-SILC based 
EUROMOD input data. The total number of individ-
uals that were selected to go through transitions 
corresponds to the relative net change in employ-
ment levels by age group, gender and education as 
shown in the LFS macro-level statistics.
The most important nowcasted results can be sum-
marised as follows. With the exception of Spain and 
Austria, both mean and median incomes in 2013 are 
significantly different (in the statistical sense) from 
their 2012 levels in all countries studied. Some of 
the highest increases in mean and median incomes 
are predicted for the three Baltic countries, Poland 
and Romania. For the Baltics, this development is 
mostly related to the return of the region to the 
path of economic growth. At the other extreme, the 
biggest reduction in the median income is expect-
ed in Greece (-10 %). Whereas changes in the total 
AROP rate are relatively small and not statistically 
significant in most of the countries, relative poverty 
rates by age group change considerably for certain 
population categories. Relative poverty for those 
aged more than 65 is expected to rise in the Baltic 
countries, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Romania 
and child poverty is expected to increase in Austria. 
These findings might serve as an indication for coun-
try and population-specific policy interventions.
The accuracy of predictions depends on the reli-
ability of employment adjustments, the precision 
of tax-benefit policy simulations, and the compa-
rability of external macroeconomic indicators to 
the actual trends observed in the EU-SILC data. 
While the first two are under the direct influence 
of the authors, the latter depends critically on the 
consistency of different sources of statistics with-
in countries. Structural breaks in the EU-SILC data 
series also affect the comparability of statistics. 
The existence of transparent documentation on 
the methodological changes in the EU-SILC data 
would contribute to a better understanding of the 
discrepancies observed between the nowcasted 
and EU-SILC results and would enhance the trust-
worthiness of the EU-SILC estimates.
There is scope to improve the nowcasting method-
ology by, e.g. experimenting with different ways of 
modelling employment changes: altering the un-
derlying econometric model, selection logics and 
transition types. This is a further step that should 
be undertaken in combination with comprehen-
sive validation of results in a wider range of coun-
tries, economic conditions and over a larger num-
ber of indicators.
Despite certain limitations, nowcasting the main 
income related poverty indicators has the poten-
tial to facilitate monitoring of the effects of the 
most recent changes in tax-benefit policies and 
macroeconomic conditions on poverty risk. Given 
the relevance of these issues to evidence-based 
policy-making, we believe that this approach con-
stitutes a sound alternative to waiting until official 
statistics are made available and can provide valu-
able ex ante information on potential distributional 
effects of contemporary economic and policy-re-
lated developments.
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20.1 Introduction
The EU portfolio of social indicators includes materi-
al deprivation (MD) measures (169) which have been 
endorsed by EU Member States and the European 
Commission as a response to the need to comple-
ment EU income poverty and social exclusion indi-
cators with indicators that better reflect differences 
in actual standards of living across the EU. Based on 
the limited information available from EU-SILC and 
building on the work by Guio (2009), the ‘standard’ 
EU MD rate is currently defined as the proportion of 
people living in households who cannot afford at 
least three out of nine items. (See Chapter 10 in this 
book for a presentation of these items and a discus-
sion of their robustness; see also Guio et al. (2012) for 
more elaborate discussion and analysis.)
The importance of EU MD indicators has grown 
considerably since 2010, when EU leaders launched 
(168) Anne-Catherine Guio and Eric Marlier are from LISER 
(Luxembourg) and Marco Pomati from Cardiff University 
(UK). This work has been supported by the second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. 
We would to thank Anthony B. Atkinson, Björn Halleröd, 
Céline Thévenot, Guillaume Osier, Paola Serafino and Richard 
Tonkin for fruitful discussions and interesting comments. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email 
address for correspondence: anne-catherine.guio@liser.lu.
(169) On the EU portfolio of social indicators used by Member 
States and the European Commission for monitoring progress 
towards the EU social protection and social inclusion 
objectives, see Chapter 1 of this volume. And on the use of EU 
social indicators as well as the methodological EU framework 
under which these are developed, see: Atkinson et al. (2002), 
Marlier et al. (2007) and Social Protection Committee (2015).
the Europe 2020 strategy and set in this context 
an EU social inclusion target (see Chapter 1 in this 
book for a short presentation of the target). Indeed, 
one of the three indicators this target is based on 
is a measure of ‘severe’ MD (SMD), which is built 
exactly in the same way as the EU ‘standard’ meas-
ure agreed in 2009 but with a threshold set at four 
rather than three enforced lacks (for the concept 
of ‘enforced lack’, see Chapter 10). The two other 
indicators used in the EU target are the standard 
EU indicator of income poverty (AROP) and the EU 
measure of (quasi-)joblessness.
The Great Recession in 2007-2008 had a dramat-
ic impact on the living conditions of EU citizens. 
The total number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion in the EU-27 decreased by around 
10.4 million between 2005 and 2009 and then 
increased by 8 million between 2009 and 2012. 
During the same periods, the changes in the lev-
el of severe MD were even more impressive: first 
a decrease by 12.2 million between 2005 and 2009 
due to general living conditions improvements 
(mainly in Eastern countries) and then an increase 
by 8.7 million between 2009 and 2012 as a result of 
the economic and financial crisis. (See Chapter 1 in 
this book (Figure 1.1) for these and also more recent 
data that were not available at the time of writing 
the present chapter.)
The key objective of this chapter is to analyse the 
evolution of MD over time across the EU and to 
explore the impact of the Great Recession on this 
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evolution. Both the cross-sectional and longitu-
dinal EU-SILC data are used. The chapter looks at 
the changes in national trajectories of MD (before 
and during/after the Recession) — considering in 
turn incidence, severity and persistence aspects. To 
better capture the dynamics of MD, it analyses the 
national flows of people entering into/exiting from 
MD each year. Finally, it also explores the impact of 
different ‘trigger events’ as well as individual and 
household characteristics on entry rates into MD.
20.2 National trends in 
incidence and severity of 
material deprivation
The overall EU evolution hides a large diversity of 
national evolution of living conditions — as illus-
trated in Figure 20.1, which presents the 2005-2012 
evolution of the standard MD measure (i.e. people 
lacking at least three items out of the nine items 
considered) in the EU-27 Member States. In this fig-
ure, countries are grouped into four clusters accord-
ing to the (broad) shape of their MD trend:
1. The first cluster consists of four Central/Eastern 
countries, national MD rates decrease during 
the whole period, quite sharply in Poland and 
Slovakia, and more smoothly in Romania and 
the Czech Republic.
2. The second cluster includes six Eastern/South-
ern countries, with MD rates that decrease 
sharply before the crisis and then increase, 
sometimes quite dramatically, with the crisis 
(Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and to a lesser 
extent Bulgaria and Hungary).
3. The third cluster includes ten countries; all of 
them are ‘old’ Member States except for Slo-
venia. The general trends are relatively flat. Al-
though there may have been annual changes, 
there are no clear increase/decrease during the 
whole period. All these countries have low MD 
rates.
4. The seven countries in the fourth cluster wit-
ness relatively flat trends in the pre-crisis period, 
but MD rates increase sharply with the crisis. Ex-
cept for Malta, these countries are ‘old’ Member 
States, whose living standards decreased dra-
matically as a result of the crisis (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom).
The MD indicator presented in Figure 20.1 provides 
very useful evidence on the incidence of MD but 
does not inform on its severity. One way of captur-
ing the severity of MD is to look at the proportion of 
people severely deprived (i.e. those lacking at least 
four items (SMD)) among those deprived (i.e. those 
lacking at least three items) (170).
Figures 20.2a and 20.2b decompose each national 
trend into the trend in the proportion of people 
lacking at least four items (SMD) and the changes 
in the proportion of people lacking exactly three 
items. As can be seen from these numbers, during 
the 2005-2008 period, in five out of the nine coun-
tries where MD decreases by at least 4 percentage 
points (Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Re-
public), this trend is mainly driven by a decrease in 
SMD. In Estonia, the trend is driven equally by a de-
crease in SMD and in the proportion of those expe-
riencing exactly three deprivations. In Hungary, the 
proportion of people suffering from SMD decreases 
whereas that of those suffering from exactly three 
deprivation items increases.
In the 2008-2013 period, in countries where MD in-
creases dramatically, both the proportion of SMD 
and that of people lacking exactly three items in-
crease — except (again) in Hungary (where SMD in-
creases sharply whereas the percentage of people 
lacking exactly three items decreases slightly) and 
in Latvia (and to a lesser extent Malta) where the 
percentage of people lacking exactly three items 
did not change. In many countries (Bulgaria, United 
Kingdom, Latvia, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary and 
Greece), the severity of deprivation increases: SMD 
increases more than the proportion of people suf-
fering from three deprivations.
In this section, we looked at MD incidence and se-
verity at one point in time, making use of EU-SILC 
cross-sectional data. The next section introduces 
dynamic analyses, taking advantage of the longitu-
dinal component of EU-SILC.
(170) See also Calvert and Nolan (2012).
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Figure 20.2: Change in national MD levels, decomposed in variation of proportion of people 
severely deprived and of proportion of people lacking exactly 3 items, 2005‑2008 and 2008‑2013
(percentage points)
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b) 2008‑2013
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Po
la
nd
Ro
m
an
ia
A
us
tr
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Fi
nl
an
d
Be
lg
iu
m
Fr
an
ce
Cz
ec
h
Re
pu
bl
ic
G
er
m
an
y
Sw
ed
en
Sl
ov
en
ia
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
rt
ug
al
Bu
lg
ar
ia
D
en
m
ar
k
Sp
ai
n
Es
to
ni
a
Li
th
ua
ni
a
U
ni
te
d
Ki
ng
do
m
La
tv
ia
Ita
ly
M
al
ta
Cy
pr
us
H
un
ga
ry
G
re
ec
e
SMD MD3
Reading note: In 2005-2008, the MD rate in Latvia decreased by 21.1 percentage points (pp) which can be split into a decrease in severe MD by 
19.9 pp. and a decrease in exactly three deprivation items by 1.2 pp.
Source: Eurostat web-database, code ilc_sip8. No data for Bulgaria and Romania in 2005.
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20.3 Dynamic analysis of 
material deprivation
20.3.1 Stock versus flux
Material deprivation is not a static phenomenon. 
Some people are persistently deprived whereas oth-
ers suffer from transient/ recurrent MD episode(s). In 
this section, we start by analysing MD on the basis 
of the most recent EU-SILC longitudinal data avail-
able at the time of writing, i.e. the 2009-2012 Waves. 
We look at people who have been deprived at least 
once during these 4 years and those who have been 
‘persistently deprived’ throughout the period. For the 
latter, we use the same concept as the one used at EU 
level for the indicator of at-persistent-risk-of-poverty, 
i.e. people persistently deprived are people living in 
households that are deprived in year N as well as in 
at least 2 out of the preceding 3 years (N‑1, N‑2 and 
N‑3). Figure 20.3 compares for each Member State the 
average proportion of people deprived during the 
period 2009-2012 and the share of people deprived at 
least once during this period. On average, the latter is 
1.6 times the former.
Among these people who were deprived at least 
once during the period 2009-2012, some went 
through a transient episode of MD whereas oth-
ers were ‘recurrently’ deprived or ‘persistently’ de-
prived (see for example Muffels et al. (1999)). These 
different situations can have different consequenc-
es on people’s lives.
Figure 20.4 presents for each EU country the pro-
portion of people persistently deprived in 2012, 
and compares this proportion with the average 
Figure 20.3: Average (standard) MD rate in 2009‑2012 (cross‑sectional) and proportion of people 
who have been deprived at least once during that period (longitudinal)
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NB: No data for Ireland and Germany. In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: the 2011 data are used instead of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of 
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Reading note: In Latvia, the average MD rate during the period 2009-2012 is 44 % (EU-SILC cross-sectional dataset). During the same period, the 
proportion of people who were deprived at least once reaches 68 %, i.e. around 50 % more (EU-SILC longitudinal dataset).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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cross-sectional MD rate (2009-2012). Both series 
are strongly correlated (correlation coefficient of 
0.98) (171). Table 20.1 presents the confidence in-
tervals of the persistent MD rate (2009-2012). (For 
a discussion of the precision and reliability of the 
persistent poverty indicator, see Chapter 22 in this 
book.)
As in Jenkins and Van Kerm (2014) for income pov-
erty, we find a quasi-linear relationship between 
the persistent MD indicator and the current MD 
(171) It is important to keep in mind that the MD rate computed on 
the basis of the EU-SILC cross-sectional dataset differs from 
the one calculated from the EU-SILC longitudinal dataset. 
The degree of divergence between these two rates varies 
between countries and between years. Figures on the degree 
of divergence are available on demand. See also Glaser et al. 
(2015) for a discussion of the coherence between longitudinal 
and cross-sectional poverty rate.
indicator. Furthermore, we find that the level of 
persistent MD is proportionally higher in highly 
deprived countries. This means that countries with 
higher MD level also tend to suffer from a propor-
tionally higher level of persistent MD (see Figure 
20.5). However, this relation varies between coun-
tries. So, for example, with similar levels of MD, the 
share of persistently deprived among those de-
prived is much higher in Slovakia than in Estonia, 
Malta or Italy, higher in Netherlands than in Den-
mark, in Luxembourg than in Sweden, in Belgium 
than in France, etc. To better understand the rela-
tionship between annual and persistent MD lev-
els and what has been the impact of the crisis on 
these indicators, we need to look at the transitions 
between years, i.e. the probability of entering into 
or exiting from MD.
Figure 20.4: Average MD rate in 2009‑2012 (cross‑sectional) and proportion of people who have 
been persistently deprived during that period (longitudinal)
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NB: People persistently deprived are people living in households who are deprived in 2012 and also in at least two of the three preceding years 
(2009-2011). In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: the 2011 data are used instead of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of data for these countries 
in the longitudinal 2012 database. No data for Ireland and Germany.
Reading note: In Bulgaria, the average MD rate during the period 2009-2012 is 59 % (EU-SILC cross-sectional dataset). During the same period, the 
proportion of people who are persistently deprived is 51 % (EU-SILC longitudinal dataset).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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20.3.2 Entry rates into MD and exit 
rates from MD
To better capture the dynamics of MD, we now 
look at the flow of people entering into/exiting 
from MD each year during the period considered 
(2009-2012). Exit rates are defined as the propor-
tion of people not deprived in year N among those 
who were deprived in year N‑1; and entry rates are 
defined as the proportion of people deprived in 
year N among those not deprived in year N‑1. Fig-
ure 20.6 presents the average entry rates and exit 
rates for the EU countries available in the Septem-
ber 2014 EU-SILC UDB (all 28 Member States except 
Germany, Ireland and Croatia), for the pooled na-
tional data covering the period 2009-2012; coun-
tries are grouped according to their level of MD. 
On average for the EU-27 as a whole, during this 
period, 6.7 % of people not deprived in one year 
fall into MD the following year whereas 33.6 % of 
those suffering from MD manage to escape from 
MD. Exit and entry rates are negatively correlated 
(0.7), meaning that countries with high entry rates 
tend to have low exit rates, but this association var-
ies substantially between countries, as highlight-
ed in Figure 20.6. (See Chapter 23 in this book for 
a similar analysis of income poverty.)
Table 20.1: Confidence interval of the MD persistent rate, 2012
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a probability of 95 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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Figure 20.5: MD rate in 2012 (cross‑sectional) and share of people persistently deprived 
(2009‑2012) among those deprived in 2012 (longitudinal)
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NB: See Figure 20.4. The 2012 share of persistent MD in MD is the ratio between the percentage of people persistently deprived during the 
period 2009-2012 and the MD rate computed on the basis of the EU-SILC longitudinal dataset (2012).
Reading note: In the United Kingdom, the MD rate is 17 % and the share of persistent MD in MD is 54 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
Figure 20.7 clearly shows the negative correlation 
between the average exit rates (2009-2012) and 
the shares of persistent MD in MD (2012). Figure 
20.8 shows the positive relationship between the 
average entry rate (2009-2012) and the average 
cross-sectional MD rate computed for the same 
period. As shown previously in Figure 20.5, Bul-
garia, Latvia, Romania and Hungary combine very 
high average MD rates and shares of persistent MD 
in MD. Figures 20.7 and 20.8 show that this is due 
to a very high proportion of people falling into MD 
combined with a very low probability of escaping 
this situation for those suffering from MD. Lithua-
nia and Poland are in the same group as these four 
countries in Figure 20.7 (very low exit rates and 
very high shares of persistent MD in MD). When 
comparing Lithuania and Latvia, the difference in 
MD rates between the two countries is explained 
by the lower entry rate in Lithuania, whereas exit 
rates are similar. Poland is in an intermediate situ-
ation, with very low exit rates and ‘medium’ entry 
rates, leading to very high share of persistent MD in 
MD but only ‘relatively high’ average MD rates. If we 
now compare Cyprus with France, the United King-
dom, Italy and Estonia, we see that exit rates are rel-
atively high in these five countries (Figure 20.7). But 
the much higher entry rate in Cyprus (higher than 
in Lithuania) leads to a much higher average MD 
rate in this country compared with France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Estonia.
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Figure 20.6: Rates of entry into and exit from MD, countries grouped according to the average 
MD value, 2009‑2012 pooled data
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NB: In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: the 2011 data are used instead of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of data for these countries in the 
longitudinal 2012 database. No data for Ireland and Germany. Countries are grouped according to their level of MD.
Reading note: In Bulgaria, the entry rate attains almost 20 % and the exit rate 12 %. With an average MD rate close to 60 % (see Figure 20.4), 
Bulgaria is in the group of countries with the highest level of MD (together with Hungary, Romania, Lithuania and Latvia).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
This provides concrete examples of the added val-
ue of panel data — by looking at both entry into/ 
exit from MD, they allow for a better understand-
ing of national differences in the levels of annual 
MD and persistent MD; and can explain in particu-
lar why countries with similar annual MD rates can 
have different persistent MD rates.
Let us now explore further the entry/exit dynamics, 
by looking at their evolution over time.
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Figure 20.8: Average entry rate (2009‑2012) and average cross‑sectional MD rate (2009‑2012)
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NB: No data for Ireland and Germany. In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: the 2011 data are used instead of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of 
data for these countries in the longitudinal 2012 database.
Reading note: In Bulgaria, the entry rate is almost 20 % and the average MD rate 59 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
Figure 20.7: Average exit rate (2009‑2012) and share of persistent MD in MD (2012)
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NB: The 2012 share of persistent MD in MD is the ratio between the percentage of people persistently deprived during the period 2009-2012 and 
the MD rate computed on the basis of the EU-SILC longitudinal dataset (2012). In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: the 2011 data are used instead 
of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of data for these countries in the longitudinal 2012 database. No data for Ireland and Germany.
Reading note: In Bulgaria, the share of persistent MD is 83 % and the exit rate 12 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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20.3.3 Evolution of entry and exit 
rates
An increase in MD over time may result from an in-
crease in the percentage of people who fall into 
MD and/or a decrease in the shares of people who 
manage to exit from MD. Figure 20.9 illustrates this 
evolution for a subset of countries. The countries 
presented belong to the different clusters presented 
in Figure 20.1, based on the shape of the recent na-
tional MD trends. Figure 20.9a presents the evolution 
of exit/entry rates for Poland, Romania and Slovakia, 
i.e. countries which had a positive trend (decrease in 
MD) throughout the period, even though this trend 
has slowed down since the crisis. This positive trend 
is mainly explained by a decrease in entry rates, as 
exit rates were quite stable in Poland and Slovakia 
and were decreasing in Romania (i.e. the risk of being 
trapped into MD for those in this situation increases 
but the risk to fall into MD decreases in Romania). This 
is an important result, indicating that in countries 
where MD decreased a lot during the last years, the 
risk of being trapped into MD did not fall, hence the 
high risk of persistent MD. Figure 20.9b presents the 
evolution of exit/entry rates for Bulgaria, Lithuania 
and Latvia, i.e. countries where trends in annual MD 
levels followed a U-shape. In Bulgaria and Latvia, the 
pre-crisis improvement was mainly due to a diminu-
tion in entry rates, but also an increase in exit rates. 
In Bulgaria, the crisis had a major negative impact 
on exit rates and in Latvia on both exit and entry 
rates (which in 2010 were back to their 2007 levels). 
In Lithuania, before the crisis, the main trend is a de-
crease in the entry rate; after the crisis, the entry rate 
increases back to its 2006 level and the exit rate de-
creases substantially (at a lower level than in 2006). To 
sum up, in Lithuania and Latvia the major pre-crisis 
improvements in exit rates (Latvia) or in entry rates 
(Lithuania and Latvia) have been lost as a result of 
the crisis. Figure 20.9c illustrates the case of countries 
where the crisis resulted in an increase in MD levels 
after a relatively flat trend (Italy, Greece). The crisis led 
to increases in entry rates, and a decrease in exit rates 
in the last years.
Figure 20.9: Evolution of the entry and exit rates, 2006‑2012
(%)
a) Examples of countries where MD levels decrease during the whole period (cluster 1 in Figure 20.1)
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b) Examples of countries where MD levels decrease before the crisis and then increase (cluster 2 
(U shape) in Figure 20.1)
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c) Examples of countries where MD levels increase during the crisis after a relatively flat trend 
(cluster 3 in Figure 20.1)
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NB: In Romania and Slovakia, there are no data in the longitudinal 2012 database.
Reading note: In Poland, the entry rate diminishes during the period (2006-2011, i.e. ‘06’ and ‘11’ in the figure) whereas the exit rate remains quite 
constant.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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It is, however, important to keep in mind that the 
confidence intervals for the entry and exit rates 
may be very large, depending on the sample 
sizes of the deprived group in the country (see 
Table 20.2).
To avoid over-interpreting erratic annual evo-
lutions, we present in Table 20.3 the average 
exit/entry rates for two sub-periods: the pre-cri-
sis period (2005-2008) and the post-crisis period 
(2008-2012). Countries are ranked according to the 
evolution between 2008 and 2012 of the cross-sec-
tional national MD rates. Figures highlighted in 
green depict favourable evolutions (a diminution 
of cross-sectional MD rates during the crisis or 
a diminution of average entry rates or an increase 
in average exit rates) whereas figures highlighted in 
red show unfavourable trends.
Important results from Table 20.3 are as follows:
• in countries where MD increases most (Latvia, 
Estonia, Italy, Greece and Lithuania), both entry 
and exit rates have deteriorated.
• at the other extreme, in Slovakia, Poland, Austria 
and (though to a lesser extent) Romania, the 
decrease in MD seems to be due to a decrease 
in entry rates rather than an increase in exit 
rates.
• there are a number of countries with highly 
varying MD levels, where exit rates diminish 
during the crisis by more than 5 percentage 
points (see last column of the table, cells in red 
or orange) and where persistent MD therefore 
increases.
Table 20.2: Confidence intervals for the exit and entry rates, 2012
(%)
Confidence interval Confidence interval
Exit Rate Lower bound Upper bound Entry rate Lower bound Upper bound
Belgium 33.9 28.3 39.5 4.3 3.4 5.2
Bulgaria 7.9 6.4 9.4 17.4 15.0 19.8
Czech Republic 29.8 25.8 33.8 5.9 5.0 6.8
Denmark 33.0 21.9 44.1 3.1 2.2 4.0
Estonia 35.7 31.2 40.2 9.7 8.3 11.1
Greece 19.8 16.4 23.2 14.7 12.6 16.8
Spain 48.3 43.5 53.1 9.1 8.1 10.1
Finland 46.5 40.1 52.9 3.6 3.0 4.2
Hungary 16.3 14.6 18.0 14.6 13.3 15.9
Italy 35.5 31.9 39.1 13.0 11.7 14.3
Cyprus 34.3 30.0 38.6 17.5 15.4 19.6
Latvia 29.9 27.4 32.4 20.2 18.0 22.4
Lithuania 25.2 22.1 28.3 13.2 11.4 15.0
Luxembourg 58.2 47.8 68.6 1.7 1.0 2.4
Malta 26.6 21.8 31.4 4.7 3.8 5.6
Netherlands 38.3 29.7 46.9 2.6 1.9 3.3
Austria 35.9 29.8 42.0 3.5 2.8 4.2
Poland 17.0 15.8 18.2 6.7 6.3 7.1
Portugal 30.3 26.5 34.1 9.9 8.6 11.2
Slovenia 43.3 39.9 46.7 8.7 7.8 9.6
United Kingdom 32.2 27.0 37.4 6.7 5.7 7.7
NB: See Table 20.1.
Reading note: In Denmark, the estimated exit rate in 2012 attains 33 %; the value of the true estimate is between 21.9 % and 44.1 %, with 
a probability of 95 %.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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• specifically, Bulgaria combines a major improve-
ment in its entry rate and a major deterioration 
in its exit rate, meaning that even though fewer 
people enter into MD, those who are deprived 
have less chance to escape from it.
Table 20.3: Average exit/entry rates for two sub‑periods (2009‑2012 and 2005‑2008) and 
cross‑sectional evolution of MD rate (2008‑2012)
(%)
 
Cross sectional MD rate Entry rate Exit rate
2008 2012 Difference 2005‑2008
2009‑
2012 Difference
2005‑
2008
2009‑
2012 Difference
Slovakia 27.8 22.7 -5.1 12.2 8.3 -3.9 38.2 34.2 -4.0
Poland 32.3 27.8 -4.5 9.3 7.5 -1.8 26.1 22.9 -3.3
Austria 13.7 9.8 -3.9 6.3 3.7 -2.6 49 40.4 -8.6
Romania 50.3 48.0 -2.3 20.2 17.3 -2.9 26.7 19.7 -6.9
Portugal 23.0 21.8 -1.2 9.1 9.5 0.4 35.9 33.7 -2.2
France 13.1 12.8 -0.3 5.0 4.5 -0.5 40.2 39.2 -1.1
Finland 9.1 8.9 -0.2 3.1 3.4 0.3 45.4 45.1 -0.3
Sweden 4.6 4.4 -0.2 2.2 1.8 -0.5 56.5 59.6 3.1
Slovenia 16.9 16.9 0.0 9.8 9.2 -0.6 40.3 43.1 2.8
Czech 
Republic 16.2 16.8 0.6 5.2 6.2 1.0 32.0 30.2 -1.8
Belgium 11.6 12.5 0.9 3.9 4.1 0.2 37.4 33.3 -4.1
Luxembourg 3.5 4.5 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.1 56.4 55.9 -0.5
Netherlands 5.2 6.5 1.3 2.1 2.3 0.2 42.7 42.8 0.1
Denmark 5.4 7.5 2.1 2.2 2.6 0.4 57.2 40.3 -16.9
United 
Kingdom 11.3 16.6 5.3 4.7 6.5 1.9 45.7 36.2 -9.5
Spain 10.8 16.3 5.5 5.2 8.5 3.3 55.5 49.7 -5.8
Malta 13.7 19.8 6.1 n.a. 4.9 n.a. n.a. 28.4 n.a.
Cyprus 24.9 31.5 6.6 11.9 16.9 50 41.7 38.0 -3.6
Bulgaria 55.0 61.6 6.6 32.7 19.8 -12.9 30.1 12.3 -17.8
Hungary 37.1 44.0 6.9 16.4 15.2 -1.1 29.6 18.8 -10.8
Latvia 35.7 44.6 8.9 13.9 22.0 8.1 31.3 27.0 -4.4
Estonia 12.4 21.3 8.9 6.2 10.4 4.2 50.6 36.8 -13.8
Italy 16.1 25.2 9.1 6.7 13.0 6.3 41.5 36.6 -4.9
Greece 21.8 33.7 11.9 8.2 12.4 4.2 34.6 24.4 -10.2
Lithuania 22.2 34.4 12.2 12.3 15.1 2.8 36.0 25.1 -10.9
NB: Countries are ranked according to national cross-sectional MD rates. No data for Ireland and Germany. In Romania, Sweden and Slovakia: 
the 2011 data are used instead of the 2012 data, due to non-availability of data for these countries in the longitudinal 2012 database. The colour 
of the cells varies between dark green (strong improvement) and dark red (strong deterioration); no colour means status quo. ‘n.a.’ means not 
available.
Reading note: In Latvia, the MD rate increased by 8.9 percentage points (pp) between 2008 and 2012 (from 35.7 % to 44.6 %). The average entry 
rate increased by 8.1 pp. between the 2005-2008 and 2008-2012 periods. The average exit rate declined by 4.4 pp. These three figures are 
highlighted in red to show a deterioration.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB September 2014.
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Figure 20.10 illustrates the impact of different ‘trig-
ger events’ as well as individual and household 
characteristics on the entry rate into MD. It presents 
odds ratios, which are one of the main ways of 
quantifying how strongly the presence or absence 
of an event/ characteristic A is associated with the 
presence or absence of an event/ characteristic B in 
a given population. If the odds ratio is significantly 
greater (in the statistical sense) than one, then the 
event/ characteristic ‘A’ is considered to be posi-
tively associated with the event/ characteristic ‘B’, 
in the sense that experiencing ‘A’ raises (relative to 
not experiencing ‘A’) the odds of experiencing ‘B’. 
In Figure 20.10, the loss of employment appears as 
the main risk factor (odds ratio of around 2.5). Oth-
er job-related factors, such as change to part-time 
hours or inactivity are not clearly associated with 
immediate experience of MD. Partnership dissolu-
tion also increases the risk of entering into MD (see 
Vandecasteele, 2010). Bad health also increases this 
risk — this confirms previous results (see Fusco, 
Guio, Marlier, 2010) showing that the presence of 
at least one person in bad health in the household 
seems to have no statistically significant impact on 
the risk of income poverty but is associated with 
higher risk of MD. Low educational level and being 
a lone parent or living alone also impact on the risk 
of entering into MD. Other factors are also likely to 
shape the relationship between unemployment 
and MD and were not tested: for example, the in-
come of other household members, the length of 
unemployment and the degree of income replace-
ment via social transfers may prevent the experi-
ence of MD.
Figure 20.10: Impact of different ‘trigger events’ as well as individual and household 
characteristics on the entry rate into MD, odds ratio, logistic regression, robust standard error, 
EU‑27, 2008‑2011
(people aged 18‑59 years)
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Reading note: People who lost their job have 2.5 times more risk of entering into MD than those who did not. When a vertical bar (black vertical 
line) crosses the blue horizontal line, this indicates that the variable has no statistically significant effect on the MD entry risk.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013.
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20.4 Conclusions
The Great Recession had a dramatic impact on 
the level of material deprivation in a number of EU 
countries. At EU level, after an impressive decrease 
of MD by 12.2 million between 2005 and 2009 due 
to general living conditions improvements (mainly 
in Eastern countries), MD increased by 8.7 million 
from 2009 to 2012 as a result of the crisis.
In this chapter, we identified four clusters of coun-
tries that differ in terms of MD levels and evolutions:
• Cluster 1: in these four Central/Eastern countries 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), 
national MD rates decrease during the whole 
period covered, even if this improvement 
slowed down during the crisis.
• Cluster 2: in these six Eastern/Southern 
countries (the three Baltic States, Cyprus and to 
a lesser extent Bulgaria and Hungary), MD rates 
decreases sharply before the crisis and then 
increase significantly, sometimes back to very 
high levels registered a few years before the 
crisis.
• Cluster 3: in these ten countries, all of them 
‘old’ Member States except for Slovenia, the 
general trend is relatively flat; there are no clear 
increase/decrease during the whole period. All 
these countries have low MD rates.
• Cluster 4: these seven countries witness 
relatively flat trends in the pre-crisis period, but 
MD rates increase sharply with the crisis. Except 
for Malta, these countries are ‘old’ Member 
States, whose living standards decreased 
dramatically as a result of the crisis (Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom).
In terms of MD national trends, the severity of MD 
increased with the crisis in many countries, i.e. the 
percentage of people lacking at least four items 
grew more than that of those lacking three items.
We showed that overall the share of persistent MD 
in MD is high in highly deprived countries: In coun-
tries with higher MD levels, a greater proportion 
of materially deprived people experience persis-
tent MD. There are, however, countries with similar 
MD rates which have different persistent MD share 
among the deprived. To better capture the dynam-
ics of MD, we then looked at the national flows of 
people entering into/ exiting from MD each year, 
showing again the large diversity of national sit-
uations in the EU. Our results highlight that entry 
and exit rates are crucial to better understand the 
diversity in cross-sectional and persistent MD rates 
across the EU. In particular, they show the strong 
(negative) correlation between the share of persis-
tent deprived (among the deprived) and the nation-
al exit rate, as well as between the cross-sectional 
MD rate and the national entry rates.
Regarding the impact of the crisis, our results show 
that in countries where (cross-sectional) MD in-
creased most (Latvia, Estonia, Italy, Greece and Lith-
uania), both entry and exit rates have deteriorated 
during the crisis. At the other extreme, in Slovakia, 
Poland, Austria and (though to a lesser extent) 
Romania, the decrease in MD seems to be due to 
a decrease in entry rates rather than an increase in 
exit rates. There are also a number of countries with 
highly varying MD levels, where exit rates diminish 
during the crisis by more than 5 percentage points 
and where persistent MD therefore increases. Spe-
cifically, Bulgaria combines a major improvement 
in its entry rate and a major deterioration in its 
exit rate, meaning that even though fewer people 
enter into MD, those who are deprived have less 
chance to escape from it.
Finally, exploring the impact of different trigger 
events and various individual and household char-
acteristics on the entry rate into MD, we showed 
that a job loss is an important risk factor of falling 
into MD. Living alone (with/without children), suf-
fering from a bad health or having a low educa-
tional level are also factors that increase MD risk.
Our analysis was constrained by the panel du-
ration: the current 4-year rotational panel is too 
short to adequately follow people after shocks or 
to take into account censoring, and extending the 
duration from 4 to 6 years would be highly valua-
ble (on this, see also Chapter 27). It was also limit-
ed by the small sample size, which prevented us 
from studying in details the annual transitions by 
sub-groups. Yet, we believe that this chapter has 
highlighted the added value of panel data. Looking 
at both entry into/exit from MD allows for a better 
understanding of national differences in the lev-
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els of annual and persistent MD; in particular, the 
reason why countries with similar annual MD rates 
can have different persistent MD rates and how 
the increase in entry rates and the decrease in exit 
rates came into play to explain MD increases in the 
countries most affected by the crisis. Adding to the 
current EU portfolio of social indicators, measures 
related to the persistence of MD, as well as context 
information on the national entry and exit rates 
would help to better capture the dynamics and the 
evolution of living standards in the EU.
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21.1 Introduction
The literature on budgeting strategies adopted by 
households on low income reveals a mixture of in-
ventiveness and experience of mild to severe ma-
terial deprivation (MD). Households on low income 
often rely on formal (such as state benefits) but 
also informal sources of financial/social assistance 
and reciprocity exchange (Dean and Shah, 2002) 
to maintain at least some elements of their usual 
lifestyles, ranging from borrowing money and ex-
changing favours with friends and relatives to mov-
ing back with one’s parents and in-laws (Orr et al., 
2006). However, despite the resilience of many of 
these households, there is considerable evidence 
that as formal resources such as income drop, MD 
tends to increase (Yeung and Hofferth, 1998; Saun-
ders et al., 2006; Berthoud and Bryan, 2011) (173). 
Orr et al. (2006) argue that reductions in resourc-
es caused by job loss or illness are easily absorbed 
only among high income households. At medium 
income levels, households begin to cut back on 
items such as holiday and rely on help from fami-
(172) Anne-Catherine Guio is from LISER (Luxembourg) and Marco 
Pomati from Cardiff University (UK). They would like to thank 
Anthony B. Atkinson, Eric Marlier, Céline Thévenot, Björn 
Halleröd, Isabelle Maquet and Serge Paugam for fruitful 
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for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely those of the 
authors. Emails for correspondence: anne-catherine.guio@liser.
lu and PomatiM@cardiff.ac.uk.
(173) Although there is a statistically significant negative relation 
between MD and income, the relation is far from perfect, 
due to measurement errors and the influence on MD of 
non-income factor, such as costs (health, housing, childcare, 
etc.), accumulated capital/debt, social and private transfers in 
kind, etc. (see Fusco et al, 2010).
lies and friends; through minimal changes in living 
standards, physical assets and customary activities. 
However, as available resources drop even further, 
social capital is stretched to the limit, items previ-
ously taken for granted become unaffordable and 
eventually even food consumption is reduced to 
a minimum and a warm house becomes an un-
affordable luxury. Hence, qualitative evidence 
shows similar MD patterns across households with 
similar levels of resources (Smith, 2005). Similarly, 
large-scale expenditure studies also suggest that 
as income rises among those who suffered from 
MD, commodity expenditure patterns converge 
with those of higher-income households (Farrell 
and O’Connor, 2003; Gregg et al., 2005).
Questions on MD available in surveys such as 
EU-SILC provide information on the types of goods 
and activities that many households go without 
because they cannot afford them. However, despite 
the large availability of MD data, little attention has 
been given to the order in which certain spending 
curtailment strategies are adopted across the EU.
Understanding how households cope with eco-
nomic constraints is important to assess claims 
that poverty is the result of erratic spending or in-
efficient household budgeting: if this was the case 
one would for example find a substantial amount 
of individuals declaring that they can afford to go 
on holiday away from home but cannot afford two 
pairs of properly fitting shoes or to keep their hous-
es warm.
Understanding the order in which deprivations are 
experienced also helps to establish a common lan-
guage across European welfare states to describe 
the severity of MD. Overall, focusing on patterns of 
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curtailment in the different EU countries also ena-
bles MD research to move towards a better under-
standing of some of the key aspects of living condi-
tions and the underlying processes of curtailment 
shared across the EU. This is in line with the Council 
of the European Union’s definition of poverty (1985), 
which following Townsend (1979) defines the poor 
as those excluded from the minimum acceptable 
way of life in the country where they live.
The main contribution of this chapter is to assess 
the most frequent deprivation sequence at the EU 
and national levels, using the longitudinal com-
ponent of EU-SILC. By definition, curtailment is 
a process that happens over time and whose study 
ideally requires following up the same individu-
als as they become more or less deprived across 
time. By proposing a longitudinal methodology, 
we extend the methodology proposed in previ-
ous papers which used cross-sectional data to de-
termine the deprivation order, by comparing the 
deprivation patterns of people with different MD 
levels at one point in time (see Deutsch and Silber, 
2008 and Deutsch et al., 2015). The use of longitu-
dinal EU-SILC data has a cost in terms of data avail-
ability, as only a subset of MD items is available in 
the longitudinal dataset at the time of writing (174). 
However, longitudinal data allow the assessment of 
the fit of different deprivation sequences by using 
information on how MD evolves for each individual 
across time. The longitudinal methodology devel-
oped in this chapter allows one to ascertain if the 
cross-sectional order can be considered a good 
proxy of the longitudinal order.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 21.2 
presents the dataset and the MD items used in the 
analysis. Section 21.3 aims to explain the sequenc-
ing methodology using simple descriptive sta-
tistics as well as an Item Response Theory model, 
which confirms and aids the interpretation of both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal Deprivation Se-
quence results. Section 21.4 concludes.
(174) We opted to use three waves of the longitudinal data set, 
instead of the four waves available in order to increase the 
sample size. Indeed EU-SILC is a rotational panel, i.e. each 
wave a quarter of the sample quit the panel. Following people 
during 3 years instead of 4 years allows working with 50 % of 
the sample, instead of 25 %.
21.2 Data
In order to estimate the order in which different 
items and activities are curtailed in different coun-
tries, both cross-sectional (2009) and longitudinal 
(2009-2011) components of EU-SILC are used.
The cross-sectional analysis is conducted on a set 
of 13 MD items available in the 2009 EU-SILC 
cross-sectional data, collected through a themat-
ic module on MD. These 13 items were proposed 
by Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012) as robust MD 
measures at the EU level in each individual Mem-
ber State and have been advocated as candidates 
for a revised version of the commonly agreed cur-
rent EU indicator. (See also Chapter 10 of this book 
and Guio et al. (2016) for more details about this 
amended indicator.)
The longitudinal analysis is estimated on six items 
because only six items (out of the 13-item list) are 
available in EU-SILC longitudinal data at the time of 
writing (175). The MD items are listed in Table 21.1. 
The last column indicates which MD items are 
available in the longitudinal dataset.
Using the six items available, Table 21.2 divides the 
pooled sample according to individual MD trajec-
tories across 2 consecutive years (2010 and 2011). 
The table shows that among those deprived in 
both 2010 and 2011 (3rd to 6th columns from the 
left), the majority experience an increase or de-
crease in the number of deprivations, although 
a non-negligible minority experience exactly the 
same number and the same types of deprivations 
(around 8 % of the sample for Austria) or experience 
the same number but different types of depriva-
tions (2 % in Belgium). Overall, Table 21.2 suggests 
that for the vast majority of countries there is a sub-
stantial amount of change in MD profiles across 
just 2 years, and this chapter outlines a methodol-
ogy aimed at exploring this longitudinal variation. 
Moreover, when looking at individual trajectories 
Table 21.2 suggests that a small minority of cases 
(175) These six items are currently collected annually in the core 
EU-SILC. The seven additional items proposed by Guio, Gordon 
and Marlier (2012) were collected in 2009 for the first time, in 
2013 on a voluntary basis for a subset of countries and in 2014 
in the ad hoc module on MD for all the EU countries. In this 
chapter, the 2009 data are used, as the 2013 and 2014 data are 
not yet available.
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experiences the same number of deprivations and 
switches between items. To fully tackle the role of 
consumer choice and relative prices much more 
detailed data on the quality and price of goods 
owned and not owned by respondents, together 
with international market prices would be needed. 
We briefly return to these issues in the conclusion.
In the next sections, we open the black box of the 
MD transitions and see whether we can identify 
a shared pattern of curtailment across countries and 
methodologies. For doing so, we focus on people 
lacking at least one item in one of the last 3 years of 
the panel (2011, 2010 and 2009).
Table 21.1: Deprivation rates for items used in cross‑sectional and longitudinal analysis (based 
on 2009 EU‑SILC data)
(%)
Material deprivation  % (2009)
Availability in the 
longitudinal analysis 
(2009‑2011)
‘Household items’, i.e. items collected at household level. The household MD information is assigned to all 
household members (including children) when the household cannot afford to:
Have 1 week annual holiday away from home 38 Yes
Face unexpected expenses 35 Yes
Replace worn‑out furniture (but would like to replace (i.e. the lack is 
an enforced lack not a choice; see Chapter 10 of this book))
31 No;  only available in 2009 
ad hoc module
Avoid arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase 
instalments)
12 Yes
Have a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every 
second day
10 Yes
Keep home adequately warm 10 Yes
Have access to a car/van for personal use (but would like to have) 9 Yes
Have a computer and an Internet connection (but would like to have) 5 No;  only available in 2009 
ad hoc module
‘Adult items’, i.e. items collected at individual adult level (‘adults’ are people aged 16 and above). The adult 
MD information is assigned to all household members (including children), when at least half the adults in the 
household cannot afford to:
Have regular leisure activities (but would like to have) 18 No; only available in 2009 
ad hoc module
Spend a small amount of money each week on oneself without 
having to consult anyone (pocket money), but would like to have
17 No; only available in 2009 
ad hoc module
Get together with friends/family for a drink/meal at least monthly 
(but would like to have)
13 No; only available in 2009 
ad hoc module
Replace worn‑out clothes by some new (not second‑hand) ones (but 
would like to have)
12 No; only available in 2009 
ad hoc module 
Have two pairs of properly fitting shoes, including a pair of 
all‑weather shoes (but would like to have)
3 No; only available in 2009 
ad hoc module 
NB: All the items collected at the adult level as well as the capacity to replace worn-out furniture and the availability of an Internet connection at 
home are not available in the longitudinal dataset.
Reading note: In 2009, 3 % of EU-27 citizens lack two pairs of properly fitting shoes.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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Table 21.2: Distribution of EU‑SILC respondents according to the number/type of items lacked 
(out of six items available in the longitudinal data) in 2010 and 2011
(%)
Not deprived of 
any item in 2010 
and 2011
Deprived of the 
same item(s) in 
2010 and 2011
Deprived of more/fewer/different items in 2011 
(compared with 2010)
More items Fewer items Equal number but different items
Belgium 63 10 13 12 2
Bulgaria 8 22 27 35 9
Czech Republic 39 21 18 18 4
Denmark 75 5 10 8 2
Estonia 27 21 23 23 5
Spain 42 13 17 23 4
Italy 37 7 31 20 4
Cyprus 26 16 30 23 5
Latvia 8 23 33 29 8
Lithuania 12 23 26 31 9
Luxembourg 71 7 11 11 1
Hungary 12 35 27 22 4
Malta 31 34 11 23 1
Netherlands 74 8 8 8 2
Austria 61 8 10 18 2
Poland 25 36 17 19 3
Portugal 25 21 25 25 5
Romania 12 45 20 21 3
Finland 63 9 13 12 2
United Kingdom 54 10 16 17 4
Reading note: Among the people present in the panel in 2010 and 2011 in Austria, 61 % do not lack any of the six items in both years, 8 % lack 
exactly the same items in both years, 10 % lack more items in 2011 than 2010, 18 % lack fewer items in 2011 than in 2010, and 2 % lack the same 
number of items but some or all these items are different.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013.
21.3 Deprivation sequence
21.3.1 Visual analysis
In the previous section, Table 21.1, based on the 
cross-sectional incidence of the 13 MD items avail-
able in EU-SILC 2009, suggests that the lack of two 
pairs of properly fitting shoes is only experienced by 
a small minority (3 %), particularly when compared 
to more common deprivations such as the lack of 
1 week holiday away from home. Our analysis also 
shows that around 90 % of those who cannot af-
ford two pairs of properly fitting shoes also cannot 
afford a holiday, while fewer than 10 % who cannot 
afford the latter cannot afford shoes (EU-SILC 2009, 
results not presented here). This would suggest 
that people tend to curtail their holidays first and 
it is only when their deprivation is extremely high 
that they lose the ability to afford even very basic 
goods like shoes. One way to corroborate this claim 
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visually is to divide respondents according to how 
many MD items they cannot afford (number of 
deprivations out of the list of 13 items proposed by 
Guio et al., 2012) as shown in Figure 21.1. For illustra-
tive purposes, this figure presents the percentage 
of people lacking four items (holidays, shoes, ina-
bility to face unexpected expenses, arrears), by the 
number of items lacked. It shows that the lack of 
holidays and the difficulty to face unexpected ex-
penses are much more widespread than problems 
of arrears and shoes deprivation across the depri-
vation scale. More than half of those who cannot 
afford two of the thirteen items covered in the fig-
ure cannot afford holidays or unexpected expens-
es, and this proportion grows gradually with the 
number of deprivations. In contrast, only a small 
proportion cannot afford to pay arrears or two pairs 
of properly fitting shoes. However, this proportion 
grows gradually with the number of deprivations. 
Most importantly, the order (first holidays, then 
unexpected expenses, arrears and finally shoes) is 
constant across the MD scale.
This order is nevertheless probabilistic: although 
on average respondents will conform to this pat-
tern, it does not necessarily apply perfectly to all 
respondents. Similarly to a model prediction, there 
is always some degree of difference between ob-
served and predicted order: even when consider-
ing the four items above there is a small minority 
of people who cannot afford to pay arrears nor af-
ford two pairs of shoes but who are able to afford 
holidays. This could be the result of misreporting, 
unique individual factors and/or particular resourc-
es which set this rare group of cases apart from the 
vast majority of the population. As the number of 
MD items increases the relative frequency order 
becomes more uncertain and the number of cas-
es that do not confirm exactly to the best order 
of curtailment increases. As shown in Figure 21.2, 
Figure 21.1: People who cannot afford each item, by level of MD, EU level, 2009
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Reading note: More than half of those who cannot afford two of the thirteen items considered here cannot afford holidays.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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the order for holidays, unexpected expenses and 
shoes remains constant across the MD scale, while 
the order is less clear for other items (such as the 
lack of a car/van and the incapacity to avoid arrears) 
across the MD scale.
It is obviously not possible to identify visually the 
most representative order of curtailment for all 13 
MD items in all EU countries, and more advanced 
methods are therefore needed.
21.3.2 Deprivation sequence: 
methodology
Understanding the determinants of the individu-
al consumption level and the relative shares of its 
components is a long standing issue in economics 
(Engel, 1895; Working, 1943; Leser, 1963). According 
to classical microeconomic theory of consumption 
behaviour, consumers are supposed to allocate 
their income to the purchase of products so as to 
maximize utility, given a set of prices for a group of 
products. Econometric studies usually use detailed 
individual data from household budget surveys to 
estimate systems of demand equations, where the 
share of expenditures depends on the relative pric-
es of different goods, disposable income and indi-
vidual characteristics (see among others the model 
proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). Some 
research focuses specifically on how consumers pri-
oritise their acquisition of durables over time as their 
income increases, and on whether people tend to 
have similar priority of acquisition patterns (Roos 
and Von Szelisk, 1943; Paroush, 1965, 1973; McFall, 
1969; Hebden and Pickering, 1974). Deutsch and Sil-
ber (2008) use the same approach as that proposed 
by Paroush (1965, 1973) and Guttman (1950), but to 
look at the mirror image, namely to assess whether 
individuals facing the threat of poverty curtail their 
consumption of various goods in a given order. This 
methodology compares the deprivation order of 
each case in a dataset to all the possible orders and 
Figure 21.2: Proportion of people who cannot afford the item, by level of MD, EU level, 2009
(%)
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NB: See Table 21.1 for the detailed description of items.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
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selects the best order as the order with the smaller 
aggregated error.
For example, if a questionnaire contains only two 
MD items, say a 1-week holiday a year and two pairs 
of shoes, there are two possible orders of curtail-
ment. As MD increases, households could decide 
to curtail holidays first and then two pairs of shoes; 
or they could curtail two pairs of shoes but still go 
on holiday. Assuming that data are collected on 
only these two items, and that being able to afford 
an item or not wanting it is scored as 0 and being 
deprived (unable to afford) is scored as 1, it is possi-
ble to test which order best approximates the one 
found among all cases in our sample.
If holidays are curtailed first followed by shoes, 
there are three possible patterns consistent with 
this order (see Table 21.3). We can then compare 
each case in our dataset to these three patterns, 
allocate errors to each case that does not follow 
any of the three patterns, and aggregate the total 
number of errors for each possible order. There are 
K! possible orders, where K is the number of items. 
In this simple example, there are only 2!=2 possi-
ble patterns. Respondents are either able to afford 
both holidays and shoes (as in the first row), or una-
ble to afford holidays and able to afford shoes (sec-
ond row), or unable to afford either (third row). Re-
spondents who cannot afford shoes but can afford 
holidays (pattern: 0,1) are in this case not consistent 
with the considered order and would need one 
change (one error) to be converted to the closest 
expected pattern (from 0,1 to 1,1). An error of 1 (or 
a residual in modelling terms) would then be allo-
cated to this case.
If the expected order is the opposite of the one 
above (shoes are curtailed first), the three possible 
patterns in the data consistent with this order are 
the ones shown in Table 21.4.
Longitudinal data allow the extension of this Dep‑
rivation Sequence methodology by looking at infor-
mation over multiple waves for the same person. 
Each individual MD pattern found in the data is 
scored against the possible patterns consistent 
with a given order (e.g. holiday, shoes). The main 
difference is that the expected patterns also al-
low change in MD scores across time. Each case is 
therefore compared against the expected patterns 
and allocated an error. As already mentioned, an er-
ror is the smallest change between the MD pattern 
of a given dataset case and an expected pattern. 
All cases that match any of the expected patterns 
of a given order are allocated an error of 0. Table 
21.5 shows the longitudinal extension of order 1 
shown in Table 21.3.
Similarly to the cross-sectional methodology, an 
aggregate error is calculated at the national/EU 
level, and the order with the smallest aggregated 
error is selected as the ‘best’ national/EU order.
Table 21.3: Possible patterns for order 1
(holidays are curtailed first)
Holidays Shoes
0 0
1 0
1 1
Table 21.4: Possible patterns for order 2
(shoes are curtailed first)
Shoes Holidays
0 0
1 0
1 1
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Table 21.5: Possible longitudinal patterns for order 1
(holidays are curtailed first)
WAVE 1 WAVE 2
Holidays Shoes Holidays Shoes
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
21.3.3 Deprivation sequence: 
results
Best EU order
Using the six items available in the longitudinal da-
taset (see Table 21.1), the best EU order is as follows 
(see Table 21.6 for national results):
1. holidays
2. unexpected expenses
3. meat/chicken/fish/vegetarian equivalent
4. home warm
5. arrears
6. car/van.
Households on average tend to first cut back on 
their annual holidays and then use up their sav-
ings (resulting in inability to face unexpected ex-
penses). As their deprivation increases further they 
are unable to afford a meal with proteins, a warm 
house and paying bills, and finally a car/van. The 
results from the longitudinal analyses show a sub-
stantial amount of overlap with those based on 
cross-sectional data (see Deutsch et al. (2015) for 
a discussion of the cross-sectional results). At the 
national level, the hierarchies show either a per-
fect or very close match. This suggests that the 
cross-sectional 13-item order can be considered 
a (very) good predictor of the longitudinal depri-
vation sequence. At EU level, this order is (see Table 
21.7 for national results):
1. holidays*
2. unexpected expenses*
3. furniture
4. pocket money
5. leisure
6. drink/meal out
7. clothes
8. meat/chicken/fish/vegetarian equivalent*
9. home warm*
10. arrears*
11. car/van*
12. computer/internet
13. shoes.
*Items available in the longitudinal data set 
(see Table 21.1).
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Homogeneity of national deprivation 
orders across the EU
In Table 21.6, there is a large degree of overlap be-
tween national hierarchies: going on holidays and 
the capacity to face unexpected expenses are gener-
ally the first items to be curtailed across all countries. 
As for the other items, most countries have an order 
similar to the EU one, but the variation is much more 
noticeable. Bulgaria and Portugal for example are 
the only countries where the lack of an adequately 
warm house is first and second respectively. Similar-
ly, access to a car/van is the second (cross-sectional)/ 
third (longitudinal) item in Romania.
Focusing on the differences between national best 
orders however hides the fact that the EU order 
fits most countries relatively well. A more sensible 
strategy is to store the aggregate errors for each 
of the 720 (6!) possible hierarchies and then rank 
them. As shown in Table 21.8, out of 720 possible 
longitudinal hierarchies the EU order has a rank of 
less than 55 in all countries apart from Denmark 
and Finland. This means that the EU order may not 
be the best fitting one but it fits better than 92 % 
(i.e. (720-55)/720) of all the other possible orders in 
all but two countries. The orders that fit marginal-
ly better are very small variations of the EU order. 
For Denmark and Finland, the EU order is still bet-
ter than the vast majority of orders but the rank 
is much lower (134th and 154th respectively). The 
third column of the table also shows that any order 
with holidays and unexpected expenses at end of 
the order fits all countries badly.
The key message from these results is that where-
as the order of curtailment for holidays and unex-
pected expenses is very similar across all countries, 
the other four items (meat/chicken/fish/vegetarian 
equivalent, home warm, arrears and car/van) show 
more variability (both in cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal analysis). Nevertheless, the EU order revealed 
by the cross-sectional and longitudinal deprivation 
sequence methods provides a good approximation 
of the order of curtailment of these four items.
Table 21.6: Best order of curtailment, longitudinal (2011) and cross‑sectional data (2009)
EU BE BG CZ DK EE ES IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO FI UK
Holidays
CS 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
LONGI 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Unexpected 
expenses
CS 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 1
LONGI 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 1
Meat/chick‑
en/fish/ 
vegetarian 
equiv.
CS 3 5 4 3 4 4 6 4 5 3 3 4 3 3 6 3 3 5 4 4 4
LONGI 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 3 3 5 3 3 6 6 5 5
Home warm
CS 4 4 1 5 6 6 4 3 3 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 2 5 6 3
LONGI 4 4 1 5 5 6 4 4 3 6 3 5 6 6 4 6 4 2 5 6 4
Arrears
CS 5 3 5 6 3 5 3 5 4 5 6 3 4 5 3 4 5 6 6 3 5
LONGI 5 3 5 6 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 3 4 4 3 4 5 5 4 3 3
Car/van
CS 6 6 6 4 5 3 5 6 6 4 5 6 5 6 4 5 6 4 2 5 6
LONGI 6 6 6 3 6 5 6 6 6 4 5 6 5 5 6 5 6 4 3 4 6
NB: CS refers to the cross-sectional orders and LONGI to the longitudinal orders. The cross-sectional orders are based on the original results 
from Deutsch et al. (2015) calculated on the full 13-item list. The seven items not available in the longitudinal dataset were omitted and the rank 
reallocated to the six remaining items. The longitudinal order was in contrast estimated directly on the six items. All cases with no deprivation 
(a sum score of 0) and the few cases who suffered from all deprivations (sum score of 6) were excluded during estimation, as they provide no 
information for the purposes of this model.
Reading note: In both the cross-sectional and longitudinal orders, the first item curtailed in Austria is the capacity to face unexpected expenses, 
and the last one is the capacity to keep one’s home adequately warm.
Source: Authors’ computation, EU-SILC 2009 cross-sectional data (UDB August 2011) and EU-SILC 2011 longitudinal data (UDB August 2013).
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Aggregate longitudinal analysis also suggests 
a similar pattern of curtailment: a large propor-
tion of those entering MD in a given year (N) were 
already lacking holidays or could not face unex-
pected expenses the previous year (N‑1), but the 
majority of them did not experience the other four 
deprivations.
21.3.4 Item response theory
Item Response Theory (IRT) models have been 
used in the measurement of MD by, among oth-
ers, Dickes (1983, 1989), Gailly and Hausman (1984), 
Pérez-Mayo (2004), Cappellari and Jenkins (2007), 
Ayala and Navarro (2007 and 2008), Fusco and 
Dickes (2008), Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012) and 
Szeles and Fusco (2013). Also known as Latent Trait 
Analysis, IRT is a set of statistical models that de-
scribe the relationship between questionnaire item 
Table 21.8: Rank of the EU order in each country, longitudinal data, 2011
Country Rank of EU order Highest rank of order with holidays and unexpected expenses as last (5th and 6th item respectively)
Poland 1 515
Czech Republic 3 435
Malta 4 517
Italy 6 478
Bulgaria 8 483
Romania 13 498
Estonia 15 520
Hungary 16 519
Belgium 17 478
Lithuania 17 429
Spain 19 431
Austria 20 478
Cyprus 30 425
Latvia 30 541
United Kingdom 33 466
Portugal 46 381
Luxembourg 53 343
Netherlands 54 415
Denmark 134 355
Finland 162 251
Reading note: Out of 720 possible longitudinal hierarchies, the best EU longitudinal order ((1) Holidays; 2) Unexpected expenses; 3) Meat/
chicken/fish/vegetarian equivalent; 4) Home warm; 5) Arrears; 6) Car/van) is the best 20th rank in Austria. Any order with holidays and 
unexpected expenses at end of the order is the best 478th order.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013.
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responses and an unobserved latent trait, such as 
academic ability, level of happiness or MD. IRT pos-
tulates a relationship between each item and the 
underlying MD trait, and this is best represented 
using Item Characteristic Curves (ICCs).
Figure 21.3 shows 13 ICCs, which illustrate the re-
lationship between the underlying MD trait (com-
parable to a standardised version of the MD score 
shown in Figure 21.1) and the probability of being 
deprived of each item: as MD (shown on the X-ax-
is, expressed in standard deviations (s.d.) from the 
mean) increases, the probability of being deprived 
of an item (shown on the Y-axis) increases. The 
further to the right the ICC the more severe the 
MD. The curves are ordered according to the EU 
(cross-sectional) MD order (see Table 21.7, EU col-
umn). The ICCs for the first two items in the order 
(i.e. holidays and unexpected expenses) show vari-
ation between -1 and 1 s.d.: as shown above these 
items detect the first signs of MD, and the vast 
majority of those who suffer from more extreme 
levels of MD (i.e. above 1 s.d.) cannot afford these. 
The horizontal distance between the curves (which 
reflects the range of MD severity and is shown by 
the dashed horizontal line) shows that the ICCs for 
these two items are close together but far apart 
from the other four items (meat/chicken/fish/vege-
tarian equivalent, home warm, car/van and arrears) 
which were included in our longitudinal MD order. 
This means that the severity of MD associated with 
these two deprivations is distinctively lower than 
that of the other four items. However, at higher 
levels of MD the probabilities of being deprived of 
the four items at the bottom of the order (meat/
chicken/fish/vegetarian equivalent, home warm, 
car/van and arrears) are very similar; the curves 
are so close together that it is difficult to tell them 
apart, and it could be argued that the order of cur-
tailment for these items is therefore much harder 
to establish. These results give a potential explana-
tion of why there is greater variability in the order of 
Figure 21.3: Item characteristic curves (ICCs), 13 items (cross‑sectional data), EU level, 2009
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example, those enduring a level of MD which is one standard deviation greater than the mean EU level of MD will on average almost certainly 
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equivalent every second day.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2011.
21How do European citizens cope with economic shocks? The longitudinal order of deprivation
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  397
curtailment of these items at national level and yet 
the EU order shows on average a good fit across 
most countries. These four items indicate more 
severe levels of MD than holidays and unexpected 
expenses, but their respective ranks in the order 
seem interchangeable.
The ICCs also corroborate the results presented 
above: not being able to afford two pairs of prop-
erly fitting shoes is associated with extremely 
high level of MD (above 1 s.d.), and therefore this 
represents the very last item to be curtailed for 
most countries and population subgroups. The 
ICCs also reiterate the need to have a broad range 
of items that capture all levels of MD, in both the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal components of 
the survey. Among the 13 items proposed by Guio, 
Gordon and Marlier (2012), those which were not 
yet collected in the core EU-SILC are crucial to cap-
ture adequately the full range of MD severity.
21.4 Conclusions
The Deprivation Sequence methodology developed 
by Deutsch and Silber (2008) in the context of MD 
research proves to be an insightful methodology 
to detect orders of curtailment. As shown in this 
chapter, its simple and data-driven logic can easily 
accommodate longitudinal data. Item Response 
Theory can also be used to explore some of these 
findings further and to identify the overlap in na-
tional MD ranks across the EU.
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that 
MD data can be used to build an insightful narra-
tive of the way people are gradually excluded from 
some of the key aspects of living conditions of 
each Member State. Cross-sectional analyses show 
that people generally first cut back on their annu-
al holidays, then their savings to face unexpected 
expenses, new furniture, leisure and social activi-
ties. Those experiencing higher levels of MD tend 
to also be unable to afford a meal with proteins, 
a warm house and paying bills, and eventually even 
two pairs of properly fitting shoes. Although using 
a smaller set of items (because of data availability 
in the longitudinal dataset at the time of writing), 
the main contribution of this chapter is to extend 
the cross-sectional methodology developed by 
Deutsch et al. (2015) using longitudinal data. The 
analysis confirms that the same MD pattern is also 
found when following the same people across time 
and that the cross-sectional order can be used as 
a reasonable proxy of the longitudinal order when 
data are not available. Across the EU, the bad fit of 
a MD order in which expenditure on holidays away 
from home is given priority over other goods and 
activities provides clear evidence against claims 
that poverty is the result of erratic spending or in-
efficient household budgeting: the vast majority 
of those who cannot afford basic items (e.g. meals 
every second day or two pairs of shoes) do not go 
on holiday nor have they enough money to face 
unexpected expenses. It also highlights the impor-
tance of social activities such as a monthly drink or 
meal with friends or family and reiterates the im-
portance of seeing poverty as a form of exclusion 
from ordinary living patterns, customs and activi-
ties (Townsend, 1979).
This type of analysis is also extremely important 
to confirm the validity and reliability of the EU MD 
measures in general, and of the 13-item scale pro-
posed by Guio, Gordon and Marlier (2012) in par-
ticular (see Chapter 10 of this book). The analysis 
shows that these 13 items can be used to capture 
a large range of MD severity, which is not perfectly 
well captured by the items currently collected in 
EU-SILC. It shows, for example, that questions on 
extreme MD such as two pairs of shoes are needed 
in the longitudinal element of EU-SILC to further 
corroborate the cross-sectional results and more 
generally for capturing extreme levels of MD.
Although theories of consumption behaviour and 
relative prices may be useful to analyse detailed 
expenditure studies which collect information on 
the cost and quality of household goods, we argue 
that MD items available in surveys such as EU-SILC 
are less suited to empirical exploration of such the-
ories; detailed expenditure data for example may 
show how the purchase/quality of certain goods 
is cut down as resources decrease and how indi-
viduals are (un)able to find cheaper goods, while 
MD items simply signal the enforced lack of these. 
The strength of much of the available MD items lies 
in their ability to detect the exclusion from shared 
living patterns, customs and activities because of 
lack of resources. Nevertheless, future research 
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could use relative price theories to track changes in 
MD across several years when more data are avail-
able and could use MD data in conjunction with 
expenditure data to unify these two subject areas 
(see Chapter 13 of this book for an example of such 
an approach). Finally, we acknowledge that the is-
sues we have raised deserve further exploration, 
particularly in understanding which formal and 
informal resources prevent people from experienc-
ing extreme levels of MD.
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22.1 Introduction
Over the last decade and through its Open Method 
of Coordination, the EU has agreed a set of com-
mon objectives for monitoring and measurement 
of social protection and social inclusion, together 
with a set of indicators to assess national and EU 
progress towards these goals. Among the prima-
ry indicators of social inclusion is the persistent 
at-risk-of-poverty rate, defined as the proportion 
of persons in a country who are at risk of income 
poverty in the current year and who were at risk 
of income poverty in at least 2 of the preceding 3 
years. Evidence about poverty persistence is an im-
portant complement to information about poverty 
prevalence at a point in time: it is widely agreed 
that poverty is worse for an individual, the longer 
he or she experiences it. Eurostat derives estimates 
of persistent at-risk-of-poverty rates using samples 
from the longitudinal component of EU-SILC in 
which the fortunes of individuals are tracked over 
4 consecutive years. Because not all of the individ-
uals present in the first sample year provide 4 years 
of income data — there is attrition — estimates of 
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persistent at-risk-of-poverty measures may not be 
reliable. In this chapter, we analyse the extent to 
which this is the case, and how the potential prob-
lems vary across EU Member States.
Attrition is a potential problem for two reasons. First, 
it means that the sample size for the 4-year sam-
ple used to calculate a persistent at-risk-of-poverty 
rate is smaller than the size of the sample of re-
spondents in the first year of the four (Wave 1), and 
a smaller sample size leads to less precise inference 
(larger standard errors and wider confidence in-
tervals). Second, if the individuals who are lost to 
follow-up differ systematically from the initial re-
spondent sample — the case of non-random or 
‘differential’ attrition — the 4-year sample may not 
be representative of the underlying population, 
thereby leading to biased estimates of persistent 
at-risk-of-poverty rates.
The longitudinal weights supplied with EU-SILC 
longitudinal data are intended to address the 
second problem. The idea is that, if differences in 
the chances of sample dropout can be fully char-
acterised in terms of differences in individuals’ 
observed characteristics, weighting will make the 
4-year sample representative of the initial sample. 
Individuals with characteristics associated with 
large dropout probabilities receive relatively large 
weights to compensate for the large fraction of 
similar individuals that have been lost. Individu-
als less likely to dropout receive relatively small 
weights. The weighting strategy works as long as 
observable characteristics predict dropout proba-
bilities well and those who remain in the sample 
are not systematically different from those who 
attrit. However, problems arise if the chances of at-
trition also depend on unobserved characteristics 
22
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that are systematically correlated with the chanc-
es of being persistently at-risk-of-poverty. Because 
such characteristics are unobserved, their impact is 
difficult to assess.
Our research builds on analysis of attrition in 
EU-SILC’s forerunner, the European Communi-
ty Household Panel (ECHP), undertaken by Behr, 
Bellgardt and Rendtel (2005) and Watson (2003). 
EU-SILC differs substantially from the ECHP which 
ran between 1994 and 2001. Although both sourc-
es employ annual data collection, EU-SILC longi-
tudinal data refer to information collected over 
a 4-year period, rather than up to 8 years. Instead 
of using a survey instrument with a cross-nationally 
input harmonised design and questionnaire (pure 
household panel surveys in ECHP), EU-SILC uses 
output harmonisation, rotating sample designs, 
and gives priority to timeliness and cross-section-
al estimates. Countries are mandated to deliver 
a number of statistics conforming to particular 
specifications (and the data used to create them) 
but have some discretion about the ways in which 
the information is collected. Most notably, some 
countries use household panel surveys to collect 
the longitudinal data; others use linked administra-
tive registers (177). In addition, there are many more 
countries contributing EU-SILC data than were in 
the ECHP: we use 23 countries in our analysis; there 
were only 15 countries covered by the ECHP.
Behr, Bellgardt, and Rendtel (2005) and Watson 
(2003) both drew attention to a substantial diver-
sity in response rates in ECHP and, moreover, their 
conclusions were that, although the amount of at-
trition was relatively large, its effects on estimates 
of poverty rates and quintile transition probabilities 
were relatively benign. Indeed, Watson went so far 
as to state that ‘fears that attrition has undermined 
the representativeness of the ECHP samples in later 
waves of the survey are largely unfounded’ (2003, 
p. 361). Her results about representativeness are 
similar to those reported by Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, 
and Moffitt (1998) for the US Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.
Patterns of attrition and their consequences may 
have changed over the last decade. Also, with 
(177) On this, see e.g. Lohmann (2011) or, for a thorough discussion, 
Jäntti, Törmälehto and Marlier (2013) and Chapter 28 of this 
volume.
many more countries with data, and output har-
monisation rather than input harmonisation, there 
is much greater scope for differences across Mem-
ber States. Our analysis of attrition and estimation 
of persistent at-risk-of-poverty rates in EU-SILC data 
is therefore not only timely but also important giv-
en the place of this indicator in the EU’s portfolio of 
social inclusion indicators.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as fol-
lows. In Section 22.2, we explain the data that we 
use, drawn from the 2011 longitudinal EU-SILC UDB. 
This discussion covers the definition of the persis-
tent at-risk-of-poverty rate, how attrition arises, 
the weights that are available, and the samples 
that we use in the analysis. The extent of attrition 
across Member States, and how it varies with per-
sonal characteristics, is described in Section 22.3. In 
Section 22.4, we analyse the implications of sam-
ple dropout, again contrasting the situation across 
countries. We assess effects on representativeness 
by comparing estimates of at-risk-of-poverty rates 
from the full initial sample with estimates derived 
from the smaller 4-wave sample. Section 22.5 con-
tains a summary and conclusions.
For brevity, we report here only a subset of the 
analyses we have conducted. See Jenkins and Van 
Kerm (2017) for a complete set of results.
22.2 Data, definitions, 
sample selection, weighting
Our analysis is based on the 2011 EU-SILC longitudi-
nal files. More specifically we use the scientific-use 
release of the longitudinal EU-SILC files made avail-
able to the Net-SILC-2 project, which are an update 
of UDB 2011-1, released in August 2013. These files 
refer to data covering the four survey years 2008-
2011. Because the reference period for EU-SILC in-
come data is the calendar year preceding the year 
of data collection, the income years covered are 
2007-2010 (178).
(178) There are two exceptions. For Ireland, the data refer to the 12 
months prior to the interview, and for the United Kingdom, 
the income reference period is the period around the date of 
interview with income totals subsequently converted to annual 
equivalents pro rata.
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22.2.1 At‑risk‑of‑poverty rates and 
persistent at‑risk‑of‑poverty rates
Following EU official definitions, an individual’s 
‘at-risk-of-poverty’ status in a given income year 
is determined by the equivalised household dis-
posable income of the household to which he or 
she belongs. (For further details of the sources in-
cluded in household income and the equivalence 
scale, see Eurostat (2010).) A person is counted as 
being at-risk-of-poverty (henceforth poor) in a giv-
en year if his or her equivalised household dispos-
able income is less than 60 % of the national medi-
an equivalised household income for that year (179). 
The current at-risk-of-poverty rate (henceforth cur‑
rent poverty rate) for a particular country or group 
within a country is the proportion of persons in 
that country or group who are poor in the current 
income year.
The persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate (henceforth 
persistent poverty rate) is the proportion of persons 
in the country or group who are currently poor and 
who were poor in at least two of the preceding 3 
years. Thus in our longitudinal data, the persistent 
poverty rate refers to the proportion of individuals 
who were poor in 2010 as well as in at least 2 of 
the 3 previous years (2007-2009). This indicator is 
the principal official EU indicator on social inclusion 
for which estimation is based on the longitudinal 
component of EU-SILC, and hence the indicator 
that is most sensitive to attrition issues.
22.2.2 Samples
EU-SILC has a 4-year rotating panel design. A fresh 
sample of households is drawn every year in every 
country, and the respondents in this sample are el-
igible for an interview in each of the following 3 
years, contributing a total of up to four interviews. 
In each particular calendar year, data are available 
from four cohorts of respondents and contribute to 
the EU-SILC cross-sectional data. The 2011 EU-SILC 
longitudinal data (and similarly in preceding releas-
es) consist of the three subsamples that provide 
data in 2011 and in at least one earlier survey year 
(179) Throughout our analysis, poverty risk lines for each country 
and year are taken from Eurostat (2014). These thresholds are 
derived from the cross-sectional EU-SILC datasets. 
as well, i.e. the cohorts that entered the survey in 
2008, 2009, or 2010.
To examine the magnitude and pattern of attrition, 
and to assess their implications for estimation of 
persistent poverty rates, we work with the 2008 
rotation group sample which provides data over 
up to 4 years and is therefore the basis for calcu-
lation of the 2011 persistent at-risk-of-poverty in-
dicator. We use the samples for 23 countries. We 
exclude the samples for Luxembourg (because no 
rotation group was started in 2008), Norway (be-
cause some of the relevant sample weights were 
not available — see below), Denmark (because 
the 2011 UDB appears to exclude households that 
attritted before the fourth interview), and Sweden 
(because of unexplained differences in sizes be-
tween the 2010 and 2011 versions of the 2008 rota-
tion group samples).
Our examination of the magnitude and effect of at-
trition relies on two overlapping subsamples. The 
first sample is composed of all individuals from all 
households in the rotation groups for survey years 
2008-2011 that responded at Wave 1 (Wave 1 is the 
year in which households entered the survey, i.e. 
2008) irrespective of their subsequent participa-
tion. We refer to this full sample of the 2008 rota-
tion group as the full W1 Sample. In principle, this 
sample should provide estimates close to those 
derived from the full 2008 cross-sectional sample. 
We return to this point later.
Our second subsample is composed of the subset 
of individuals from the W1 Sample that belong to 
a household successfully interviewed in each one 
of the 4 survey years 2008-2011. This is the 4‑wave 
Balanced Sample, from which persistent poverty 
rates can be calculated (180). We consider only indi-
viduals who were living in a household that was in-
terviewed at Wave 1: we discard children born after 
Wave 1 as well as co-residents that joined a sam-
ple household after Wave 1 since, by construction, 
these individuals do not have a full 4-year set of 
responses. An important distinction between ‘reg-
ister’ and ‘survey’ countries then comes into play. 
(180) More precisely, it is based on the subsample with valid 
(non-missing) data on household income in the EU-SILC 
data files in all years. However, because missing information 
on income is imputed (and we use the imputed values), all 
households contain non-missing data on income in the EU-SILC 
data files.
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Two distinct models are used in EU-SILC in the 
follow-up of respondents (see Chapter 27 of this 
volume). Survey countries use a standard longitu-
dinal survey design and aim to follow over time all 
household members initially interviewed; that is, if 
an original household splits, they attempt to fol-
low all individuals in all the newly-formed house-
holds. By contrast, register countries use a ‘selected 
respondent’ design and only track this ‘selected 
respondent’ from each original household. Only 
co-residents who remain living in the same house-
hold as the selected respondent provide infor-
mation on income over time. This following rule 
mechanically leads to higher attrition rates in reg-
ister countries, as we show below, since not all the 
members of the households that split are tracked.
Variations in practice and in the success of tracking 
such individuals and interviewing ‘split-off’ house-
holds has been shown to vary widely across coun-
tries by Iacovou and Lynn (2013). (see also Chapter 
27 of this volume.) These are likely sources of the 
cross-country differences in attrition rates docu-
mented below.
22.2.3 Attrition
The differences in size and composition between 
the W1 Sample and the 4-wave Balanced Sample 
reflect attrition. Not all individuals or households 
eligible for an interview after the first interview 
provide data in subsequent years. There are four 
reasons for this. First (this is related to the following 
rule used by these countries), co-residents of the 
main ‘selected respondent’ that leave a household 
are not followed in register countries, by design. 
Second, some individuals or households move 
out of scope after the first interview, for example 
because they die, or move abroad permanently, or 
move into an institution. Third, eligible individuals 
may not be followed by the data collection agen-
cy, or the agency may be unsuccessful in tracking 
them (with the chances greater for individuals that 
split off from a household, or where all members 
of a household move from the initially-sampled 
address). Fourth, individuals or households may 
refuse to participate in the survey in the second 
interview or later (181).
The first kind of attrition among register coun-
tries — attrition by design — is not necessarily 
a problem per se; the issue in the current context 
is that it leads to cross-national inconsistencies in 
EU-SILC. The second kind of sample dropout re-
flects the dynamics of a population and is a natural 
feature that is built into the data collection design 
(based on representation of the population of indi-
viduals in private households in a particular coun-
try). By contrast, the third and fourth types of attri-
tion are undesirable and, other things being equal, 
data collection agencies should aim to minimise 
them. Country-specific factors may also play a role, 
for example, whether up-to-date address registers 
exist, the prevalence of geographical mobility by 
households, general attitudes towards surveys, etc.
22.2.4 Sampling weights
Sampling weights are designed to adjust for bias-
es arising from cross-sectional non-response and 
subsequent longitudinal attrition. The EU-SILC lon-
gitudinal files include five types of sample weights 
(Museux, 2006), of which two are relevant to our 
analysis.
The first set of weights is the individual‑level base 
weights (variable rb060). In Wave 1, this is the design 
weight adjusted for non-response and calibrated. 
In later waves, it is the base weight of previous year 
adjusted for non-response. When individuals leave 
the sample, they are attributed with a weight of 
zero for each wave thereafter. Our analysis of the 
W1 Sample uses rb060 to ensure the sample ac-
counts for non-proportional sampling design (and 
initial non-response), and for differential attrition, 
and is calibrated to population totals in 2008.
The second set of weights that we use, rb064, is the 
individual-level longitudinal weights created for 
analysis of data for the four survey years 2008-2011 
and, of course, the weights are only relevant for the 
single rotation group that provides data for these 4 
years. For analysis of the 4-wave Balanced Sample, 
we contrast results obtained with rb064 (construct-
(181) Chapter 27 in this volume discusses the difficulty in consistently 
identifying the causes of attrition in EU-SILC across the different 
countries.
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ed to ensure that the balanced sample remains 
representative of the original 2008 population), 
with rb060 at their 2008 values (so they correct for 
initial non-response and sampling rates, but not for 
differential attrition), and with rb060 at their 2011 
values (in which case they are similar to rb064).
We also create our own bespoke set of longitu-
dinal weights (discussed later). The advantage of 
these weights is that we can use them to engage 
in a number of counterfactual exercises that we 
cannot undertake with the weights that are sup-
plied. We show below that these weights gener-
ally closely reproduce estimates derived using the 
official longitudinal weights although our bespoke 
weights are derived using variables available in the 
longitudinal data files, and we do not have access to 
all the factors employed by statistical offices when 
producing longitudinal weights (rb064), nor do we 
attempt to calibrate our weights to known popula-
tion totals, for example, as derived from other data 
sources or from the full EU-SILC cross-sectional files.
22.3 How much attrition is 
there? Who drops out?
In this section, we document how much attrition 
there was in the 2008-2011 EU-SILC longitudinal 
data, and which types of individual were most like-
ly to be lost to follow-up. We discuss attrition — or 
its complement, sample retention — in terms of 
differences between the full Wave 1 Sample and 
the smaller 4-wave Balanced Sample.
22.3.1 How much attrition is there 
overall?
The overall retention rate for each country is the 
fraction of the country’s full W1 sample that be-
longs to the Balanced Sample. More precisely we 
calculate the retention rate as the proportion of in-
dividuals belonging to a respondent household at 
Wave 1 which remains in a respondent household 
in each of the three subsequent waves. These rates 
are shown in Figure 22.1.
There are very large differences in retention rates 
across countries, ranging from greater than 90 % to 
nearer 40 %. The UK stands out as having a particu-
larly low retention rate, nearly 10 percentage points 
smaller than the next smallest rate, 50 % for Slove-
nia. There is a cluster of two countries with remark-
ably large retention rates: those for Romania and 
Bulgaria are all near 90 %. Unsurprisingly, the meth-
od of data collection is related to the retention rate 
of original household members: ‘register’ countries 
(identified by the circles in Figure 22.1; Slovenia, Fin-
land, Iceland and the Netherlands) tend to exhibit 
comparatively low retention rates for reasons out-
lined above.
22.3.2 Attrition’s effect on the 
precision of estimates
The decrease in sample sizes associated with attri-
tion means that, questions of representativeness 
and hence bias aside (on which see below), esti-
mates of persistent poverty rates are estimated less 
precisely. Standard errors are larger, and confidence 
intervals are wider. The effects of differences in 
sample size on the sampling variability of estimates 
can be gauged by noting that the persistent pov-
erty rate is a proportion (p), and there is a standard 
formula for the standard error of a proportion. The 
standard error of p is given by,  d√(p(1-p)/N) where 
N is the sample size and d is a design effect arising 
because of the complex survey design. We exam-
ined how standard errors vary with N, using values 
of N and p which cover the range of estimates ob-
served in EU-SILC. Following Goedemé (2013), we 
set d equal to 1.8, i.e. survey design effects such as 
stratification and clustering (e.g. of individuals into 
households, and households into primary sam-
pling units) increase the standard error by 80 % 
compared to the standard error for a simple ran-
dom sample of the same size.
Our calculations may provide some cheering 
news for analysts. Even with substantial attrition 
and hence relatively small sample sizes, standard 
errors for persistent poverty rates at the national 
level may be sufficiently precise. For example, if 
the persistent poverty rate is around 20 % and the 
sample size is 2 500, the standard error for the rate 
is around 0.015, so the estimated rate is more than 
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Figure 22.1: Retention rates by country, 2008‑2011
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Reading note: The retention rate is the proportion of individuals belonging to a respondent household at Wave 1 (2008) which remains in 
a participating household in each of the three subsequent waves. Only these individuals are used for the calculation of the 2011 persistent 
poverty rates. Unweighted proportions of Wave 1 sample.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013. 2008 rotation group only.
ten times larger than its standard error, and the 
95 % confidence interval is roughly [17 %, 23 %]. If 
the sample size were instead 1 000, then the stand-
ard error increases to around 0.025, so the ratio 
of estimate to standard error is around 8, and the 
confidence interval is approximately [15 %, 25 %]. 
If, instead, the persistent poverty rate is only 5 %, 
then a sample size of 1 000 implies a standard error 
of around 0.012, so the ratio of estimate to standard 
error falls to just over 4. Ratios of around 2 or more 
are often interpreted as indicating statistical signifi-
cance of sufficient degree.
Estimates of persistent poverty rates for subgroups 
within a country may not be precisely estimated, 
however. For subgroups of particular policy interest, 
for example individuals living in households headed 
by a lone parent, sample sizes are likely to number 
a few hundred at most. With a sample size of 100 and 
a persistent poverty rate of 20 %, the standard error is 
around 0.06, implying a ratio of estimate to standard 
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error of just over 3 and a 95 % confidence interval of 
approximately [8 %, 32 %] which is rather wide. In this 
case, it would be hard to detect statistically signifi-
cant changes over time in the subgroup persistent 
poverty rate. The same problem would arise if the 
persistent poverty rate were smaller than 20 %. To 
add to this cautionary note, we should say that we 
suggest later that, even for large sample sizes (such 
as for countries as a whole), confidence intervals 
may be sufficiently wide to encompass differences 
between estimates that are unbiased and those that 
are biased because of differential attrition.
22.3.3 Who drops out?
We now consider which types of individuals are 
most likely to be included in the 4-wave Balanced 
Samples. We classify individuals according to their 
characteristics when measured in Wave 1, and cal-
culate retention rates separately for subgroups de-
fined by those characteristics. The individual charac-
teristics we use are poverty status, quintile group of 
equivalised disposable household income, age and 
sex, household type, labour market activity status 
and education level of the household head, and 
whether the interview questionnaire was completed 
by a proxy respondent (another household member 
filling out the questionnaire on behalf of the target 
respondent). Differences in attrition (retention) rates 
associated with individual characteristics exemplify 
the process of differential attrition (retention).
Figure 22.2 shows the univariate breakdowns for 
each country. Each panel of the figure has a com-
mon format. Countries are ordered vertically in each 
chart by their overall retention rate as provided in 
Figure 22.1. Each subgroup retention rate is shown 
separately using a numerical code. If all subgroup 
rates for a country are very close to each other (and 
thus also close to the national rate), then attrition is 
not associated with subgroups membership.
For example, Figure 22.2 panel (a) shows that poor 
individuals are more likely to be lost to follow-up 
in around half the countries and, in a few countries 
(e.g. Belgium and Iceland), the differences are very 
large. Panel (b) tells a similar story. Retention rates do 
not vary greatly with income group, except that in a 
small number of countries, individuals in the poor-
est fifth are more likely to be lost. (The effects are 
more muted than in panel (a), probably because the 
poorest fifth includes more people than only those 
counted as poor.)
Figure 22.2, panel (c), shows that, in the vast ma-
jority of countries, young men (aged between 18 
and 40 years) as well as (to a lesser extent) young 
women are more likely to attrit than the other age-
sex groups. The difference in retention rates across 
age-sex groups is particularly marked in some 
countries. For example, in Malta and the UK, the 
range is around 20 percentage points between the 
smallest and largest rates.
Figure 22.2, panel (d), shows that, for many but not 
all countries, there are large differences in retention 
rates between household types in some countries, 
some of which are larger than shown in panel (c). 
The general picture is that single adult households 
(with and without children) are most likely to be 
lost to follow-up, whereas single or couple house-
holds with the head aged 60+ have substantially 
higher retention rates. These differentials are what 
one would expect given the positive correlation 
between geographical mobility and age. But dis-
persion in retention rates by household type is not 
inevitable: observe the relatively small differentials 
for the countries with large overall retention rates 
(at the top of the figure).
Figure 22.2, panel (e), shows that for most countries 
retention rates do not vary substantially with the la-
bour market activity status of the household head, 
though there is a tendency for individuals with un-
employed household heads to be more likely to be 
lost to follow-up and individuals with a retired house-
hold head to be less likely to be lost. (In both cases, 
the head may be the individual him- or herself.) This 
pattern is particularly marked in some countries. For 
example, in the UK, the retention rate is just below 
20 % for individuals with an unemployed head but 
around 50 % for individuals with a retired head (a 
difference of some 30 percentage points). The cor-
responding differential is more than 20 percentage 
points in Malta.
There appears to be a more complex association 
between the education level of the household head 
and retention rates. For countries with relatively low 
overall retention rates, it is individuals whose house-
hold head has either of the two lowest education-
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Figure 22.2: Retention rates by characteristic by country, 2008‑2011
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al levels who have the largest attrition rate. (Austria 
stands out as an example of this.) And for countries 
with relatively high overall retention rates, it is indi-
viduals whose household head has either of the two 
highest educational qualifications who have the 
largest attrition rate. (Look at the cases of Estonia or 
Slovakia, for example.)
Besides individual or household characteristics, 
fieldwork-related features are correlated with attri-
tion. Figure 22.2, panel (g), shows that the retention 
rate for individuals for whom data were collected 
from a proxy respondent in Wave 1 tend to have 
low retention rates. This is particularly strong in the 
Netherlands or Greece, for example. This is unsur-
prising because a proxy interview in the first wave is 
indicative of difficulties in securing a respondent’s 
participation to start with. Under-representation of 
the ‘proxy respondent’ characteristic itself is unlike-
ly to be a concern; rather, the concern is the extent 
to which being a ‘proxy respondent’ is associated 
with other relevant individual characteristics.
In sum, there is substantial diversity in the rates at 
which individuals from EU-SILC Wave 1 samples are 
also found in the 4-wave Balanced Samples from 
which persistent poverty rates can be calculated. 
There is differential attrition in terms of observable 
characteristics (182). The finding of diversity in re-
tention rates was also reported by Behr, Bellgardt, 
and Rendtel (2005) and Watson (2003) in the ECHP, 
though specific results are difficult to compare be-
cause findings are summarised in different ways in 
the different studies (and there is no good ‘one num-
ber’ summary of the amount of differential attrition).
(182) We have also undertaken probit regression analysis to examine 
the association between the probability of retention and 
each characteristic. Multivariate analysis helps tease out 
the associations between retention rates and a particular 
characteristic, holding other characteristics constant. Our 
multivariate analysis of the correlates of retention propensities 
is reported in Jenkins and Van Kerm (2017: Figure 4). It turns 
out that many of the associations uncovered by the univariate 
analysis are also found in the multivariate analysis, and so we 
do not discuss these results further here.
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Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013. 2008 rotation group only.
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22.3.4 Generating bespoke 
sample weights from retention 
regressions
The purpose of longitudinal weights in general is 
to adjust the 4-wave Balanced Sample so that the 
reweighted Wave 1 covariate distributions of the 
sample is the same as the Wave 1 distribution of 
covariates in the full Wave 1 Sample. Using sim-
ple multivariate probit regressions, we construct 
bespoke weights by multiplying the Wave 1 base 
weights of each observation i provided in EU-SILC, 
ωi, by the inverse of the retention probability pre-
dicted by the combination of the fitted regres-
sion parameters and the values of the predictor 
variables. So, if ri  = Φ(Xib) is the predicted reten-
tion probability of observation i belonging to the 
4-wave Balanced Sample for a given country given 
standard Normal distribution Φ(.), vectors of char-
acteristics Xi and fitted regression parameters b, 
individual i’s bespoke longitudinal weight is wi  = 
ωi × (1/ri).
EU-SILC longitudinal weights are constructed by 
national statistical institutes in a similar though not 
identical fashion. They use cumulative year-on-year 
retention probabilities (rather than a 4-year proba-
bility we have). They may include Wave 1 character-
istics or perhaps more detailed fieldwork informa-
tion that is not available in the public release files; 
and more flexible specifications for the regression 
equations used to predict retention probabili-
ties; and there may be adjustment and calibra-
tion to the marginal distributions observed in full 
cross-sectional samples. Our specification is basic, 
but it can be implemented straightforwardly using 
the data in the scientific-use EU-SILC files that are 
available to us.
The greater the dispersion of subgroup attrition 
rates around a national average, the greater the 
variance in a country’s sample weights. This can 
also have an adverse impact on the precision of es-
timates of persistent poverty rates — a factor that 
we did not take into account earlier when showing 
the connection between standard errors and sam-
ple size. We assumed in our illustration that the de-
sign effect was constant across countries. However, 
the variance of the sample weights is one of the 
factors that influence the design effect, mediating 
the relationship between sample size, standard er-
rors and the poverty rate. So, although application 
of sample weights may adjust for bias associated 
with differential attrition, it may come at a cost in 
terms of sampling variability when attrition is heav-
ily differential and therefore sample weights have 
substantial variability.
We use our bespoke weights for some counterfac-
tual exercises that cannot be undertaken with the 
EU-SILC weights.
22.4 What effects does 
differential attrition have?
In this section, we provide indirect evidence about 
potential bias in estimates resulting from differen-
tial attrition. See Jenkins and Van Kerm (2017) for 
additional analysis using different approaches.
22.4.1 Indirect evidence of 
attrition bias: comparisons of 
estimates of Wave 1 poverty rates
We follow Behr, Bellgardt, and Rendtel (2005) and 
assess the magnitude and potential impact of 
attrition by comparing our original base sample 
with the sample that remains after attrition. In our 
application, this means comparisons of statistics 
derived from the W1 Samples with the same sta-
tistics derived from the 4-wave Balanced Samples. 
The benchmark statistic is the Wave 1 (2008) pov-
erty rate. If there are differences in estimates, this 
suggests that the differences in the samples will 
also lead to bias in estimates of persistent pover-
ty statistics (which cannot be calculated for both 
samples, of course) (183). We refer to this as indirect 
evidence because it is not directly about the persis-
tent poverty rate.
(183) The W1 Samples and the Balanced Samples are not 
representative of exactly the same target population. The latter 
excludes by definition people who leave the sample frame 
between Wave 1 and Wave 4 (through death, out-migration, or 
move into non-private households). So differences in Wave 1 
estimates between the two samples can also reflect differences 
in target populations. However, over only 4 years, we expect 
this effect to be very small.
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Figure 22.3, panel (a), contains four series of es-
timates of Wave 1 poverty rates for each country 
(countries are ranked as before). The ‘All W1’ sam-
ple consists of all individuals in the Wave 1 sample; 
there are two series calculated using our Balanced 
Samples but using different weights (the EU-SILC 
longitudinal weights and our bespoke ones). As 
an additional reference point, we show the es-
timates of the 2008 poverty calculated using the 
full cross-sectional sample (i.e. based on multiple 
cohorts rather than simply one) that are calculated 
and reported by Eurostat (2014).
In an ideal world, without random sampling var-
iability, attrition or other data problems, all series 
would provide the same estimate for the poverty 
rate in 2008. Comparison of the Eurostat series (yel-
low filled circles) with the ‘All W1’ series (green dia-
monds) indicate that there are discrepancies asso-
ciated with differences between full cross-sectional 
and longitudinal data files that we are unable to 
resolve using the data available to us. Although the 
differences in estimates are small for some coun-
tries (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Italy, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia), there are differences 
that are relatively large for some other countries, 
nearly five percentage points in some cases (some-
times a negative difference, sometimes a positive 
one). See e.g. Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, 
Romania and the UK. There appears to be no sys-
tematic relationship with type of data collection or 
persistent poverty rate. Because these differences 
relate to aspects that we cannot control, we note 
the inconsistencies and pass on to the other com-
parisons. (Differences between full cross-sectional 
and longitudinal files are primarily related to sam-
pling variability since the former are composed of 
about four times as many observations, but note 
also that the longitudinal files potentially have 
more non-response bias and older frames than ‘All 
W1’ estimates.)
Specifically, we are interested in the extent to 
which the longitudinally-weighted estimates from 
the 4-wave Balanced Samples match the estimates 
from the ‘All W1’ samples (compare estimates de-
noted by a cross and by a green diamond, respec-
tively), and then the extent to which estimates 
using our bespoke weights match the estimates 
based on the Eurostat weights (compare estimates 
denoted by a green cross and by a blue dot). These 
comparisons are easiest to make if one looks at 
Figure 22.3, panel (b), in which each longitudinal 
sample estimate is expressed as a ratio of the cor-
responding ‘All W1’ sample estimate. Longitudinal 
estimates that lie outside the boundaries demar-
cated by the vertical dashed lines differ by more 
than 10 % from the ‘All W1’ sample estimates. These 
cases are a signal that differential attrition is likely 
to lead to bias that is not fully accounted for by 
weighting. (The boundaries are sufficiently wide 
to allow for differences arising from sampling varia-
tion or differences in the underlying sample frame.)
The figure shows that, for 17 of the 23 countries, 
the longitudinal estimates based on the Eurostat 
weights are within 10 % of their full Wave 1 Sample 
counterparts. However, for six countries, the esti-
mates are outside the boundaries, and hence there 
is indirect evidence that unaccounted-for differen-
tial attrition is possibly leading to bias. For three 
countries (the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the 
UK), longitudinal sample estimates are between 
80 % and 90 % of their corresponding Wave 1 
sample estimate and, for two countries (Finland, 
Iceland), the longitudinal estimates are even small-
er, less than 80 % of their corresponding Wave 1 
sample estimate.
Differences turn out to be large for the four regis-
ter countries (Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia). However, again, the evidence about po-
tential bias from differential attrition is less strong 
for these countries if our bespoke longitudinal 
weights are used rather than the Eurostat ones. 
With the former, the longitudinal estimates for all 
countries are within 10 % of their Wave 1 Sample 
counterpart.
The Netherlands stands out in this exercise. Its pov-
erty rate estimate based on the balanced sample 
with EU-SILC longitudinal weights is more than 
twice the estimate obtained on the All Wave 1 
sample and the estimate obtained from the bal-
anced sample with our bespoke weights. (The rel-
ative difference is so large that it does not fit the 
horizontal scale of Figure 22.3 (b).) Eurostat’s esti-
mate is in between the two estimates although it is 
almost twice as large as our calculations. This sug-
gests, first, that the other three cohorts forming the 
full cross-sectional dataset differ widely from the 
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Figure 22.3: Estimates of Wave 1 (2008) poverty rate
(by subsample and sample weight)
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NB: Countries ordered as in Figure 22.1.
Reading note: Panel (a) shows Wave 1 (2008) poverty rates estimated on alternative subsamples and with alternative sample weights. All 
estimates are based on the balanced sample of full 4-year respondents, except ‘All W1’ which is based on all respondents at Wave 1 (including 
subsequent attritors) and Eurostat’s estimates based on cross-sectional data for 2008. The weighting of the samples are: 2008 base weights 
(rb060) for ‘All W1’, 2011 EU-SILC longitudinal weights (rb064) and 2011 bespoke longitudinal weights for the Balanced Sample. Panel (b) shows 
estimates expressed as a fraction of the corresponding ‘All W1’ sample estimates. In the bottom panel, the estimate for NL is not shown as its 
estimate from the EU-SILC longitudinal sample is an outlier (see text).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013. 2008 rotation group only. Eurostat estimates are from Eurostat (2014) and are computed 
using 2008 cross-sectional EU-SILC data.
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2008-2011 cohort we focus on. Second, the EU-SILC 
weights for the Netherlands appear to be calibrat-
ed to fit a rich set of external distribution charac-
teristics, including income distribution information. 
This casts serious doubt about the representative-
ness of analysis based on the Dutch longitudinal 
data alone, since, as we shall illustrate, large adjust-
ments to the longitudinal sample weights lead to 
wide sampling variability.
In sum, there is suggestive evidence of bias from 
differential attrition for a number of countries, but 
strong(er) conclusions are difficult to draw because 
of the inconsistencies across the different sets of 
estimates. We observe that our bespoke longitudi-
nal weights generally do a good job of reproduc-
ing estimates derived using Eurostat longitudinal 
weights but, again, there a few marked differences.
22.4.2 Is attrition bias within the 
range of sampling variability?
Our ability to draw strong conclusions is also com-
plicated by the fact that all estimates are subject 
to sampling variation, and this may overwhelm any 
differences in bias due to differential attrition. We 
illustrate this point in Figure 22.4, which shows esti-
mates of persistent poverty rates from the 4-wave 
Balanced Sample calculated using the Eurostat 
weights (crosses) and our bespoke weights (green 
diamonds), and their associated 95 % confidence 
intervals. For reference, also shown (using yellow 
circles) are the estimates published by Eurostat for 
the same period (Eurostat 2014) and estimates ob-
tained without any weights (green squares) (184).
The main messages of Figure 22.4 are, first, that 
confidence intervals for persistent poverty rates 
calculated using Eurostat and our bespoke longitu-
(184) Puzzlingly, there are some distinct differences between the 
published estimates and estimates based on the Eurostat 
longitudinal weights. The former are larger than the latter for 
Spain and Cyprus (around three percentage points in the latter 
case).
dinal weights overlap substantially in the vast ma-
jority of countries. There are some clear differences, 
to be sure, most notably for the Netherlands, but 
also for several other countries (such as Slovakia) — 
the countries for which we identified differences 
between the series earlier.
The second lesson is that confidence intervals for 
persistent poverty rates can be relatively wide. The 
ranges shown in the figure are of course similar to 
those suggested by our calculations earlier, but the 
lesson here is that the effects of differential attrition 
would have to be relatively large for differences to 
be significant in the statistical sense and, for exam-
ple, to change the ranking of countries by persis-
tent poverty rates.
The wide confidence interval for the Netherlands 
with the EU-SILC longitudinal weights connects to 
the discussion of Figure 22.3 and illustrates how 
large adjustments to sampling weights influences 
sampling variability. In light of these results, it is un-
clear whether the benefits in terms of bias reduc-
tion from calibrating sample weights to more reli-
able external information (here the cross-sectional 
data) are not offset by the increased sampling var-
iability. A more detailed analysis in terms of mean 
squared error (which summarises both bias and 
variance in a single statistic) would be relevant 
here.
The cross-country ranking of persistent poverty 
rates shown in Figure 22.4 is broadly the same as 
the ranking that we reported in earlier work (Jen-
kins and Van Kerm, 2014), though we should point 
out that the estimates are not directly comparable 
because the sets of countries differ (the 21 used in 
the earlier paper are not a subset of the 23 used 
here), and the EU-SILC data have been revised since 
the earlier study.
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Figure 22.4: Estimates of 2008‑2011 persistent poverty rates with different sampling weights
(%)
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NB: Countries ordered as in Figure 22.1.
Reading note: Persistent poverty rates calculated by the authors use alternative sampling weights (defined in the text) and are surrounded by 
95 % confidence intervals. They are contrasted with rates published by Eurostat (circles) and plain unweighted estimates (squares).
Source: Authors’ computation, UDB August 2013. Eurostat estimates are from Eurostat (2014).
22.5 Conclusions
Rates of attrition from the 4-year EU-SILC samples 
used to calculate persistent poverty rates vary sub-
stantially across Member States. The loss of sample 
size associated with attrition may lead to increases 
in standard errors for persistent poverty rates, and 
wider confidence intervals, that are sufficiently 
large — especially for population subgroups — 
that it is not possible to derive statistically robust 
conclusions about changes in persistent poverty 
rates over time or differences between subgroups.
There is substantial cross-national diversity in the 
characteristics of individuals lost to follow up. One 
key distinction stems from the different follow-
ing rules applied by register and survey countries 
when households split. Overall, differential attrition 
abounds in EU-SILC. Moreover, we provide indirect 
evidence that application of longitudinal weights is 
essential yet it may not fully account for the effects 
of attrition, and that different assumptions about the 
poverty status of attritors lead to wide bounds in es-
timates of persistent poverty rates for most Member 
States. Thus, overall, we are less sanguine about the 
impact of attrition of EU-SILC-based estimates of per-
sistent poverty than Watson (2003) was about the es-
timation of cross-sectional statistics using the ECHP.
We have been unable to pin down with confidence 
the effects of sample attrition on bias and preci-
sion in estimates of persistent poverty rates, but 
we have produced sufficient evidence to support 
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a conclusion that researchers and data producers 
need to be mindful of these issues. Researchers 
analysing persistent poverty should at the least 
provide standard errors and confidence intervals 
for their estimates of rates, and their changes over 
time or differences between countries. (For EU-SILC 
applications, see e.g. Goedemé, 2013 and Chapter 
26 of this volume.) Sampling variability is not iden-
tical to the uncertainty introduced by attrition, 
but accounting for the former should help remind 
readers of the effects of the latter.
National data collectors and Eurostat should con-
tinue their efforts to reduce loss to follow-up. This 
would be all the more important if a decision is 
made to extend the panel dimension of EU-SILC to 
more than 4 years. Extending the panel duration is 
attractive on substantive grounds, but minimising 
attrition and minimising cross-country differentials 
in its patterns is essential to reap the benefits of 
panel lengthening. Currently, the following rules 
are not implemented successfully in all the survey 
countries and, in the register countries, they are dif-
ferent by design. Our analysis has provided addition-
al information about the groups at greatest risk of 
not providing income data for 4 years, and whom 
should therefore receive special attention. Reducing 
inconsistency across countries in the application of 
following rules would also have payoffs for sample 
retention overall and reduce differential attrition 
(see Chapter 27 of this volume). If more information 
about the details of the data collection process were 
available in the EU-SILC UDB, this might be used to 
derive better weights to account for attrition or to 
build more successful parametric models. We have 
also drawn attention to a number of apparent in-
consistencies in estimates between cross-section-
al and longitudinal components of EU-SILC, and it 
would be good to have these resolved.
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23.1 Introduction
The population facing poverty and social exclusion 
is made up of both a body of permanently poor 
people and a number of rotating individuals expe-
riencing shorter spells of poverty. To tackle pover-
ty durably, policy-makers need to understand the 
drivers of both permanent and transient poverty. 
They also need to address the question of how to 
help people exit income poverty during both em-
ployment and unemployment spells.
This chapter aims at understanding the dynamics 
of poverty through an analysis of year-on-year tran-
sitions. It highlights national differences in poverty 
turn-over across EU Member States. This chapter 
also aims to relate changes in labour market con-
ditions, i.e., job take-ups and exits from poverty. 
It shows that, on average, taking up a job helps 
people to get out of poverty in half of the cases. 
Finally, the role of policy support in changing em-
ployment status is discussed through the example 
of unemployment benefit coverage.
This chapter is structured as follows: The first sec-
tion focuses on the dynamics of poverty and high-
lights the added value of understanding poverty 
as a dynamic process. It focuses especially on the 
year-on-year transitions into and out of the ‘at risk 
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of poverty’ group. The second section focuses on 
labour market changes and associated exits from 
poverty, with a special focus on the transition from 
unemployment to employment. The third part dis-
cusses to what extent a broad and well-designed 
unemployment benefit coverage can support 
transitions to employment and contribute to pre-
venting entries into poverty.
23.2 The dynamics of 
poverty
23.2.1 The value added 
of multiannual poverty 
measurement
Analysing the risk of poverty over time enables one 
to better understand its drivers and the channels 
to mitigate it. The first approach to poverty analysis 
over time was the life-cycle perspective (Rowntree, 
1901). Based on this approach, individuals are more 
prone to experiencing poverty during earlier and lat-
er stages of their lives, and to getting out of it during 
their working age. Later approaches introduced in 
the 1990s refer to the individualisation of social risks 
and life events, such as birth of a child, or a separa-
tion (Beck, 1992; Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Based on this 
perspective, individuals go through their lives with 
a certain degree of insecurity, and face the risk of 
experiencing events such as unemployment, health 
problems or household changes.
Several outcomes can occur between the two ex-
treme states of never being at risk of poverty on 
the one side, and always being at risk on the other 
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side. Poverty spells can last for a while in the form of 
persistent income poverty, or be extremely short in 
the form of transient income poverty. The position 
of income with regard to the poverty line can also 
be less clear-cut, with alternative movements above 
and below the poverty threshold (recurrent or occa-
sional) or people entering income poverty and never 
getting out of it. As a result, Jenkins (2011) referred to 
income trajectories as a plateful of cooked spaghet-
ti, with each strand corresponding to an individual’s 
profile, which needs to be unravelled.
In this perspective, empirical research has defined 
types of income trajectories in order to measure 
their prevalence (see for example Gardiner and Hills, 
1999). Muffels et al. (1999) defined the following four 
income trajectories with respect to the poverty line 
(see Figure 23.1):
• persistent risk of poverty: trajectories where the 
risk of poverty is experienced during the whole 
period or almost the whole period;
• recurrent risk of poverty: trajectories where 
several spells of income poverty occur during 
the period;
• transient risk of poverty: trajectories where the 
risk poverty is experienced only for a short spell;
• never income-poor: trajectories where the risk 
of poverty is never experienced over the whole 
period.
Empirically, it is not possible to isolate each type 
of income trajectory with a 4-year panel such as 
EU-SILC. Recurrent risk of poverty can only be ap-
proximated with spells of poverty separated by at 
least 1 year out of the risk of poverty, and transient 
risk of poverty can be approximated with trajecto-
ries comprising only one spell of poverty.
Longer spells of income poverty can be more easily 
identified. The risk of persistent poverty is defined 
consistently with the definition of the EU social indi-
cator, namely the risk of poverty during the final year 
of the panel accompanied by at least 2 other years of 
poverty among the preceding 3 years.
In 2012, 16.5 % of the EU working age (18-64) popula-
tion was at risk of poverty and 9 % was at persistent 
risk of poverty (see Figure 23.2). While a small part 
of the population at risk of poverty was persistently 
poor in some countries, much more significant parts 
were also persistently poor in others. Pairs of Mem-
ber States with comparable cross-sectional risk of 
poverty rates, for example Romania and Spain, Slo-
vakia and Austria, or France and Sweden, have quite 
different shares of their poor population suffering 
Figure 23.1: Types of poverty trajectories
Time
Income
Poverty line
Never poor
Persistently  poor
Recurrently poor
Transiently poor
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from persistent poverty (and then suffering from less 
severe forms of exclusion).
Nevertheless, the measurement of persistent risk of 
poverty, which requires using the whole duration 
of the panel (4 years), might be subject to meas-
urement problems such as attrition and treatment 
of new entrants in the rotation sample. As shown 
in detail in Chapter 22 in this book, which discusses 
these issues in-depth, there are large differences in 
attrition rates across countries, with larger attrition in 
the United Kingdom and in Slovenia and very limited 
attrition in Romania and Bulgaria.
23.2.2 Entering into and getting 
out of poverty
A simple and complementary approach to examin-
ing the dynamics of the risk of poverty consists of 
analysing the year-to-year transitions into and out of 
risk of poverty, as does the rest of this chapter. The 
entry rate into poverty is measured as the share of 
those who were not at risk of poverty 1 year earlier 
but fell into risk of poverty. Symmetrically, the exit 
from poverty rate is defined as the share of individ-
uals not at risk of poverty among those who were 
at risk of poverty the year before. Between 2010 and 
2011, some 7 % of the EU 18-64 population entered 
into income poverty, while 37 % of the population at 
risk of poverty in 2010 exited poverty in 2011. Both 
entry and exit poverty rates increased throughout 
the crisis (186). The entry rate increased from 6.0 % 
between 2008 and 2009 (2010 EU-SILC data, see Box 
23.1) to 7 % between 2010 and 2011 (187) (2012 EU-SILC 
data). Over the same period, exit rate increased from 
35 % to 37 % (188). See Chapter 20 in this book for fur-
ther analysis of the changes in entries and exits from 
material deprivation during the crisis.
(186) This can be explained by the severity of the crisis for entries 
into poverty, and by changes in at-risk-of-poverty thresholds 
due to a decrease of the median income and thereby the 
poverty threshold for exits out of poverty (see Vaalavuo, 2015 
for a discussion on the impact of the changes in poverty 
threshold on poverty transitions).
(187) Over countries for which the 2012 data are available.
(188) During the same time, the poverty risk increased across these 
Member States. This is not incompatible with increases in both 
entry into and exits out of poverty, as the entry rate applies to 
a population four times bigger than that of the exit rate, i.e., the 
population not at risk of poverty.
Figure 23.2: Persistent at‑risk‑of‑poverty rate and at‑risk‑of‑poverty rate by Member State, 2012
(% of the 18‑64 population)
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NB: Member States are grouped by increasing size of the population at risk of persistent poverty within the population at risk of poverty and 
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Reading note: In the EU-28, 16 % of the 18-64 population was at risk of poverty in 2012. 9.5 % of the 18-64 population was persistently poor.
Source: EU-SILC (Eurostat web-database).
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The combination of entry and exit rates varies con-
siderably across Member States (see Figure 23.3). 
Four main patterns emerge.
Spain, Austria and the United Kingdom are singled 
out in a first group. In these countries, both exit from 
poverty and entry-into-poverty rates are higher than 
the EU average. This outcome seems relatively pos-
itive, as those entering poverty can count on a high 
chance of exit it in the near future. However, income 
poverty can also be recurrent. In such a framework, 
people might repeatedly go in and out of the risk of 
poverty with insecure prospects. In the United King-
dom and Spain, the share of means-tested benefits 
is far above the EU average, and might partly explain 
this pattern. This, however, is not the case in Austria.
The second group of countries, consisting of Esto-
nia, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Latvia and Portugal, shows 
a high entry-into-poverty rate, and a moderate ex-
it-from-poverty rate. This situation reflects a possible 
risk of being trapped in income poverty, with the in-
dividuals falling into the risk of poverty having limited 
chances to get out of it in the following years. These 
countries should both address better prevention of 
income poverty, and promote policies aiming at pull-
ing individuals out of income poverty.
In the third group, entry-into-poverty rates are 
close to average, combined with low to moderate 
exit-from-poverty rates in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In this 
group, there are some risks of being trapped in 
poverty, as chances to exit are low, especially in Bul-
garia, where the exit-from-poverty rate is very low.
Finally, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Cyprus, Mal-
ta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland show 
signs of very low entries into and low exits from risk 
of poverty. However, this does not prevent some 
parts of the population at risk of poverty to remain 
durably excluded. In Malta and the Netherlands for 
Figure 23.3: Entry into and exit out of poverty risk rates, 2010 and 2011
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example, the share of the persistent income-poor 
is high within the population at risk of poverty.
As these figures result from survey data, some 
measurement errors can occur. Estimates of the 
95 % confidence intervals around the entry and 
exit rates are detailed in Table 23.1.
23.3 The role of labour 
market transitions in exiting 
out of the risk of poverty
Changes in labour market conditions and 
risk-of-poverty transitions are linked, but to which 
extent? The European Commission (2009) high-
lighted that ‘employment increases have not suf-
Table 23.1: Entry‑into‑ and exit‑out‑of poverty risk rates and 95 % confidence intervals, 2010 and 2011
(% of 18‑59 population)
Entry Exit
Denmark 2.1 [0.2;3.9] 52.2 [42.2;62.2]
Slovenia 2.3 [1.0;4.0] 34.1 [28.4;39.8]
Cyprus 2.6 [1.8;3.4] 34.8 [26.4;43.2]
Czech Republic 2.6 [2.0;3.2] 42.6 [36.2;49]
Finland 3.0 [2.2;3.8] 32.2 [26.6;37.8]
Netherlands 3.1 [2.3;3.9] 36.3 [28.9;43.7]
Malta 3.2 [0.1;6.3] 30.8 [23.3;38.3]
Hungary 4.5 [3.8;5.2] 31.3 [27.2;35.4]
Belgium 4.6 [3.6;5.6] 35.7 [29.2;42.2]
Luxembourg 4.8 [3.2;6.4] 31.7 [24.3;39.1]
Romania 4.8 [3.8;5.8] 16.9 [13.2;20.6]
Bulgaria 4.9 [3.8;6.1] 26.9 [21.7;32.1]
Poland 5.1 [4.3;5.9] 34.6 [30.7;38.5]
Slovakia 5.1 [4.0;6.2] 36.7 [30.6;42.8]
France 5.2 [4.5;5.9] 40.1 [35.8;44.4]
Lithuania 6.1 [4.7;7.5] 37.1 [31.3;42.9]
Croatia 6.5 [5.1;7.9] 28.6 [23.4;33.8]
Estonia 6.6 [5.4;7.8] 34.2 [28.7;39.7]
Portugal 6.7 [5.4;8.0] 30.2 [25;35.4]
Italy 7.1 [6.3;7.9] 32.3 [29;35.6]
Austria 7.8 [6.5;9.1] 49.6 [42.9;56.3]
Latvia 8.5 [7.0;10.0] 33.0 [28.3;37.7]
United Kingdom 8.8 [7.3;10.3] 45.7 [40;51.4]
Greece 10.7 [8.8;12.6] 27.9 [22.5;33.3]
Spain 10.8 [9.6;12.0] 40.4 [36.6;44.2]
NB: The 95 % confidence intervals have been computed with the statistical guidance of G. Osier using the Ultimate Cluster approach (see 
Chapter 26 in this book). Countries ranked according to national entry poverty risk rates.
Reading note: In Denmark, 2.1 % of individuals not at risk of poverty in 2010 were poor in 2011. The 95 % confidence interval of this figure ranges 
between 0.2 % and 3.9 %.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
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ficiently reached those furthest away from the la-
bour market, and jobs have not always succeeded 
in lifting people out of poverty’.
Exits from the risk of poverty are always lower for 
those who are out of work at the beginning of 
the reference period than for those who are al-
ready in-work. 40 % of in-work poor individuals get 
out of poverty from one year to the next, against 
32 % of non-working poor individuals. Differ-
ences in exits from poverty associated with work 
vary across Member States, with large differences 
in exit-from-poverty between the working poor 
and the non-working poor in the Belgium, Croatia, 
the Netherlands or Austria (see Figure 23.4). At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, exit-from-poverty 
rates among non-working individuals are close to 
those of the working poor, due to household com-
position effects (non-working person living with 
a partner at work for example) in Spain, Poland and 
Romania.
The gap — or absence of a gap — between the 
exits from poverty of the in-work poor and the 
non-working poor can be a function of the dif-
ferences in household compositions. While the 
employment status refers to individuals, poverty 
is measured at household level. For this reason, 
changes in the employment status of one adult 
impacts the situation of other adults in the house-
hold. In such a framework, the variety in household 
composition across Europe can explain away these 
differences. As detailed in Corluy and Vandenbro-
ucke (2012), household types do not have a uniform 
distribution across Member States. While Northern 
Members States account for large shares of single 
adult household, multigenerational households 
Figure 23.4: Exit out of poverty risk rates by initial labour market attachment, 2010 and 2011
(% of 18‑59 population at risk of poverty in 2010)
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are much more numerous in Southern or Eastern 
European Member States.
23.3.1 Transitions to employment 
might refer to various cases
The following analysis investigates the question of 
the exits from poverty among poor out of work 
individuals who started a job the year after. The 
working age population out of work comprises 
both those who are (1) unemployed or (2) at risk 
of poverty and inactive. The rationale for such 
a reference population is to focus on those individ-
uals who need to take up a job in order to avoid 
or escape the risk of poverty. Those who might be 
out of work for personal or household reasons are 
therefore excluded from this analysis, the rationale 
being to narrow the analysis to a population who 
needs to be activated.
Several types of transitions from non-employment 
to employment are reviewed in the following anal-
ysis, depending on the activity status before and 
after transition. Their respective exit-from-poverty 
rate is then estimated.
Evidence suggests that the chance of getting a job 
depends on the initial activity status. While the 
short-term unemployed are more likely to go back 
to work, the long-term unemployed, those who are 
disabled or adults fulfilling domestic tasks, might 
experience greater barriers to entering or re-enter-
ing the labour market. The rate of those who are 
short-term unemployed but are back in work the fol-
lowing year (30 %) is far larger than it is for the one of 
the long-term employed (9 %). Those who are unem-
ployed and at risk of poverty have greater chances of 
being at work the year after compared to those who 
are inactive at risk of poverty (see Figure 23.5).
Second, the quality of the return to work is a key fac-
tor in making it possible to exit the risk of poverty. 
Low paid jobs, involuntary part-time work, or tem-
porary jobs might be insufficient to lift job seekers 
out of poverty. For that reason, transitions are also 
Figure 23.5: Transitions from non‑employment to employment among adults out of work 
(unemployed or at risk of poverty and inactive) by initial status, 2010 and 2011
(% of 18‑59 population unemployed or at risk of poverty and inactive)
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Reading note: 31 % of those who were unemployed in 2010 were employed in 2011.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015..
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broken down by work characteristics (temporary or 
permanent contract, part-time or full-time position, 
low or high pay).
Taking up a job can have different implications and 
lead to different outcomes in terms of exits from 
the risk of poverty, depending on the characteris-
tics of the job found. EU-SILC provides partial indi-
cators in terms of the nature of the contract, time 
worked over a week, and wage level. Figure 23.6 
shows the likelihood of returning to permanent or 
fixed-term work, part-time or full-time jobs, and 
low-paid (189) and better-paid jobs for those who 
are out of work (both the unemployed and the 
inactive poor). It illustrates that most transitions 
to employment pertain to full-time, non-low paid 
jobs. Temporary contracts are also more represent-
ed than permanent contracts.
(189) Hourly wages have been computed from the EU-SILC following 
a methodology close to Engel and Schaffner (2012). A proxy of 
the hourly wage has been estimated among the population of 
those who worked full time over more than 9 months during 
the previous year by applying the number of hours worked 
a week declared at the time of the interview. Low-wage earners 
are identified as those who earn less than two thirds of the 
national median gross hourly earnings as in usual definition. 
Figure 23.6: Transitions from non‑employment to employment among adults out of work 
(unemployed or at risk of poverty and inactive) by type of job found, 2010 and 2011
(% of 18‑59 population unemployed or at risk of poverty and inactive)
28
72
57
42
33
67
0
20
40
60
80
to part-time to full-time to temporary
contract
to permanent
contract
to low wages to other wages
Working time Type of contract Wage level
Tr
an
si
ti
o
n
s 
fr
o
m
 u
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
to
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
NB: The measure of low-wage earners in this chapter is defined above. This definition is restricted to the group of employees who worked more 
than 9 months over the income reference period; this is why the average of ‘low-wage’ and ‘non-low-wage’ workers is different from the value 
for (all) full-time workers.
Reading note: Among those who were out of work in 2010 and were working in 2011, 28 % were working part time, 57 % were employed as 
temporary workers, and 33 % were low wage earners.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
23Exits from poverty and labour market changes: taking up a job does not always help to get out of poverty
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  427
23.3.2 Getting a job helps to get 
people out of the risk of poverty 
in half of the cases
To what extent does getting a job help a person 
escape from income poverty? Between 2010 and 
2011, 50 % of those who were out of work, lived in 
a poor household and took up a job, exited from 
poverty. The chance of getting out of the at risk of 
poverty group while taking up a job varied from 
40 % in Bulgaria to 70 % in Estonia (see Figure 23.7). 
As these figures rely on limited samples size, one 
must nevertheless bear in mind that they are as-
sociated with relatively broad confidence intervals.
Figure 23.7: Is taking up a job enough to leave income poverty? Share of adults out of work 
(non‑working, at‑risk‑of‑poverty) in 2010 and taking up a job who exited out of poverty in 2011
(% of 18‑59 population at risk of poverty in 2010 and taking up a job in 2011)
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Box 23.1: Measuring year to year transitions: treatment of reference periods
Two main types of year‑on‑year transitions are considered in this chapter: labour market changes and 
at‑risk‑of‑poverty transitions. The two variables do not refer to similar measurement periods in the 
EU‑SILC data. Their analysis, therefore, requires a careful treatment (see Debels and Vandecasteele 2008 
for a similar discussion).
The main variables in labour market participation, such as activity status, type of contract and number 
of hours worked over a week, refer to the year of the interview (2012 being the latest in the EU‑SILC lon‑
gitudinal UDB available at the time of writing). Some complementary information on activity during the 
previous year (reference year) is also available through the so‑called calendar of activity, i.e. the number 
of months i) at work, ii) unemployed or iii) inactive over the whole reference year. In the EU‑SILC longitu‑
dinal UDB 2012, these data refer to the year 2011.
Income data (including wages and poverty status) refer to the income reference period, i.e. the previous 
year. In the EU‑SILC longitudinal UDB 2012, these data refer therefore to the year 2011. The UK and Ire‑
land have however different rules. Data from the United Kingdom refer to the current income. Irish data 
refer to the last 12 months.
To properly compare the transitions into the labour market and the risk of poverty transitions between 
2 years, the variables need to refer to the same time period. For example, observing the link between 
labour market and risk of poverty transitions for an individual in 2010 and 2011 requires referring both 
to the EU‑SILC data collected in 2010 and 2011 for the labour market (current status), and to the data 
collected in 2011 and 2012 for income composition (which is to refer to reference years 2010 and 2011).
In this chapter, data are treated so that labour market attachment and income reference period refer 
to the same year as initial income (2010). Unless otherwise specified, transitions refer to the 2010‑2011 
reference years.
Various reasons explain why taking up a job does 
not guarantee exit from risk of poverty, notably the 
quality of the job found (as indicated by the type 
of contract, working hours and wages) and the 
household composition. At EU level, exit rates from 
the risk of poverty are similar if the job happens to 
be with a permanent or temporary contract (see 
Figure 23.8). Taking up a full-time job is associat-
ed with better chances of getting out of poverty. 
Among full-time jobs, those that are better paid, i.e., 
above the low-wage threshold, also led to better 
chances of exiting poverty. However, this overall 
picture needs to be nuanced as patterns of work-
ing arrangements differ a great deal across Member 
States in terms, for example, of whether tempo-
rary contracts or part-time jobs serve as stepping 
stones, or imply entry into the wrong part of a high-
ly segmented labour market.
Whether getting a job is enough to get out of pover-
ty may also depend on household composition. As 
Figure 23.9 shows, adults without children are more 
likely to get out of the risk of poverty when they take 
up a job than adults living with children, and espe-
cially single parents.
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Figure 23.8: Exit‑out‑of‑poverty risk rate by type of labour market transition, 2010‑2011
(% of 18‑59 population at risk of poverty and taking up a job)
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NB: The measure of low-wage earners in this chapter is defined above. This definition is restricted to the group of employees who worked more 
than 9 months over the income reference period; this is why the average of ‘low-wage’ and ‘non-low-wage’ workers is different from the value 
for (all) full-time workers.
Reading note: Among those who were out of work and at risk of poverty in 2010 and who were working full-time in 2011, 55 % exited poverty 
in 2011.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
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23.4 The role of policies in 
labour market transitions 
and exits from poverty
Smoothing transitions to employment and ensur-
ing that their success in exits from poverty can be 
achieved through combined efforts in providing 
adequate income support, promoting inclusive 
labour markets and ensuring wide access to ena-
bling services, such as training or childcare services 
(see European Commission, 2014).
There is however little information at an individu-
al level enabling an assessment that encompasses 
the effect of all these policy tools on transitions. 
The following analysis investigates the examples of 
the coverage of unemployment benefits, by taking 
advantage of the income composition information 
available at individual level on a yearly basis.
The characteristics of an unemployment bene-
fit system can be described in terms of coverage, 
adequacy, duration, eligibility rules and associat-
ed tax-benefit treatments. Here we refer to one 
of these dimensions, namely the coverage of un-
employment benefits. In practice, information on 
benefit coverage is difficult to measure, especially 
in the context of cross-country comparisons (see 
Maquet et al., 2016). Coverage of unemployment 
benefits is therefore estimated by the share of 
the population unemployed and actually receiv-
ing some unemployment benefits. This share is 
varying greatly over Member States, with broad 
coverage in some countries, such as Germany, and 
much weaker coverage of the unemployed in oth-
er countries, e.g. Greece or Italy.
The fact that, in a given country, some unem-
ployed are covered by unemployment benefits 
and others not can be explained by several fac-
Figure 23.9:  Exit‑out‑of‑poverty risk rate while getting a job, 2010‑2011
(% of 18‑59 population at risk of poverty in 2010 and taking up a job)
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Reading note: Among adults living in a single adult household at risk of poverty and not at work in 2010 and at work in 2011, 45 % exited poverty 
by 2011.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
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tors, such as the share of long term unemployed, 
who might have exhausted their rights. It can also 
depend on entitlement rules, such as the number 
of months of work required to claim benefits. The 
following analysis investigates the link at individu-
al level between the coverage of unemployment 
benefits and transition to employment 1 year after. 
It tends to conclude that, at individual level, the un-
employed receiving unemployment benefits have 
better transitions to work compared to those who 
do not receive any.
Nevertheless, it should be underlined that this 
result does not prove any causality between un-
employment benefit recipiency and returns to 
employment or poverty; nor does it mean that 
benefit recipiency per se favours transitions to em-
ployment. Indeed, unobserved — but related — 
variables, such as training, conditionality of benefits 
or activation measures cannot be included in the 
model. Therefore, the result tends to only suggest 
that well-designed income support does not pre-
vent returns to employment. Further information 
about activation measures, training or counselling 
at individual level and their link to unemployment 
benefits recipiency could help to better identify 
the drivers of successful returns to employment.
This result could, nevertheless, be disputed by the 
claim that those who are not covered by unem-
ployment benefits might also have some specific 
characteristics in common, making them more 
likely to be unemployed in the long term, or to be 
in precarious labour market situations not covered 
by unemployment protection schemes. Those not 
covered by unemployment benefits might for ex-
ample be less educated, unemployed for a longer 
period, or with lower employment spells over 
the past years, and have, therefore, lower chanc-
es to be employed. However, this result still holds 
Table 23.2: Individuals characteristics of unemployed within groups considered as being of 
‘similar profile’ in the propensity score matching analysis, 2010‑2011‑2012 (pooled)
Group Propensity to be covered
Number of 
cases
Age (average, 
years)
Months worked 
over last 3 years 
(average)
Share of low 
educated (%)
Share of women 
(%)
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1 [0.11;0.2] 940 171 26 28 0.44 0.98 0.31 0.40 0.28 0.17
2 [0.2;0.25] 559 163 35 39 1.09 2.24 0.46 0.28 0.57 0.41
3 [0.25;0.3] 429 159 41 42 3.05 3.81 0.39 0.49 0.59 0.59
4 [0.3;0.4] 486 278 40 39 7.58 8.36 0.56 0.46 0.49 0.57
5 [0.4;0.5] 347 276 38 39 15.06 15.11 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.48
6 [0.5;0.55] 169 157 38 39 20.39 19.80 0.32 0.44 0.39 0.36
7 [0.55;0.6] 139 201 40 39 21.91 23.25 0.38 0.31 0.39 0.35
8 [0.6;0.8] 421 936 43 42 27.60 27.93 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.44
9 [0.8;0.9] 25 149 53 50 34.84 34.65 0.66 0.58 0.57 0.61
Reading note: This table illustrates the profiles of individuals covered or not covered by unemployment benefits (recipients and non-recipients). 
It illustrates that within each group, the profiles of individuals are comparable in terms of age, gender, education and time spent in employment. 
For example, in group 1, individuals are on average aged 26 among non-recipients of unemployment benefit recipients and 28 among 
recipients, which is quite similar.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
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when individuals with similar backgrounds with re-
spect to the above-mentioned characteristics are 
compared.
Comparing individuals with similar backgrounds 
with respect to unemployment benefit cover-
age can be achieved through a propensity score 
matching (190). This method aims at grouping indi-
viduals with similar characteristics (in terms of age, 
gender, education and time spent in employment) 
and then comparing across groups the share of 
those employed 1 year later. As Table 23.2 illus-
trates, within each group, unemployment benefit 
recipients and non-recipients within each group 
have similar characteristics.
(190) See Chapter 25 in this book for another use of this technique.
Figure 23.10 shows that, within groups of individ-
uals with similar characteristics, the transitions 
to employment are higher among individuals 
receiving unemployment benefits in most cas-
es. To measure more precisely the difference in 
transition to employment between recipients and 
non-recipients, average treatment effects are esti-
mated. Pairs of recipients and non-recipients with 
similar profiles are identified through different 
methods (see Table 23.3). The average treatment 
effect is then estimated as the difference of tran-
sitions to employment within pairs. Overall, the 
estimated impact of unemployment benefit cov-
erage on the job take-up is significantly positive in 
the statistical sense.
Figure 23.10: Transitions to employment the year after for unemployed receiving or not 
unemployment benefits, by group of profiles based on propensity score matching, 2010‑2011‑2012 
(pooled)
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Reading note: Individuals are ranked against their propensity to be covered by unemployment benefits given some of their characteristics and 
grouped by blocks of similar propensity. Within each group, the bars represent the transition rate to employment for unemployment benefit 
recipients and non-recipients. For example, in the first block of individuals with low likelihood to be covered by unemployment benefits (young 
people, little work experience), 19 % were employed 1 year later.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
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Table 23.3: Average difference estimated through different matching methods in transitions to 
employment within 1 year between unemployment benefit recipients and non‑recipients, 2010‑
2011‑2012 (pooled)
Technical estimation
Average 
treatment effect 
(%)*
Standard 
error (%)
Estimated 
confidence interval 
(%) (bootstrap)
Stratification matching: based on blocks of individuals 
with similar propensity to be covered. It matches each 
non-recipient with all recipients in the block.
6.6 1.5 [4.6;8.4]
Nearest neighbour matching: identifies for each 
non-recipient the benefit recipient with the closest 
propensity to be covered.
5.6 1.6 [1.7;9.3]
Radius matching: considers all benefit recipients with 
a likelihood to be covered differing no more than x % from 
the likelihood of the selected non-recipient (x being the 
so-called radius, here 0.05)
9.5 0.9 [7.0;12.0]
Kernel method: considers a wide range of recipients around 
the non-recipient, and weights them decreasingly as the 
distance to the selected non-recipient increases.
6.2 1.2 [3.5;8.8]
Reading note: The average treatment effect compares the transition to employment of identified pairs of unemployment benefits recipients and 
non-recipients among 2 490 unemployed receiving unemployment benefits and 2 275 unemployed not receiving any unemployment benefits. 
Propensity score matching estimates are based on number of months spent in employment during the 3 years before the income reference 
year, age and education level (low educated or not). Regional dummies are included (but not country dummies). This helps to identify wider 
groups of individuals with similar characteristics regardless of whether or not they are covered (as an individual with a given profile might be 
covered in a Member State and not covered in another one based on eligibility rules). However, this also has disadvantages, as variables such 
as national economic situation of the time cannot be captured. The average treatment effect is estimated by taking into account the following 
factors: number of consecutive months in employment during the income reference period, number of months spent in work during the past 3 
years before the reference period, education level (being low educated or not), age, gender and number of children.
Source: Author’s computation, UDB March 2015.
23.5 Conclusions
Through an approach based on examining the 
dynamics of entering and exiting poverty, this 
chapter has aimed at showing how addressing 
and preventing income poverty needs to take into 
account its dynamic nature. It has also explored to 
what extent labour market changes can contribute 
to explaining exits from income poverty.
The results show that entering and exiting pover-
ty can vary greatly across Member States. Some 
main patterns can be distinguished: First, there 
are countries where rates of entry and exit pover-
ty are high, sometimes with a significant share of 
those at risk of poverty forming the ‘core group’ 
of the permanently poor. Second, there are coun-
tries with a high risk of entering poverty, and low 
or moderate exit from it. This is related to the risk 
of an income poverty trap, as those entering the 
risk of poverty will have difficulties getting out of 
it. Third, there are countries with both low entry 
into and exit from risk of poverty. In some of these 
countries, the share of people at risk of persistent 
income poverty is high, which highlights signs of 
social polarisation, with a group of people at risk of 
poverty; for these people there are few chances of 
getting out of it.
The chapter also explores to what extent taking up 
a job is associated with exits from risk of poverty. It 
has shown that transitions to employment do not 
necessarily result in exits from risk of poverty. Only 
half of individuals switching from non-employ-
ment to employment also get out of risk of poverty 
at the same time. This can be attributed to various 
factors that remain difficult to explore with existing 
data. These factors include household composi-
tion and its changes, work characteristics that are 
not observed in the current data and interactions 
with income-support schemes. There might also 
be some chronological effects, with exits from 
poverty occurring later.
Finally, the chapter investigates how unemploy-
ment benefit coverage is associated with job 
take-up. It shows that widely available systems 
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of income support do not prevent or discourage 
returns to employment if they are well-designed 
and accompanied with appropriate conditions (job 
search requirements). The analysis shows that, all 
other things being equal, people receiving unem-
ployment benefits have greater chances to take up 
a job than non-recipients. Further analyses investi-
gating the adequacy of the benefits, their design 
(such as reducing overtime) or their overlaps with 
other types of income support or services (such as 
training or counselling) are, nevertheless, required 
to draw proper lessons for policy-makers.
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24.1 Introduction
The definition of the appropriate equalitarian ob-
jective for the (re)distribution of many social and 
economic outcomes has been a long debated top-
ic among scholars, which is also of central interest 
for policy-makers. The notion of equality of oppor-
tunity has gained popularity over the last decades 
as one of the relevant distributional criteria for 
achieving a fair allocation of resources (see Lefranc 
et al., 2009 or Roemer and Trannoy, 2014) (192). Op-
portunities are equally distributed when individu-
als of the same ‘type’ (i.e., sharing similar circum-
stances of origin for which they cannot be held 
responsible), who make similar ‘effort’ choices (for 
example in terms of hours worked, educational 
choices, etc.), also face identical opportunity pro-
files. This does not imply that opportunities should 
coincide for everybody, but rather that factors such 
as the background of origin should have no direct 
impact on determining individual life chances. 
(191) Both authors are with LISER (Luxembourg). Comments by 
Anthony B. Atkinson, Luna Bellani, Tim Goedemé, Sigita 
Grundiza, Anne-Catherine Guio, Eric Marlier, Marco Pomati, 
Philippe Van Kerm and participants to the 2014 International 
Conference on Comparative EU Statistics on Income and Living 
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(192) This setting follows the work of political philosophers such as 
Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989) and comprises 
traditional models of equality of opportunity such as Roemer 
(1998) and Fleurbaey (2008).
This is, indeed, the ideal distribution of opportu-
nities that the policymaker should target to reach 
an ‘endowment insensitive’, ‘responsibility-sensi-
tive’ allocation of resources (see Fleurbaey, 2008). 
When, instead, individual circumstances play a role 
in determining opportunities, a form of inequality 
of opportunity prevails, meaning that some types 
enjoy/suffer an unfair advantage/disadvantage 
compared to others.
By seeking to promote social inclusion across the 
EU, one of the objectives of the Europe 2020 policy 
agenda (see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book) is to en-
hance equality of opportunity among its citizens. 
Indeed, as argued by Atkinson and Marlier (2010, p. 
3), ‘an inclusive society is one that rises above differ-
ences of race, gender, class, generation and geog-
raphy to ensure equality of opportunity regardless 
of origin’. Yet, the extent to which this objective 
has been attained across the EU is disputable, and 
different chapters in this book are offering various 
perspectives on social inclusion issues in the EU.
This chapter proposes a coherent evaluation 
framework for assessing the inequality of opportu-
nity dimension of social exclusion in Europe. The 
contribution is twofold. First, it suggests a nov-
el way of quantifying the degree of inequality of 
opportunity through simple indicators, that are 
consistent with the normative perspectives on 
equality of opportunity (see Andreoli et al., 2014) 
and that have an appealing interpretation for the 
policymaker. Secondly, it illustrates the proposed 
measurement framework by investigating the evo-
lution of inequality of opportunity across selected 
European countries between 2005 and 2011.
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Many factors may have affected the evolution of 
opportunity profiles in the period we consider. The 
recent economic crisis, the so-called ‘Great Reces-
sion’, may have considerably reshaped individuals’ 
labour market opportunities, as a consequence of 
the interaction between the dynamics of the EU la-
bour market and the public intervention schemes 
promoted by each single government. While dis-
entangling the various mechanisms that affected 
the evolution of inequality of opportunity may be 
a difficult exercise involving a counterfactual anal-
ysis of opportunities distributions, understanding 
how the opportunities of different types evolved 
over the last decade is relevant to understand new 
forms of unfair disadvantage, and to provide a new 
perspective on the recent crisis effects. The em-
pirical goal of this chapter is to illustrate how the 
measures of inequality in access to opportunities 
discussed hereafter can usefully complement the 
current set of official statistics available to the pol-
icymaker. In particular, the chapter contrasts such 
measures with indicators of social inequalities, such 
as the EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or–social-exclusion’ in-
dicator (AROPE; see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book). 
Furthermore, it allows for an assessment of the 
extent of convergence of opportunity inequalities 
across EU countries.
One of the major empirical obstacles to the as-
sessment of inequality of opportunity is the lack 
of any large scale dataset of individual outcomes 
and circumstances, from where opportunity pro-
files can be estimated, which would allow for com-
parisons between countries and over time. In this 
chapter, we make use of the 2005 and 2011 EU-SILC 
ad hoc modules on intergenerational transmission 
of disadvantage where measures of parental back-
ground for a sufficiently large number of respond-
ents are available. We use annual labour earnings 
before state intervention as a measure of oppor-
tunity faced by working individuals. Indeed, gross 
earnings define living standards opportunities and 
consumption possibilities. We use paternal educa-
tion (a characteristic beyond one’s control) to cap-
ture the quality of the circumstances individuals 
are exposed to in young age (193). Our model focus-
(193) It is well known from father-son education and income 
intergeneration mobility studies that more educated parents 
transmit significant wealth and social advantages to their 
children (see Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014).
es on distributional assessments, meaning that the 
analysis is carried out by looking at the distribution 
of opportunities for people sharing the same fam-
ily background but making different effort choices.
The availability of the 2005 EU-SILC module led to 
several academic contributions analysing the ques-
tion of inequality of opportunity across Europe, 
such as Checchi et al. (2010), Dunnzlaff et al. (2010) 
or Marrero and Rodriguez (2012). These studies 
have in common the use of the same underlying 
data but differ in their implementation of the con-
cept of inequality of opportunity (194). To our knowl-
edge, this chapter is the first attempt to analyse the 
evolution of inequality of opportunity over time by 
making use of the 2011 EU-SILC module (195) as well.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 24.2 
presents in more details the indices of inequali-
ty of opportunity that we propose. Section 24.3 
contains the description of our empirical analysis 
based on EU-SILC data and Section 24.4, the results. 
Finally, Section 24.5 concludes.
24.2 Indices of inequality of 
opportunity
We assume that individual opportunities can be 
measured by virtue of an outcome of interest, de-
noted y, which is determined by three components:
• Circumstances (denoted c) capture illegitimate 
determinants of y that fall beyond individuals’ 
responsibility, such as parental background 
(194) Various synthetic indicators of the extent of inequality in 
opportunities distribution have been used/proposed in these 
papers. Dunnzlaff et al. (2010) apply Gini opportunity index to 
the outcome variable à la Lefranc et al. (2008) to measure the 
average degree of advantage across pairs of opportunity profiles, 
evaluated according to a specific evaluation function. Marrero 
and Rodriguez (2012) or Checchi et al. (2010) decompose overall 
income inequality using regression methods à la Ferreira and 
Gignoux (2011) and separate the part of income that is mostly 
associated with circumstances from the residual component.
(195) Other papers have used the 2011 module in the context of 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage analysis — 
a concept which bears similarity with that of EOp — e.g. 
Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana (2013), Serafino and Tonkin (2014) 
as well as Chapter 25 in this book. The methodology in this last 
chapter, in particular, is based on matching methods to assess, 
in a form of counterfactual analysis setting, the inheritance of 
financial poverty. This differs substantially from the normative 
evaluations expressed by the EOp framework presented here.
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or social origin. Individuals sharing the same 
circumstances belong to the same type.
• Effort (denoted e) captures legitimate 
determinants of y, that pertain to the sphere 
of individual responsibility.
• Attainable outcomes are contingent on a state 
variable (denoted s). All individuals in a society, 
which might represent a given country in 
a given period, share the same institutional 
background. The analysis of inequality of 
opportunity across states involves comparisons 
across countries and time.
Let ys(c,e) denote the outcome of an individual in 
state s with circumstances c and exerting effort e. 
Given effort, Equality of Opportunity (EOp) holds 
whenever circumstances do not contribute to ex-
plain the distribution of the outcome across the 
population. If individuals cannot be made account-
able for their circumstances, they should not be 
made accountable for the correlation between cir-
cumstances and effort, either. As a consequence, the 
notion of responsibility that is relevant in this setting 
should define effort as orthogonal to the circum-
stances. Assuming (as in Roemer, 1998) that there is 
a monotonic relation between effort and outcomes 
for any given circumstance, and that effort has only 
a relativistic meaning (i.e. more effort never yields 
lower outcomes), then individual effort can be iden-
tified by the position p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, that this indi-
vidual occupies in the outcome’s distribution made 
conditional on his type. We define a quantile ys(c,p) as 
the outcome level associated with position or effort 
p in the outcome’s Pen’s Parade, obtained by arrang-
ing outcomes by increasing magnitude (196).
We define therefore EOp in state s as a situation 
where ys(c,p) = ys(c',p) for any pair c ≠ c' and for any 
level of effort identified by the position p. When 
EOp holds, the opportunity profiles offered to dif-
ferent types exerting the same effort coincide. Al-
(196) To identify the outcome quantile ys(c,p), it is sufficient to 
represent the cumulative distribution (cdf) of outcome 
ys conditional on circumstances c (denoted FS(y|c), which 
indicates the share of population whose outcome is smaller 
than y) and then to measure the level of income corresponding 
to the poorest p-percent of the population. This quantile 
satisfies: p = FS (ys(c,p)|c). The Pen’s Parade is a graphical 
representation of the distribution of ys(c,p) at various levels of p. 
It is often denoted by the inverse cdf: ys(c,p) = F‑1s   (p|c) 
(see Maccheroni et al. 2005 for notation).
though opportunity profiles conditional on effort 
and circumstances are singletons (i.e. outcome lev-
els), the hypothesis above makes the EOp criterion 
distributional in nature. Figure 24.1 illustrates this 
point. The Pen’s Parades of outcomes distributions 
for types c and c' are reported in this figure. For each 
type, the curve’s height in a given point (measured 
on the vertical axis) corresponds to the income as-
sociated with that level of effort (measured on the 
horizontal axis). Only the first panel displays a case 
where EOp is satisfied. In fact, the two types’ out-
come Pen’s Parades coincide at every effort level. In 
the remaining cases, a form of inequality of oppor‑
tunity prevails.
In the central panel of the figure, type c enjoys an 
advantage compared to type c’ that holds irrespec-
tive of the effort chosen. In the right hand-side 
panel, type c’ advantage is confined to compari-
sons involving low effort, while it reverses to a dis-
advantage at high effort. One intuitive, distribu-
tional measure of advantage is the gap between 
the opportunity profiles offered to each type at any 
given effort level. This is easily identifiable by the 
gap between outcomes Pen’s Parades associated 
with two types c and c', denoted: ys(c,p) – ys(c’,p), 
0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
The distribution of this gap is informative on the 
distribution and sign of advantage across pairs of 
types (for alternative models based on the same 
principle, see Lefranc et al. 2008 and Andreoli et 
al. 2014). We provide integrated assessments of the 
extent of inequality of opportunity using inequal‑
ity of opportunity indicators, denoted IOp, that are 
obtained as averages of these gaps. An IOp(s)  in-
dicator is a mathematical function that transforms 
the extent of advantage and disadvantage across 
types and effort levels into a number, which corre-
sponds to the level of inequality of opportunity in 
state s. When, IOp(s') ≥ IOp(s) state s is closer to an 
ideal situation where EOp is satisfied compared to 
state s’. If EOp holds in state s, then IOp(s) = 0.
There are many, equally valuable, alternative for-
mulations of the IOp indicator. Here, we focus on 
IOp indicators that can be expressed as the aver-
age degree of advantage in a given society. Their 
representation, involving pairwise comparisons of 
opportunity profiles, is inspired by the well-known 
Gini index formulation of income inequality. The 
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Gini index GI(.) is, in fact, a weighted average of 
the gap between any pair of incomes yi and yj ob-
served in a distribution:
∑ • • –GI(y1, …, yn): = i
i
∑
j
w i
y
| y jy  |jw
1
2µ
where wi is unit i’s weight and µy denotes the av-
erage income. There are two ways of aggregating 
evaluations across the effort dimension: the ex post 
and the ex ante perspectives.
24.2.1 Ex post perspective
In the ex post setting, we assume that the obser-
vation of effort bears relevant information for 
evaluating inequality of opportunity. Given two 
circumstances ci and cj, the absolute gap between 
opportunity profiles is a natural metric for assess-
ing the advantage of one type over the other. The 
Gini-type ex post inequality of opportunity index 
IOpp is an average, taken across the continuous ef-
fort measure considered, of the average degree of 
unfair advantage across types at each effort level 
(as measured by a Gini inequality index):
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where wci denotes the demographic size of the 
type ci and µs the average outcome in state s. In 
the ex post setting, evaluations of unfair advantage 
should be neutral with respect to inequalities relat-
ed to effort. This explains why the overall absolute 
advantage measured by IOpp(s) is then averaged 
across the effort distribution (as indicated by the 
integral operator in the formulas).
The value of the index, scaled up by 100, can be 
interpreted as the average percentage change in 
the average outcome level in state s (i.e. µs) that can 
be associated with a change in the circumstances 
of origin from cj to ci.
24.2.2 Ex ante perspective
In the ex ante setting, evaluations are made as if 
effort has not been yet exerted. This is a norma-
tive standpoint rather than an empirical necessity. 
This means that the inequality of opportunity as-
sessment should be based on overall evaluations 
of the opportunities distributions of each type at 
any effort levels, denoted Fs(y|c). Each distribution 
represents the complete mapping between out-
comes and responsibility. Evaluations are carried 
over through evaluation functions, denoted E, of 
the conditional distributions Fs(y|c). Evaluations 
might incorporate efficiency (i.e. only the average 
size of the advantage experienced by the type 
should matter) and even equity (i.e. also the uncer-
Figure 24.1: Equality and inequality of opportunity
0 1
y
p
0 1
y
0 1
y
p*
p p
ys (c , p) = ys (c’ , p) ∀p
ys (c , p) > ys (c’ , p) ∀p ys (c , p) >  (<) ys (c’ , p)
if p > (<)p*
Reading note: Effort (p) is measured on the horizontal axis, quantiles of outcomes (y) on the vertical axis. The yellow (blue) line refers to the 
distribution of outcomes of type c (c’).
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tainty in the effort distribution should be taken into 
account) concerns about the effort distribution, 
which is ex ante unknown. The overall disadvan-
tage in a society is captured by the ex ante index 
IOpA. It consists in an assessment of the dispersion 
in evaluations across types. If the dispersion is 
measured by the Gini index, we obtain:
IOp
A
(s): = GI (E(F
s
(y|c
1
)), …, E(F
s
(y|c
N
)))
We consider two specifications of this index. In the 
first case, evaluation is exclusively based on an ef-
ficiency argument, implying that the focus should 
be on the average realisations of individuals with 
circumstance c, denoted μc, so that E(FS(y|c)) = μc. 
The corresponding ex ante inequality of opportuni-
ty index is denoted:
∑ • • –
IOp
A1
(s): = 
= 
ic c
i
∑
j
w
GI (µ
c     
, …, µ
c
   )
s
s
| ∫ dp|.(ci ,p) sy  (cj ,p)jw y
1
2µ
1 N
1
0
By definition, the integral in the second row is 
equivalent to µci – µcj , since the area below a Pen’s 
Parades (i.e., its integral) is an alternative way of 
computing the average of the outcomes generat-
ing that Parade. In this type of evaluation, positive 
and negative gaps in opportunities along the ef-
fort domain can exactly compensate each other.
In the second case, we consider evaluations incor-
porating efficiency and equity concerns, incorpo-
rating not only the expected realisations of a type’s 
opportunities distribution, but also the intrinsic un-
certainty about the distribution of effort. To do so, 
we express the evaluation as the expected value of 
an opportunity profile corrected by an inequality 
measure, which captures distributional concerns. 
Assuming that the inequality in each type’s oppor-
tunities distribution is measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient GIc , the new ex ante inequality of opportunity 
indicator writes:
∑ • • –
IOp
A2
(s): = 
= 
ic c
i
∑
j
w
GI (µ
c   
• (1 – GI
c  
), …, µ
c
   • (1 – GI
c    
))
s
s
| ∫ dp|.(ci ,p) sy   (cj ,p))jw 2 • (1 – p) • ( y
1
2µ
1 1 N N
1
0
The Gini index GIc can be reformulated as the in-
tegral of a Pen’s Parade, distorted by a weighting 
function, 2 · (1 – p), that depends on the position 
along the parade (for references see Zoli, 1999). In 
this type of evaluations, positive gaps in opportu-
nities associated with low effort levels overweight 
negative gaps of equal intensity, but associated 
with high effort level. This is the perspective behind 
the Gini Opportunity index by Lefranc et al. (2009).
24.2.3 Comparing the two 
approaches
The indicators provide different perspectives about 
the distribution of advantage that are interesting 
in their own right. The comparison of these indi-
cators is, indeed, useful to assess which dimension 
of advantage is driving countries’ performance. 
The indicators have a common interpretation: they 
measure the expected percentage change in op-
portunities (income) associated with a change in the 
circumstances. Since circumstances are not a-priori 
ordered, assessments of this differential effect re-
quire a comparison of gaps across all possible pairs 
involved in the analysis. These gaps are estimated 
in a regression framework (197). Finally, note that the 
well-known clash between the ex ante and ex post 
perspectives (Fleurbaey, 2008) emerges clearly from 
the formulation of the indicators IOpP and IOpA. They 
essentially differ from where the absolute value, de-
fining the extent of advantage, is placed. Unless the 
types can be clearly ordered by the advantage they 
confer, thereby giving IOpP = IOpA1, the indicators IOpP 
and IOpA1 give different perspectives on the extent 
of inequality of opportunity. The IOpA2 index, instead, 
conveys additional information on the distributional 
features of the ex ante distributions of opportunities.
(197) To estimate the IOp(s) indices we use quantile regression 
within a RIF design to estimate gaps at selected deciles of 
the conditional distributions, and then we average these 
gaps according to the relative size of the type in the sample. 
Standard errors of our estimates are bootstrapped (see 
Goedemé, 2013 for bootstrap analysis on EU-SILC data).
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24.3 Using EU‑SILC 
intergenerational modules 
to study inequality of 
opportunity
We use our measurement framework to investigate 
the evolution of inequality of opportunity across 
selected EU countries. In addition to the core infor-
mation collected in EU-SILC (see Chapter 2 in this 
book), every year ad hoc modules on specific topics 
are added to the cross-sectional dataset. We use the 
2005 module on ‘Intergenerational transmission of 
poverty’ and the 2011 module on ‘Intergeneration-
al transmission of disadvantage’ to construct be-
tween-states, cross periods, comparisons of the re-
cent evolution of inequality of opportunity in the EU. 
These modules provide repeated cross-sectional in-
formation on the socioeconomic background of or-
igin of the individuals interviewed in EU-SILC, along 
with standard relevant measures of labour market 
outcomes. In particular, they contain retrospective 
information about the parental background experi-
enced by the respondents when aged between 12 
and 16 (see Atkinson et al., 1983 for pros and cons 
of retrospective data). This unique base provides 
(to a large extent) comparable data allowing similar 
definitions for variables measuring outcome and cir-
cumstances across countries and time (198).
Our estimation sample covers 19 countries where 
data of interest are available both in 2005 and 
2011 (199). Our objective is to estimate opportu-
nity profiles in each country from labour market 
outcomes. As a consequence, the focus is shifted 
on individuals, rather than households. To esti-
mate opportunity profiles, we restrict attention to 
males aged between 30 and 50 who worked full 
time as an employee for at least 7 months in the 
(198) The assessment of the implementation of each module 
can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
income-and-living-conditions/data/ad-hoc-modules; see 
Whelan et al., 2013 for possible limitations of the 2005 module.
(199) These countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Denmark, (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Lithuania (LT), 
Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland 
(PL), Sweden (SE), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
The other countries were left out because they were not 
present in both years, did not report gross earnings in 2005 or 
because of other data issues.
income reference period. In addition, individuals 
who declared that they were living in another pri-
vate household, foster home, collective household 
or institution were excluded. All tables are based 
on this estimation sample. Following Raitano and 
Vona (2014), we use the intergenerational module 
weight included in both modules. In 2011, these 
weights are available for 16 countries. For Den-
mark, France and Cyprus, we substitute the missing 
intergenerational module weights in 2011 with the 
personal non-module specific weights.
24.3.1 Circumstances
The modules contain retrospective information 
about parents’ educational attainment, occupa-
tional status, labour market activity status, family 
composition as well as presence of financial diffi-
culties during respondents’ teenage years. In this 
chapter, we focus on the educational attainment of 
the father as the relevant circumstance. This choice, 
which is in line with previous literature (e.g. Roem-
er, 1998 or Lefranc et al., 2008), is driven by compa-
rability motives and by sample size requirements at 
the moment of estimating the unfair disadvantage 
distribution. As a consequence, we disregard inter-
esting circumstances that were not present in both 
waves (e.g. the migration status of the parents) or 
whose comparability over time is not guaranteed 
(e.g. financial difficulties). By using paternal edu-
cation we aim, nonetheless, at drawing out the 
effect of a circumstance which escapes individual 
responsibility but might explain unfair inequalities 
in the labour market.
To construct circumstances, individuals are first di-
vided in three types (or groups) according to their 
father’s education. The high education type con-
sists of individuals who lived in a household where 
the father attained the first (e.g. bachelor, master 
or equivalent) or second (e.g. PhD or equivalent) 
stage of tertiary education; the medium education 
type consists of individuals who lived in a house-
hold where the father attained upper secondary 
education and post-secondary, non-tertiary educa-
tion. Finally, the low education type consists of indi-
viduals who lived in a household where the father 
at most completed lower secondary education.
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24.3.2 Outcome
Our outcome variable of interest is the annual gross 
employee cash or near cash income. It is defined 
as the monetary component of the compensation 
in cash payable by an employer to an employee, 
and it includes the value of any social contributions 
and income taxes payable by an employee or by 
the employer on behalf of the employee to social 
insurance schemes or tax authorities. This variable 
reflects the relation between the labour income 
and individual circumstances before state interven-
tion. Differences in earnings originating from this 
variable are likely to reflect the effect that paternal 
education has on the individual skill accumulation 
process, on the individual costs in exerting effort, 
and on equal access to all positions offered in the 
job market.
Two caveats apply to this particular metric of op-
portunities. First, this variable is defined at the level 
of the individual, implying that labour supply de-
cisions are assumed to be made at individual lev-
el, thus neglecting household bargaining issues. 
Second, earnings represent yearly evaluations of 
performances, since we focus on individuals who 
spent more than 6 months in the income reference 
period as full-time workers. The observed earnings 
were converted in purchasing power standard 
(PPS) using the conversion rates provided on the 
CIRCABC user group (200). Table 24.1 contains the 
average gross earnings by type and country. As 
expected, individuals with a more highly-educated 
father have the highest gross earnings.
(200) See: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/3c60eeec-aca4-
4db7-a035-0a6d892e6069. It is also worth mentioning that 
the method is scale invariant, which means that we obtain 
the same results when analysing gross earnings in national 
currency or after conversion in PPS. On PPS, see also Chapters 1 
and 3 in this book.
Table 24.1: Average gross earnings by type and country, 2005 and 2011
(Purchasing Power Standard (PPS))
Country
2005 2011
All High Medium Low All High Medium Low
Belgium 38 363 66 493 35 496 32 305 38 693 45 270 38 943 35 600
Denmark 33 253 37 810 33 851 31 065 41 770 48 700 40 558 37 749
Germany 39 142 42 081 38 409 35 727 40 160 43 920 39 571 34 104
Estonia 11 268 14 356 11 882 9 153 17 672 22 060 17 390 13 935
Ireland 36 824 41 470 68 336 31 446 44 464 54 726 46 432 38 981
France 27 205 35 618 28 954 25 592 30 807 40 700 35 729 28 636
Cyprus 26 459 32 351 31 562 24 744 32 014 34 834 35 207 30 629
Lithuania 8 813 13 268 9 100 7 746 10 630 12 844 12 185 9 077
Luxembourg 51 020 70 120 59 723 43 286 47 993 67 426 56 391 37 817
Hungary 9 945 22 108 10 427 6 922 12 715 18 918 13 918 10 857
Netherlands 40 361 48 555 44 080 37 092 47 214 51 018 49 156 43 257
Austria 32 394 39 010 35 534 29 768 39 727 48 731 40 634 34 993
Poland 11 735 16 894 12 491 10 185 16 975 24 766 17 291 14 558
Slovakia 7 371 11 391 7 277 6 408 14 374 18 364 14 042 13 512
Finland 26 592 35 366 25 168 24 385 36 364 41 078 34 242 35 158
Sweden 27 415 36 523 28 252 25 554 34 342 42 470 33 386 31 255
United Kingdom 44 324 58 673 50 498 37 726 41 626 55 472 39 974 37 751
Iceland 36 024 42 207 37 558 31 706 36 011 39 874 37 146 32 290
Norway 34 155 39 756 33 207 31 290 46 681 52 887 45 093 42 374
Reading note: In Austria in 2005, the average gross earnings of our estimation sample was 32 394 Purchasing Power Standard (PPS; see Chapters 
1 and 3 in this book). For individuals who lived in a household whose father was highly (low) educated when he was between 12 and 16 it was 
39 010 (29 768) PPS.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
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24.4 Results
In this section, we first study the patterns of the indi-
cators discussed in Section 24.2 and applied to the 
EU-SILC data presented in Section 24.3. Then, we ex-
plain how these indices relate to known measures 
of intergenerational income elasticity. This perspec-
tive makes clear that the inequality of opportunity 
indicators capture components related to structur-
al inequalities and disadvantage. Finally, we discuss 
how the structural component of disadvantage is 
related to the ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ 
(AROPE) EU indicator.
24.4.1 Inequality of opportunity 
indices
As the data show, the social prestige stemming from 
the paternal educational status also reflects the unfair 
advantage or disadvantage that these circumstances 
are likely to generate in terms of opportunity profiles 
for the younger generations. This holds across all 
years and countries. The magnitude of these gaps, 
along with their variation across time, are reported in 
Figure 24.2. The figure also reports, for each estimate, 
the 95 % confidence interval based on bootstrapped 
resampling procedures on baseline data, where strat-
ification by country, year and region of residence is 
accounted for (see Goedemé, 2013).
The top-left panel of the figure shows that there is 
a strong heterogeneity in inequality of opportunity 
(measured in the ex post perspective) across the 19 
EU countries considered in this chapter. In 2005, we 
can distinguish two well-defined groups of coun-
tries. The first group, comprising the Nordic coun-
tries, as well as Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Cyprus and the Netherlands, displays low levels of 
inequality of opportunity, ranging from 0.023 to 
0.04. The remaining countries display higher het-
erogeneity in inequality of opportunity, ranging 
from 0.043 for Slovakia to 0.098 for Hungary. This 
group includes lower income EU countries, with 
some notable exceptions such as Finland, Luxem-
bourg and the United Kingdom. For the last two 
countries, it is likely that part of the measured in-
equality of opportunity is driven by the high-skill 
premium specific to their labour market conditions, 
which has probably benefitted more those coming 
from relatively advantaged backgrounds. In gener-
al, we conclude that these indicators are all signifi-
cantly positive in the statistical sense.
We can give an easy interpretation to the extent 
of inequality of opportunity measured by the in-
dicators: in Germany (the least ‘opportunity une-
qual’ country in 2005), one expects that a shift in 
the background circumstances generates a 2.3 % 
change in earnings, while the same shift would in-
duce a 9.8 % change in earnings in Hungary (the 
most opportunity unequal country in 2005).
Some patterns of changes in ex post inequality of 
opportunity across the 2005-2011 period are worth 
mentioning. Among the least opportunity unequal 
countries in 2005 we generally observe an increase 
in inequality of opportunity, with the largest change 
in absolute terms being registered in Austria. Coun-
tries placed at the centre of the inequality of op-
portunity spectrum in 2005 generally experienced 
a drop in IOpp index. These reductions have been 
particularly high for the Netherlands and Cyprus, be-
coming the least opportunity unequal countries in 
2011. For the most opportunity unequal countries in 
2005, the change is more heterogeneously distribut-
ed. Finland, for instance, has seen a major drop while 
Luxembourg has jumped to the top of the ranking 
in 2011, with a measured inequality of opportunity 
of around 0.11, which can be interpreted as 11 % of 
the average income. How many of these changes 
are statistically significant? An answer comes from 
the analysis of the patterns of IOpp differences and 
their standard errors across the countries, reported in 
the bottom-right panel of Figure 24.2. As the graph 
shows, the 95 % confidence interval around the ab-
solute change in inequality of opportunity contains 
the zero for most of the countries, detecting cases 
where the changes between the 2 years are not 
statistically significant. Relevant exceptions to the 
general trend are Austria, where inequality of oppor-
tunity has increased by 0.018, and Finland, where ine-
quality of opportunity has dropped by 0.024 in 2011. 
Overall, we conclude that the level of ex post inequal-
ity of opportunity has not dramatically changed dur-
ing the period considered, underlying the relevance 
of long term trends in this phenomenon.
Moving onto the analysis of the ex ante inequality 
opportunity perspective embodied by the IOpA1 
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indicator, we obtain patterns that are very closely re-
lated to what has been discussed above. The results 
reported in the top-right panel of the figure reflect 
the patterns described above, indicating that the 
opportunities prospects associated with the groups 
we are looking at can be ordered consistently at 
any effort level. These results confirm that the ex-
tent of inequality of opportunity we are measuring 
is characterised by a strong component of advan-
tage across types, with children of more educated 
parents expecting more favourable opportunities, 
which is unchanged across the effort spectrum.
Also the bottom-left panel of the figure, reporting 
the distribution of IOpA2 indicators across countries, 
displays a pattern in line with the evolution of ine-
quality of opportunity in the ex post setting. Howev-
er, the size of inequality of opportunity is somehow 
lower. This finding reflects the fact that the IOpA2 
indicator gives larger weight to the advantage/
disadvantage concentrated at the bottom of the 
distribution of effort. Hence, the overall advantage/
disadvantage between the different types must be 
concentrated at high levels of effort, indicating that 
children from families with more educated fathers 
receive an economic advantage in the labour mar-
ket compared to children from low educated fa-
thers, and this advantage increases along the ‘com-
parable’ effort dimension. Comparing the patterns 
in 2005 and 2011, we find that changes in the IOpA2 
index reflect changes observed for the other indica-
tors. The relevant exception is Luxembourg, where 
we cannot reject that ex ante inequality of opportu-
nity has augmented in the period considered.
What are the drivers of these results? The answer 
lies on the cross-country heterogeneity in the pat-
tern of the gaps between opportunity profiles as-
sociated with different types. These gaps are con-
veniently rearranged and reported with their 95 % 
confidence intervals in Figure 24.3. In the figure, the 
height of the bars represents the weighted average 
gap in PPS between pairs of types, where the op-
portunity profile of children with more educated 
parents is always compared with the opportuni-
ty profile of children with less educated parents. 
These gaps are mostly positive, aside from some 
cases where they are not statistically distinguish-
able from zero. In general, the gaps between the 
children from more educated parents and those 
from less educated parents drive the inequality 
of opportunity indices, despite the relatively small 
size of the most advantaged type across the sam-
ple of countries considered here.
Notable cases where the gap is particularly high 
are Luxembourg, registering the largest gap across 
types, and Ireland (201).
24.4.2 Inequality of opportunity 
and risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The inequality of opportunity indicators are related 
to structural components of inequality that have to 
do with the pattern of transmission of advantage 
and disadvantage across generations. We support 
this conjecture by drawing from the literature on 
intergenerational father-son earnings elasticity. Re-
liable estimates for these elasticities, depicting the 
percentage change in the earnings of the son as 
a response to a 1 % change in paternal earnings, are 
practically hard to identify and measure on availa-
ble data. The most reliable estimates are available 
for Nordic countries (see Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014).
For illustrational purposes, we focus on the case 
of Sweden in 2005. In the data, we find that 
IOpp = 0.038, indicating that over the effort distri-
bution, an increase by a category of the paternal 
educational standards when the child was still 
living with the parents is associated with a 3.8 % 
increase in the expected advantage this child will 
experience. Here, the ‘change’ in circumstances 
has a vague interpretation, since circumstances 
are not ordered on a-priori ground (they represent 
categories of parental education). However, with 
the appropriate metric the indicator can be asso-
ciated with a measure of intergenerational elas-
ticity. Let us approximate the expected shift of an 
educational circumstance by the income returns 
to education that fathers would have experienced 
over the life cycle. For Sweden, it can be safely ar-
gued that returns from education for the father’s 
(201) It is worth recalling that the indicators are standardised by 
the mean income of the country. Hence, despite the fact 
that Luxembourg displays larger advantage gaps in 2005 
compared to Hungary, it also has a comparatively larger 
average expected earnings levels which finally smooths the 
evaluation of these gaps.
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Figure 24.2: Inequality of opportunity indicators and their changes, 2005 and 2011
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NB: The two panels at the top and the bottom-left panel report the patterns of the ex post and ex ante indicators in 2005 and 2011 for all selected 
countries. In these three panels, the vertical columns indicate the level of inequality of opportunity in a given country-year as measured by one 
of the indicators. The bottom-right panel reports, for each country, the actual changes in the indicators from 2005 to 2011. In all four panels, the 
grey bars indicate the 95 % confidence bands for these estimates (based on 250 bootstraps replications for stratified data). Countries are ordered 
by IOpp values in 2005.
Reading note (top-left panel): In Germany (least ‘opportunity unequal’ country in 2005), the 0.023 figure means that a shift in the background 
circumstances is expected to generate a 2.3 % change in wages.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
generation considered here are generally larger 
than 9.95 % (202). Using these data, we can infer an 
(202) Björklund (1986) has documented a fall in the returns to 
schooling in Sweden from 7.8 % in 1968 to nearly 4 % in 1984. 
This result is confirmed by Björklund and Kjellström (2002) who 
show that for male worker, the returns from education estimated 
by the Mincer equation have shifted in the same time span from 
8.7 % to 4.6 %, or from 11.2 % to 5.4 % according to the reference 
scenario. It is therefore reasonable to assume a 9.95 % return 
to education for the cohort of the parents considered in this 
study. Given the trend identified by the two authors, and the 
possibly large shift in human capital associated with a change in 
the circumstances we consider, this figure is likely to be a lower 
bound of the earning variation we are interested in.
upper bound for the earning elasticity between fa-
thers and children earnings of nearly 0.382 (equal 
to 3.8 %/9.95 %), which is close to the 0.3 intergen-
erational elasticity estimate found by Björklund 
and Jäntti (1997) on 1990 earnings of Swedish male 
workers aged 29-38.
This simple example shows the relevance of the in-
equality of opportunity analysis in capturing inter-
generational patterns of advantage and disadvan-
tage, and allows approximate mobility coefficients 
for countries where reliable estimates of intergen-
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Figure 24.3: Average weighted gaps in opportunity profiles across types, 2005 and 2011
(in Purchasing Power Standards)
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Reading note: Each panel reports, for each country in a given year, the weighted average gap between the opportunity profiles of pairs of 
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Figure 24.2.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
erational elasticities are not available. Within this 
perspective, it is interesting to understand how the 
intergenerational dimension of disadvantage is re-
lated to the actual extent of disadvantage. Figure 
24.4 provides some hints on this. The figure scatters 
the 19 countries considered in this study, where the 
level of ex post inequality of opportunity measured 
in 2011 is confronted with the realisations of the EU 
indicator of ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion 
(AROPE) for the male population aged 25-49. The 
figure provides evidence on two stylised facts. 
First, that there is a positive association between 
short-term disadvantage, as captured by the AROPE 
index, and long-term disadvantage, as captured 
by IOpp Hence, countries promoting labour market 
policies targeting the AROPE indicator have good 
chances of reducing the process of intergeneration-
al persistence of disadvantage. The second fact is 
that, even among countries with very low levels and 
stable patterns of actual disadvantage, there is high 
heterogeneity in intergenerational disadvantage. 
This indicates that despite similar level of poverty or 
social exclusion, the policies targeting intergenera-
tional disadvantage may affect the channels through 
which disadvantage passes across generations. This 
can be done, for instance by fostering participation 
in the educational system or, as suggested by recent 
evidence in Andreoli et al. (2014), by shaping univer-
sal pre-schooling programmes to provide uniform 
high quality pre-primary education to all children, 
while targeting with additional support those chil-
dren with the most disadvantaged background 
who are most unlikely to thrive in the labour market. 
This form of predistribution taking place early in life 
would contribute to promoting a fair distribution 
of resources later on, alongside yielding efficiency 
gains if the disadvantaged children are those with 
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larger potential to develop additional skills that are 
valuable in the labour market (203).
24.5 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, to 
propose a novel way of quantifying the degree of 
inequality of opportunity through simple indicators, 
which are consistent with the normative perspec-
tives on EOp. Secondly, to illustrate this measurement 
framework by investigating the evolution of inequal-
ity of opportunity across a selection of European 
(203) A synthetic overview of mechanism transforming 
predistribution of skills into redistribution of wealth 
can be found in J.J. Heckman’s post on the Boston 
Review: http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/
promoting-social-mobility-james-heckman (Accessed: 10 
March 2016).
countries between 2005 and 2011. Our analysis sug-
gests that there have been no statistically significant 
changes in inequality of opportunity across the 19 EU 
countries considered in the study. There are excep-
tions, and the change seems to be driven from varia-
tions in the gap between opportunity profiles of the 
more and the least advantage ‘types’ (a type gathers 
all individuals who share similar characteristics for 
which they cannot be held responsible for, such as 
paternal education). While these results probably re-
flect the differentiated effect of the recent crisis on 
each country’s labour market (our analysis focuses 
on gross earnings, i.e. before taxes and transfers) and 
the measures that have been proposed to mitigate 
its effects though incentives to the labour market, 
explaining the causes of this evolution will require 
further research and analysis (e.g. focusing on house-
hold net income).
Figure 24.4: Disadvantage in opportunities and the risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2011
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While the EU-SILC 2005 and 2011 modules constitute 
the best available data to answer our research ques-
tion, some comparability issues across countries and 
time constrained us to reduce the scope of our analy-
sis to countries which collected both waves and with 
similar income and circumstances (father’s education) 
data. Indeed, the 2011 module is an improved version 
of the 2005 module taking into account pitfalls of the 
initial module highlighted by the assessment of the 
2005 module (see also Whelan et al., 2013 for issues 
related to the 2005 module). These improvements 
increase the quality of the 2011 data but affect the 
comparisons of the results drawn from both mod-
ules. For example, the possibility for respondents to 
answer ‘don’t know’ to a wide range of questions in 
2011 (an option that was not given to the respondent 
in the 2005 questionnaire) may affect the compari-
sons of the results drawn from the two modules in 
ways that are difficult to assess.
In addition, as already mentioned, the two EU-SILC 
modules are examples of retrospective questions 
that ask ‘present-day respondents about past history’ 
(Atkinson et al., 1983, p. 17). Respondents are asked 
about their parents’ past characteristics. This type of 
survey is appealing as it allows the study of intergen-
erational issues without actually having to wait for 
two generations. The validity of the data is, however, 
crucial and rests on the ability of each respondent to 
provide accurate answers about their parents’ char-
acteristics. To our knowledge, no external validity 
test of the retrospective modules present in EU-SILC 
has been undertaken. In order to do so, confronting 
EU-SILC module data with official records in register 
countries, or encouraging the researchers commu-
nity to engage in meta-analysis, such as the one we 
performed by comparing inequality of opportunity 
indicators with results from the literature on intergen-
erational earnings elasticity, may be a strategy worth 
exploring further.
Finally, while our results depend on elements such as 
the choice of the outcome variable and the circum-
stances or, as already mentioned, the validity of the 
retrospective modules, they provide a new perspec-
tive on the distribution of well-being which can use-
fully complement the Europe 2020 social inclusion 
target. Indeed, the inequality of opportunity indica-
tors are positively associated with actual measures of 
disadvantage and social exclusion, such as the AROPE 
indicator. However, this correlation is not perfect and 
the inequality of opportunity indicators seem to cap-
ture some underlying heterogeneity among coun-
tries with very low and similar levels of social exclu-
sion. This perspective highlights that the inequality of 
opportunity analysis is relevant in its own right, and 
that introducing inequality of opportunity indicators 
in the toolkit of the European social policymaker will 
foster the knowledge of the patterns of intergenera-
tional persistence of inequality across the EU.
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25.1 Introduction
The impact of poverty during childhood on indi-
viduals’ economic outcomes later in life is a topic of 
active research and a major policy concern in many 
developed as well as developing countries. Existing 
literature has focused typically on the estimates of 
the intergenerational elasticity in income or earnings 
of parents and their offspring. (See among others, 
Altonji and Dunn (2000), Chadwick and Solon (2002), 
for the United States; and Björklund et al. (2001) for 
Scandinavian Countries; Blanden et al. (2007), Ermisch 
and Nicoletti (2007) for Britain; Mocetti (2007) for It-
aly; and Lefranc et al. (2010) for France and Japan.) 
Together, these contributions provide evidence from 
several countries, mainly suggesting that the United 
States and the United Kingdom tend to have higher 
rates of intergenerational persistence, and, hence, 
less socioeconomic mobility than other countries, 
while the Scandinavian countries experience the 
higher intergenerational mobility in earnings.
Focusing on poverty (rather than earnings or in-
come) persistence across generations, research has 
(204) Luna Bellani is at the University of Konstanz (Germany) and 
Michela Bia at LISER (Luxembourg). Comments by Francesco 
Andreoli, Anthony B. Atkinson, Sigita Grundiza, Anne-Catherine 
Guio, Eric Marlier, Philippe Van Kerm and participants to the 2013 
International Meeting of the Society for the Study of Economic 
Inequality (ECINEQ) and the 2014 International Conference on 
Comparative EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions on 
previous versions are gratefully acknowledged. Usual disclaimers 
apply. This work has been supported by the second Network 
for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. In 
addition, Bellani acknowledges financial support from an AFR 
grant (PDR 2011-1) from the Luxembourg ‘Fonds National de 
la Recherche’ co-funded under the Marie Curie Actions of the 
European Commission (FP7-COFUND). Email addresses: luna.
bellani@uni-konstanz.de and michela.bia@liser.lu.
highlighted that growing up in a poor family raises 
the probability of falling below the poverty thresh-
old in adulthood (see Jenkins and Siedler (2007) for 
a comprehensive survey on industrialised countries).
Many of the findings reported in the literature are 
based on an estimation of the effect of experiencing 
poverty during childhood on the average of chil-
dren’s attainments. They rely on the assumption that 
the observed and unobserved components effects 
on attainments are uncorrelated with each other. If 
this is not the case, then these estimates are likely to 
be biased. One way to address this problem is the 
estimation of siblings’ difference models. However, 
the use of these models does not guarantee that es-
timates are unbiased, since there may remain some 
child-specific factors contributing to potential bias 
that are also relevant to the estimation of the levels 
model. Moreover, these estimates are based on a se-
lected sample of households with siblings, making 
the generalisation of the results to one-child families 
difficult. This type of family can in fact be different 
with respect to other factors affecting the outcome 
of the child, as well as their poverty status. Alterna-
tive methods to the levels models are based on in-
strumental variables (205). In practice, it is difficult to 
find an additional variable which determines child-
hood poverty status and which at the same time has 
no direct influence on the outcome variable; moreo-
ver, instrumental variables estimates tend to lead to 
less efficient coefficient estimates.
Standard parametric models rely on strong assump-
tions about parents’ and individuals’ behaviour as 
well as about the mechanisms of poverty trans-
(205) In attempting to estimate the causal effect of some variable 
x on another y, an instrumental variable is a third variable 
z which affects y only through its effect on x.
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mission. In order to overcome the limitations of the 
previous studies, we contribute to the poverty trans-
mission literature by using the potential outcome 
approach to causal inference (Rubin, 1974, 1978). 
Following the Rubin Causal Model, our estimation 
strategy consists in matching individuals that expe-
rienced poverty when children with individuals that 
did not experience poverty in their childhood, con-
ditional on a large pool of observable characteristics 
(see Section 25.2 for further details).
Analysing data from a wide range of European coun-
tries, we find that experiencing financial problems 
in childhood significantly (in the statistical sense) 
decreases the level of income in adulthood, by an 
average of 2 %, increasing thereby the probability 
of being at risk of poverty by 4 percentage points. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 25.2 introduces the estimation strategy and 
Section 25.3 describes the samples used through 
the whole chapter. Section 25.4 analyses both the 
average and distributional impact of growing up 
poor. Section 25.5 concludes.
25.2 Estimation strategy
The intergenerational transmission of poverty is 
a complex process. Both the economic outcomes 
of a person and the income of his/her family of 
origin may be partly determined by various un-
observed individual or household characteristics, 
such as the parents’ or the child’s ability or any 
‘neighbourhood’ effect. Therefore, estimating 
causal effects in this context is a notoriously diffi-
cult task. Experience of low income during child-
hood is not the only determinant of outcomes later 
in life; in order to assess the true causal effect of 
growing up in (financial) poverty, we need to con-
trol for these other potential influences.
In this chapter, we use the Potential Outcomes ap-
proach for causal inference (Rubin, 1974, 1978). The 
basic idea of causal inference and the statistical 
framework based on potential outcomes, is that of 
a ‘treatment’ (in our study, ‘growing up in a financial-
ly poor household’) applied to a unit (in our study, 
a child), at a specific point in time. As a result, for 
each unit and each treatment, there are two poten-
tially observable results: one referring to the value 
of the outcome variable in the event of treatment 
(growing up in a poor household), and the other 
in the event of non-treatment (not growing up in 
a poor household). The causal effect is the result of 
a comparison between the two potential results, 
that is the difference between the probability for an 
individual to be poor if he grew up in a poor house-
hold and the probability for the same individual (i.e. 
an individual with the same characteristics) of be-
ing poor if he did not grow up in a poor household.
This statistical framework, based on potential out-
comes, is referred to as the ‘Rubin’s Causal Model’ 
(RCM) by Holland (1986). It views causal inference 
as a missing data problem and explicitly formulates 
the assignment mechanism as a process for reveal-
ing the observed data.
Formally, if we consider the case of a binary policy 
treatment T  = 0 or 1, let Y(0) be the value of the out-
come variable Y if the unit is not treated (T  = 0) and 
Y(1) the value if the unit is treated (T  = 1). Causal ef-
fects are defined as comparisons of Y(1) and Y(0), i.e. 
Y(1)‑Y(0). Inference on such effects is characterised 
by missing data, since only one of the two poten-
tial outcomes can be observed for each unit. This 
creates uncertainty on the causal effects even if all 
units of a given population of interest are available. 
In order to infer the causal effects, it is therefore 
crucial to specify the assignment mechanism, i.e. the 
process that determines which unit receives which 
treatment, and so which potential outcomes are re-
alised and can be observed, and which are missing.
In experimental studies, this stochastic rule is the 
known probability that subjects will be assigned to 
treatment; it usually does not depend on individ-
ual characteristics nor on the potential outcomes. 
In observational studies, the assignment mecha-
nism is usually unknown and may depend on the 
potential outcomes (either directly or indirectly). 
Formally, the assignment mechanism, or ‘propensi-
ty score’, is the probability of growing up in a poor 
household conditional on a set of observable char-
acteristics (X), such as parental characteristics, fam-
ily composition, and other features fixed in child-
hood, like the number of siblings or the birth order: 
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p(X) = Pr(T  = 1|X  = x)  = E[T|X  = x] (206). It is ignorable 
if it depends only on observed values, as is the case 
in randomised experiments or in observational 
studies where the treatment is supposed to be 
‘unconfounded’. The ‘unconfoundedness’ assump-
tion, often referred to as ‘ignorability, or selection 
on observables’ (see Imbens, 2004 for an extensive 
review), assumes that, among units with the same 
value of the pre-treatment variables, the treatment 
was assigned at random. Under this key assump-
tion, all biases between treated and control groups 
can be removed by conditioning on observed co-
variates; this assumption underlies the propensity 
score (PS) matching methods for treatment effects 
estimation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
As already explained above, in our analysis Ti in-
dicates whether an individual (when he/she was 
a child) was growing up in a household experienc-
ing financial problems, Ti  = 1 (treated), or not, Ti  = 0 
(control). For each individual, we observe a vector 
of pre-treatment variables, Xi and the value of the 
outcome variable (here the household equivalised 
disposable income) associated with the treatment, 
Yi(1) for being a poor child, Yi(0) for not being a poor 
child. The central assumption of our approach is 
that the ‘assignment to treatment’ is unconfound-
ed given the set of observable variables: Yi(0), Yi(1) 
 Ti | Xi.
In our study, we assume that unconfoundedness 
holds conditional on all the pre-treatment vari-
ables, arguing that these characteristics are also 
good proxies of unobserved factors that might 
have an effect on the likelihood of being poor as 
a child (Rubin, 2008). More specifically, in order 
to measure the causal impact of experiencing fi-
nancial problems in childhood, we implement 
the propensity score procedure applying a single 
nearest‑neighbour matching, taking each treated 
unit and selecting the control unit with the small-
est propensity-score distance (see also Becker and 
Ichino (2002) and Dehejia and Wabba (2002) for an 
extensive review on alternative propensity score 
methodologies). We apply this method with re-
placement, that is, we allow a comparison unit to 
be the best match for more than one treatment 
(206) So, an individual’s propensity score is the probability for him/
her to be poor in childhood given a number of observed 
characteristics.
unit. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if 
the potential outcome Yi(0) is independent of the 
treatment assignment conditional on X, it is also in-
dependent conditional on PS (that is, within strata 
with the same value of a given propensity score, 
exposure to treatment can be considered as ran-
dom and thus poor and non-poor children should 
be on average observationally identical). After 
matching each treated unit with a control unit, we 
compute the difference between the outcomes of 
the treated and control units.
In our study, we use the matched samples of poor 
and non-poor children to estimate the average 
effect of experiencing financial problems dur-
ing childhood on adulthood outcomes, primarily 
equivalent disposable income and probability of 
being poor, on the whole population (Average 
Treatment Effect [ATE]: τ  = E[Y1i‑Y0i ] given p(Xi )), and 
the average effect of being poor on those exposed 
to poverty (Average Treatment on the Treated 
[ATT]: τt  = E[Y1i‑Y0i | Ti  = 1] given p(Xi )), respectively.
Moreover, regarding income in adulthood, we fo-
cus not only on the mean impact, but also on the 
distributional effects of growing up poor. A way 
to explore differences across the distribution of 
outcomes is the quantile regression, which allows 
quantifying the effect of being born in a poor fami-
ly on an arbitrary point along the conditional distri-
bution of the relevant outcomes of children when 
adult. This flexibility to look across the distribution 
allows for an examination of differences between 
children at the top of the income distribution versus 
children at the bottom of the income distribution. It 
is referred to as Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) (207).
More formally, we can define the QTE for a given 
quantile q in a similar manner as the ATT introduced 
above. Let FY1 be the distribution function of po-
tential outcomes Y1, while we note with QY1(q) the 
quantile q of this distribution. The QTE, τ(q), coin-
cides with the expected gains/loss from treatment 
associated to quantile q of outcomes distributions: 
τ(q)  = QY1(q)‑QY0(q). QTE is thus defined as the hori-
zontal difference between the distribution function 
(207) We thus apply Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE), identified 
through semi-parametric and non-parametric estimators 
(Firpo, 2007, Firpo et al., 2009, Frölich and Melly, 2010, 2013), 
in order to identify the potentially heterogeneous impacts of 
growing up poor at different points of the income distribution 
(see Section 25.4.2 for further details).
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in the presence and in the absence of the treatment, 
in our case the distribution function of incomes of 
individuals who experienced financial problems in 
their childhood and the ones who did not.
25.3 Data
For the specific purpose of our analysis, we use the 
modules on intergenerational transmission includ-
ed in the 2005 and 2011 EU-SILC Waves (208). We re-
strict our sample to individuals aged between 35 
and 55 years, in order to maintain a higher degree 
of homogeneity in the stage of the life cycle in 
which the outcomes of interests are measured (209). 
More precisely, for the 2005 sample, our treatment 
variable is an indicator of having experienced pov-
erty in childhood. It is based on the presence of fi-
nancial problems in the household (often or most 
of the time), while the variables we use as pre-treat-
ment are: for the child, country of residence and of 
birth, gender, year and quarter of birth, family com-
position and number of siblings and for both par-
ents, year of birth, highest level of education (210), 
main activity and main occupation (211). For the 
2011 sample, our treatment variable is constructed 
either on the basis of the financial situation of the 
household (very bad or bad) or from the ‘ability to 
make ends meet’ question (the household man-
ages to make ends meet with great difficulty or 
with difficulty), and as pre-treatment variables (i.e. 
already determined at the birth of the child) we are 
able to add also the number of adults in the house-
hold, the number of persons in the household at 
work, the country of birth, the citizenship, the man-
agerial position of the father and of the mother and 
the tenancy status. We focus on three outcomes of 
the children as adults: the log of the equivalised 
disposable income (212), the probability of being at 
(208) See Chapter 24 in this book for a description of these modules.
(209) Our main results hold also on the unrestricted sample, the 
relative Tables are not presented here but are available from 
the authors upon request.
(210) See Chapter 24 in this book for a description of the various 
educational levels.
(211) See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/
isco88/.
(212) For the definition of equivalised disposable income, see 
Chapter 3 in this volume. The log transformation allows 
interpreting average differences in earnings across treated and 
non-treated units in terms of percentage changes.
risk of poverty (as defined at EU level, i.e. a house-
hold is at risk of poverty if its equivalised disposable 
income is lower than 60 % of the national house-
hold median equivalised disposable income) and 
the difficulty of making ends meet (only for the 
analysis of the 2011 module) (213). In both samples 
we treat missing data as an additional category, 
keeping cases that would otherwise be dropped. 
As mentioned in Allison (2001), ‘this is particularly 
appropriate when the unobserved value simply 
does not exist. For instance, individual may have 
questions on mother’s and father’s education, but 
the father or mother was unknown or never part 
of the family’.
Finally, as we are dealing with retrospective ques-
tions, we are aware that individuals may suffer from 
recall bias, as respondents may not remember cor-
rectly when an event actually happened, or how an 
event exactly took place. Mathiowetz and Duncan 
(1988), looking at the accuracy of retrospectively 
collected unemployment information, find that 
89 % of respondents indeed had an unemploy-
ment period if they reported it in the survey. More-
over, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Jürges (2007) 
checking the correct report of unemployment 
spells by means of retrospective questions, find 
that the more important the event was at the time, 
the more accurately it is remembered. In studies of 
intergenerational occupational mobility the retro-
spective technique has been extensively applied, 
as a conventional longitudinal survey would have 
to cover more than a generation’s time to link the 
present to those events in the past.
In our specific context, we believe that the type 
of question asked is less affected by this problem 
given its saliency and the lower level of informa-
tion required compared, for example, with a direct 
question on the level of income in the household. 
Moreover, it is plausible that this problem would 
affect our estimates by introducing a downward 
bias as parents tend to shield their children from 
the financial problems they may experience, result-
ing in more cases of individuals reporting no finan-
cial problem in childhood, while there were in fact 
problems, than the other way round.
(213) The descriptive statistics of the sample used are available from 
the authors upon request.
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25.4 Results
25.4.1 Propensity score‑based 
methods
A simple test of the differences by treatment status 
in the averages of the outcomes of interest gives 
us a first insight on our data (see Table 25.1). On av-
erage, poor and non-poor children significantly (in 
the statistical sense) differ in their level of income 
and in their probability of being income-poor or 
not being able to make ends meet in adulthood 
in both samples, with all the different definitions of 
poverty in childhood that we consider: experienc-
ing financial problems (with the different wording 
in the 2005 and 2011 surveys) or not being able to 
make ends meet (only available in 2011). These dif-
ferences go from 10-13 % for the level of dispos-
able income to 7-10 % for the probability of being 
income-poor up to 22 % for the probability of not 
being able to make ends meet.
As we can notice from the results presented in 
Table 25.2, these differences, although varying 
considerably in the levels, show a consistent sta-
tistically significant difference in the outcomes in 
adulthood between poor and non-poor children 
in all countries, with the exception of Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland for 
at least one outcome in one of the samples.
As explained briefly in the introduction, these sim-
ple differences do not take into account that there 
are factors jointly affecting both the probability of 
experiencing financial difficulties in the family of or-
igin when being a child and the financial situation 
in adulthood. In order to measure the impact of 
experiencing financial problems during childhood, 
abstracting from other factors that correlate with 
both childhood and adulthood financial situation, 
as a first step in our empirical strategy, we estimate 
each individual’s propensity score, i.e. his/her prob-
ability to be poor in childhood given the observed 
characteristics introduced in the previous section. 
We do so by means of probit models (214).
A first interesting result is that almost all our 
pre-treatment variables result in statistically sig-
nificant prediction of the probability of experienc-
ing financial problems in both samples. The only 
characteristics of the child which seem to play no 
significant role are his/her gender and the quarter 
of birth.
Younger children seem to be less likely to experi-
ence poverty, while immigrants are more likely to 
face financial problems in the 2005 sample, and the 
country of birth has no real impact in the 2011 sam-
ple. Living arrangements different from the stand-
ard reference (i.e. not living with both parents) and 
also living in larger households (i.e. having more 
siblings or more generation under the same roof) 
are correlated with a higher probability of experi-
encing poverty in childhood.
(214) The results are available from the authors upon request.
Table 25.1: Test of the difference in the averages of the outcomes by treatment status, 
pooled data, 2005 and 2011
2005 2011(a) 2011(b)
Equivalised disposable income, log
0.131*** 0.0967*** 0.0990***
(39.64) (29.94) (31.21)
At risk of poverty as adult
-0.0655*** -0.0952*** -0.0936***
(-25.75) (-34.65) (-34.68)
Ability to make ends meet as adult
-0.217*** -0.220***
(-61.67) (-63.73)
NB: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The treatment variable is based on the question about childhood financial 
problems for 2005, financial situation for 2011(a) and ability to make ends meet for 2011(b).
Reading note: Individuals who experienced financial problems during their childhood have on average almost 7 % (almost 10 %) more 
probability of being at risk of poverty in adulthood than those who did not experience financial problems in our 2005 (2011) pooled sample.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
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Table 25.2: Test of the difference in the averages of the outcomes by treatment status, country 
data, 2005 and 2011
Equivalised disposable income, 
log At risk of poverty as adult
Ability to make ends 
meet as adult
2005 2011(a) 2011(b) 2005 2011(a) 2011(b) 2011(a) 2011(b)
Belgium 0.0796*** 0.110*** 0.110*** -0.0882*** -0.156*** -0.151*** -0.225*** -0.212***
Bulgaria 0.234*** 0.227*** -0.285*** -0.279*** -0.265*** -0.246***
Czech 
Republic 0.0405*** 0.0603*** 0.0560*** -0.0253* -0.0704*** -0.0738*** -0.177***
-0.184***
Denmark 0.0598*** 0.0465** 0.0490** -0.0547*** -0.0318 -0.0371 -0.0651** -0.0747***
Germany 0.0520*** 0.0530*** -0.0484*** -0.0494*** -0.119*** -0.117***
Estonia 0.0637*** 0.0496* 0.0376* -0.0589*** -0.0804** -0.0757** -0.174*** -0.186***
Ireland 0.111*** 0.0576*** 0.0617*** -0.136*** -0.0779*** -0.0710** -0.191*** -0.209***
Greece 0.0787*** 0.0786*** -0.0801*** -0.0710*** -0.111*** -0.115***
Spain 0.0545*** 0.118*** 0.115*** -0.0344*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.279*** -0.276***
France 0.0419*** 0.0469*** -0.0409*** -0.0484*** -0.0640*** -0.0829***
Croatia 0.0781*** 0.0738*** -0.0875*** -0.0814*** -0.189*** -0.182***
Italy 0.0790*** 0.0961*** 0.0868*** -0.0800*** -0.121*** -0.108*** -0.287*** -0.291***
Cyprus 0.0840*** 0.0795*** 0.0786*** -0.0600*** -0.0705*** -0.0675*** -0.185*** -0.181***
Latvia 0.0722*** 0.115*** 0.113*** -0.0753*** -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.191*** -0.192***
Lithuania 0.0655*** 0.0943*** 0.0872*** -0.0623*** -0.0907*** -0.0960*** -0.239*** -0.239***
Luxembourg 0.135*** 0.115*** 0.121*** -0.209*** -0.152*** -0.157*** -0.125*** -0.129***
Hungary 0.0472*** 0.104*** 0.101*** -0.0538*** -0.163*** -0.159*** -0.221*** -0.219***
Malta 0.0387** 0.0375** -0.0280 -0.0306 -0.246*** -0.250***
Netherlands 0.0352*** 0.0580*** 0.0582*** -0.0176 -0.0532** -0.0564*** -0.102*** -0.100***
Austria 0.0478*** 0.0449*** -0.0442*** -0.0402*** -0.112*** -0.121***
Poland 0.0750*** 0.0874*** 0.0754*** -0.0802*** -0.0963*** -0.0824*** -0.220*** -0.197***
Portugal 0.131*** 0.130*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.289*** -0.293***
Romania 0.0989*** 0.0973*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.262*** -0.258***
Slovenia 0.0450*** 0.0422*** 0.0400*** -0.0272* -0.0557*** -0.0525*** -0.131*** -0.129***
Slovakia -0.0161** 0.0576*** 0.0572*** 0.0231* -0.0548** -0.0647*** -0.239*** -0.237***
Finland 0.0121 0.0370* 0.0366* -0.0132 -0.0447* -0.0457* -0.0477** -0.0567**
Sweden 0.0203 0.0354** 0.0263* -0.00499 -0.0251 -0.0130 -0.0859*** -0.109***
United 
Kingdom 0.0384*** 0.0489*** 0.0466*** -0.0272** -0.0668*** -0.0652*** -0.111***
-0.124***
Iceland 0.0329 0.0292 0.0184 -0.0271 -0.0232 -0.0193 -0.106* -0.0954*
Switzerland 0.0385*** 0.0442*** -0.00924 -0.00280 -0.123*** -0.112***
NB: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The treatment variable is based on the question about childhood financial problems for 2005, financial 
situation for 2011(a) and ability to make ends meet for 2011(b).
Reading note: In Finland, Iceland and Sweden there is no statistically significant difference in the probability of being at risk of poverty in 
adulthood between children who experienced financial problems and children who did not in our 2005 sample.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
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Focusing on parental characteristics, as expected, 
the higher the educational level, the lower the 
probability of falling into poverty, whereas being 
unemployed, retired or full time house worker in-
creases this probability; this is true for both moth-
ers and fathers. Interestingly, while having a father 
who is self-employed decreases the probability of 
experiencing financial problems, if it is the moth-
er who is self-employed this probability increases. 
Analysing the impact of the variables available only 
in the 2011 sample, we see that the country of birth 
and citizenship of the parents do not seem to have 
a significant role, while growing up in a family that 
owns its dwelling and having a father with a mana-
gerial position significantly decrease the probabili-
ty of experiencing financial difficulties.
Finally, looking at country dummies, although we 
cannot directly say something about the link be-
tween each dummy and the probability of being 
poor, given that this impact is somehow mediated 
by potential migration between those countries 
(e.g. one individual may have experienced poverty 
in his/her childhood in Poland and then moved to 
Italy at the time of the survey, so he/she will now 
be included in the Italian sample) (215). Yet, we can 
infer from the country dummies the general trend 
at country level on the probability of experiencing 
poverty during childhood, suggesting that in gen-
eral there are significant differences in these prob-
abilities between countries in both samples. Coun-
tries which do not differ from the United Kingdom 
(country of reference in our regressions) are: Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, and Italy with no substantial 
differences in 2011; Cyprus in 2005; Luxembourg in 
both cases.
As mentioned in Section 25.2 (‘Estimation Strate-
gy’), after matching each treated unit with a con-
trol unit conditional on a given PS, the difference 
between the outcomes of the two groups (treated 
and controls) is computed. The ignorable assign-
ment mechanism (unconfoundedness) underlies 
PS matching techniques for (causal) treatment ef-
fects estimation of interest (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983).
(215) ‘Mediated’ because migration exhibits an indirect causation. 
It should be noted that we have information regarding 
immigration that we use as the country of birth, but we do not 
know where the individual was living during his/her childhood 
when he/she was experiencing financial problems.
Results of this procedure are presented in Table 
25.3 (part A for 2005, part B and C for 2011).
In our analysis, results show a significant decrease 
in the equivalised income in adulthood due to ex-
posure to poverty in childhood. This decrease is on 
average around 2 % (only 1 % when we focus on 
the average effect on those exposed to poverty in 
childhood in 2005). It is also worth noticing that, 
although the difference in income by treatment 
status in the 2005 sample is slightly higher than in 
the 2011 one, the causal impact of experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties as a child accounts for 20 % and 
30 % (in 2005 and 2011 respectively) of the differ-
ence between income levels (in adulthood) pre-
sented in Table 25.1.
The impact of the treatment on the risk of poverty 
in adulthood is also significant in both samples. It is 
2.3 percentage points in 2005 and almost doubles 
in 2011. Here again, recalling the simple difference 
in means between poor and non-poor in child-
hood, this effect accounts for 40 % and 50 % of the 
difference, respectively.
Important differences in the magnitude of the re-
sults can be found once we use a different defini-
tion of poverty in both childhood and adulthood. 
The results regarding the respondent’s feeling 
about the level of difficulty experienced by the 
household in making ends meet show in fact an 
increase of around 14 percentage points in the 
probability of not making ends meet as adult, if 
growing up in a household were it was difficult to 
make ends meet.
To conclude the discussion of these results, it is im-
portant to remind that the estimates between the 
two samples cannot be directly compared given 
the different wording used in the 2005 and 2011 
surveys in the question at the basis of the definition 
of our treatment, and given the inclusion of addi-
tional pre-treatment variables in 2011, which pro-
vides a more informative and complete estimate of 
the probability of experiencing poverty.
As we can see from Figure 25.1 (part (a) and (b)), av-
erage effects at EU level mask statistically significant 
country differences both in the magnitude and the 
importance of experiencing financial problems. 
Scandinavian countries show no significant impact 
in both samples. In particular, in the 2005 sample, 
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Table 25.3: Average treatment effect estimation, pooled data, 2005 and 2011
(1)
Equivalised disposable income, log
(2)
At risk of poverty
Part A: 2005 sample
ATE -0.020*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.004)
ATT -0.010*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.004)
N. 98 318 98 483
Part B: 2011 sample
ATE -0.015*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.005)
ATT -0.032*** 0.037***
(0.005) (0.006)
N. 146 504 146 731
Part C: 2011 sample
ATE -0.024*** 0.144***
(0.005) (0.006)
ATT -0.033*** 0.139***
(0.005) (0.007)
N. 146 390 146 498
NB: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The treatment variable is based on the question about 
financial problems for 2005 (part A), financial situation for 2011 (part B) and ability to make ends meet for 2011 (part C). The outcome at risk of 
poverty in C is based on the ability to make ends meet as adult in 2011. ATE is the ‘Average Treatment Effect’ and ATT the ‘Average Treatment on 
the Treated’.
Reading note: The average treatment effect of experiencing poverty in childhood has a statistically significant decreasing impact of 2 % on the 
equivalised disposable income in adulthood in our 2005 sample.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
it is worth noticing that the most significant effect 
can be found in Ireland (around 8 %); among the 
other countries for which data are available only 
Italy, Cyprus and Poland show a significant impact 
of experiencing poverty during childhood (2-3 %).
When looking at the most recent sample, Ireland 
and Italy no longer show a significant effect, while 
now growing up in poverty in Spain significantly 
decreases the income later in life (by around 5 %). 
More significant effects can be in general found 
in the Eastern European countries — almost all of 
them (exceptions are Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Slo-
venia and Slovakia) show a significant reduction of 
adult income if growing up poor, with a maximum 
of 10 % for Bulgaria. While the magnitude of these 
results should be considered in the light of the dif-
ferent levels of average incomes these countries 
have, the impact on the probability of being poor, 
provided in Figure 25.1 (parts (c) and (d)), are more 
directly comparable.
In the 2005 survey, Luxembourg and Ireland are the 
two countries revealing the highest penalty of grow-
ing up poor (around 10-12 percentage points higher 
probability to be poor as an adult) while there is no 
significant effect in the other countries, with the ex-
ception again of Poland and Italy, which show a sig-
nificant impact of around 2 percentage points.
These results are confirmed in 2011 for Italy and 
Poland. Denmark, Spain, Latvia and Hungary and 
now show significant impacts and we can see that 
among the countries that now belong to our sam-
ple, Bulgaria, Portugal and Romania show a signifi-
cant impact ranging from 5 to 15 percentage points.
Unfortunately, the numbers are again not perfectly 
comparable from one sample to the other for the 
reasons explained above.
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Recalling the simple difference in means between 
income levels and between the probabilities of 
being income-poor (in adulthood) presented in 
Table 25.2, it is worth noting that once we control 
for all the available confounders factors, many coun-
tries for which these simple differences were signifi-
cant, do no longer show any significant impact (e.g. 
Belgium, Greece, France and the United Kingdom).
25.4.2 Quantile treatment effect
In this final section, we apply Quantile Treatment 
Effects (QTE) to identify the potentially heteroge-
neous effects of growing up in poverty at different 
points of the income distribution. This allows us to 
uncover potential differences between children at 
the top and the bottom of the income distribution. 
However, in interpreting these results we need to 
keep in mind that the QTE cannot be assigned to 
a particular individual in the distribution; it rather 
consists in a measure of the change in incomes at 
a given quantile of the distribution due to experi-
encing poverty. Hence, the QTE on distributions 
does not coincide with the distribution of QTE, un-
less there are no changes in the ranking of the in-
dividuals due to exposure to poverty in childhood. 
Nevertheless, with this analysis we can exclude the 
presence of significant and consistent heterogene-
ous impacts of growing up in poverty.
Figure 25.1: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimation, country data, 2005 and 2011
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NB: 90 % confidence intervals of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Estimation for the equivalised income and risk of poverty, in the 
2005 and 2011 samples, respectively.
Reading note: There is no statistically significant increase in the risk of poverty for children growing up in poverty in Belgium in both our 2005 
and 2011 samples, while in Italy those children experience a significant decrease in their income in our 2005 sample but not in our 2011 sample.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 (part (a) and (c)) and August 2014 (part (b) and (d)).
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We analyse conditional (on the values of the regres-
sors) and unconditional quantile treatment effects. 
Figure 25.2 (a, b) shows the results of the impact 
of being poor as a child on the whole population 
(unconditional quantile treatment effect) for 2005 
and 2011, respectively. These unconditional QTE 
are estimated following Firpo (2007), who propos-
es a semi-parametric procedure. This estimation 
technique requires two steps. In the first step, 
a non-parametric estimator of the propensity score 
of observation i is estimated. Unlike the PS match-
ing method previously implemented, the PS esti-
mated in the context of QTE is non-parametrically 
derived by implementing a logistic power series 
approximation (Koenker and Bassett (1978), Heck-
man and Robb (1986), Hahn (1998), Hirano, Imbens 
and Ridder (2003)). Then ‘the difference between 
the treated and the control group in quantiles of 
the marginal distribution’ is computed (Firpo, 2007) 
The models presented in column (c) and (d) imple-
ment instead Koenker and Bassett (1978) condition-
al quantile regression under randomisation on ob-
servables. These specifications differ because they 
impose different structures of the variables gov-
erning the heterogeneity in the impact of experi-
encing poverty. More precisely, with the uncondi-
tional quantile we can explore whether the impact 
of experiencing poverty on income in adulthood 
varies depending on the individuals’ total charac-
teristics. And with the conditional quantile, we can 
study how this impact varies for given observed 
individuals’ characteristics. Individuals who have 
high income level conditional on a specific level of 
individual characteristics (conditional QTE) may not 
Figure 25.2: Quantile treatment effect estimation on equivalised income, pooled data, 2005 
and 2011
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NB: 90 % confidence intervals of the Quantile Treatment Effects Estimation.
Reading note: Experiencing financial problem in childhood decreases the equivalised income of individuals belonging to the lowest 10 % of the 
income distribution (Q10) by almost 7 % in the pooled sample of 2011.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 (part (a) and (c)) and August 2014 (part (b) and (d)).
25The impact of growing up poor in Europe
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  459
be the same individuals as those who have high 
income levels in the whole (total) sample (uncon-
ditional QTE).
These results are in line with the ones reported in 
Table 25.3, showing a significant decrease in the 
equivalised income in adulthood due to exposure 
to poverty in childhood. In addition to the average 
results presented above, this distributional anal-
ysis gives us interesting insights as this decrease 
is evident and consistent in magnitude through 
the entire distribution of the conditional QTE es-
timates, which results in fairly flat trends for both 
years under consideration. More heterogeneity 
can be seen once we look at the unconditional 
effect. In particular, while for the 2005 sample we 
can see an inverse U-shaped trend where the mid-
dle-low income (from the 25th to the 55th quin-
tile) seems unaffected by growing up in poverty, 
we notice a clearly decreasing trend for the 2011 
sample, where the lower the income quantile, the 
higher the impact of experiencing financial diffi-
culties in childhood. Altogether, these estimates 
provide strong evidence that, irrespective of the 
quantile the individuals belong to, being poor in 
childhood leads to lower levels of income later in 
life in our pooled sample. The same heterogene-
ity among countries that we have shown in the 
average impact can be found in this distributional 
analysis (216). For example in 2005 in Italy, the impact 
of growing up in poverty is higher for individuals 
belonging to the lower quintile (Q5-Q10) or higher 
quintile (Q90-Q95) of the income distribution than 
for the ones belonging to the median (Q50), while 
in Ireland the highest impact can be seen for the 
individuals belonging to the quintile of the income 
distribution closer to the median (Q30-Q50) and 
in Luxembourg a significant impact can be found 
only for the individuals belonging to the lower half 
of the distribution (Q10-Q45).
25.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the causal relationship 
between growing up in a poor household and 
the individual’s economic outcomes as an adult, 
namely equivalent disposable income and proba-
(216) Country results are available from the authors upon request.
bility of being poor. We contributed to the exist-
ing literature on intergenerational transmission of 
poverty by providing a formal assessment of the 
magnitude of the causal impact of parental eco-
nomic conditions on the future outcomes of their 
children. We did so by means of different econo-
metric techniques, like propensity score match-
ing and quantile treatment effects procedure in 
a wide-ranging cross-country comparison.
The EU-SILC 2005 and 2011 modules currently 
represent the best data source to assess whether 
experiencing financial problem as a child has an 
impact or not on alternative outcomes later in life 
in the European context. Nonetheless, even if the 
2011 module contains a wider range of questions 
on parents’ characteristics and family condition 
than the 2005 one — which constitutes an im-
provement (see Whelan et al, 2013 for issues rel-
ative to the 2005 survey) — comparability across 
countries and over time, between the two mod-
ules, has been affected (217). Moreover, the validity 
of the EU-SILC data relies on the level of accuracy 
provided by respondents when answering to the 
questions. No external validity test on these data 
was carried out at the moment. Only a comparison 
with administrative records available at the country 
level would allow us to check more in depth the 
quality and features of EU-SILC data.
If we consider all the countries analysed in this 
chapter as a whole (i.e. when pooling all the na-
tional datasets together), our results show a de-
crease in the equivalised income and an increase in 
the probability of being at risk of poverty in adult-
hood, for people who were exposed to financial 
problems during childhood. Looking at individual 
countries, we see that this impact is statistically 
significant for at least one outcome in 1 year (2005 
and/or 2011), in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Romania.
Moreover, when we look at potentially heteroge-
neous effects of growing up in poverty at different 
points of the income distribution our estimates 
provide strong evidence that experiencing finan-
cial difficulties in childhood leads to lower levels of 
(217) For example, respondents to the survey of 2011 had additional 
options, in the list of possible answers to select, that were not 
included in the 2005 survey. 
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income later in life in our pooled sample, irrespec-
tive of the quantile the individuals belong to. While, 
as for the average impact, we found substantial 
country differences in the heterogeneous effects 
in both samples.
These results highlight the importance of devel-
oping policies aimed at tackling the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty. At the same time, 
they show substantial differences across countries, 
which may point to some good policy practices 
that could if not eliminate the long-term impact of 
growing up in a poor household at least reduce it. 
These practices need to be further explored and 
understood so they can possibly be tested in other 
countries confronted with similar difficulties.
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26.1 Introduction
Given that all the indicators based on EU-SILC are 
sample estimates, they should be reported along 
with estimates of standard errors and confidence 
intervals, particularly if the indicators are used for 
policy decisions. It is crucial to take the sampling 
variance into account when using sample estimates 
to monitor poverty and social exclusion, otherwise 
small changes in estimates may be wrongly inter-
preted as real changes in the population. Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 28/2004 of 5 January 2004, 
regarding the detailed content of intermediate and 
final EU-SILC Quality reports, requires that stand-
ard error estimates shall be provided by countries 
along with the EU-SILC main target indicators. In 
this chapter, we develop a practicable set of recom-
mendations for computing standard errors both at 
data producers’ level (National Statistics Institutes — 
NSIs) and data users’ level (non NSIs).
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26.2 Variance estimation 
approach
26.2.1 Description
The computation of standard errors for estimates 
based on EU-SILC is confronted with many chal-
lenges. Standard error estimation should reflect 
as much as possible the complexity of the EU-SILC 
surveys, otherwise estimates may be severely bi-
ased. The complexity of EU-SILC arises from, among 
other factors, the national sampling designs involv-
ing stratification, geographical clustering, unequal 
probabilities of selection and post-survey weight-
ing adjustments (re-weighting for unit non-re-
sponse and calibration to external data sources (219)) 
and rotation. There are also complex cross-section-
al and longitudinal indicators and indicators of net 
changes. Furthermore, different methods of impu-
tation are used across countries. There are also con-
fidentiality issues and limited resources in terms of 
budget, staff and time at national and at EU level. 
Standard errors estimates also depend on the avail-
ability of accurate and well-documented sample 
design variables (Goedemé, 2010, 2013, 2013a).
(219) Calibration consists of adjusting the sampling weights to 
known population totals or counts from external sources (e.g. 
population census). It modifies the sampling weights such that 
the new calibrated weights reproduce exactly these totals or 
counts. For example, calibrated weights reproduce exactly the 
population totals/counts of age-gender population groups. 
These weighting adjustments are expected to reduce the 
variance of survey estimates when the auxiliary information is 
correlated with the study variables.
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Table 26.1: EU‑SILC sampling design by country, 2012
Without stratification
Simple random sampling Denmark, Iceland, Malta, Norway
Systematic sampling Sweden
With stratification
Stratified simple random sampling Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Switzerland
Stratified and systematic sampling Estonia
Stratified two-stage Croatia, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia
Stratified multi-stage Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom
Stratified two-phase Hungary, Finland
Source: Eurostat, 2012 EU-SILC Comparative Quality report (available on CIRCABC).
The complex structure of EU-SILC samples sug-
gests that we should not use naïve variance for-
mulae based upon the assumption that sample 
observations are independently and identically 
distributed, but rather to go further by taking ac-
count of the complex design features such as strati-
fication, clustering, unequal selection probabilities, 
re-weighting for unit non-response and calibration 
to external data sources (see Table 26.1). If these 
features are not taken into account, standard errors 
can be under-estimated, thus resulting in wrong 
interpretations.
Given the growing number of requests for 
EU-SILC-based statistics, the proposed approach 
produces standard error estimates for any set of tar-
get indicators, including breakdowns. The variance 
estimation approach involves a trade-off between 
statistical accuracy and operational efficiency. The 
proposed approach is general enough to be valid 
under most of the EU-SILC sampling designs, which 
is a challenge considering the range of sampling 
designs used in EU-SILC (see Table 26.1). In addition, 
the approach is simple to implement with stand-
ard statistical software (SAS, SPSS, Stata, etc.) and 
requires minimal computing power.
Re-sampling approaches like Bootstrap or Jack-
knife are flexible enough to be applicable to the 
sampling designs and the target indicators used in 
EU-SILC (Verma and Betti, 2011). However, the com-
putational effort may be considerable, which is not 
desirable when standard error estimates need to 
be produced quickly for a large number of target 
indicators, including breakdowns. That is why we 
propose to use direct variance estimators (Berger, 
2004). The main assumption underlying such es-
timators is that sample units have been selected 
with replacement, which considerably simplifies 
the estimation of the variances. Sampling with and 
without replacement are approximately equal as 
far as variances are concerned when the sampling 
fraction, i.e. the ratio of the sample size to the pop-
ulation size, is negligible. Note that this is the case 
with nearly all the EU-SILC sampling designs. Fur-
thermore, those direct estimators can be easily ex-
tended to cover multi-stage designs by using the 
well-known ‘ultimate cluster’ approximation (e.g. 
Särndal, Swensson and Wretman, 1992). With the 
ultimate cluster approach, the variance between 
PSUs as identified in the sample (‘ultimate clusters’) 
is used as an approximation of the total sampling 
variance. If the ratio of selected clusters at the first 
stage of the sampling process to the total number 
of clusters in the population is small, subsampling 
within these clusters adds relatively little to the 
total sampling variance (for a mathematical elabo-
ration, see e.g. Kish, 1965). Under these conditions, 
limiting the calculation to the variance between ul-
timate clusters, as expressed in the formula below, 
results in only a slight underestimation of the total 
sampling variance. The main advantage of the ulti-
mate cluster approach is that it considerably simpli-
fies the estimation of the sampling variance, while 
also limiting data needs on the sampling design of 
the primary sampling units.
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Consider a population U consisting of N identifiable 
units such as households or individuals. Let s de-
note a sample of size n drawn from U using a prob-
abilistic design so that each unit k has a known 
inclusion probability πk. Suppose we wish to esti-
mate the total ∑=θ yk kU , where yk is the value 
of a study variable y for unit k. The study variable 
y can be a continuous (e.g. household income), or 
a categorical variable (e.g., employment status). If y 
is a dichotomous variable, then θ is a count. Let  θˆ  
be an estimator of θ, for which an estimate of the 
standard error is required. The variance of  θˆ   is es-
timated from the variation between the estimated 
Primary Sample Unit (PSU) totals of y:
∑ ∑( ) ( )
= =
•••=
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h
n
i
hhi
h
h
h
yy
n
n
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1 1
2
1
ˆˆ θ  (1)
where  ∑ =• =
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j hijhijhi
yωy
1  and 
∑( )= ••• = hni hihh yny 11 .
The symbol h is the stratum label and H the num-
ber of strata. If there is no stratification, the whole 
target population U can be regarded as a single 
stratum (H = 1). The symbol i is the label of the 
PSU. We have nh PSUs within the h-th stratum. The 
symbol j is the household label within PSU i of stra-
tum h, with a total of mhi households. For single 
stage sampling designs, each household can be 
regarded as a PSU. The quantity ωhij is the sampling 
weight for household j in PSU i of stratum h. The 
quantity yhij is the value of the study variable y for 
household j in PSU i of stratum h.
Note that if nh = 1 for some strata, the estimator (1) 
cannot be used. A solution is to collapse strata to 
create ‘pseudo-strata’ so that each pseudo-stratum 
has at least two PSUs. A common practice is to col-
lapse strata which are similar with regard to the tar-
get variables of the survey (Ardilly and Osier, 2007).
The estimator (1) is valid for linear indicators, i.e. 
means, totals and proportions. However, most of 
the EU-SILC key indicators are nonlinear (e.g. the 
median income, the persistent risk of poverty or 
the Gini coefficient). In order to estimate the var-
iance of nonlinear indicators, the linearisation ap-
proach may be used (Deville, 1999, Demnati and 
Rao, 2004, Wolter, 2007, Osier, 2009). The principle 
is to approximate a nonlinear indicator by a lin-
ear form by retaining only the first-order term of 
a Taylor expansion. The variance of the linear ap-
proximation can be used as an approximation of 
the variance of the nonlinear indicator considered. 
The linearisation procedure is justified on the ba-
sis of asymptotic properties of large samples and 
populations (Demnati and Rao, 2004). Assuming θ 
is a complex nonlinear indicator, the variance of an 
estimator  θˆ   of θ is estimated by:
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zωz
1 , ∑( )= ••• = hni hihh znz 11  
and zhij is the value of a linearised variable.
The estimators (1) and (2) are similar. In (2), the study 
variable y is replaced by the linearised variable z. 
For example, if ∑ ∑( ) ( ) 11 == XYxy
Uk kk k
θ  
is the ratio of two population totals, then we have 
θ( )kkk xyXz = 1  for all k.
The differences ( )••• hhi yy  in (1) and ( )••• hhi zz  
in (2) can be seen as the residuals of the linear re-
gression of the PSU aggregates yhi· and zhi· on 
the dummy variables for each stratum category 
(Berger, 2005). This provides a quick and easy way 
to compute the variance of both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal measures using basic statistical 
techniques.
The approach proposed reflects most of the fea-
tures of the sample design. A specific approach is 
needed to measure how the calibration weighting 
(Deville and Särndal, 1992) affects the variance. 
In EU-SILC, calibration is expected to have signifi-
cant effect for the Nordic countries like Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden which use powerful calibra-
tion variables from income registers. As shown by 
Deville and Särndal (1992), the effect of calibration 
on variance estimation can be taken into account 
by replacing the study variable by the residuals 
from the linear regression of the study variable 
using the calibration variables as regressors. Such 
an approach is easy to implement as long as the 
calibration variables are available in the EU-SILC mi-
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cro-data files along with the initial weights before 
calibration or, equivalently, the calibration adjust-
ment factors (also called g-weights). The calibra-
tion adjustment factors are the ratios of the final 
weights after calibration to the initial weights. Un-
fortunately, hitherto the latter are not available in 
the EU-SILC UDB.
26.2.2 Extension to estimators of 
changes between two time points
Monitoring changes or trends in indicators over 
time is of key importance in many areas of eco-
nomic and social sciences. Since the launch of the 
Europe 2020 strategy, EU-SILC has been increasing-
ly used for policy targeting; it is the source of one 
of the five Europe 2020 headline targets, the EU 
social inclusion target. In order to monitor trends 
towards agreed policy goals, we compare two 
cross-sectional estimates for the same study var-
iable taken on two different waves or occasions. 
Yet, interpreting differences between point esti-
mates may be misleading if temporal correlations 
between indicators are not properly taken into ac-
count. The aim is to judge whether the observed 
change is statistically significant.
This would be relatively straightforward if esti-
mates were based upon independent samples, as 
in that case there is no covariance between survey 
sample estimates. However, nearly all the EU-SILC 
countries have adopted a 4-year rotating structure 
as recommended by Eurostat, where individuals 
are interviewed for a maximum of 4 years and 25 % 
of the sample is refreshed every year with new in-
dividuals. In most countries non-negligible covar-
iance between estimates can be expected even 
over longer time intervals. For some countries, the 
covariance can be expected to be different from 
zero over more extended periods, either because 
households remain longer in the sample (e.g. Lux-
embourg), or because rotation is implemented 
within PSUs rather than at the level of PSUs (e.g. 
Belgium) (see Goedemé, 2013a).
Standard error estimators for changes between 
two time points, taking covariance effects into ac-
count, were proposed in the statistical literature — 
see e.g. Muennich and Zins (2011), Qualité and Tillé 
(2008) and Wood (2008). Yet, none of those estima-
tors seem, in our view, general, accurate as well as 
flexible enough to be implemented in the context 
of an EU-wide undertaking such as EU-SILC. The 
regression-based approach described in the previ-
ous section can be easily extended to cope with 
estimators of changes between two time points 
(Berger and Priam 2016, Oguz Alper and Berger 
2015).
Suppose we wish to estimate the change ∆ be-
tween two population totals ∑= i U1 y1i1θ  and ∑= i U2 y2i2θ  at years 1 and 2, where y1i and y2i 
denote respectively the values of the variable of 
interest at 1 and 2. For example, θ1 may be the to-
tal number of persons who are at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion at year 1 and θ2 may be the same 
indicator calculated at year 2. In that case, y1i = 1 
( y2i = 1, resp.) for i at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion at 1 (at risk of poverty or social exclusion at 2, 
resp.), y1i = 0 ( y2i = 0 , resp.) otherwise. The change ∆ 
is estimated by:
∆ = θ   – θ2 1ˆ ˆˆ
Where ∑=θ ω1i y1i1 i s1ˆ  and ∑=θ ω2i y2i2 i s2ˆ  
are the estimates of θ1 and θ2 based on the 
cross-sectional samples s1 and s2 at Waves 1 and 2. 
The quantities ω1i and ω2i denote respectively the 
sampling weights at Waves 1 and 2. Using these 
notations, the variance of ∆ˆ  is given by:
ˆVar(∆)
2 1
ˆ ˆ= Var(θ  – θ )
2 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ= Var(θ  ) + Var(θ ) – 2 Cov(θ  ,θ )
2 2 1
ˆ ˆVar(θ )2 1ˆˆ ˆ= Var(θ ) + Var(θ ) – 2  1Var(θ ) ρ (θ  ,θ )ˆ
The cross-sectional variances Var ( θˆ 1) and Var ( θˆ 2) 
are calculated using expression (1). The correlation 
ρ (θˆ 2, θˆ 1) between the cross-sectional estimators 
is certainly the most difficult part to estimate. As 
said previously, this term cannot be ignored as the 
survey waves in EU-SILC are time-correlated. The 
estimator proposed by Berger and Priam (2016) is 
based upon the residual matrix of a multivariate 
regression model. The model includes covariates 
which specify the stratification. In addition, inter-
action terms specify the rotation of the sampling 
designs:
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Where i s  =  s1  ⋃ s2 and the residuals 
Tε
i
 = (ε
1i 
,ε
2i
)  follow a bivariate distribution with 
mean zero and an unknown variance-covariance 
matrix. The z1h,i and z2h,i are (dummy) design varia-
bles which specify the stratification:
= =z 1h,i z 2h,i0 otherwise
s1h1 if i� � 0 otherwise
s2h1 if i
The quantities βh
(1), βh
(2), γh
(1), γh
(2), βh
(12) and γh
(12) are re-
gression parameters that need to be included into 
the model.
The correlation between the estimated regression 
residuals ε1i and ε2i gives an estimate of the correla-
tion ˆ ˆ ρ(θ
2
, θ
1
)  between θˆ1 and θˆ2. Berger and Priam 
(2016) show that the estimator is design-consistent. 
Simulation studies have shown that the proposed 
estimator outperforms the traditional estimators 
proposed in the literature. Yet, the approximation 
is based on the assumption that the sampling frac-
tions are negligible, which may not hold in practice. 
Furthermore, using the ‘ultimate cluster’ approxima-
tion and the linearisation procedure, this approach 
can be easily extended to cope with multi-stage 
sampling designs and nonlinear indicators.
26.3 Numerical results
We implemented the proposed regression-based 
approach to compute standard error estimates for 
key EU-SILC cross-sectional measures, longitudi-
nal measures and measures of changes. The first 
indicator considered is the at-risk-of-poverty-or- 
social-exclusion indicator (AROPE) and its three 
sub-indicators: the at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP), 
the severe material deprivation rate (SMD), and the 
share of individuals aged less than 60 years living in 
(quasi-)jobless households (QJ) — i.e. households 
with very low work intensity (see Chapters 1 and 3 
of this volume). AROPE is the indicator used for the 
Europe 2020 headline social inclusion target. The 
change in the AROPE between 2 years is also consid-
ered. We also consider the persistent at-risk-of-pov-
erty rate, which is the core EU-SILC longitudinal in-
dicator. The persistent risk of poverty is defined as 
having an equivalised disposable income below the 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold in the current year and 
in at least two of the preceding 3 years.
The computations were kindly made by Eurostat 
using the EU-SILC Production Database (rather than 
the Users’ Database which is available to the scien-
tific community). In this case, the correct stratifica-
tion variable was used (220). However, the impact of 
calibration and imputation on the standard error 
estimates is not taken into account as sufficient 
information on calibration and imputation is not 
available in the EU-SILC production datasets.
26.3.1 Cross‑sectional measures
Yearly estimates
Table 26.2 shows the estimates of the standard 
error for AROP, SMD, QJ and AROPE. The standard 
error estimates for the AROPE lies between 0.5 
and 1 percentage point in most of the countries, 
which means that the absolute margin of error for 
the indicators (based on normality assumption) 
lies between +/-1 and +/-2 percentage points. The 
standard errors are greater than 1 point in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania; while they 
are lower than 0.5 point in Finland and Germany.
As far as the AROPE’s three sub-indicators are con-
cerned (AROP, SMD, QJ), the standard error esti-
mates appear lower than those calculated for the 
AROPE because, by definition, the AROPE indicator 
reaches higher values than its three components. 
For example, the estimated standard errors for the 
SMD are relatively low for some countries (e.g. 0.1 
percentage point for Switzerland and 0.2 point for 
Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden.
(220) We would like to thank Emanuela Di Falco and Emilio Di Meglio 
(Eurostat’s Unit F4 ‘Income and living conditions; quality of life’) 
for making this possible.
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Table 26.2: Standard error estimates for the at‑risk‑of‑poverty‑or‑social‑exclusion indicator 
(AROPE) and its three sub‑indicators (AROP, SMD and QJ), 2013
(percentages and percentage points)
At‑risk‑of‑poverty 
rate (AROP)
Severe material 
deprivation rate 
(SMD)
Share of individuals 
living aged < 60 living 
in (quasi‑)jobless 
households (QJ)
At‑risk‑of‑pover‑
ty‑or‑social‑exclusion 
(AROPE)
Indicator 
value (%)
Estimated 
standard 
error (pp)
Indicator 
value (%)
Estimated 
standard 
error (pp)
Indicator 
value (%)
Estimated 
standard 
error (pp)
Indicator 
value (%)
Estimated 
standard 
error (pp)
Belgium 15.1 0.77 5.1 0.44 14.0 0.81 20.8 0.86
Bulgaria 21.0 0.97 43.0 1.13 13.0 1.04 48.0 1.13
Czech 
Republic 8.6 0.51 6.6 0.44 6.9 0.55 14.6 0.61
Denmark 12.3 0.97 3.8 0.50 12.9 0.96 18.9 1.00
Germany 16.1 0.33 5.4 0.23 9.9 0.29 20.4 0.35
Estonia 18.7 0.62 7.6 0.46 8.4 0.49 23.5 0.69
Greece 23.1 0.78 20.3 0.81 18.2 0.78 35.7 0.88
Spain 20.4 0.60 6.2 0.43 15.7 0.54 27.3 0.64
France 13.7 0.52 5.1 0.32 7.9 0.44 18.1 0.53
Croatia 19.5 0.90 14.7 0.90 14.8 0.86 29.9 1.02
Italy 19.1 0.46 12.4 0.46 11.0 0.38 28.4 0.53
Cyprus 15.3 0.65 16.1 0.72 7.9 0.52 27.8 0.82
Latvia 19.4 1.10 24.0 1.05 10.0 0.55 35.1 1.15
Lithuania 20.6 0.96 16.0 0.88 11.0 0.81 30.9 1.07
Luxembourg 15.9 0.91 1.8 0.28 6.6 0.52 19.0 0.93
Hungary 14.3 0.76 26.8 0.94 12.6 0.84 33.5 0.89
Malta 15.8 0.69 9.5 0.59 9.0 0.58 24.0 0.81
Netherlands 10.4 0.74 2.5 0.40 9.4 0.63 15.9 0.93
Austria 14.4 0.61 4.2 0.40 7.8 0.49 18.8 0.66
Poland 17.3 0.50 11.9 0.42 7.2 0.30 25.8 0.56
Portugal 18.7 0.82 11.0 0.68 12.2 0.70 27.4 0.93
Romania 22.4 1.06 28.5 1.20 6.4 0.57 40.4 1.22
Slovenia 14.5 0.47 6.7 0.33 8.0 0.39 20.4 0.52
Slovakia 12.8 0.68 10.2 0.58 7.6 0.58 19.8 0.74
Finland 11.8 0.38 2.5 0.18 9.0 0.41 16.0 0.42
Sweden 14.8 0.51 1.4 0.18 7.1 0.45 16.4 0.53
United 
Kingdom 15.9 0.51 8.3 0.42 13.2 0.56 24.8 0.66
Iceland 9.3 0.61 1.9 0.30 6.2 0.56 13.1 0.69
Norway 11.0 0.48 2.0 0.24 6.4 0.45 14.2 0.53
Switzerland 14.5 0.54 1.0 0.14 4.1 0.36 16.4 0.57
Reading note: For Austria, the value of the AROP in 2013 is 14.4 %, with a standard error of 0.61 percentage points (pp), the value of the SMD is 
4.2 % (standard error: 0.40 pp), the value of the QJ is 7.8 % (standard error: 0.49 pp) and the value of the AROPE is 18.8 % (standard error: 0.66 pp).
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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Measures of changes
In Tables 26.3a, 26.3b, 26.3c and 26.3d, we present 
the standard error estimates for changes in the 
AROPE and its three sub-indicators (AROP, SMD 
and QJ) between 2012 and 2013. Standard errors 
estimates use the regression-based approach ex-
plained in Section 26.2.2.
The associated margins of error for the changes, 
based on the normality assumption, are also pre-
sented. They represent half the length of the con-
fidence intervals for the differences. If a confidence 
interval does not include 0, the difference between 
2012 and 2013 is statistically significant (at the 5 % 
level of confidence). The estimated standard errors 
obtained look plausible. The seemingly low stand-
ard errors in Belgium may be due to the sample ro-
tation being implemented within the PSUs rather 
than at PSU level. Furthermore, the low values in 
France compared to the other countries is likely to 
result from the combined effect of a pretty high 
sample size and a panel of longer duration (9 years 
instead of 4 years in most EU-SILC countries). Finally, 
the values in the Netherlands might come from the 
use of powerful auxiliary information (income reg-
isters) to compute the sampling weights.
26.3.2 Longitudinal measures
Table 26.4 presents confidence intervals (at 95 % 
confidence level) for the persistent at-risk-of-poverty 
rates based upon the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). 
Under normality assumption, these intervals are cen-
tred at the estimated values of the indicator and their 
half-lengths are given by 1.96 times the estimated 
standard errors. Overall, the precision of the persis-
tent at-risk-of-poverty rate appears to be lower than 
the precision of the AROPE. There are several possible 
reasons for this. For the longitudinal component of 
EU-SILC, the achieved sample size is lower than for the 
cross-sectional component: the longitudinal sample 
sizes range from about 1 000 individuals in Iceland to 
11 000 in France. This is caused mainly by the rotat-
ing design used in most of the countries (25 % of the 
sample is refreshed every year with new individuals), 
but also by lost individuals and attrition (see inter alia 
Chapters 22 and 27 of this volume). Another expla-
nation is that the persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate is 
lower than the cross-sectional at-risk-of-poverty rate 
(AROP) or the AROPE indicator. Finally, the higher dis-
persion of the longitudinal sampling weights, which 
are adjusted at each wave for attrition and calibration 
to external data sources, is likely to reduce the preci-
sion of the persistent risk of poverty.
26.4 Imputation and other 
sources of variability
The proposed approach does not take into account 
the imputation variability. However, some variables 
have been heavily imputed, with imputation tech-
niques which vary from one country to another. 
For simplicity, imputed values have been treated 
as true values. However, this may lead to a severe 
under-estimation of the variance, particularly when 
the proportion of imputed values is important (Rao 
and Shao, 1992). Direct variance formulas are usu-
ally very complex (Deville and Särndal, 1994) and 
method-specific. For example, Berger and Esco-
bar (2016) proposed an approach to estimate the 
variance of change in the presence of hot-deck 
imputed values. As variance estimation under im-
putation is not straightforward, it does not seem 
realistic to try to estimate the imputation variance 
on a streamlined basis, especially when the impu-
tation methods vary greatly from one country to 
another and, in some cases, even from one income 
component to another. Nevertheless, the imputa-
tion variance may be estimated occasionally with 
the SAS software SEVANI developed by Statistics 
Canada (Beaumont and Bissonnette, 2011) or the 
multiple imputation technique as implemented 
in the Eurosystem Household Finance and Con-
sumption Survey (HFCN, 2013). Furthermore, the 
proposed approach cannot reflect non-sampling 
sources of variability such as measurement, cover-
age or processing errors. In the absence of stand-
ard error estimates for non-sampling errors, indica-
tors related to the amount of those errors (level of 
processing errors, share of substituted units, etc.) 
could be published in order to describe the effect 
of those sources (Eurostat, 2013, Section 3.2).
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Table 26.3a: Estimated standard errors and margins of error for estimators of net change in the 
AROPE between 2012 and 2013
(percentages and percentage points)
Value 
2013
(%)
Value 
2012
(%)
Difference
2013‑2012 
(pp)
Estimated standard 
error for the 
difference 2013‑2012
(pp)
Margin of error 
(pp)  = 1.96*SE
Statistical 
significance of 
change (95 % 
confidence level)
Belgium 20.8 21.6 -0.8 0.04 0.08 Y
Bulgaria 48 49.2 -1.2 0.51 1.01 Y
Czech 
Republic 14.6 15.3 -0.7 0.32 0.63 Y
Denmark 18.9 18.9 0.0 0.62 1.23 N
Germany 20.3 19.6 0.7 0.22 0.44 Y
Estonia 23.5 23.4 0.1 0.36 0.71 N
Greece 35.7 34.5 1.2 0.44 0.88 Y
France 18.1 19 -1.0 0.12 0.23 Y
Croatia 29.9 32.5 -2.7 0.58 1.15 Y
Italy 28.4 29.9 -1.5 0.41 0.80 Y
Cyprus 27.8 27.1 0.7 0.36 0.71 N
Latvia 35.1 36.2 -1.1 0.48 0.94 Y
Lithuania 30.8 32.4 -1.6 0.68 1.34 Y
Luxembourg 18.9 18.3 0.6 0.34 0.67 N
Hungary 33.5 32.4 1.1 0.74 1.45 N
Malta 24 23 0.9 0.34 0.67 Y
Netherlands 15.9 14.9 0.9 0.07 0.14 Y
Austria 18.7 18.4 0.3 0.50 0.99 N
Poland 25.8 26.7 -0.9 0.32 0.62 Y
Portugal 27.4 25.2 2.1 0.43 0.85 Y
Romania 40.3 41.7 -1.3 0.12 0.25 Y
Slovenia 20.3 19.5 0.8 0.20 0.40 Y
Slovakia 19.7 20.5 -0.8 0.51 1 N
Finland 15.9 17.2 -1.2 0.31 0.61 Y
Sweden 16.4 15.6 0.7 0.31 0.61 Y
United 
Kingdom 24.7 24.1 0.6 0.06 0.13 Y
Iceland 13 12.6 0.4 0.41 0.81 N
Norway 14.1 13.7 0.4 0.33 0.65 N
Switzerland 16.4 17.5 -1.1 0.30 0.60 Y
NB: Calculations not possible for Spain (break in series) and Ireland (missing data at the time of extraction). ‘Y’ means ‘yes’, and ‘N’ means No.
Reading note: The difference in AROPE between 2012 and 2013 is 0.3 percentage point (pp) in Austria, with a margin of error of +/-0.99 pp. As the 
confidence interval includes 0, we can say the difference between 2012 and 2013 is not statistically significant (at 95 % confidence level).
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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Table 26.3b: Estimated standard errors and margins of error for estimators of net change in the 
at‑risk‑of‑poverty (AROP) rate between 2012 and 2013
(percentages and percentage points)
Value 
2013
(%)
Value 
2012
(%)
Difference
2013‑2012 
(pp)
Estimated 
standard error 
for the difference 
2013‑2012 (pp)
Margin of error 
(pp)  = 1.96*SE
Statistical significance 
of change (95 % 
confidence level)
Belgium 15.0 15.2 -0.2 0.02 0.04 Y
Bulgaria 20.9 21.2 -0.2 0.45 0.89 N
Czech 
Republic 8.5 9.6 -1.0 0.25 0.5 Y
Denmark 12.3 13.1 -0.8 0.61 1.19 N
Germany 16.1 16.0 0.0 0.20 0.41 N
Estonia 18.6 17.5 1.1 0.32 0.64 Y
Greece 23.1 23.0 0.0 0.36 0.72 N
France 13.6 14.1 -0.4 0.15 0.29 Y
Croatia 19.5 20.3 -0.8 0.51 1.01 N
Italy 19.1 19.4 -0.3 0.35 0.7 N
Cyprus 15.3 14.7 0.6 0.30 0.58 Y
Latvia 19.3 19.2 0.2 0.43 0.86 N
Lithuania 20.5 18.6 2.0 0.62 1.22 Y
Luxembourg 15.8 15.1 0.7 0.33 0.66 Y
Hungary 14.2 14.0 0.3 0.62 1.23 N
Malta 15.7 15.0 0.7 0.30 0.59 Y
Netherlands 10.4 10.0 0.3 0.02 0.05 Y
Austria 14.3 14.3 0.0 0.46 0.91 N
Poland 17.2 17.0 0.2 0.29 0.57 N
Portugal 18.7 17.9 0.8 0.35 0.69 Y
Romania 22.4 22.5 -0.2 0.16 0.31 N
Slovenia 14.4 13.5 0.9 0.18 0.37 Y
Slovakia 12.8 13.2 -0.4 0.46 0.91 N
Finland 11.8 13.2 -1.4 0.29 0.57 Y
Sweden 14.7 14.1 0.6 0.30 0.6 N
United 
Kingdom 15.8 16.0 -0.1 0.08 0.15 N
Iceland 9.2 7.9 1.4 0.38 0.74 Y
Norway 10.9 10.0 0.9 0.31 0.61 Y
Switzerland 14.4 15.9 -1.5 0.29 0.58 Y
NB: Calculations not possible for Spain (break in series) and Ireland (missing data at the time of extraction)
Reading note: The difference in AROP between 2012 and 2013 is 0 percentage point (pp) in Austria, with a margin of error of +/-0.91 pp. As the 
confidence interval includes 0, we can say the difference between 2012 and 2013 is not statistically significant (at 95 % confidence level).
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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Table 26.3c: Estimated standard errors and margins of error for estimators of net change in the 
severe material deprivation (SMD) rate between 2012 and 2013
(percentages and percentage points)
Value 
2013
(%)
Value 
2012
(%)
Difference 
2013‑2012 
(pp)
Estimated standard 
error for the 
difference 2013‑2012
(pp)
Margin of error 
(pp)  = 1.96*SE
Statistical 
significance of 
change (95 % 
confidence level)
Belgium 5.1 6.3 -1.2 0.11 0.22 Y
Bulgaria 43.0 44.1 -1.1 0.50 0.99 Y
Czech Republic 6.5 6.6 0.0 0.22 0.43 N
Denmark 3.8 2.8 1.0 0.30 0.59 Y
Germany 5.3 4.8 0.5 0.15 0.3 Y
Estonia 7.5 9.3 -1.8 0.24 0.48 Y
Greece 20.3 19.4 0.8 0.39 0.78 Y
Spain 6.1 5.8 0.3 0.33 0.65 N
France 5.0 5.2 -0.2 0.10 0.2 Y
Croatia 14.6 15.9 -1.2 0.50 0.98 Y
Italy 12.4 14.4 -2.0 0.36 0.72 Y
Cyprus 16.1 14.9 1.1 0.31 0.61 Y
Latvia 24.0 25.6 -1.6 0.41 0.81 Y
Lithuania 16.0 19.8 -3.8 0.58 1.14 Y
Luxembourg 1.7 1.3 0.5 0.09 0.18 Y
Hungary 26.7 25.7 1.1 0.76 1.5 N
Malta 9.5 9.1 0.4 0.24 0.47 N
Netherlands 2.4 2.3 0.2 0.01 0.03 Y
Austria 4.2 4.0 0.2 0.31 0.62 N
Poland 11.8 13.4 -1.6 0.23 0.45 Y
Portugal 10.9 8.6 2.3 0.33 0.66 Y
Romania 28.4 29.9 -1.4 0.07 0.14 Y
Slovenia 6.6 6.6 0.0 0.11 0.22 N
Slovakia 10.2 10.4 -0.2 0.40 0.79 N
Finland 2.4 2.9 -0.5 0.13 0.26 Y
Sweden 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.12 0.23 N
United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 0.05 0.49 0.1 Y
Iceland 1.9 2.3 -0.5 0.17 0.35 Y
Norway 1.9 1.7 0.2 0.15 0.3 N
Switzerland 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.09 0.18 N
NB: Calculations not possible for Ireland (missing data at the time of extraction).
Reading note: The difference in SMD between 2012 and 2013 is 0.2 percentage point (pp) in Austria, with a margin of error of +/-0.62 pp. As the 
confidence interval includes 0, we can say the difference between 2012 and 2013 is not statistically significant (at 95 % confidence level).
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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Table 26.3d: Estimated standard errors and margins of error for estimators of net change in the 
(quasi‑)joblessness indicator between 2012 and 2013
(percentages and percentage points)
Value 
2013
(%)
Value 
2012
(%)
Difference 
2013‑2012 
(pp)
Estimated standard 
error for the difference 
2013‑2012
(pp)
Margin of error 
(pp)  = 1.96*SE
Statistical 
significance of 
change (95 % 
confidence level)
Belgium 14.0 13.9 0.09 0.10 0.19 N
Bulgaria 13.0 12.5 0.50 0.50 0.98 N
Czech Republic 6.9 6.8 0.10 0.30 0.58 N
Denmark 12.9 11.3 1.60 0.60 1.17 Y
Germany 9.9 9.9 0.00 0.20 0.39 N
Estonia 8.4 9.1 -0.69 0.30 0.58 Y
Greece 18.2 14.2 4.00 0.40 0.78 Y
Spain 15.7 14.3 1.40 0.40 0.78 Y
France 7.9 8.4 -0.50 0.20 0.39 Y
Croatia 14.8 16.8 -2.00 0.50 0.98 Y
Italy 11.0 10.3 0.69 0.30 0.58 Y
Cyprus 7.9 6.5 1.40 0.20 0.39 Y
Latvia 10.0 11.7 -1.70 0.30 0.58 Y
Lithuania 11.0 11.4 -0.40 0.50 0.98 N
Luxembourg 6.6 6.1 0.50 0.20 0.39 Y
Hungary 12.6 12.8 -0.20 0.70 1.37 N
Malta 9.0 9.0 0.00 0.20 0.39 N
Netherlands 9.4 8.9 0.50 0.20 0.39 Y
Austria 7.8 7.7 0.09 0.40 0.78 N
Poland 7.2 6.9 0.30 0.20 0.39 N
Portugal 12.2 10.1 2.10 0.30 0.58 Y
Romania 6.4 7.4 -1.00 0.10 0.19 Y
Slovenia 8.0 7.5 0.50 0.20 0.39 Y
Slovakia 7.6 7.2 0.39 0.40 0.78 N
Finland 9.0 9.3 -0.30 0.30 0.58 N
Sweden 7.1 5.7 1.40 0.30 0.58 Y
United Kingdom 13.2 13.0 0.19 0.10 0.19 Y
Iceland 6.2 6.1 0.10 0.30 0.58 N
Norway 6.4 7.1 -0.69 0.30 0.58 Y
Switzerland 4.1 3.5 0.60 0.20 0.39 Y
NB: Calculations not possible for Ireland (missing data at the time of extraction).
Reading note: The difference in (quasi-)joblessness between 2012 and 2013 is 0.09 percentage point (pp) in Austria, with a margin of error of +/-
0.78 pp. As the confidence interval includes 0, we can say the difference between 2012 and 2013 is not statistically significant (at 95 % confidence 
level).
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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Table 26.4: Confidence intervals for the persistent at‑risk‑of‑poverty rate, 2010‑2013
(%)
Persistent at‑risk‑of‑poverty rate (%)
Confidence interval
Lower Upper
Belgium 8.7 6.61 10.85
Bulgaria 13.4 10.05 16.83
Czech Republic 4.1 3.01 5.20
Denmark 5.1 1.74 8.53
Germany 10.6 9.39 11.72
Estonia 9.3 7.45 11.18
Ireland 7.9 5.13 10.73
Greece 12.4 11.45 13.37
Spain 12.1 10.20 13.98
France 8.5 7.41 9.54
Croatia 13.2 9.99 16.45
Italy 13.2 11.52 14.89
Cyprus 10.0 7.97 11.97
Latvia 12.1 9.86 14.31
Lithuania 10.2 8.02 12.29
Luxembourg 9.2 5.97 12.35
Hungary 8.0 7.86 8.22
Malta 8.5 5.99 11.07
Netherlands 6.5 3.45 9.59
Austria 8.9 7.00 10.90
Poland 9.0 7.53 10.56
Portugal 11.7 9.46 13.98
Slovenia 7.5 6.12 8.85
Slovakia 7.1 4.78 9.35
Finland 7.0 5.79 8.12
Sweden 7.6 5.70 9.45
United Kingdom 7.8 5.84 9.79
Iceland 2.7 1.09 4.36
Norway 6.2 4.77 7.57
NB: Missing data for Romania, no sample design variables for France (household id used as PSU id).
Reading note: For Austria, the persistent at-risk-of-poverty over 2010-2013 is 8.9 %. The confidence interval based on the Central Limit Theorem is 
[7.0, 10.9].
Source: EU-SILC Production Database.
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26.5 Conclusions
The proposed variance estimators are simple and 
flexible, yet theoretically sound. They can accom-
modate a wide class of sampling designs using 
standard statistical techniques. It is not necessary 
to develop a specialised computer package for 
the implementation of the proposed approach 
as it can be implemented with standard statistical 
procedures in R, SAS, SPSS or Stata. It can also be 
extended to complex estimators through lineari-
sation. However, as the linearisation procedure is 
justified on the basis of asymptotic properties, var-
iance estimates may not be reliable if the sample 
size is not sufficiently large.
The numerical results obtained using this approach 
seem plausible, although they have to be interpret-
ed with caution given the lack of sampling design 
information in the EU-SILC UDB and potential qual-
ity problems with the current design variables. 
Concrete recommendations were made for better 
recording of sampling design variables in EU-SILC 
(Goedemé, 2013a), which are currently implement-
ed for new waves of EU-SILC.
The proposed approach can be implemented 
with any rotating longitudinal survey as long as 
the sampling fraction is negligible. Berger (2004a) 
proposed a variance estimator for change which 
is more complex and can be used with large sam-
pling fractions. With a small sampling fraction, 
Berger and Priam (2016) showed that the estimator 
proposed in this paper is asymptotically equal to 
the Berger (2004a) estimator.
The estimated standard errors presented in this 
chapter show that sampling variance should re-
main an issue of concern for data producers, re-
searchers and policy-makers using EU-SILC. In this 
chapter, we have focused on estimates for the total 
population, and it is likely that standard errors are 
(much) larger for estimates of (small) subpopu-
lations. At the same time, the standard error esti-
mates presented in this chapter also show that due 
to the rotational panel structure of EU-SILC, yearly 
changes in the indicators underlying the social in-
clusion EU target can be estimated with a reason-
able degree of precision in most EU countries. This 
may strengthen the confidence we can have in the 
trends revealed by these indicators. Even though 
much progress has been made over the past years 
with regard to estimating the sampling variance for 
EU-SILC indicators, continued efforts are required 
to further improve the quality of the sampling de-
sign variables, to evaluate how standard errors are 
affected by calibration and imputation, and to train 
researchers to correctly estimate the sampling var-
iance when using EU-SILC. Progress is also needed 
in the estimation of non-sampling sources of vari-
ability such as measurement, coverage or process-
ing errors.
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27.1 Introduction
EU-SILC represents a major investment on the part 
of EU Member States, and is the primary data re-
source for research and policy-making across the 
EU. As such, it is vital that the data are (1) of the 
highest possible quality, and (2) collected and 
made available in a form which maximises the 
potential for reliable, timely and policy-relevant re-
search. This chapter summarises findings from two 
methodological research projects undertaken by 
the authors, which assessed aspects of the design 
and implementation of the longitudinal compo-
nent of EU-SILC, and which made recommenda-
tions for future developments in the context of the 
revision of the EU-SILC legal basis.
The first of these projects relates to the implemen-
tation of EU-SILC following (or ‘tracing’) rules that 
determine which particular member(s) of sample 
households should be traced and re-interviewed, 
and under what circumstances (222). The research, 
published in Iacovou and Lynn (2013), outlines the 
following rules as they are laid out in the regula-
tions governing EU-SILC, and assesses (1) the ex-
(221) Maria Iacovou is with the Social Science Research Methods 
Centre at the University of Cambridge, Department of 
Sociology. Peter Lynn is with the University of Essex, Institute 
for Social and Economic Research. The authors are grateful to 
Anthony B. Atkinson, Emilio Di Meglio, Anne-Catherine Guio 
and Eric Marlier, as well as to other Net-SILC2 project members 
and colleagues at ISER, for useful comments. This work was 
supported by the Net-SILC2 Network, funded by Eurostat. The 
European Commission bears no responsibility for the analyses 
and conclusions, which are solely those of the authors. Email 
address for correspondence: mi305@cam.ac.uk or plynn@
essex.ac.uk.
(222) This project began as part of the research programme ‘Analysis 
of Life Chances in Europe (ALICE)’, funded by the UK’s Economic 
and Social Research Council under grant number RES-062-23-
1455, and was then extended under the Net-SILC2 programme.
tent to which these regulations are properly im-
plemented in the different national surveys, and 
(2) the implications of the attrition resulting from 
non-follow-up of sample members on the repre-
sentativeness and usefulness of the EU-SILC data. 
This work is summarised in Section 27.3.
The second project was carried out to inform the 
work of the EU Task-Force on the Revision of the 
EU-SILC legal basis (223). A series of research pa-
pers were produced in the course of this project; 
these have been published as proceedings of the 
Task-Force (Eurostat, 2012-2012d). In this chapter, 
we discuss selected findings from these papers. 
In Section 27.4, we summarise findings regarding 
best practice in the minimisation of attrition in 
longitudinal surveys. We draw on a wide range of 
published research arising from both experimental 
studies in the field and empirical experiences in the 
implementation of longitudinal surveys, and make 
recommendations on how attrition in EU-SILC may 
be minimised in the future.
In Section 27.5, we summarise findings regard-
ing the effectiveness of alternative sample rota-
tion schemes for the longitudinal component of 
EU-SILC. This research is based on statistical con-
siderations and draws on a consultation which sur-
veyed the views of both national statistical agen-
cies (who are responsible for collecting the data) 
and the research community (who are the primary 
users of the data). Recommendations for future 
developments are based on a joint consideration 
(223) This was carried out for DevStat, as part of Specific Eurostat 
Contract No 10602 2012.004 — 2012 194 under the Framework 
contract No 61001 2008.001 — 2009 065 on a study for the 
Assessment of the future design of the EU-SILC longitudinal 
component.
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of the costs and operational issues involved in ad-
ministering a large-scale survey, and the needs of 
researchers.
27.2 The longitudinal 
component of EU‑SILC
A description of key features of the longitudinal 
component of EU-SILC is necessary at this point, in 
order for the reader to be able to contextualise the 
analysis which follows. However, we will keep this 
description brief, since much of the necessary ma-
terial is covered in detail in the other sources from 
which this chapter is drawn (principally Iacovou 
and Lynn, 2013 and Eurostat, 2012-2012d).
The recommended design for the longitudinal 
component of EU-SILC is a 4-year rolling panel, and 
in the majority of participating countries, this rec-
ommendation has been adopted (224). Under this 
design, sample households are allocated to one of 
four ‘rotational groups’. Each household remains 
part of the sample for 4 years, being interviewed 
on four annual occasions. Each year, all households 
in one of the rotational groups (the group that has 
just been interviewed for the fourth time) leave the 
sample, while a new set of households are inter-
viewed for the first time. Thus, one-quarter of the 
sample (that is, one of the four rotational groups) is 
replaced each year.
It is a general requirement of EU-SILC that adult 
members of sample households are interviewed 
each year for 4 years. The meaning of this require-
ment is intuitively clear when a household remains 
at the same address between successive years, 
with no changes in composition. However, things 
become more complicated when a household re-
locates between waves, or otherwise changes its 
composition; all longitudinal household surveys 
incorporate a set of ‘following rules’ that determine 
which particular members of sample households 
should be traced and re-interviewed, and under 
what circumstances.
(224) Luxembourg originally implemented a ‘pure’ panel with no 
replacement, though has since moved to a 4-year panel; 
Norway has implemented an 8-year panel, and France a 9-year 
panel.
The rules relating to tracing in EU-SILC are clearly 
spelled out in Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003, Article 
8 (Eurostat, 2003) which states:
‘In the longitudinal component, individuals 
included in the initial sample, that is to say, 
sample persons, shall be followed over the du-
ration of the panel. Every sample person who 
has moved to a private household within the 
national boundaries shall be followed up to the 
new location in accordance with tracing rules 
and procedures to be defined under the proce-
dure referred to in Article 14(2).’
‘Sample Persons’ are defined by Article 2 of the 
same document as:
‘…the persons selected to constitute the sam-
ple in the first wave of a longitudinal panel. 
They may comprise all members of an initial 
sample of households, or a representative sam-
ple of individuals in a survey of persons.’
A later Regulation (No 1981/2003, Eurostat, 2003a) 
clarifies the situation, making the following distinc-
tion between sample persons and other members 
of sample households:
• ‘sample persons: means all or a subset of the 
members of the households in the initial sample 
who are over a certain age;
• ‘co-residents (non-sample persons): all current 
residents of a sample household other than 
those defined above as sample persons;
This is an important distinction: most countries use 
household-based samples, and in these countries, 
sample persons are all those over the national age 
threshold living in a set of households at the time 
of the first wave of data collection. However, a mi-
nority of countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden) use 
administrative registers as the basis for their sur-
veys. In these countries, the initial sample is one of 
individuals. A large amount of data is taken from 
the administrative registers for all other members 
of the household of each sample person. In these 
‘register countries’, the survey interview is carried 
out only with the sample person (often referred 
to as ‘selected respondent’; see Chapters 2 and 28 
of this volume); in these countries, all other adult 
household members are defined as ‘co-residents’.
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27.3 Empirical study of 
attrition on EU‑SILC
In this section, we assess the extent to which 
EU-SILC is successful at re-interviewing sample 
members over multiple waves and, in particular, 
the extent to which sample members who move 
to a new address are successfully traced. We high-
light differences between countries in the appar-
ent success of tracing efforts and we discuss the 
implications for data analysis of the observed pat-
terns of attrition amongst movers.
As described in section 27.2, the set of persons de-
fined as sample members is established at the first 
wave for each panel. Thereafter, these same per-
sons should be interviewed at each subsequent 
wave, so long as they remain in the same country 
and are not resident in an institution.
Our analysis is based on a data set that we have 
constructed by combining the longitudinal data 
files from the 2005 to 2010 EU-SILC data releases, 
using the most recent release of the data availa-
ble at the time of writing (releases 2005v1, 2006v2, 
2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2). These cover 
the years between 2003 and 2010. We have select-
ed observations in such a way that each survey 
record appears only once. Households are there-
fore eligible to appear in two waves (if their rota-
tional group ended in 2005 or 2006 or started in 
2009), three waves (if their rotational group ended 
in 2006 or started in 2008), or four waves (if their 
group started in 2004, 2005, 2006 or 2007). The 
data set thus constructed contains 3.37 million ob-
servations on over 1 million individuals in 608 000 
households. Of these, 59 % were part of a rotational 
group which had been present in the data for four 
waves; 25 % were part of a group present in the data 
for 3 waves; and the remaining 16 % formed part 
of a group only present twice; these percentages 
vary between countries, with a larger percentage 
of observations being part of a full 4-year rotation 
in those countries which started the survey earlier. 
We exclude from our analysis any households that 
do not provide data in the first wave in which they 
were eligible for interview.
For households that participate in the survey in 
one year and are eligible to be included the next 
year, a range of outcomes are recorded in the data. 
These form three main groups: (1) households still 
in scope of the survey (meaning that at least one of 
the sample members in the household is still alive 
and living in a residential household in the country); 
(2) those that have moved out of scope (for exam-
ple, because all sample members have moved into 
a residential home, or abroad, or have died); and (3) 
those recorded as not having been contacted. We 
add a further group (4) consisting of households 
that have simply disappeared from the sample (i.e., 
for which there is no entry in a year when an entry 
is expected). We find that 87 % of households who 
are contacted in one year are re-contacted the fol-
lowing year, and provide at least some information 
at interview. Just under 1 % of households move 
out of scope; 2 % are recorded as not being con-
tacted, while 10 % are recorded as being in scope 
the following year, but do not provide information. 
The percentage of households who ‘disappear’ is 
small, and is only at all substantial in Austria (1.7 %) 
and Ireland (4.4 %). Overall, the lowest re-interview 
rates at the household level are found in the UK 
(75 %) the highest are found in Romania (98 %).
27.3.1 Household splits
We focus here on households where the sample 
members observed at one wave are no longer all 
in the same household at the next wave. We refer 
to such cases as ‘household splits.’ This situation is 
clearly associated with an increased risk of failing to 
interview all the sample members at the next wave 
as at least some, and possibly all, will have moved 
to a new address.
Household splits are conceptualised differently 
in register and non-register countries. In register 
countries, sample households contain only one 
sample person, with all other household members 
defined as co-residents. If a household in a register 
country splits, the household of the sample per-
son remains as a sample household, regardless of 
whether the sample person remains at the same 
address or moves away, while any members of the 
original household who no longer live with the 
sample person are no longer part of the sample, 
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and are not followed. Thus, household splits are not 
recorded as such in the data, and the only means of 
identifying splits is to identify households in which 
some individuals who were resident at year t are no 
longer resident at year t+1.
In non-register countries, household splits fall into 
two categories: (a) those where one or more mem-
bers of the ‘parent’ household are still living at the 
original address in year t+1, while one or more oth-
er members have moved to a new address, and (b) 
those where all members of the ‘parent’ household 
have moved away from the original address. In the 
first case, the people remaining at the original ad-
dress are considered to form the ‘original’ house-
hold, while those who have moved to a new ad-
dress are considered to form a ‘split-off’ household. 
In the second case, one of the two or more new 
households is designated as the ‘original’ house-
hold, while the other(s) are designated as split-off 
household(s); this is done on the basis of an iden-
tified household reference person. In our analysis, 
we do not distinguish between households where 
some people stay at their old address and house-
holds where everybody moves, since the second 
group (where all household members move) con-
stitutes only around 5 % of observed cases (225).
Identification of household splits in non-regis-
ter countries is not simple, as there are different 
means of recording them. If all countries followed 
the survey protocols precisely, each split would be 
detectable in two ways. First, for a split occurring 
between Waves t and t+1, the original and split-off 
households would both be recorded at Wave t+1 in 
the household register (D) file. Second, any sample 
member(s) who had moved to form the split-off 
household would be recorded in the individual 
register (R) files of the ‘parent’ household at t+1, as 
a member who had left the household. It should 
be possible to identify households where splits 
had taken place by either of these means, and they 
would be equivalent. However, there is considera-
ble inconsistency in implementing these protocols. 
Overall, we identify 4.05 % of Wave t households to 
have split by Wave t+1. However, of these splitting 
households, only 14.1 % are correctly recorded in 
(225) It is likely that the actual proportion of household splits which 
result in all household members moving to new addresses 
is higher than this, but that a higher proportion of these 
households are lost between waves.
the data files as described above. In 26.9 % of cases 
the split-off household is recorded but the movers 
do not appear in the individual register of the par-
ent household. In 50.0 % of cases, the movers are 
listed but the split-off household is not recorded. 
And in 9.0 % of cases we have inferred a split as 
sample members have simply disappeared from 
the individual register without any split-off house-
hold being recorded (226).
In register countries, we estimate that 7.0 % of 
households split between t and t+1. The means by 
which these can be identified is different from that 
for non-register countries, as described above. Of 
the split households, 73 % are households in which 
some household members are recorded at t+1 as 
no longer living in the household, while 27 % are 
inferred to have split as some members of the 
Wave t household have simply disappeared from 
the household roster.
A potential source of inconsistency lies in the fact 
that the percentage of individuals reported as 
‘temporarily absent’ from a household varies mark-
edly between countries. For households in the 
second, third and fourth years of their rotation, the 
percentage ranges from zero in France, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, up to 4 % in Spain, 7 % 
in Cyprus and 9 % in Hungary. Although these dif-
ferences may reflect genuine differences in house-
hold circumstances between countries, it is likely 
that they also reflect some differences in survey 
practice. Where a household member is reported 
as temporarily absent, we do not define this as con-
stituting a household split (until such time, if at all, 
as the individual disappears from the household 
register, or is reported as no longer a member of 
the household). This may contribute to under-esti-
mation of the overall numbers of household splits 
in countries like Cyprus and Hungary. Furthermore, 
our analysis implicitly assumes that the proportion 
of households that split amongst households that 
provide no data at all at t+1 is the same as that 
(226) We have only inferred a split when at least one of the 
people who disappear from the household register is aged 
60 or younger, as older people are more likely to have died 
than moved out. Our estimates of rates of re-interview of 
sample members involved in splits are therefore, if anything, 
conservative as some genuine movers have been omitted from 
the base. The remaining individuals who disappear from the 
rosters are predominantly aged in their twenties, suggesting 
that these are indeed bona fide departures from the household.
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amongst observed households. If anything, splits 
may be more likely amongst non-responding 
households, so this too may contribute to an un-
der-estimation of household splits.
Table 27.1 summarises the percentages of adult 
sample members who were successfully re-inter-
viewed at t+1. Overall, we estimate the re-interview 
rate to be around 67 % in households that have 
split, compared to 84 % in households that have 
not split. It is clear, then, that EU-SILC is less success-
ful at following sample members when a house-
hold splits.
Moreover, re-interview rates vary considerably be-
tween countries (Iacovou and Lynn, 2013, appendix 
A6). In non-register countries, re-interview rates for 
adult sample members in a split-off household in 
the year following a split range from 0 % in Ireland 
and 11 % in Slovakia, to 38 % in Cyprus and 40 % 
in Italy. The re-interview rates for sample members 
who stay in the original household display less var-
iation, ranging from 83 % in Belgium, up to 99 % in 
Romania, Ireland, Greece, Malta and Cyprus. Overall 
re-interview rates for all adult sample members fol-
lowing a household split (that is, those who remain 
in the original household and those who move 
away) range from 65 % (Belgium, Ireland, Latvia and 
the United Kingdom) to 78 % (Cyprus). In register 
countries, the re-interview rate amongst all house-
hold members is lower by design than in the sur-
vey countries; our estimates of the percentage of 
sample members re-interviewed after a household 
split range from 52 % (Norway) to 63 % (Slovenia).
Although re-interview rates in split-off households 
are low, this does not have a big impact on overall 
survey attrition rates. This is because only around 
7 % of individuals experience a household split in 
any one year, and because, of those, the sample 
members who remain in the original household 
following the split have high relatively re-interview 
rates. However, these low follow-up rates may be 
problematic for certain types of analysis: they have 
the potential to create serious difficulties for the 
analysis of certain household transitions, and of 
the dynamics of particular groups of people going 
through these transitions.
In all countries, the failure to observe all persons 
who should in principle have been followed could 
introduce bias if the non-respondents are signifi-
cantly different from the respondents. They clearly 
are different in at least one respect: they are much 
more likely to have moved home. Other differences 
are likely if the circumstances of the household split 
Table 27.1: Adult re‑interview rates in EU‑SILC, 2003‑2010
In splitting households In non‑splitting households Total
Adults who 
remain in 
‘original’ 
household
Adults who 
form a split‑off 
household
All adults All adults All adults
Non‑register 
countries 95.9 % 26.3 % 71.6 % 84.5 % 83.7 %
(N) (98 972) (1 584 716) (1 683 688)
Register 
countries 98.1 % 0.0 % 57.2 % 81.6 % 79.1 %
(N) (50 283) (476 898) (527 181)
All countries 96.6 % 16.6 % 66.8 % 83.9 % 82.7 %
(N) (149 255) (2 061 614) (2 210 869)
NB: Included in the category 'non-splitting households' are households for whom no information is collected at Wave t+1 (non-contacts and 
refusals). Some of these may, in fact, have split.
Reading note: Cell entries represent the percentage of adults (aged 17+) eligible for re-interview the following year, who actually were 
re-interviewed (so, for example, in the non-register countries, 95.9 % of adults who remained in the ‘original’ household following a household 
split were re-interviewed). N indicates the number of sample members (assumed to be) eligible for re-interview; co-residents are excluded from 
the analysis. Analysis is unweighted.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2.
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tend to contribute to the propensity to be success-
fully re-interviewed. An additional problem is sim-
ply that the sample sizes available for analysis may 
be significantly reduced, causing an increase in the 
variance of estimates.
A further consideration in register countries is that, 
by design, we never observe more than one part 
of a Wave t household at Wave t+1 following a be-
tween-wave split. This limits the analysis possibili-
ties as there is never complete information at Wave 
t+1 about all the members of the Wave t house-
hold, if the household has split.
27.3.2 Whole‑household moves
In the previous section, we have demonstrated 
that re-interview rates are substantially lower for 
sample members who form a split-off household 
following a household split than for other house-
hold members. The rules that define how a house-
hold is designated as ‘original’ or ‘split off’ imply 
that all split-off households must have moved to 
a different address to the one at which the Wave 
t interviewing took place, while it is likely that 
a large majority of original households at the wave 
after a household split will still reside at the same 
address. Thus, we can deduce that it is moving 
home that strongly predicts a lower re-interview 
rate, rather than splitting per se.
It is not only household splits that lead to moving 
home. Sometimes, a whole household will move 
home without the composition of the household 
changing. Such moves have not been the subject 
of our analysis, but it seems reasonable to assume 
that the re-interview rate amongst sample mem-
bers in such households is also likely to be lower 
than that amongst people who are still at the same 
address at the time of the next wave. It would be 
useful for further research to examine the extent 
to which this is true and to which this varies be-
tween countries. This could lead to an assessment 
of the extent to which the overall sample is biased 
towards ‘stable’ households (those that neither 
split nor move) and of the limitations of analysis of 
phenomena that are to greater or lesser extent as-
sociated with moving home, such as changing job, 
moving from education to employment, or getting 
married.
27.3.3 Effect on the study of 
transitions
In this section we assess the effect of failing to fol-
low people after a household split on substantive 
analysis. We focus on two transitions of particular 
substantive interest, namely young (16-35) adults’ 
departure from the parental home, and the break-
down of a marital or cohabiting relationship. These 
almost inevitably involve a household split, and are 
numerically the most important transitions associ-
ated with household splits. As shown in Table 27.2, 
these two transitions together account for almost 
three quarters of all observed household splits. 
Young single adults moving out of a home in which 
their parents are not resident account for a further 
10 % of household splits, while older adults (36-50) 
leaving their parents’ home account for an addi-
tional 3 %. The relative prevalence of each transi-
tion type varies between countries, but in all coun-
tries the two transitions on which we focus here 
account for over 60 % of all household splits. The 
proportion associated with a young adult leaving 
the parental home ranges from 37.7 % in Sweden 
and 39.0 % in Norway to 63.8 % in the Netherlands 
and 66.5 % in Ireland, while the proportion associ-
ated with divorce or separation ranges from 5.2 % 
in Ireland to 23.8 % in Finland and 29.3 % in Sweden 
(Iacovou and Lynn, 2013, appendix A7).
In order for the analyst to assess whether a particu-
lar household has split, the sample members in that 
household need to have responded to two survey 
waves: one just prior to the split, and one just after 
the split. If a household experiencing a split is as 
likely as any other household to respond to both 
waves, fairly accurate estimates can be made of the 
percentages of households or individuals making 
a transition of interest.
In the case of home-leaving, this may be the case. 
While home-leaving is frequently eventful, and 
may have associated stresses, it is considered to 
be in the natural order of things, and is not usual-
ly preceded by particularly stressful circumstances. 
Therefore, there is no particular reason to believe 
that a household from which a young person leaves 
home would be less likely than average to respond 
to the survey either before or after the young per-
son’s departure. As EU-SILC records information on 
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all household members who have moved away be-
tween one wave and the next, a response from the 
parental household, before and after the young per-
son leaves home, is sufficient to identify the depar-
ture of the young person. The information provided 
by the parental household can also be used to study 
factors associated with the timing of home-leaving. 
However, to investigate the effects of leaving home 
on subsequent events in young people’s lives, or the 
living conditions of young people who have recent-
ly left home, the young people themselves need to 
be traced and re-interviewed. If re-interview rates 
are low amongst young home-leavers, these esti-
mates are likely to be unreliable.
Table 27.2: Transition types associated with a household split (EU‑SILC 2003‑2010)
N  %
(1) Young adult (16‑35) leaving parental home 20 581 52.7
(2) Divorce or relationship separation 6 649 17.0
(3) Both (1) and (2) in the same year 1 599 4.1
(4) Older adult (36‑50) leaving parental home 1 235 3.2
(5) Young single adult (16‑35) leaving non‑parental household 3 823 9.8
(6) Elderly adult (60+) moving to an institution 433 1.1
(7) Indeterminate — missing partner or parent identifiers 709 1.8
(8) Other 3 991 10.2
Total 32 923 100.0
NB: The unit of analysis is the household, not the individual, and the base is all Wave t households that had experienced a split by Wave t+1.
Reading note: 52.7 % of all household splits arise as the result of a young adult aged 16-35 leaving the parental home.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4 and 2010v2.
Table 27.3: Re‑interview rates (2003‑2010) for sample members in split‑off households, by type 
of household split
(non‑register countries) (%)
Non‑register countries
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Young adult (16‑35) leaving parental home 28.6 21.1 50.3 33.1 17.7 49.2
Divorce or relationship separation 17.0 17.5 65.4 23.5 16.2 60.3
Older adult (36‑50) leaving parental home 28.8 15.3 56.0 33.5 15.0 51.6
Young single adult (16‑35) leaving non‑parental h/h 11.6 10.3 78.0 15.8 12.4 71.8
Elderly adult (60+) moving to an institution - 100.0 - - 100.0 -
Indeterminate — missing partner or parent identifier 0.9 0.0 99.1 1.4 0.0 98.6
Other 30.0 7.2 62.7 31.9 11.0 57.1
Reading note: Of men moving to split-off households as the result of a young adult leaving home, 28.6 % were re-interviewed the following year.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2.
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Table 27.4: Location of interviewed sample members (2003‑2010) whose household has split, by 
type of household split
(register countries) (%)
Register countries
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Young adult (16‑35) leaving parental home 89.3 10.7 89.0 11.0
Divorce or relationship separation 56.0 43.9 56.2 43.8
Older adult (36‑50) leaving parental home 51.7 48.2 52.8 47.3
Young single adult (16‑35) leaving non‑parental h/h 87.5 12.5 87.3 12.7
Elderly adult (60+) moving to an institution 70.0 30.0 72.3 27.7
Indeterminate — missing partner or parent identifier 96.6 3.4 97.6 2.4
Other 37.7 62.3 35.8 64.9
NB: The unit of analysis here is the individual who moved; more than one such individual may be present in a household which splits. Where an 
individual falls into more than one category, they are prioritised as follows: (1) institutionalisation; (2) divorce or relationship separation; (3) young 
or older adult leaving parental home, or young adult leaving other home (all mutually exclusive); (4) missing partner or parent identifier; (5) other.
Reading note: Of men interviewed following a household split which occurred as the result of a young adult leaving the parental home, 89.3 % 
were living at the same address as before the split, while 10.7 % had moved to a different address.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2.
In the case of relationship splits, the couple is likely 
to be under considerable stress both at the wave 
prior to the household split and the wave subse-
quent. In addition, tracing movers after a split may 
be challenging, particularly if the partner who has 
not moved is unwilling or unable to assist with this. 
Thus, there may be a higher risk of non-response 
at both waves. As observations are needed at 
both waves in order to estimate the percentages 
of couples splitting up, there may be a risk that 
EU-SILC substantially under-represents couples 
who separate (227).
In the analysis that follows, we examine re-inter-
view rates in situations where a household split can 
be identified from the data. These will tend to be 
over-estimates of the true re-interview rates when 
households split as survey non-response will have 
caused some splits to not have been identified. In 
Table 27.3 it can be seen that re-interview rates in 
non-register countries are low following every type 
(227) It may be possible to assess the degree of under-representation 
by comparing the incidence of divorce in EU-SILC with official 
divorce statistics.
of household split, but are highest in the case of an 
adult leaving the parental home, at around 29 % for 
men and 33 % for women. Following a divorce or 
separation, re-interview rates are only 17 % for men 
and 24 % for women.
Table 27.4, dealing with register countries, is organ-
ised differently, because there is no distinction be-
tween people who remain members of the original 
household or who become members of a split-off 
household. Instead, we present the percentages of 
sample members whom we observe in separating 
households, according to whether they are at their 
original address at t+1 or have re-located to a new 
address.
In the case of young adults leaving the parental 
home, only 11 % of the re-interviewed sample are 
‘movers’ — i.e. the young adults. In the register 
countries, young adults about to leave the paren-
tal home live, on average, with approximately two 
other people who would be eligible to be the sam-
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ple person (228). Thus, if movers and stayers were 
equally likely to be re-interviewed, we would ex-
pect to observe about 33 % of the followed sample 
moving to a new address; roughly speaking, the 
11 % we actually observe suggests that the re-in-
terview rate amongst young adults who leave their 
parents’ home may be only around one-third that 
of the parents (and other adult household mem-
bers) whose household they have left.
In the case of divorce and relationship separation, 
56 % of those interviewed at t+1 are living in the 
original address, while 44 % have moved. This may 
imply that the fieldwork agencies in these coun-
tries are somewhat less successful in following up 
movers than stayers following divorce or separa-
tion; however, this interpretation should be treated 
with caution, since the percentage of people we 
would expect to remain at the original address is 
not known exactly. In around 25 % of households 
experiencing relationship splits, more than two 
adults are present in the household; to the extent 
that these ‘extra’ adults (mainly adult children) are 
more likely to remain at the original address than to 
move, we would expect over 50 % of sample mem-
bers to be at the original address in the year follow-
ing the split. On the other hand, in a proportion of 
partnership dissolutions, all household members 
move to other addresses, which would push the 
expected percentage remaining at the original ad-
dress downwards.
Tables 27.5 and 27.6 present re-interview rates for 
young home-leavers and for ‘movers’ in separating 
couples respectively, by country and by the sex of 
the mover (i.e. for sample members in the split-off 
household rather than in the original household). 
Data are not presented for register countries, due 
to the estimation difficulties outlined previously. 
Also presented are the percentages of people who 
are indicated as having moved out of scope — in 
the case of the two groups we are considering, this 
is predominantly moving to another country.
The first point to note is that in some countries 
a large proportion of movers actually move out 
of scope. This is particularly the case with young 
(228) The figure of 2 is the actual average number of eligible sample 
persons (in most of the register countries, it is not common to 
live with multiple eligible siblings, and in some cases only one 
parent is present).
male home-leavers — around one half of all young 
male home-leavers in Lithuania and Poland move 
abroad, while the same is true of around one third 
of male home-leavers in Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg and Slovakia, and significant percentages 
of young people in other countries which joined 
the EU in or after 2005. This phenomenon is also 
evident in the case of relationship separation, 
with over half of those in Bulgaria, and substantial 
numbers in several other countries, moving out 
of scope following a separation (229). Moving out 
of scope is clearly not the only reason for low re- 
interview rates among people undergoing 
a household split, but it is clearly a contributory 
factor, and raises the question of whether, in the 
context of a cross-national longitudinal survey, 
people moving across national borders within the 
EU should be traced and re-interviewed in their 
new country of residence.
In the case of divorce or separation (see Table 27.5), 
the re-interview rate amongst movers is less than 
10 % in eight countries; between 10 % and 20 % 
in five more; and over 30 % in only one country 
(Italy). Considering that a substantial proportion of 
households undergoing divorce or separation will 
not be identified in the data at all, due to a higher 
probability of non-interview either before and/or 
following the split, these figures indicate that, with 
the possible exception of a handful of countries, 
EU-SILC is probably not suitable for any longitudi-
nal analysis of individuals who leave their house-
holds following a relationship breakdown. Note 
that the same is not necessarily true of individuals 
who remain living in their original households fol-
lowing a divorce or separation (230).
The re-interview rates for young adults leaving 
home (see Table 27.6) are low too, but considera-
bly higher than the rates for separating couples. 
There are ten countries in which fewer than 20 % 
of male leavers are interviewed and six countries in 
which fewer than 20 % of female leavers are inter-
viewed, but there are also four countries in which 
(229) As far as we can tell these are genuine separations rather than 
temporary arrangements where one partner works away, 
since temporary arrangements would have been coded as 
‘temporarily absent’ in variable rb200.
(230) In the register countries, it is not possible to assess the 
percentages which are followed, though we observe that 
re-interview rates are somewhat lower amongst movers than 
amongst stayers. 
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Table 27.5: Re‑interview rates for people leaving their original household for divorce or 
relationship separation, by country and sex (2003‑2010)
(%)
Men Women
Percentage 
re‑interviewed
Percentage moving 
out of scope
Percentage 
re‑interviewed
Percentage moving 
out of scope
Belgium 26.7 4.8 33.6 3.2
Bulgaria 7.1 51.8 10.5 54.7
Czech Republic 24.4 8.4 29.3 3.3
Estonia 26.5 17.7 33.6 13.8
Ireland 0.0 7.1 0.0 9.5
Greece 6.0 11.9 5.5 9.9
Spain 17.1 10.2 28.1 10.5
France 27.7 5.9 38.3 6.1
Italy 30.9 12.8 30.6 13.2
Cyprus 28.2 23.1 19.6 37.0
Latvia 4.8 23.0 8.6 23.8
Lithuania 3.3 31.5 14.8 34.4
Luxembourg 20.3 35.0 19.8 29.2
Hungary 11.5 7.9 19.2 8.8
Malta 16.7 5.6 8.3 8.3
Austria 21.3 14.9 26.6 13.6
Poland 4.6 35.6 15.5 32.6
Portugal 13.5 36.9 23.9 19.7
Romania 0.0 27.3 20.0 30.0
Slovakia 3.5 11.8 3.1 13.9
United Kingdom 14.2 6.5 24.8 5.6
All 17.0 17.5 23.5 16.2
N (number 
interviewed, year 
after split)
505 542
Reading note: Of Austrian men who moved out of their original household due to divorce or separation, 21.3 % were re-interviewed following 
the household split, while 14.9 % moved out of scope.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2.
the re-interview rates exceeds 40 % for men and 
seven countries in which it exceeds 40 % for wom-
en. There are two countries in which re-interview 
rates for young adults leaving home are around or 
above 50 % (Italy and Cyprus).
Finally, we assess whether young home-leavers 
who are not followed may be considered as ‘miss-
ing at random’, or whether the characteristics of 
those re-interviewed after the split differ systemat-
ically from the characteristics of those not re-inter-
viewed. We compare those who were interviewed 
and those who were not in terms of six key indi-
vidual or household characteristics. These char-
acteristics are: employment status (% with a job), 
sex (% female), mean household size, mean age, 
education (% with a degree), and income (% living 
in households whose equivalised income was in 
the lower two income quintiles for their country 
of residence). All characteristics are measured at 
the interview prior to the young person leaving 
home (231). These results are presented in Tables 6a 
(231) Clearly, we cannot use characteristics measured in the year 
after the young person leaves home, because these are not 
measured for anyone who is not re-interviewed.
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Table 27.6: Re‑interview rates for young people (16‑35) leaving home, by country and sex, 
EU‑SILC 2003‑2010
(%)
Men Women
Percentage 
re‑interviewed
Percentage moving 
out of scope
Percentage 
re‑interviewed
Percentage moving 
out of scope
Belgium 32.2 5.6 36.9 4.2
Bulgaria 18.4 38.4 31.1 28.2
Czech Republic 33.7 17.3 32.0 17.6
Estonia 40.1 18.6 43.0 19.5
Ireland 0.0 23.9 0.0 16.7
Greece 18.3 22.0 22.6 5.8
Spain 37.9 5.1 42.6 6.1
France 41.7 9.7 44.1 8.1
Italy 48.1 9.4 51.1 6.6
Cyprus 52.8 18.0 63.4 15.7
Latvia 9.4 38.3 16.8 30.6
Lithuania 12.5 55.1 19.0 54.0
Luxembourg 23.6 31.8 30.2 26.9
Hungary 16.7 15.5 25.1 15.8
Malta 21.0 12.6 41.7 4.6
Austria 36.3 12.0 34.5 11.1
Poland 14.7 48.8 19.2 43.3
Portugal 38.7 23.5 40.3 17.2
Romania 12.4 20.2 11.6 23.3
Slovakia 8.6 31.9 15.8 28.3
United Kingdom 18.7 10.7 30.1 11.8
All 28.6 21.0 33.1 17.7
N (number interviewed, 
year after split) 2 346 2 561
Reading note: Of Austrian men aged 16-35 who moved out of their parents’ household, 36.3 % were re-interviewed after leaving home, while 
12 % moved out of scope.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs 2005v1, 2006v2, 2007v4, 2008v4, 2009v4, and 2010v2.
and 6b of Iacovou and Lynn (2013); these tables are 
not reproduced here for reasons of space.
We find that young adults who are successfully fol-
lowed are more likely in most countries to have a job, 
more likely to be female, more likely to have lived in 
a larger household, likely to be a little older and to 
have a university degree, and less likely to live in 
a low-income household.
There is no clear difference between countries with 
very low re-interview rates and countries with higher 
re-interview rates; two countries in particular (Spain 
and the UK) have more significant differences be-
tween the two samples than other countries, and 
only three countries (Austria, Estonia and the Czech 
Republic) have no significant differences between 
groups on any of the indicators. The use of weights 
makes little difference to these findings.
Thus, it must be concluded that the missing at ran-
dom assumption does not hold. Moreover, the char-
acteristics of those who are lost to non-response 
differ between countries, so between-country com-
parisons may be particularly compromised. The ev-
idence suggests that only in a handful of countries 
(notably Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Por-
tugal,) are young people re-interviewed in sufficient 
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numbers to make analysis of the life trajectories of 
young home-leavers worthwhile. Furthermore, in 
most of these countries, with the notable exception 
of Spain, differences in observable characteristics be-
tween those who were and were not re-interviewed 
appear to be modest.
However, EU-SILC is a cross-national survey de-
signed to facilitate comparative research into in-
comes, wellbeing and family life across all coun-
tries of the EU. Although limited research on young 
adult home-leavers is possible with EU-SILC, true 
cross-national comparative research is simply not 
possible in respect of young home-leavers, and no 
such analysis, comparative or otherwise, is possible 
regarding relationship dissolution. With respect to 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990 and 1999) welfare regime 
typology, one welfare regime type (the social-dem-
ocratic regimes) cannot be analysed because the 
survey design in register countries means that it is 
not possible to reliably estimate transition rates, and 
because it appears that re-interview rates are very 
low in the case of young people who move home. 
And among the countries of Eastern Europe which 
joined the EU after 2005, re-interview rates are so 
low that it also becomes extremely problematic to 
include them in the analysis. So, while the data en-
able a reasonable comparison to be made of young 
adult home-leavers between the Southern Europe-
an countries, analysts might have hoped for much 
more from EU-SILC. The situation could be improved 
in future by amending the sampling and following 
rules in register countries and by implementing bet-
ter procedures to maximise re-interview rates in all 
countries. Such procedures are outlined in the next 
section of this chapter.
27.4 Minimising sample 
attrition (232)
There are two main reasons why it is desirable 
to make efforts to minimise sample attrition on 
EU-SILC. First, a higher rate of attrition implies 
a larger number of interviews required at the first 
wave in order to achieve the target longitudinal 
sample size. Second, if sample members who drop 
(232) This section is based on Eurostat (2012b).
out before the end of the panel differ systematical-
ly from those who continue responding, longitudi-
nal estimates can be biased. Thus, implementing 
methods to control attrition can both save survey 
costs and improve the research value of the data.
Lepkowski and Couper (2002) identify three stages 
in the process of obtaining response from sam-
ple members: location, contact and cooperation. 
These three stages take place at each wave, and 
attrition will occur if any of the stages is unsuccess-
ful. To minimise attrition, it is therefore necessary to 
implement measures that reduce the risks of fail-
ing to locate, failing to make contact, or failing to 
gain cooperation. Fortunately, there are many such 
measures available; the best practice is to employ 
a broad range of these measures. They may be cat-
egorised into three types:
• Anticipatory measures are implemented at, or 
before, the wave prior to the wave at which 
there is risk of attrition. An example would be 
collecting extra contact information at Wave 1 
in order to aid the process of making contact at 
Wave 2;
• between-wave measures are implemented 
subsequent to the previous wave but prior 
to the wave at which there is risk of attrition. 
An example is to send a mailing to all sample 
members to motivate them to want to take part 
again;
• in-wave measures are implemented during 
the wave at which there is risk of attrition. An 
example would be calling at neighbouring 
houses in the event that no reply can be 
obtained at the previous known address of 
a sample member.
27.4.1 Locating sample members
To minimise the risk of failing to locate longitudinal 
sample members who were interviewed at a pre-
vious wave (Couper and Ofstedal, 2009), best prac-
tice involves these key elements:
• Every opportunity should be taken to collect 
information that may help to locate a sample 
member in the future, in the event that he or 
she should move;
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• A range of information should be collected, 
rather than relying on just one or two types of 
information;
• The information should be stored systematically 
in a database which permits relevant 
information to be supplied in a timely manner 
to the people who need it (interviewers, field 
managers, office staff );
• Timely action should be taken in response 
to particular situations (a sample member 
reporting an intention to move, an interviewer 
reporting that a sample member cannot be 
found, etc.).
27.4.2 Making contact with 
sample members
Some of the measures taken to assist with locating 
sample members can also increase the chances of 
making contact. For example, collecting mobile 
phone numbers at Wave 1 will not only make it eas-
ier to locate someone who has moved by the time 
of Wave 2 but will also make it easier to make con-
tact with someone who has not moved but is not 
often at home. Additionally, best practice at each 
wave should involve interviewers being required 
to make at least a certain number of visits, and to 
spread these over different days of the week, times 
of day, and weeks, in order to maximise the proba-
bility of making contact.
The wealth of information collected at previous 
waves can be used in various ways to help make 
contact with sample members. This includes both 
socio-demographic characteristics collected in the 
survey and paradata about the fieldwork process 
(Kreuter, 2013). Prior to fieldwork, such information 
can be used to identify cases with a heightened 
risk of being hard to contact. This may enable pri-
oritisation of fieldwork (Calderwood et al., 2012) or 
appropriate allocation of interviewers to sample cas-
es. Interviewers may be able to plan their work more 
effectively if they are supplied with information 
about the numbers, days and times of unsuccessful 
(non-contact) visits at previous waves and the days 
and times when contact was successfully made.
The use of different modes of approach may also 
help. People who cannot be contacted easily 
face-to-face may perhaps be contacted by tele-
phone or email instead. Telephone and email ap-
proaches can be used to make appointments for 
a face-to-face visit, or at least to ascertain when 
may be a good time for a visit.
27.4.3 Obtaining the cooperation 
of sample members
The overall experience of being approached and 
participating in the survey at one wave will have 
a big influence on the chances of a sample mem-
ber agreeing to be interviewed again at the next 
wave. In particular, sample members’ experienc-
es at EU-SILC Wave 1 are likely to form the major 
determinant of willingness to take part again sub-
sequently. Almost every aspect of the design and 
implementation of the survey can have an impact 
on the propensity to agree to participate, from the 
name of the survey, through to the appearance 
and manner of the interviewer. However, a design 
feature that has a positive effect for some sample 
members may have a negative effect for others 
(Groves et al., 2000). Researchers can take advan-
tage of this by targeting some aspects of the sur-
vey process to the particular characteristics of re-
spondents (Lynn, 2016).
The role of the interviewer cannot be over-empha-
sised. Thorough training of interviewers in refusal 
avoidance and good practice to encourage partici-
pation (Morton-Williams, 1993) is essential.
Several other design features also influence coop-
eration rates. The use of modest-value respondent 
incentives is beneficial. The types of incentives used 
on panel surveys and the results of studies into 
their effects are reviewed in Laurie and Lynn (2009). 
In some cases, an incentive can actually reduce the 
overall cost of a survey, as interviewers find it easier 
to persuade people to take part and have to make 
fewer visits as a result (Lynn et al., 1998).
Between-wave mailings should be designed to 
motivate respondents to take part again. Fum-
agalli et al. (2012) found that this is more likely to 
happen if the contents of the mailing are relevant 
to the sample member. Most surveys with annual 
waves have two or three between-wave mailings: 
a post-wave ‘thank you’, a between-wave mailing 
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(with some findings and a request for updated con-
tact details), and a pre-wave advance letter.
27.4.4 Checklist of best practices
Prior to the start of the first wave of fieldwork with 
a new panel:
• A sample management database should 
be created. This can be used for managing 
fieldwork at each wave, tracing between waves, 
and keeping-in-touch exercises.
• Information that might help with tracing should 
be collected from the sample frame or from 
other sources if possible. Such information 
should be stored in the sample management 
database.
• Procedures for in-wave tracing should be 
developed and all necessary materials 
produced. For field tracing, details must be 
included in interviewer training. For office 
tracing, appropriate personnel must be 
identified/recruited and trained.
• Attention should be paid to the choice of 
interviewers and to interviewer training. It is 
particularly important on a panel survey that 
the interviewer leaves a favourable impression.
At each wave:
• An advance letter should be mailed to each 
sample member. If possible, a small incentive 
should be included.
• Sample members at high risk of being 
non-contacts should be given priority 
(attempted first) in the field.
• Interviewers should make at least a certain 
number of visits — ideally seven — to each 
sample address, on different days of the week, 
times of day, and weeks, before accepting 
a non- contact.
• Interviewers should be supplied with data 
from previous waves that may help them to 
make contact at the current wave or to gain 
cooperation.
• After a number of non-contact calls to an 
address, a calling card should be left.
• Alternative modes of contact — such as email 
or phone — should be considered for sample 
members who have not been contacted after 
seven attempts.
• When a mover is identified, the interviewer 
should ask current residents of the address (and, 
if necessary, neighbours) whether they know 
the new address of the mover. Interviewers 
should be equipped to hand a prepared mailing 
to the new/other resident/neighbour, for them 
to address and mail to the mover.
• If a mover’s new address is not obtained in 
the field, other tracing procedures should 
be initiated promptly. These should include 
phone calls to numbers provided previously by 
the sample member and, if necessary, emails, 
hard-copy mailings and database searches.
• When a mover’s new address is obtained, it 
should be issued promptly to a field interviewer.
At each wave other than the last wave for each 
panel:
• Each sample member should be asked to 
provide: home telephone number, mobile 
telephone number, work telephone number, 
email address, and address and phone number 
of at least one ‘stable contact'.
• Each sample member should be asked if they 
expect to move in the next 12 months. If ‘yes’, 
they should be asked if they know when or 
where they will move. If they already know 
where, the new address should be recorded. If 
they know when but not where, the expected 
month of the move should be recorded.
• Each sample member should be asked to 
inform the National Statistical Institute (NSI) 
if they change address. They should be given 
a reply-paid postcard, a Freephone telephone 
number and an email address to which they 
can write. A small incentive might be offered for 
reporting an address change.
Between waves:
• Relevant information collected during fieldwork 
should be copied to the sample management 
database.
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• A mailing of all sample members should 
take place. If possible, this mailing should be 
targeted, with the content differing between 
sample subgroups.
• Whether or not the mailing is targeted, the 
contents should be thoughtfully designed to 
maximise the sample member’s interest in the 
survey.
• If resources allow, additional targeted 
interventions, such as a phone call to sample 
members estimated to have the highest risk of 
losing contact, are desirable.
• Other regular tracing procedures should 
be considered, such as routine searches of 
commercial databases or electoral registers.
27.5 Design options for the 
longitudinal component of 
EU‑SILC
The previous sections of this chapter have been 
concerned with the implementation of the four-
wave rotating panel which has been, since the in-
ception of EU-SILC, the recommended design for 
the longitudinal component. In this section, we 
consider possible alternatives to this design, as-
sessing their strengths and weaknesses in relation 
to cost, operational issues, and the usefulness and 
quality of the resulting data.
The possible alternatives to a four-wave rotational 
design are outlined in detail in Eurostat (2012a). The 
range of possible alternatives is extremely large, 
including variations in panel length, the frequency 
with which new panels are introduced, the extent 
to which questionnaire content differs between 
years and between different sections of the sam-
ple; the extent to which retrospective questioning 
is used as an alternative to year-by-year contempo-
raneous interviews; and ‘hybridisation’ of surveys 
(for example, splitting the sample into ‘short’ and 
‘long’ panels, in an attempt to combine the advan-
tages of different designs).
In our consultations with National Statistical Insti-
tutes (N=18) and with members of the research com-
munity (N=131), the issue of the length of the panel 
was clearly the most important of all these consid-
erations; neither group of stakeholders appeared to 
feel that there was any particular benefit in altering 
any of the other parameters, and in particular the 
1-year interval between interviews.
In terms of the choice of panel lengths, the possi-
ble alternatives are as follows:
a) A cross-sectional survey with no longitudinal 
component (effectively, this is equivalent to 
a panel length of 1);
b) A longitudinal survey with a shorter panel com-
ponent of two or three waves;
c) The current arrangement, with a panel length 
of four waves;
d) A longitudinal survey with a longer panel com-
ponent (five or more waves);
e) A ‘perpetual’ panel, where sample households 
are never replaced; this is technically equivalent 
to an infinite panel length.
We identify a range of advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with different panel lengths. 
These are listed below; there are several important 
trade-offs to be considered.
27.5.1 Opportunities for research
In terms of the potential opportunities for re-
search, there was a fairly strong consensus on 
the part of the research community that a longer 
panel was better than a shorter panel. Some re-
spondents noted that as they only ever performed 
cross-sectional research, the four-wave panel de-
sign was completely adequate for their purposes, 
and indeed they would be perfectly happy with 
a repeated cross-sectional survey. However, of the 
respondents who were interested in doing longitu-
dinal research, virtually all expressed a preference 
for a longer panel; some noted that the current 
4-year design afforded such limited opportunities 
for longitudinal research that it was, for their pur-
poses at least, almost useless.
This feedback is entirely consistent with a growing 
body of literature on longitudinal analysis. Kalton 
and Citro (2000, p. 41) note that ‘the longer the 
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panel lasts, the greater is the wealth of data ob-
tained for longitudinal analysis’. Jenkins (2011), in 
his analysis of income dynamics in Britain, demon-
strates that an understanding of many aspects of 
dynamics would not be possible without at least 8 
years of data (indeed, he argues (p. 183) that even 
with 17 years of data, as he had available from the 
British Household Panel Survey, there remain nec-
essary assumptions that restrict the interpretation 
that can be put on findings). Duncan (2000) finds 
it necessary to compare successive 5-year periods 
to identify stability of income of American families, 
implying that at least 10 years of data are need-
ed. Hernández-Quevedo et al. (2010) indicate that 
4-wave data severely restricts the ability to analyse 
the determinants of health outcomes in Europe, 
pointing out that dynamic models are unreliable 
with (a maximum of) only four observations per 
person and that it is hard to ascribe causality. Till 
and Eiffe (2010), in their work identifying factors 
leading to the onset or alleviation of material dep-
rivation (MD), also conclude that longer periods of 
observation would be desirable, and would enable 
researchers to more fully identify the sequences of 
events that lead to changes in MD status.
27.5.2 Non‑response and attrition 
bias
As discussed earlier in this chapter, steps may be 
taken to minimise attrition; but it cannot be com-
pletely eliminated. Attrition can become a more 
serious problem the longer the length of the pan-
el, and is potentially most serious in a ‘perpetual’ 
panel without replacement. The most obvious 
consequence of attrition is progressively smaller 
sample sizes over the life of the panel. Howev-
er, where some or all of the attrition occurs via 
not-at-random processes, as is likely to be the case 
in most conceivable real-life contexts, it may give 
rise to a sample which is not only small, but also 
non-representative (see Chapter 22 of this volume, 
on some of the implications of attrition). Where 
the degree of attrition is not too severe, it is pos-
sible to use weights to adjust for selective attrition; 
however, this becomes progressively more difficult 
when attrition has occurred steadily over a period 
of many years.
The decisions as to (a) whether the data can be used 
at all, and (b) if so, whether and how best to adjust 
for attrition, should depend on both the degree of 
attrition and the remaining sample size. In common 
with most decisions in research practice, there are 
no hard-and-fast rules here, but a reasonable rule 
of thumb is to exercise considerable caution when 
attrition rates exceed 50 %, and to make decisions 
based on sample sizes as well as attrition rates. 
For example, in our analysis of young people leav-
ing home (Table 27.6 and associated discussion), 
we proposed that the Portuguese sample (with 
re-interview rates of 38.7 % for men and 40.3 % for 
women) was potentially usable, whereas the Aus-
trian sample (with only slightly lower re-interview 
rates, but a smaller sample overall) was not.
A rotating panel will still suffer from attrition, but 
this will be limited by the repeated introduction of 
new panels. Additionally, when the survey is ‘ma-
ture’, it will attain a steady state. The sample will 
not be entirely representative of the population, 
due to non-response and attrition; however, we 
may expect that the characteristics of the sample 
will be broadly the same from year to year, and 
that year-on-year comparisons will thus be more 
reliable.
It is important to note that although a rolling 
sample is likely to embody a greater degree of 
year-on-year consistency, it does not necessarily 
follow that a shorter panel would result in a less-
er degree of non-response bias, since the degree 
of such bias depends on the relative likelihood of 
non-response at the first wave and subsequent 
interviews.
27.5.3 Variance of estimates
One major advantage of rotating panel designs is 
that they reduce the variance of estimates of net 
change between two time periods, compared with 
the use of independent cross-sectional samples. It 
is entirely possible to construct an estimate of net 
change from two independent samples: for exam-
ple, one could estimate the net change in unem-
ployment rates using a repeated cross-sectional 
survey. In this case, each of the two cross-section-
al estimates of the unemployment rate would be 
subject to sampling variance, and the sampling 
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variance of the difference between the two esti-
mates would be equal to the sum of the variances 
of each cross-sectional estimate. This variance can 
be reduced by using a rotating panel design, as the 
variance of the estimated change is reduced by an 
amount equal to the covariance between the two 
measures, which is positive in the case of depend-
ent samples. The longer the panel, the smaller the 
contribution made in each wave by a ‘new’ sample, 
and the smaller the variance.
27.5.4 Practicalities of data 
collection
In the course of our consultation, a perception 
was evident among several NSI respondents, that 
following sample members over longer periods of 
time might make the survey more demanding to 
implement; several of our respondents noted that 
even under the current arrangements, they found 
implementing the tracing and following rules the 
most difficult aspect of their work on EU-SILC, and 
that this difficulty would be compounded if the 
panel length were to increase.
Other NSIs, however, did not share this percep-
tion. Some survey managers argued that a short-
ening of the panel length would increase both 
non-response and potential costs, since obtaining 
response from a new sample, about whom little or 
nothing is known, for the first time is more chal-
lenging than obtaining response from people who 
have already taken part in the survey previously 
and about whom quite a lot is known. A rotating 
design with a larger number of waves would im-
ply that in any one year a smaller proportion of the 
total sample would be being approached for the 
first time. Consequently, a larger proportion of the 
total survey effort would consist of re-approaching 
people interviewed previously; although a propor-
tion of these would have to be traced after moving 
house, the net effort involved may well be lower.
The consultation was anonymous, so we do not 
know how the individual NSIs answered, but it is 
likely that these differences may be driven by sub-
stantial variability between NSIs in the degree of 
pre-existing expertise with longitudinal surveys. 
There seems to be a strong case, therefore, for 
a greater degree of sharing of experience and best 
practice between NSIs; this would be the case even 
if the survey were to remain in its current form, and 
should definitely occur if the length of the panel 
were to be extended.
27.5.5 SWOT analysis and 
recommendations
The final part of the Eurostat project involved 
a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities 
and Threats) analysis. A full account of this is pre-
sented in Eurostat (2012c and 2012d). The report 
concluded that several features of EU-SILC were 
working well and required no change; the major 
change recommended was an extension of the 
panel length from 4 to 6 years. This would permit 
a broader range of analyses and greater power to 
identify the precursors, causes and effects of vari-
ous dynamic processes such as changes in income 
poverty, MD, (quasi-)joblessness and changes in 
health status; EU-SILC would provide a unique op-
portunity to make cross-national comparisons of 
these processes, causes and effects and to better 
understand variation between Member States.
However, there are also potential disadvantages 
associated with larger numbers of waves, relating 
to problems with attrition. There are ways in which 
these problems may be minimised; we propose 
that following rules and procedures for minimising 
non-response should be re-specified and should in 
future be better monitored, with greater support 
provided to NSIs to help them to understand and 
to correctly implement the procedures.
27.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have reviewed the legislation 
relating to the following rules of EU-SILC, and have 
examined the ways in which the following rules are 
implemented in different countries. We found that 
the following rules are interpreted and implement-
ed very differently in the different Member States 
of the EU, particularly in respect of individuals or 
whole households who change address between 
one survey year and the next; and we illustrat-
ed that this may have important implications for 
27 Design and implementation issues to improve the research value  of the longitudinal component of EU-SILC
  Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe496
research on groups of people who have a high-
er-than-average risk of moving. We also discussed 
‘best practice’ in relation to minimising attrition 
in longitudinal surveys, identifying a number of 
procedures that could help to reduce attrition on 
EU-SILC. We support the suggestion of Glaser et 
al. (2015) that EU-SILC would benefit from coun-
tries sharing best practice in this regard. Finally, we 
discussed the findings of a project evaluating the 
challenges of producing the EU-SILC longitudinal 
data from the perspective of National Statistical 
Institutes, and the value of the longitudinal com-
ponent from the perspective of the research com-
munity. Based on all this evidence, we recommend 
(a) a shift to a 6-year rotating panel, rather than the 
current 4-year panel; (b) a tighter specification of 
the following rules, and more rigorous monitoring 
of their implementation; and (c) a greater degree 
of information-sharing between NSIs and other ex-
perts, with the particular aim of supporting those 
NSIs with less expertise in administering longitudi-
nal social surveys.
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28.1 Introduction
A key feature of EU-SILC is output harmonisation. 
This gives national statistical institutes flexibility of 
implementation at the national level, with variation 
in data collection methods, coupled with system-
atic monitoring of data quality and the degree of 
comparability within and across countries. Coun-
tries implementing the EU-SILC surveys are split 
between ‘register countries’ and ‘survey countries’. 
This chapter reviews the use of registers in combi-
nation with interviews in EU-SILC. It is based on the 
contributions from the international Workshop on 
the Use of Registers in the Context of EU-SILC held 
in December 2012 in Vienna (Jäntti, Törmälehto 
and Marlier, 2013).
While the acronym EU-SILC stands for EU Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions, the EU-SILC data 
need to be collected at least in part with a sam-
ple survey, because subjective questions on liv-
ing conditions and their joint distributions with 
income and other domains are essential for the 
output of the whole instrument. The use of reg-
isters in EU-SILC is therefore to be seen as part of 
a wider strategy of multi-mode data collection; 
in other words, registers complement rather than 
(233) Veli-Matti Törmälehto is from Statistics Finland, Markus Jäntti 
from the University of Helsinki and Eric Marlier from LISER 
(Luxembourg). The authors would like to thank all contributors 
of the workshop on the use of registers (Vienna, December 
2012) as well as Anthony B. Atkinson, Didier Dupré and Hannele 
Sauli for valuable comments and suggestions. All errors 
remain our own. This work has been supported by the second 
Network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), funded by 
Eurostat. The European Commission bears no responsibility 
for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely those of 
the authors. Email address for correspondence: veli-matti.
tormalehto@stat.fi.
substitute data collected in statistical surveys (see 
chapter by Di Meglio and Montaigne in Jäntti et al., 
2013).
The current trend in European statistics (including 
EU-SILC) is to encourage the use of administrative 
data. Nowadays, one could well split the EU-SILC 
countries into three groups instead of just two. The 
first group consists of the ‘old’ register countries, 
where the use of registers affects quite profound-
ly the design and implementation of the survey. 
The second group consists of countries that have 
started using or will use income data from regis-
ters extensively, but have mostly maintained other 
features of their survey implementations. The third 
group consists of countries that rely, by necessity, 
largely on interview-based income data.
Since the launch of EU-SILC, Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, and Swe-
den have been thought of as the ‘register coun-
tries’. Recently, there has been a further expansion 
in the use of register data in EU-SILC, in particular 
on regular income components such as wages and 
salaries, pensions, and social benefits. The group 
of EU-SILC countries that derive income data from 
registers now includes countries such as Austria, 
France, Latvia, Spain, and Switzerland. The meas-
urement of income data from registers is the area 
where the benefits of register data are most immi-
nent, both in terms of quality and costs. An impor-
tant difference is that these ‘new’ register countries 
are not using the so-called selected respondent de‑
sign, which is the distinct feature of the ‘old’ register 
countries.
We will discuss these two groups in this chapter, 
but it is important to note that the third group (the 
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survey countries) is a large one, and includes coun-
tries such as Germany, Greece, Poland, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom. These countries may have le-
gal and actual barriers to access and/or link register 
data to the EU-SILC sample, and the quality of the 
register data may not be fit for purpose due to low 
quality of the available registers. Even then, there 
may be some scope for utilising register data for 
EU-SILC purposes, at least for quality assessments. 
Examples of such evaluation and cross-validation 
studies are provided in Jäntti et al. (see chapters by 
Lunn and McKay, Cifaldi and Neri, Liégeois et al.).
The chapter is organised as follows. First, some 
general quality considerations are briefly discussed, 
followed by a review of the implementations in the 
‘selected respondent’ or ‘old’ register countries. 
Then, some experiences of the ‘new’ register coun-
tries are reviewed. Finally, the last section provides 
a summary and conclusions.
28.2 EU‑SILC and data 
integration: general 
considerations
Access to administrative and statistical registers 
can influence the design, production and quality 
of sample surveys in several ways. The use of in-
come data from registers implies a decrease in the 
length of the questionnaire and less quantitative 
questions. This makes less costly modes of collec-
tions, such as telephone or web interviewing, vi-
able alternatives to face-to-face interviewing. Yet, 
these alternatives may constrain the type of data 
that can be collected in the interviews, and in this 
way reduce the flexibility of the register-based 
implementations.
Income is at the very core of EU-SILC and inter-
view-based income data typically suffer from item 
non-response. In EU-SILC, in order to allow for 
complete case analysis, missing items are imput-
ed (with a single imputation). Countries with no or 
only limited access to register-based income data 
have to devote quite some effort to imputation of 
non-response. Consequently, the great benefit of us-
ing register-based income data is the reduced need 
for imputations. Registers also provide a wide pool of 
auxiliary information for further adjustments of the 
sampling weights, in order to improve the accuracy 
of the estimates. However, consistency checks and 
editing, weighting and construction of the target 
variables may become more time consuming. The 
use of register income data also implies paying more 
attention to disclosure risk in the micro data.
The combined use of survey and register data af-
fects the total survey error, and effectively expands 
the traditional survey error sources to those related 
to registers (single sources) and data integration 
from multiple sources. The linkage and align-
ment of multiple sources introduces an additional 
second phase source of errors, in addition to the 
sources of error in any single source (Zhang, 2012). 
Both surveys and registers have errors related to 
measurement (variables) and errors related to rep-
resentation (units). The various types of errors, such 
as unit errors (e.g. different household definitions) 
and measurement errors (e.g. under-reporting 
of income), are discussed in detail e.g. in Jäntti, 
Törmälehto and Marlier (2013).
In the case of EU-SILC, the great expectation is that 
register-based income data are more accurate and 
cheaper to collect, and the whole survey becomes 
much less burdensome for the respondents. Nev-
ertheless, the errors that occur in surveys may also 
occur in registers, and the values available from sur-
veys and registers may differ from the ideal values, 
for various reasons (Bakker, 2011). It should be kept in 
mind that there is variation within countries across 
different register sources, and possibly even across 
variables within a single register source in a country.
In general, measurement errors in the register 
sources depend on the administrative data collec-
tion process, and the involvement and interest of 
the registered person or unit (Bakker, 2011). Some 
administrative register data are collected with 
survey-like techniques, through self-administered 
questionnaires (e.g., tax forms), which are processed 
into electronic format. The person may have an in-
terest of registering very accurate data, but could 
also intentionally provide false data. A classic case 
of the latter is tax evasion (Matsaganis et al., 2013); 
for instance, self-employment income self-de-
clared in the tax forms can contain intentionally 
underreported data. Some administrative register 
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data come directly from electronic administrative 
systems without the direct involvement of a per-
son. As an example, wages and salaries based on 
electronic data transmission between employers 
and tax authorities can be very accurate. Different 
types of data may be included even in the same 
register, in particular in the tax register(s).
EU-SILC always needs a questionnaire-based data 
collection, and the use of registers obviously has 
an impact on the questionnaire. Some survey 
questions may be completely replaced with regis-
ter variables, with the obvious benefit of a shorter 
and possibly cognitively less burdensome ques-
tionnaire. Some adaptation of the questionnaire 
is typically needed. For instance, when Statistics 
Austria started to use income data from registers, 
it also adapted its questionnaire not only by delet-
ing questions but also by changing the remaining 
questions because their context had changed, as 
well as by adding new questions to fill in the gaps 
in the register incomes (see chapter by Heuberger 
et al. in Jäntti et al., 2013).
A critical precondition for using registers is that 
the existing legislation does not prevent their use 
for the intended purpose. As a related matter, re-
spondent consent is usually required in surveys be-
fore unit-level data from registers may be linked to 
interview-based data. Administrative data sources 
require a great deal of work on harmonisation of 
populations and units, common identifiers and the 
record linkage process, and derivation of variables. 
One of the most important constraints in using 
registers is timeliness; late availability of registers 
and the required processing time may not allow 
using registers to meet the required EU-SILC data 
transmission deadlines.
28.3 The ‘old’ register 
countries
As noted in the introduction, the group of ‘old’ 
register countries includes the Nordic countries, 
the Netherlands, and Slovenia. Broadly speaking, 
these countries in EU-SILC take income data most-
ly from registers, sample individuals and not ad-
dresses, have shorter questionnaires with a focus 
on qualitative questions, use telephone interviews 
(or, in the case of Denmark, also web interviews), 
and apply the selected respondent (SR) design. In 
this design, a pre-defined set of personal variables 
are collected only for a representative sub-sample 
of adults (aged 16 and above) instead of all adults. 
The 16+ individuals drawn from the frame are ‘se-
lected respondents’, and the household is defined 
around the selected person. Since individuals are 
randomly pre-selected from the sampling frame, 
the respondents constitute a representative sam-
ple of the population of 16+ individuals. The results 
are generalised to the cross-sectional target popu-
lation with special weights.
In the longitudinal part, where the individual is the 
unit of analysis, only the initially selected respond-
ents are the sample persons followed in the subse-
quent waves. The split-off members, i.e. the initial 
co-residents, are not followed, which is an impor-
tant practical simplification. The SR registers coun-
tries using the standard 4-year design also must 
select an extra sample to cover population of 14 
and 15 year olds.
The SR design of EU-SILC was tailored for the reg-
ister countries in the transition from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) to EU-SILC. 
Although the minimum effective sample size is 
defined to be larger in the SR design, it reduces 
respondent burden and cuts costs because not 
all household members need to be interviewed 
and cheaper modes of collection (telephone or 
web interviews) can be used. The limits of tele-
phone interviews and data collection from a proxy 
respondent, in particular, may restrict the type of 
data to be collected. For instance, reliable data on 
cognitively burdening and/or sensitive issues (e.g., 
wealth, event histories) are very difficult to collect 
by telephone and/or proxy interview.
For the users of cross-national data, the SR design 
complicates the analysis somewhat. Data from 
register countries have to be analysed separately if 
the SR variables are used. Joint analysis with house-
hold-level variables or with personal variables col-
lected for all adults is not straightforward. The user 
may have to restrict their analysis to the sub-sam-
ple of selected respondents using the appropriate 
weights, when such variables are analysed sepa-
rately or jointly with other types of variables. This 
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leads to a loss in efficiency due to full clustering 
effect, which is partly compensated by the larger 
minimum effective sample sizes required from SR 
register countries.
Helgeson (in his chapter included in Jäntti et al. 
2013) reviews how the use of register data affects 
EU-SILC in the Nordic countries. The Nordic coun-
tries have used administrative data for statistical 
purposes since at least the mid-1960s, and also 
have long traditions in integrating sample surveys 
and registers. All Nordic countries sample individ-
uals rather than addresses, and follow the SR de-
sign. The surveys in these countries benefit from 
well-established system of basic registers, which 
usually consist of three or four registers. Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland and Norway have organised their 
data in three basic registers: a Population register, 
a Register of buildings and dwellings, and a Business 
register. Sweden has built up a statistical system 
based on four basic registers: Population Register, 
Activity Register, Real Estate Register, and Business Reg‑
ister. The Population and dwelling registers are more 
(Denmark, Finland and Norway) or less (Iceland 
and Sweden) developed, which has implications 
for the use of the registers in creating households 
for EU-SILC. In a few years’ time, though, all Nordic 
countries will be using similar population registers 
which will imply similar production processes for 
EU-SILC in all these countries.
Despite the many similarities, there are some dif-
ferences in the EU-SILC implementations between 
the Nordic countries. The sampling is performed 
slightly differently. Denmark, Norway and Swe-
den use simple random sampling while Finland 
uses a stratified two-phase sampling. Iceland uses 
post-stratified simple random sampling. All Nordic 
countries mainly use Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviews (CATI) as the main method for interview-
ing— except in Denmark, where now almost 6 in 
10 interviews are performed through web inter-
views (Computer Assisted Web Interviews (CAWI)). 
The fieldwork is set up differently. In Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland and Norway the fieldwork takes place 
during the first part of the year. Sweden performs 
a continuous survey throughout the year. Also the 
countries have sometimes interpreted the regula-
tions regarding EU-SILC slightly differently. Since 
EU-SILC is an output-harmonised survey, there is 
also room for choosing methods adapted to the 
local circumstances (see chapter by Helgeson in 
Jäntti et al., 2013).
In Slovenia, EU-SILC is the first sample survey where 
administrative sources were used, starting in 2005. 
From the outset, all the conditions for using ad-
ministrative sources needed to be resolved — the 
legal basis, the quality of the administrative data, 
timeliness of the data, etc. The experience of Slo-
venia highlights the potentially significant start-up 
costs of integrating register and survey data. The 
main problem of using administrative sources in 
Slovenia is timeliness, although the situation has 
improved over the years (see chapter by Inglič in 
Jäntti et al., 2013).
In the Netherlands, because of the common labour 
variables, EU-SILC has been integrated in the La-
bour Force Survey as an additional panel wave. The 
Dutch Labour Force Survey is conducted according 
to a rotating panel design, in which respondents 
are interviewed five times at quarterly intervals. 
Households that have taken part in the fifth wave 
are recruited for the EU-SILC survey. Statistics Neth-
erlands has access to a wide range of administra-
tive data which are integrated in the overarching 
social statistics database on which all output of so-
cial, regional and spatial statistics is or will be based 
in the future (e.g. income). Through the so-called 
satellite on income and wealth, EU-SILC is provided 
annually with register data on income and wealth. 
(see chapter by Huynen et al. in Jäntti et al., 2013.)
Apart from replacing variables in surveys, register 
data also improve the efficiency of the survey pro-
cess in the Netherlands by streamlining the data 
collection and supporting more efficient sampling 
schemes. Moreover, register data contribute to im-
proving the quality of the output of household sur-
veys by providing auxiliary variables for weighting 
purposes. The income calibration variables used 
in EU-SILC are based on the Income Panel Survey. 
Since the 2012 Wave of EU-SILC, the calibration var-
iables are based on the social statistics database, 
which covers the entire population in the Neth-
erlands. The at-risk-of-poverty rate, based on the 
national definition of equivalised income, is one of 
the calibration variables. (Huynen et al., op. cit.)
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The register countries who use the ‘selected re-
spondent’ design tend to have a comprehensive 
system-based approach to using registers for sta-
tistics and many also have a long tradition in us-
ing registers for surveys. Legal and actual access 
to using registers is well established, and technical 
issues (e.g., concerning record linkage) have in gen-
eral been solved.
It should be noted that many of the ‘old’ register 
countries such as Denmark, Finland, Norway, the 
Netherlands and Sweden are increasingly produc-
ing income inequality and income poverty indi-
cators from entirely register-based sources. These 
sources are not restricted by the sample size and 
can provide highly disaggregated regional and 
longitudinal information. In such countries, EU-SILC 
may not be the national reference source on in-
come distribution, but a source for multidimen-
sional, cross-nationally comparable living condition 
indicators (234).
28.4 The ‘new’ register 
countries
The transition to register data is not easy and may 
take years, since it may require adaptation of the 
legal basis, careful quality assessments, and chang-
es to the production processes. In other words, 
there may be significant start-up costs, as already 
highlighted in the case of Slovenia. We next review 
some experiences and findings of the ‘new’ regis-
ter countries — which include Austria, France, Lat-
via, Spain and Switzerland — and to some extent 
also other countries such as Italy with more mixed 
strategies.
The main difference to the ‘old’ register countries is 
that in the transition, these ‘new’ register countries 
mostly have not adopted the selected respond-
ent design, i.e., they have not changed the basic 
designs, including the mode of collection, or the 
practice of interviewing all adults. The challenges 
related to various technical and quality aspects 
(units not linked, coverage problems, quality of 
(234) This is one the main reasons for the differences in these 
countries between OECD and Eurostat inequality estimates, 
and it is obviously not a good thing for the quality of EU-SILC.
e.g. self-employment income) exist but seem to be 
manageable using mixed or combined approach-
es. Within-country comparability across time is 
generally an issue; the transition to registers tends 
to lead to breaks in (at least some) time series.
National statistical agencies typically conduct 
evaluations of register-based and interview-based 
income data before more extensive use in statisti-
cal production. Taken together, the results of such 
evaluations suggest that differences between sur-
vey- and register-based estimates in inequality and 
poverty can be of a substantial order of magnitude 
(see for instance Statistics Austria, 2014; Méndez 
Martin, 2015; Nordberg et al., 2004).
In France, administrative data have been used to 
complement survey data since 1956 (see chapter 
by Burricand in Jäntti et al., 2013). In EU-SILC, the 
transition to register-based income data took place 
in 2008, and unfortunately overlapping measure-
ment of both interview and register data was not 
feasible. A test conducted in 2005 before the tran-
sition suggests that interview- and register-based 
estimates of mean and median wages as well as 
wage dispersion are quite close. At-risk-of-poverty 
rates using the two sources suggest a high agree-
ment in estimates, with about 13 % income-poor 
for both sources and a very high degree of overlap. 
The differences are small, for the most part, but can 
be large at the ends of the distribution. As EU-SILC 
is used especially to examine the income and living 
conditions of the disadvantaged populations, what 
happens in the lower tail of the distribution is par-
ticularly important.
The transition had only a small impact on the main 
cross-sectional indicators on income poverty but 
led to an increase in the income inequality indica-
tors. This is due to both improved coverage and in-
creased accuracy of income. For instance, between 
2007 and 2008, the source of real estate income 
changed from surveys to registers and the aggre-
gate amounts collected doubled. There is some ev-
idence that an increase in overall income inequality 
in France between those years was driven by the 
change in sources. Despite the break in time-series, 
the transition from survey to register data in France 
was an important step toward increased quality 
(Burricand, op. cit.).
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In France, there is a break in data series in 2008 fol-
lowing the transition to register data. For instance, 
the Gini coefficient increased by 3.2 percentage 
points, which seems almost like a level shift and 
2008 is therefore rightly flagged as a break in time 
series in the Eurostat web-database.
The change to register data improves coherence of 
different data sources, as illustrated in Figure 28.1 in 
the case of France. The national source for income 
inequality is based on register-data, and this source 
has been used also by the OECD in its income dis-
tribution database. After the transition to register 
data in EU-SILC, its level and change in income ine-
quality is fairly consistent with the national source.
In Austria, the transition to using register data was ful-
ly implemented in EU-SILC 2012. The use of register 
data has reduced response burden, non-response 
and survey error, and data editing. An evaluation 
pilot was conducted in 2010 (see chapter by Heu-
berger et al. in Jäntti et al., 2013). The change in data 
source affected significantly the income-based in-
dicator included in the Europe 2020 social inclusion 
target, and consequently Statistics Austria decided 
to revise the EU-SILC data sets 2008-2011, i.e. back 
to the baseline year for these indicators (Statistics 
Austria, 2014). The switch to register data on wages, 
salaries and transfers increased income inequality 
compared to using only interview-based data, as 
shown in Figure 28.2. The at-risk-of-poverty rate 
increased markedly as well, while average income 
remained almost unchanged.
In Spain, the use of administrative data for the con-
struction of income variables was implemented 
in EU-SILC 2013 (Méndez Martin, 2015). Spain uses 
a ‘mixed’ model, wherein income data are taken 
from both registers and questionnaires, depending 
Figure 28.1: Gini coefficient in France in three different data sources, 2004‑2012
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NB: In the case of Eurostat and INSEE, the equivalence scale used is the so-called OECD-modified scale which takes account of both the 
household size and the age of household members (see Chapter 3 in this volume). In the case of the OECD, the equivalence scale is the square 
root of the household size (independent of the age of household members).
Reading note: After the transition to register data in EU-SILC in France, the level and change in income inequality are fairly consistent with the 
national source (Enquête Revenus Fiscaux et Sociaux).
Source: Eurostat, OECD, INSEE.
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on data quality. The Spanish experience of tran-
sition also confirms that legal barriers need to be 
overcome first, that timeliness can be an impor-
tant constraint, and that breaks in time series may 
emerge (see chapter by Méndez Martin in Jäntti et 
al., 2013).
Regarding potential breaks in time series, an eval-
uation based on 2007 data suggested that the use 
of administrative records had an impact on indica-
tors that rely on income level estimates, as it signif-
icantly increases their level (Méndez Martin, ibid). 
Following this, overlapping measurement was 
conducted in EU-SILC 2009 to 2012. The compari-
sons show that change to register data decreased 
income inequality and poverty risk somewhat, 
while average income level increased by around 
15 % (Méndez Martin, 2015). Figure 28.2 illustrates 
the impact on the Gini coefficient in Spain, which 
is more modest and in the opposite direction com-
pared to Austria. As in Austria, the Spanish EU-SILC 
data sets will be revised back to the baseline year 
2008 for income-based Europe 2020 social inclu-
sion indicator (2009-2012 data already revised at 
the time of writing this chapter).
In the Spanish EU-SILC the publication of provision-
al results was implemented in the 2010 survey. In 
October of the survey year (4 months after data col-
lection) some basic monetary and non-monetary 
indicators were already published. However, ad-
ministrative data are available around November 
of the survey year. This makes publication of provi-
sional indicators difficult, although the publication 
of the final results is less affected.
The Spanish case is an example of a way to over-
come shortcomings in registers by measuring 
a variable either from interviews or from registers. If 
Figure 28.2: Gini coefficients in Austria and Spain based interview data and combined register/
interview data, 2004‑2013
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Reading note: In Austria, the Gini coefficient based on interviews was 26.1 % in 2007, whereas it was 27.7 % based on register data.
Source: Statistics Austria 2014, Méndez Martin 2015, Eurostat.
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there is a priori knowledge about the coverage er-
ror of units in the registers, the questionnaire may 
be designed to collect data only from such units. 
This reduces respondent burden which may bring 
significant benefits. Méndez Martin (in his chapter 
included in Jäntti et al., 2013) outlines the strategy 
in Spain wherein, e.g., capital incomes questions 
are filtered so they are asked only of Basque Coun-
try households, because it is known, a priori, that 
these are not covered in the registers.
In Italy, EU-SILC data quality has been improved 
through multiple-source data collection strategy 
since 2004 (see chapter by Consolini and Donatiel-
lo in Jäntti et al., 2013). One option to improve data 
quality is to measure the variable both from in-
terviews and from registers for all units, i.e. to use 
a mixed method. For example, the Italian Statisti-
cal Office (ISTAT) has matched self-employment 
incomes, pensions and employment income to 
the EU-SILC sample. The inclusion of administra-
tive data produces a substantial increase in the 
estimate of average income and the number of 
self-employed earners, while the increase for em-
ployees is less pronounced. Using a mixture of sur-
vey and register information, as opposed to only 
survey information, produces data with a mostly 
close correspondence to each other. Both the pov-
erty rate and the Gini coefficient are lower in the 
former case, by a not unsubstantial margin. Poverty 
is 19.6 % and the Gini coefficient 31.3 % when also 
register information is included. When not, poverty 
is 21.4 % and the Gini is 33.0 %. The misclassifica-
tion rates are also not small, implying substantial 
re-ranking in the income distribution.
28.5 Conclusions
Access to registers influences the design and pro-
duction of household sample surveys in several 
ways. The main benefits stem from replacing survey 
questions with register data. This leads to shorter 
questionnaires and lower data collection costs, re-
duced response burden, and often more accurate 
measurement of quantitative variables, in particular 
income data. With less item non-response, there is 
less need for imputation. Moreover, the net-to-gross 
conversion of income data can be avoided in 
EU-SILC. Sampling designs, non-response analysis, 
and weight adjustments using auxiliary data can be 
improved on. There is much more scope for data 
validation and quality control. There are also po-
tential indirect benefits — for instance, the lower 
response burden may lead to higher response rates.
There may also be challenges and negative influ-
ences. These include validity errors, reduced con-
trol and flexibility over data content, problems in 
obtaining respondent consent, a possible increase 
in proxy answers, constraints of telephone inter-
views, fragmentation of questionnaires, and pos-
sible mixed and multiple mode effects. Further 
errors and/or need for data editing may result 
from changes to the survey questionnaire, record 
linkage, and especially record linkage failure. More 
production time also needs to be devoted to con-
solidating different data sources and resolving con-
flicts (micro-integration). The register-based data-
sets tend to carry a higher disclosure risk, which 
needs to be monitored. Timeliness may be one 
of the most important challenges, since registers 
imply some delays related to late availability and 
processing of administrative data.
Many countries now have access at least to 
a sub-set of income data from registers. In the short 
run, the greatest potential gains may stem from 
replacing survey questions on social benefits and 
employment income with valid register data in as 
many EU-SILC countries as possible. However, it is 
likely that many countries need in the foreseeable 
future to rely mostly on survey-based income data. 
The main obstacles to increasingly relying on reg-
ister data are mostly related to national legal bar-
riers, governance and register infrastructures, and 
timeliness, rather than the more technical issues, 
such as record linkage. Timely estimates of inequal-
ity and poverty are in high demand, and there is 
a trade-off between timeliness and the use of ad-
ministrative data in EU-SILC.
For those who analyse cross-national data, the per-
tinent question is to what extent the flexible use of 
data sources reduces the intra-country total survey 
errors but introduces additional bias in cross-country 
comparisons. Could it be, for instance, that the low 
relative poverty rates in the Nordic countries are 
related to better measurement of social benefits 
from registers and not only to their welfare-state 
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regime? Or to what extent do the different longi-
tudinal following rules in the register-based EU-SILC 
implementations affect the transition and mobility 
estimates derived from the data?
The research findings suggest that the differential use 
of registers may affect comparability across countries, 
while country-case studies tend to show that the 
transition to register income data may affect with-
in-country comparability across time. The results of 
studies based on unit-level comparisons indicate that 
the biases using survey income tend to be larger, and 
that the biases are correlated with income.
The data integration process should, in particular, 
pay attention to the internal consistency of the 
data, because EU-SILC is used both as a descrip-
tive and an analytical data source, with a focus on 
joint distributions and interdependencies across its 
many dimensions. Given this, it seems that even 
more monitoring and documentation of data qual-
ity and comparability is needed. The EU-SILC flag 
variables, which provide metadata for each data 
variable, do not currently carry information on 
whether the data source is a register. It would be 
most useful to have this fundamental information 
included in the EU-SILC flags. This is also impor-
tant for the survey-based variables, since the proxy 
rates may vary by variable in the ‘selected respond-
ent’ countries.
It would also be very useful to systematically doc-
ument exactly which administrative income vari-
ables are included in each of the EU-SILC income 
variables, in particular in the case of social bene-
fits. The link is necessary at national level in order 
to derive EU-SILC income data from administrative 
data, and it would be good if this mapping could 
be made available.
In a broader quality context, there are some im-
portant trade-offs to consider with administrative 
data as well. Following the economic crisis of the 
past years, timely indicators on inequality and 
poverty for policy monitoring are more important 
than ever before. In many countries, registers are 
in conflict with timeliness due to late availability of 
administrative data. The first trade-off may then be 
between timeliness and accuracy, and timeliness 
may have to be prioritised at the cost of accuracy. 
Second, with even more variation in the EU-SILC 
implementations, there is a trade-off between 
comparability and flexibility of implementation. 
The differences in survey versus register data do 
have implications for cross-country comparability; 
the selected respondent design prevents some 
analyses that require intra-household data, and 
likely variation in mode and context effects re-
mains a concern in output-harmonised surveys. For 
practical reasons, however, a de-centralised ex ante 
harmonised survey such as EU-SILC may have to 
accept a somewhat lower degree of comparability.
In terms of the substantial content of EU-SILC, ex-
tending register-based measurement of social 
benefits to as many countries as possible could be 
one important and practical objective. This would 
reduce substantially the length of ‘survey country’ 
questionnaires and would improve the quality and 
comparability of important EU-SILC variables and 
the associated indicators. Moreover, the discrepan-
cies in data sources and validity issues may be of 
much less concern for these income sources than, 
say, with self-employment income.
In the early 2000s, the EU-SILC legislation was 
written considering variation in data collection 
practices in Member States. The revision of the 
EU-SILC legislation is expected in the near future. 
The revised framework and the detailed guidelines 
should obviously not prevent the utilisation of reg-
isters. This warrants careful consideration of the 
target populations, data collection units, contents, 
modalities, reference times and so forth in such 
a way that they can be implemented in any mul-
ti-mode design at a decentralised level.
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29.1 Introduction
The current crisis has generated a number of chal-
lenges for official statistics and, in particular, for 
social statistics. Policy makers have turned to sta-
tistics to have the necessary toolbox to timely and 
reliably describe the current situation and patterns 
in order to take informed, timely and effective poli-
cy measures. In this context, there is increasing de-
mand from stakeholders for new developments in 
EU-SILC, as main data source for comparative analy-
ses and indicators on income and living conditions 
in the EU, so as to ensure the correct monitoring 
of the evolution of poverty and social exclusion 
phenomena.
In the meantime, resources available to statistical 
authorities are under pressure in several Member 
States and only coordinated efforts for achieving 
modern and cost effective solutions are viable 
ways forward. Modernisation of social statistics is 
indeed a key solution identified to meet the grow-
ing needs of users (see Section 29.3 below). The 
revision of EU-SILC is part of this process carried out 
by the European Statistical System.
EU-SILC is however a complex survey involving dif-
ferent challenging methodological problems. The 
contribution from researchers is therefore a vital el-
ement for making EU-SILC a scientifically sound, ef-
fective and high quality instrument. Hence, results of 
the methodological work on EU-SILC undertaken in 
the framework of the ‘Second Network for the Anal-
(235) Eurostat, Unit F4 (Income and living conditions; quality of 
life). Address for correspondence: ESTAT-SECRETARIAT-F4@
ec.europa.eu.
ysis of EU-SILC’ (Net-SILC2) are being implemented in 
the production process of EU-SILC data.
This chapter complements Chapter 2 in this book 
on the current EU-SILC survey by describing the 
planned developments of EU-SILC in the frame-
work of the modernisation of social statistics. In ad-
dition, it illustrates how recent Net-SILC2 research 
has contributed to the improvement of the EU-SILC 
process.
29.2 Policy context
Since the launch of the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
importance of EU-SILC has grown further: one of 
the five Europe 2020 headline targets is entirely 
based on EU-SILC data (the EU social inclusion tar-
get, which consists of lifting at least 20 million peo-
ple in the EU out of the risk of poverty and exclu-
sion by 2020; see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book). It 
has been planned to improve the measurement of 
the target in the context of the mid-term review of 
the Europe 2020 strategy, by revising the basket of 
material deprivation (MD) variables in EU-SILC. This 
basket is the basis for the calculation of the severe 
MD indicator, one of the three components of the 
indicator on poverty and social exclusion used for 
the EU social inclusion target (see Chapter 10 in this 
book).
The social consequences of the economic and fi-
nancial crisis have given increased importance to 
income and living conditions data. In particular, the 
lack of timely data on the extent of poverty and 
social exclusion has become a burning issue, espe-
cially for countries where the crisis has hit hardest. 
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In the conclusions of the December 2010 Employ-
ment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
Council (EPSCO), EU countries’ ministers for social 
affairs recognised the importance of this issue and 
invited ‘the Commission to support, in collabora-
tion with the Member States, the timely availability 
of valid indicators to monitor the social dimension 
of the Europe 2020 strategy’.
The ‘Social Investment Package’ (236), adopted in 
February 2013, urging countries to put more em-
phasis on social investment to achieve the EU so-
cial inclusion target, also increased the demand for 
timely and reliable data on the social situation in 
Europe.
Moreover, the ‘Beyond GDP’ debate has drawn at-
tention to the need to complement GDP measures 
with indicators that encompass environmental and 
social aspects of progress (237). In the social area, 
more data are needed on distributional aspects 
and household perspective.
Finally, the European Commission recently un-
derlined the need to consider social indicators at 
a par with macroeconomic indicators. There is also 
a need to integrate information on income, con-
sumption and wealth, and to link them with nation-
al accounts in order to support integrated analysis 
at the macroeconomic level. Therefore, the policy 
relevance of EU-SILC is likely to continue to grow in 
the future, increasing the need for further improve-
ments in the quality and timeliness of EU-SILC data.
29.3 Modernisation of 
social statistics
The legal context of EU-SILC is expected to change 
in the near future. In September 2011, the Euro-
pean Statistical System Committee adopted the 
Wiesbaden Memorandum on a ‘New conceptual 
(236) Communication from the Commission ‘Towards Social 
Investment for Growth and Cohesion — including 
implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020’, available 
at:
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:20
13:0083:FIN:EN:PDF.
(237) Communication from the Commission ‘GDP and beyond — 
Measuring progress in a changing world’, COM(2009) 433 of 
20.8.2009, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0433:FIN:EN:PDF. 
design for household and social statistics’ (238). This 
memorandum calls for progress towards an overall 
common architecture for European social statistics 
together with actions on sampling frames, admin-
istrative data sources, measurement of the quality 
of life and the living conditions of population sub-
groups, time use and household budgets. In line 
with these orientations, Eurostat has been working 
on the modernisation of social statistics. The main 
objectives are to increase responsiveness to users’ 
needs, quality and efficiency.
The programme includes actions towards better 
integration of data collections, with standardisation 
of variables and modules, wider use of administra-
tive data sources and improved statistical frames. 
It covers social microdata collections (collections 
based on samples), population statistics (including 
census) and administratively-based statistics and 
accounts. The ongoing revision of EU-SILC is part 
of this programme.
As far as the collection of microdata is concerned, it 
is planned that a Framework European Parliament 
and Council Regulation on ‘Integrated European 
Social Statistics’ will cover all surveys stipulating 
their common elements. Then, delegated and im-
plementing acts will set up more specific elements 
for one or more data collections.
29.4 Planned developments 
for EU‑SILC
29.4.1 Objectives of EU‑SILC 
revision
In view of the aforementioned growing data needs, 
the EU-SILC instrument needs to be improved in 
a number of areas:
• Data timeliness, in particular in the context 
of the crisis (when it is necessary to closely 
monitor the social situation and the impact of 
policies) and of the ‘European Semester’.
(238) Available at: https://www.destatis.de/EN/AboutUs/Events/
DGINS/Document_Memorandum.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
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• Early estimates of relevant social indicators, as is 
already the case for national accounts and price 
statistics.
• Regional data in the context of the monitoring 
of EU regional policy and after 2020 for the 
allocation of funds, on the basis of indicators 
derived from EU-SILC, as well as the regional 
dimension of the Europe 2020 strategy.
• Poverty and social exclusion dynamics 
(including transitions, persistence, etc.).
• Multidimensional aspects of living conditions, 
poverty and social exclusion. There are 
several requests that cannot any longer be 
accommodated in the current flexibility 
mechanism of the ad hoc modules. For 
example, the need for more information on 
children, on access to services, on vulnerability, 
on consumption and wealth, on the structure of 
the households, on quality of life and well-being 
issues, and on health. The need for more 
breakdowns of social benefits and transfers, 
social transfers in kind, etc. More generally, data 
needs will continue to evolve, and increased 
flexibility is required.
• Development of social indicators in the 
context of the EU macroeconomic assessment 
(for instance, in the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure where so far the 
‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ (AROPE) 
indicator used for the EU social inclusion target, 
and its components, are only included as 
auxiliary indicators) and more generally a better 
integration of social and macroeconomics data.
• Increased use of administrative data for EU-SILC 
income components and the often associated 
problems of delays. New data collection modes 
and sources will also be considered (web 
interviews, matching).
As a consequence, the objective of the planned 
EU-SILC revision is to re-design EU-SILC so as to:
• increase EU-SILC responsiveness to new policy 
needs, currently and for the future;
• deliver data faster and provide information 
useful for the production of early estimates;
• maintain the stability of the main indicators, 
with adapted frequency;
• keep a cross-cutting approach, allowing to 
jointly analyse different social phenomena;
• allow analysis at regional level with sufficient 
precision;
• ensure adequate accuracy and quality of 
measurements;
• adapt to multi-modes and multi-sources data 
collections;
• allow better integration of EU-SILC data, with 
data coming from other European Statistical 
System surveys;
• ensure consistency among the different 
elements of the instrument (e.g. frequency 
of non-annual modules and length of the 
longitudinal component).
All of this, while not increasing costs and respond-
ents’ burden.
29.4.2 Approach to EU‑SILC 
revision
This section presents the main directions retained 
for the revision of EU-SILC, which is based on a bal-
anced package of measures.
The content of EU-SILC will be further modularised 
and the periodicity of collection of the themat-
ic modules will be adapted with a view to bet-
ter meeting increased analytical and monitoring 
needs. Currently, EU-SILC collects every year about 
135 ‘non-technical’ variables from households and/
or registers plus about 20-25 in ad hoc thematic 
modules. In the revised EU-SILC, the objective is 
to reduce to around 115 the number of variables 
collected each year. These core variables (the 
EU-SILC ‘nucleus’) would cover income, key labour 
information and MD — as part of the Europe 2020 
framework — as well as key variables on health, 
childcare, education, housing costs and quality of 
life. The space left empty by the removal of the 
40-45 other variables will be used for fixed rotat-
ing modules with a periodicity of either 3 years (for 
the variables dealing with labour, health, children 
and housing) or 6 years (for the other variables: 
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social participation, quality of life, access to servic-
es, wealth, debt, consumption, intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantages and possibly past 
experience of homelessness). Each module will 
contain about 20-25 variables. Some of the 6-year 
modules will be dedicated to new policy needs 
and will be changing. In the first wave, respondents 
will also be asked about ‘stable variables’ (e.g. coun-
try of birth and education of parents, in the context 
of migration and intergenerational transmission). 
(see Table 29.1.)
Timeliness has become a crucial issue. To improve 
timeliness, it is planned: a) to issue all EU-SILC data 
much more quickly than is currently the case (in 
June of year N+1 instead of December of year N+1 
(with N being the survey year), i.e. 6 months ear-
lier); b) to make available MD items (and all other 
available non-income data, if possible) at the end 
of the survey year N or at the very beginning of year 
N+1; c) to introduce elements in the data collection 
that would be useful to estimate the evolutions of 
income distribution; and d) to maximise the possi-
bilities of micro-simulation (see Section 29.4.3) for 
early estimates. In relation to the latter and also to 
respond to increased policy needs, the ultimate 
target is to issue all EU-SILC data (including income 
information) by the end of year N or very beginning 
of year N+1.
Users are more and more interested in analysing 
trajectories into and out of poverty and social exclu-
sion. Consequently, it is planned to extend the ro-
tational panel from 4 to 6 years, so as to have better 
estimates of longer phenomena (the persistent risk 
of poverty indicator will then be based on a sam-
ple size double than what is currently feasible) and 
more appropriate data to study transitions and re-
currences of poverty and social exclusion. Howev-
er, some further analysis and tests are still needed 
before this extension can possibly be implement-
ed. The proposed rotational scheme is shown in 
Figure 29.1.
The regional dimension of EU-SILC is becoming in-
creasingly important. To allow for more regional 
breakdowns, on a country-based approach, a com-
bination of several solutions will be used by Mem-
ber States, including re-design of the sample, mod-
elling and calibration, and in some cases, increased 
sample size.
The possibilities of linking and matching data with 
other data collections or estimates will be im-
proved. For instance: harmonisation of variables 
including a household grid, additional information 
Table 29.1: Structure of the contents of the revised EU‑SILC
Nucleus (variables asked 
every year)
(Europe 2020, main 
indicators)
YEAR Every 3‑year modulesMax. 20 var. each
Every 6‑year modules
Max. 20 var. each
Income
(Revised) material 
deprivation
Economic activity
Demography
Education
Childcare
Housing costs
Health
Quality of life
Variables only collected 
in the first wave
Miscellaneous
1 Children Quality of life, social and cultural participation
2 Health New policy needs 1
3 Labour and housing conditions Over–indebtedness, wealth, consumption
4 Children New policy needs 2
5 Health Access to services, social transfers in kind
6 Labour and housing conditions
Intergenerational and homelessness?
New policy needs 3
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for a better estimation of social transfers in kind, 
short modules on wealth and (if feasible) on con-
sumption. The collection of a limited number of 
variables on consumption and wealth highly cor-
related with total consumption and wealth would 
allow for a better understanding of the links be-
tween income, consumption and wealth. Further 
needs for integration and reconciliation of social 
and macroeconomics data and indicators will also 
be taken into account.
Accuracy requirements will be expressed in a way 
that facilitates compliance assessment based on 
the standard error to be achieved. The aim is to 
achieve a precision of +/- 1 percentage point (pp) 
for the largest Member States and +/-1.5 pp. for 
the smallest ones for the main indicators (in par-
ticular for the AROPE indicator) at national level, 
and between +/- 2.5 and +/- 4 pp. at regional level 
(for a 95 % confidence interval). An accuracy re-
quirement will also be placed on the longitudinal 
component.
An integrated approach to the use of registers and 
multi‑mode data collection will be promoted, for 
instance by allowing whenever possible, interview 
time compatible with Computer Assisted Tele-
phone Interview (CATI), when income is available in 
registers, and/or Computer Assisted Web Interview 
(CAWI). This integrated approach should take into 
account the possible comparability issues related 
to registers and multi-mode data collection as well 
as timeliness issues related to the use of registers 
(see also Chapter 28 in this book).
Other elements such as the Quality reports (see 
Chapter 2 in this book), the tracing rules (Chapter 
27), the metadata on sources of data, etc. will also 
be improved. Best practices will be promoted.
Finally, EU-SILC data and macroeconomic data will 
be better integrated. The exact elements need-
ed from EU-SILC for this purpose still need to be 
identified.
29.4.3 Use of results from research
The research community uses EU-SILC extensively. 
The Users’ Database (UDB) is available to research-
ers and allows focused analyses and developments 
that are useful to the continuous improvement 
of the EU-SILC instrument. In particular, a lot of 
EU-SILC methodological work was undertaken in 
the framework of Net-SILC2. Some of the findings 
of this research are already applied, in the process 
of being applied, or under consideration for future 
developments in the EU-SILC production process. 
Three examples are shortly described below. More 
Figure 29.1: 6‑year rotational model
Time
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel 1 Wave 6
Panel 2 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel 4 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel 6 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel 7 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Panel 8 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Panel 9 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Panel 10 Wave 1 Wave 2
Panel 11 Wave 1
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details are given in the chapters of this volume that 
are specifically dedicated to these issues: a) stand-
ard error estimation of EU-SILC based indicators 
(see Chapter 26); b) improved measurement of MD 
(see Chapters 10 and 11); and c) micro-simulation 
and early estimates (see Chapter 19).
a) Standard error estimation of EU‑SILC based 
indicators
Given the high policy relevance of EU-SILC, there is 
increasing demand from stakeholders for accuracy 
measures of the published indicators. As EU-SILC is 
a complex instrument involving different sampling 
designs in different countries, standard methods 
for calculating accuracy measures cannot be di-
rectly applied. Eurostat, building on the research 
performed by Net-SILC2 has put in place a rela-
tively simple method for standard error estimation 
based on linearisation and the ultimate cluster ap-
proach, as presented in Chapter 26 of this volume. 
In the context of the revision of EU-SILC, and more 
generally the EU Framework Regulation on ‘Inte-
grated European Social Statistics’ for all social mi-
crodata survey collections, accuracy requirements 
will be based on the standard error (see above for 
the accuracy requirements to be achieved). It is 
planned to use the calculation method explained 
in Chapter 26 to assess Member States’ compliance 
to these accuracy requirements.
b) Improved measurement of material deprivation
AROPE is used in the context of the Europe 2020 
strategy for monitoring progress towards the 
achievement of the EU social inclusion target (see 
Chapters 1 and 3 of this volume). One of the three 
sub-indicators used in the AROPE indicator is the 
share of the population living in a household that 
is severely materially deprived.
Net-SILC2 carried out in-depth analyses of 50 MD 
items available in the 2009 Wave of EU-SILC (this 
wave included a detailed ad hoc module dedicat-
ed to this subject). The Net-SILC2 study analysed 
the dimensional structure of the whole set of 50 
items as well as their suitability, validity, reliability 
and additivity. The aggregation of MD items was 
also analysed in depth and robust indicators for 
the whole population and for children were pro-
posed (see Chapters 10 and 11 of this volume (239)). 
On this basis, Member States and Eurostat agreed 
on a list of seven new MD variables for the whole 
population (to be used together with six of the 
nine EU-SILC MD variables included in the current 
indicator of severe MD) and 13 MD variables for 
children (to be used with five household items) 
for child-specific measures of MD. In order to test 
further their robustness and their behaviour over 
time, the proposed new variables were collect-
ed again in the 2013 Wave of EU-SILC on a volun-
tary basis (the variables for the whole population 
were collected in all but 3 Member States and the 
child-specific variables were collected in only a few 
countries) and in the 2014 Wave on a regulatory ba-
sis (variables for the whole population and for chil-
dren). In 2015, variables for the whole population 
only were again collected. Based on the analysis 
of these variables and suggestions for alternative 
indicators for the whole population and for chil-
dren, the EU Social Protection Committee and its 
Indicators Sub-Group will consider the adoption of 
improved indicators for MD. As from 2016, EU-SILC 
will collect the new items for the whole population 
routinely every year (‘nucleus’ variables). Children 
items will be collected in one of the every-3-year 
modules of the revised EU-SILC (see Table 29.1).
c) Micro‑simulation and early estimates
As explained above, in order to improve the time-
liness of EU social indicators, model-based esti-
mations provide a solution to answer the policy 
demand for ‘nearly real time’ information on pov-
erty and social exclusion and on the evolution of 
income distribution. For example, estimating by 
means of now-casting or forecasting methods 
some key indicators such as the Europe 2020 head-
line indicators or other indicators makes it possi-
ble to have social indicators available at a similar 
time as economic indicators for recent reference 
periods. This is particularly true for income-based 
indicators as at the time of the collection of the 
EU-SILC data in year N, the latest full year over 
which income data are available is year N‑1. Except 
in two countries, a full year is indeed needed for 
(239) See also: Guio, A.-C., Gordon, D. and Marlier, E. (2012), Measuring 
material deprivation in the EU: Indicators for the whole population 
and child‑specific indicators, Eurostat methodologies and 
working papers, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
29Planned future developments of EU-SILC
Monitoring Social Inclusion in Europe  515
a full coverage of household income due to, e.g., 
non-regular earnings or benefits as well as self-em-
ployed income (240). Hence, when EU-SILC data be-
come available in year N+1, only income of year N‑1 
is available, while for non-income related condi-
tions data concerning year N are available. Howev-
er, early estimates need to be developed together 
with the measures aimed at improving significantly 
the EU-SILC data timeliness; it is indeed essential 
to reduce the time lag between the release of es-
timates and that of the final figures, as the former 
cannot replace the latter for a full and final analysis.
One promising avenue in this field is micro-simula-
tion, a methodological approach that is becoming 
increasingly used at national and EU levels to build 
policy scenarios. Micro-simulation can draw to-
gether information from microdata, policy chang-
es and external information (e.g. on labour market 
evolutions) in order to forecast at micro-level (each 
individual or household) the evolution of certain 
indicators. In the case of EU-SILC, micro-simulation 
models allow to take into account changes in tax 
and benefit policy, employment changes and de-
mographic changes and to project them to a pe-
riod of time posterior to the survey reference year, 
filling in this way the temporal gap between the in-
come reference period and the release of the data.
In the framework of Net-SILC2, the possibility of 
using EUROMOD to evaluate the effects of policy 
and other changes on the prospects for meeting 
the EU social inclusion target was explored (see 
Chapter 19 of this volume). In particular, the use 
of EUROMOD for now-casting EU-SILC based indi-
cators was tested. EUROMOD is based on EU-SILC 
data and the EU-SILC instrument is being adapted 
to better respond to the information needed for 
the EUROMOD model; other information collect-
ed in EU social surveys could possibly also be im-
proved for this purpose. The EUROMOD tests and 
the EU-SILC improvements will be highly valuable 
in the context of the analysis of the feasibility to use 
micro-simulation for computing and releasing ear-
ly estimates of EU-SILC based indicators to satisfy 
the increasing policy demands.
(240) The two exceptions are the United Kingdom and Ireland (see 
Chapter 2 of present volume).
29.4.4 Implementation
The main re-design of EU-SILC (in particular its con-
tent) requires a new EU legal act. Therefore, for the 
content and the panel length of EU-SILC, chang-
es might be introduced in the context of the EU 
Framework Regulation on ‘Integrated European 
Social Statistics’ which might be adopted by the 
European Parliament and the EU Council of Minis-
ters around 2018.
However, progress on timeliness and regionalisa-
tion will be gradual, with national action plans over 
the next years starting in the context of the current 
EU-SILC. In the first months of 2015, for the refer-
ence year 2014, early MD data were received for 17 
Member States and one EFTA country. These data 
were published in a Eurostat Statistics Explained 
article on ‘Material deprivation statistics — early 
results’ in April 2015 (however, one should keep in 
mind that, in some cases, there may be discrepan-
cies between provisional and final data). This fol-
lowed a first exercise carried out in 2014 with data 
from the 2013 Wave.
Several countries are progressively implementing 
the June N+1 deadline over the period 2014 to 2016 
for EU-SILC data transmission. Ten countries were 
already able to transmit the 2014 cross-sectional 
data before the end of June 2015 (against seven 
Member States in 2014 for the 2013 data). As indi-
cated above, this is only an interim target; the final 
target is that countries should deliver their data 
even earlier.
The EU-SILC Quality reports have been improved 
and are now sent via an IT application (metada-
ta handler), which should contribute to further 
standardising quality reporting. Reflections are 
also ongoing on how to better describe the rela-
tions between income, consumption and wealth 
and on how to better reconcile EU-SILC microda-
ta with macroeconomic aggregates from national 
accounts.
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29.5 Conclusions
Expectations on high quality and timely data to 
monitor and analyse the social situation across 
Europe have increased among policy-makers and 
other users, inter alia as a consequence of the eco-
nomic crisis. EU-SILC is the main data source for 
comparative analysis and indicators on income 
and living conditions in the EU and is therefore 
particularly solicited for answering these growing 
demands.
An important objective of the revision of EU-SILC, 
which takes place in the broader context of the 
modernisation of social statistics, is to respond to 
these needs. Another important objective is to im-
prove EU-SILC, while securing modern and viable 
foundations in the governance of the instrument 
in the European Statistical System. The full imple-
mentation of the revised EU-SILC will be achieved 
by the end of the decade as it requires long and 
difficult processes both at legal and technical level. 
However, both Eurostat and the national statistical 
institutes in the EU Member States and neighbour-
ing countries have already started implementing 
a number of changes in the current EU-SILC; in 
particular, in the fields of timeliness and regional-
isation. Further integration with other sources of 
data relevant for the analysis of the social situation 
will also be explored, especially in the domains of 
national and sectorial accounts.
In view of the complexity of EU-SILC, it is essen-
tial to ensure that researchers actively participate 
in its revision and, more generally, in its improve-
ment. In this chapter, and in a number of other 
chapters in this volume, a number of examples of 
concrete contributions from Net-SILC2 have shown 
the unique added value of such collaboration be-
tween the European Statistical System and the re-
search community.
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Appendix 1 List of Net‑SILC2 members
The second Network for the Analysis of EU‑SILC 
(Net-SILC2) brought together expertise from 
European Statistical System (ESS) bodies as well 
as from universities and research centres. It was 
coordinated by the Luxembourg Institute of 
Socio-Economic Research (LISER) and consisted of 
the following partners:
a) LISER: Francesco Andreoli, Michela Bia, Alessio 
Fusco, Anne-Catherine Guio, Eric Marlier 
(Net-SILC2 Project Director), Anne Reinstadler 
and Philippe Van Kerm
Associated contributors: Luna Bellani (University of 
Konstanz, Germany) and Jean‑Claude Ray (University 
of Nancy, France)
b) Six National Statistical Institutes:
• Statistics Austria: Thomas Glaser, Elisabeth 
Kafka, Nadja Lamei, Lars Lyberg and 
Matthias Till
• Statistics Finland: Veli-Matti Törmälehto 
and Hannele Sauli
• Statistics France (INSEE): Sophie Ponthieux
• Statistics Luxembourg (STATEC): Guillaume 
Osier
• Statistics Norway: Rolf Aaberge, Audun 
Langørgen, Petter Lindgren and Henrik 
Sigstad
• Statistics UK (ONS): Paola Serafino and 
Richard Tonkin
c) Non-ESS (academic/ research) experts (241):
• Freie Universität Berlin (Germany): Ulrich 
Rendtel
• Institute for Social and Economic Research 
of the University of Essex (UK): Maria 
Iacovou, Chrysa Leventi, Peter Lynn, 
Jekaterina Navicke, Olga Rastrigina and Holly 
Sutherland
• London School of Economics and Political 
Science (UK): Stephen Jenkins
• Luxembourg Income Study, Luxembourg: 
Guillaume Osier
• Nuffield College (UK): Anthony B. Atkinson 
(also London School of Economics and 
Political Science)
• Oxford Poverty and Human Poverty 
Initiative, Oxford University (UK): Sabina 
Alkire and Mauricio Apablaza
• University of Antwerp (Belgium): 
Vincent Corluy, Tim Goedemé and 
Frank Vandenbroucke (also University of 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
• University of Bristol (UK): Eldin Fahmy, 
Viliami Fifita, David Gordon, Shailen Nandy 
and Marco Pomati
(241) Affiliations mentioned here are those at the moment when the 
Net-SILC2 grant was received. In the meantime, some Net-SILC2 
members have moved to another research body. For the 
affiliation at the moment of the publication of this book, please 
see first footnote at the beginning of each chapter.
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• University of Southampton (UK): Yves 
Berger
• Stockholm University (Sweden): Lars 
Lyberg
• Swedish Institute for Social Research, 
Stockholm University (Sweden): Markus 
Jäntti
d) Bank of Italy: Andrea Brandolini, Alfonso 
Rosolia and Eliana Viviano
EU‑15 Member States (‘old’ Member States) ‘New’ Member States
BE Belgium May 2004 Enlargement
DK Denmark CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany EE Estonia
IE Ireland CY Cyprus
EL Greece LV Latvia
ES Spain LT Lithuania
FR France HU Hungary
IT Italy MT Malta
LU Luxembourg PL Poland
NL Netherlands SI Slovenia
AT Austria SK Slovakia
PT Portugal
FI Finland January 2007 Enlargement
SE Sweden BG Bulgaria
UK United Kingdom RO Romania
July 2013 Enlargement
HR Croatia
Other (non‑EU) EU‑SILC countries covered in some chapters
IS Iceland
NO Norway
CH Switzerland
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AF Alkire and Foster 
AROP At risk of poverty
AROPE At risk of poverty or social exclusion
CATI Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews 
CAWI Computer Assisted Web Interviews
CH‑MD Child-specific material deprivation
CIRCABC Communication and Information Resource Centre for Administrations, Businesses and Citizens
CLT Central Limit Theorem 
CTT Classical Test Theory 
EA Euro Area 
EC European Commission
ECB European Central Bank
ECEC Early childhood education and care
ECHP European Community Household Panel
ECOFIN EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers
EOp Equality of opportunity 
EPSCO EU Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council of Ministers
ER Standard employment rate
EU European Union
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Union
EU‑SILC EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
FGT Foster Greer Thorbecke index 
FISIM Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GHDI Gross household disposable income 
GP General practitioner 
HBS Household Budget Survey
HH or HHD Household
HFC Household final consumption
HFCN Household Finance and Consumption Network 
HFCS Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
HWER Household work-intensity-adjusted employment rate
ICC Item Characteristic Curve 
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IOp Inequality of opportunity
IR Imputed rent
IRT Item Response Theory 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
JAF Joint Assessment Framework
JHR Jobless household rate
LFS Labour Force Survey 
LISER Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
MD Material deprivation
MEGE Monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings 
MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index 
n.a. Not available
NA National accounts
NA scale Needs-adjusted scale
Net‑SILC Network for the analysis of EU-SILC
NPISH Non-Profit Institutions serving households 
NSI National statistical institute
OECD The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS Ordinary least square
PAPI Paper and pencil interview
pp Percentage point
PPP Purchasing Power Parities 
PPS Purchasing Power Standard 
PSU Primary Sample Unit 
QJ (Quasi-)jobless
QJ‑ness (Quasi-)joblessness
QTE Quantile Treatment Effects 
RCM Rubin’s Causal Model
S14 Household sector (in the national accounts)
S15 Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households (in the national accounts)
s.d. Standard deviation
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SMD Severe material deprivation
SNA scale Simplified needs-adjusted scale
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SR Selected respondent 
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STIK Social transfers in kind
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UN United Nations
US United States
WER Weighted employment rate
WTID World Top Incomes Database
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339-340, 340n155, 342f18.4, 356, 356n164, 358t19.1, 
361, 408-409f22.2bc, 431t23.2, 432, 433t23.3, 435, 
452-453, 465n219, 486t27.4, 488t27.5
  see also intra-household sharing of resources
George Washington University, 225n114
GHDI (Gross Household Disposable Income), 69, 74, 
78-79, 81n44
  adjusted GHDI, 68, 70f3.1, 70f3.2, 71f3.3, 74, 76-77
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indicator; registers
  household employment/ joblessness, see em-
ployment > household employment
  household expenditure/ consumption, 36, 38, 
42-43, 79, 82, 104, 137f6.8, 137-138, 144-145, 147, 
163, 166, 168, 181, 243, 254f13.10, 255f13.11, 256, 
319, 320f17.1
  household income, 35, 38, 41-42, 45, 47, 54-
55, 54n20, 65-66, 66n33 and 34, 67-68, 68n40, 
74t3.1, 78, 82, 87, 89-91, 94, 94f4.1, 96-97, 96n49, 
99f4.3, 104, 123, 125, 129-132, 130f6.5, 131t6.1, 
138-139, 143-144, 146-147, 161-162, 175-177, 
175n91, 179t9.1, 180t9.2, 181-184, 185f9.2, 188, 
213, 217, 230, 241-242, 253, 256, 299, 354, 356-
358, 385, 403,403n180, 407, 446, 451-452, 466
  see also income > disposable income
  household splits, see longitudinal component/ 
measure > household splits
  household statistics, 41, 60, 65
  imputed rent in, see imputed rent (IR)
  intra-household sharing, see intra-household 
sharing/ distribution/ allocation of resources
  variations in poverty by, 34, 38, 65, 94-100, 
96n48, 99f4.3, 104, 108, 229-230
household budget survey (HBS), 42, 46, 242-243, 
247f13.3, 247f13.4, 250-252, 254-255, 258t13.1, 390
  see also household > household expenditure/ 
consumption
household composition/ type/ structure, 34, 37-38, 
39, 66n34, 68, 72, 75, 82, 89‑102, 147, 159-160, 162n80, 
163, 165-167, 166n86, 168-169, 173, 179t9.1, 181, 204-
206, 217-218, 253, 280, 283, 286, 301-306, 308, 311, 
333‑351, 360, 407, 409f22.2d, 424, 428, 433, 463
  see also AROPE; child(ren); household; Non-Prof-
it Institutions Serving Households (NPISH)
  couples, 36, 38, 92t4.2, 93t4.3, 99f4.3, 169, 
175-176, 179, 179t9.1, 180t9.2, 180-181, 253, 
301, 336t18.2, 337, 337t18.3, 338, 338f18.1, 339, 
339f18.2, 340, 343, 345, 348-349, 349f18.10
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  couples no children household, 95-96, 98, 178, 
303t6.1, 409f22.2d, 430f23.9
  couples with children household, 89, 92t4.2, 
93t4.3, 94-96, 97, 99f4.3, 99-100, 163, 178, 
219f11.5, 301-302, 303t6.1, 336t18.2, 337t18.3, 
338f18.1, 339f18.2, 344f18.5, 345-346, 348-349, 
349f18.10, 350, 409f22.2d, 428, 430f23.9
  extended family household, 34, 89, 92t4.2, 
93t4.3, 97, 99f4.3, 100, 336, 336t18.2, 337t18.3, 
338f18.1, 339f18.2, 346f18.7, 349f18.10
  distribution of household types by regional 
cluster, 93t4.3, 94-100, 336, 337t18.3
  multi-person household, 36, 175-176, 301
  non-private households, 56, 70, 68, 75, 412n183
  one-person household, 72, 205t10.2
  ‘other’ types of household (including lodgers, 
sharers), 92t4.2, 93t4.3, 99f4.3, 336t18.2, 337t18.3, 
338f18.1, 339f18.2, 346f18.7, 349f18.10
  ‘patchwork’ family household, 175
  same sex couple household, 178, 206
  single adult with children/ lone parent house-
hold, 34, 38, 89, 92t4.2, 93t4.3, 94-967, 97f4.2, 98, 
99f4.3, 99-100, 163, 169, 205, 205t10.2, 205t10.2, 
206, 219f11.5, 253, 301-302, 303t6.1, 336t18.2, 337, 
337t18.3, 338, 338f18.1, 339f18.2, 343, 344f18.5, 
345f18.6, 346f18.7, 348f18.9, 349f18.10, 350, 
381f20.10, 382, 409f22.2d, 428, 430f23.9
  single-adult household, 34, 89, 92t4.2, 93t4.3, 98, 
99f4.3, 166n86, 169, 301, 303t6.1, 336t18.2, 337, 
337t18.3, 338f18.1, 339, 339f18.2, 340, 341f18.3, 
342f18.4, 345-346, 349, 349f18.10, 381f20.10, 382, 
409f22.2d, 430f23.9
  students under 25 with no working age mem-
ber household, 337
household (social) surveys, 33, 35-36, 40-42, 46, 51, 
55-56, 58, 60, 66, 82, 91, 123‑131, 209-210, 213, 390, 
401-417, 463, 479-497, 499-508, 574-585, 583t27.5, 
584t27.6, 585
  see also British Household Panel Survey; com-
puter assisted personal interview (CAPI); com-
puter assisted telephone interview (CATI); 
computer assisted web interview (CAWI); Euro-
pean Community Household Panel (ECHP); EU 
Labour Force Survey (LFS); EU-SILC; household 
budget survey (HBS); panel; paper and pen(cil) 
interview (PAPI); registers; self-administrated 
paper questionnaire
housing, 34-35, 53-54, 77, 130, 141-147, 156, 160, 182, 
214t11.1, 226, 228-229, 231t12.1, 251-252, 385n173, 
511, 512t29.1
  see also imputed rent (IR); social housing
I
ICCs, see Item Characteristic Curves (ICCs)
ILO, see International Labour Office (ILO)
imputed rent (IR), 35, 55, 55n21, 77, 141‑157, 167, 
168n89
  see also housing
income
  see also affluence (richness); earnings; imputed 
rent (IR); inequality and its indicators; poverty; 
World Top Incomes Database (WTID)
  capital gains, 54, 124, 124n60, 126-127, 130, 134, 
167, 181, 506
  disposable (net) income, 35, 41, 45, 47, 54, 65, 
66n34, 68, 68n40, 74t3.1, 77-78, 82, 104, 123, 
128, 130f6.5, 131, 133f6.6, 135t6.2, 141, 143-144, 
146f7.2, 147-149, 154, 156, 159-162, 165, 167-172, 
178, 180-183, 213, 230, 231t12.1, 333, 354, 356-
358, 360, 390, 407, 451-454, 456, 459, 469
  distribution of income, 33-35, 37-38, 45, 51, 60, 
63, 65-66, 90, 103-104, 117, 121, 123-124, 127-
134, 138, 143, 145, 148-149, 159-163, 165-166, 
168, 169t8.3, 176-177, 182f9.1, 183-184, 185f9.2, 
187n103, 309, 309f16.7, 312, 317‑332, 353-355, 
360, 415, 451, 451n207, 457, 458f25.2, 459, 503, 
506, 512, 514
  equivalence scales, 66n34, 72, 90-91, 100, 123, 
159-162, 165-168, 171-173, 175n91, 181, 184, 403, 
504f28.1
  equivalent/ equivalised income, 35n3, 36-37, 45, 
66n34, 67n36, 68, 72-73, 82, 85f3.13ab, 86f3.14, 
91, 94f4.1, 96n49, 97f4.2, 99f4.3, 104, 123, 128, 
130f6.6, 131, 131t6.1, 133f6.6, 135t6.2, 136f6.7, 
146f7.2, 148t7.1, 160-162, 167t8.2, 168, 175‑189, 
205t10.2, 213, 230, 231t12.1, 243, 271, 309f16.7, 
318, 322-323, 324f17.3, 331, 333, 356-357, 403, 407, 
451-459, 469, 488, 502
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  household income, see household > house-
hold income
  in top 5%, 124-129, 131, 134-135, 138
  income poverty, 33-36, 38-39, 42, 44, 45, 65‑
87, 89‑102, 103‑122, 132, 149, 171, 217m113, 
218f11.3, 227, 243f13.1, 244t13.1, 245-246f13.2, 
247f13.3, 247f13.4, 248f13.5, 249f13.6, 250f13.7, 
251f13.8, 252f13.9, 253, 256, 333-351, 419-434, 
495, 503
  see also AROP
  income poverty gap, 67, 67n36, 107t5.1, 233-235, 
237
  income quintile share ratio (S80/S20), 35, 35f3, 
47, 104
  income reference period (definition), 55
  income(-related) inequality, see inequality and 
its indicators
  mean per capita income, 45, 68, 72-74, 76f3.6 
and 3.7, 77f3.8, 82-84
  non-cash income, 54, 160n78, 167-168
  non-income data, 35, 40, 123, 132, 139, 249f13.6, 
250f13.7, 251f13.8, 252f13.9, 385n173, 512, 516
  property income, 41, 54, 74t3.1, 77, 78t3.2, 123, 
126-127, 130, 138, 182
  redistribution, 91, 132, 134, 136t6.3, 446n203
  rental income, see imputed rent (IR)
  self-employment income, 41, 54, 77, 126, 167, 
256, 263, 265, 319, 321, 356, 455, 500, 503, 506-
507, 515
indicators, see affluence (richness); AROP; AROPE; 
child(ren); EU social indicators (EU portfolio of so-
cial indicators); Social Protection Committee (SPC); 
FGT (Foster–Greer–Thorbecke) index; GHDI (Gross 
Household Disposable Income); Gini coefficient; 
Gini opportunity index; income; inequality and its 
indicators; longitudinal component/ measure; ma-
terial deprivation (MD); multidimensional poverty 
> Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI); persistent 
poverty (risk) rate; (quasi-)joblessness (QJ/ QJ-ness) 
and its indicator; SPC indicators Sub-Group 
(SPC-ISG/ ISG); Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs); World Development Indicators (of the 
World Bank)
Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Com-
mittee, see SPC Indicators Sub-Group (SPC-ISG/ ISG)
inequality and its indicators, 35-36, 35n3 and 4, 39, 
44-45, 47-48, 66, 68, 72, 103-104, 106, 127, 133-134, 
138, 141, 147-149, 148n75, 156, 159-160, 162, 164, 167-
168, 171-173, 175-178, 186-188, 210, 264, 322-323, 
353-354, 436-439, 503-505, 503n234, 507
  see also affluence (richness); child(ren); cumu-
lation; dominance; gender (female, male, sex, 
women); income; public services
  inequality of opportunity (IOp), 39, 435‑448
   see also AROP; AROPE; Gini coefficient; Gini 
opportunity index; Great Recession/ 2008 
crisis/ crisis
  inequality within household, see intra-house-
hold sharing
INET, see Institute for New Economic Thinking 
(INET)
in-cash benefits, see social transfers > social trans-
fers in cash
in-kind benefits, see social transfers > social trans-
fers in kind
INSEE, see Statistics France (INSEE)
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET), 33n1, 
65n29, 103n51
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), 
353n157, 401n176, 479n221
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 401n176
Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage/ 
poverty module, 39, 436n195, 440-441, 452
Integrated European Social Statistics, 510, 515
intensity of income poverty, see income > income 
poverty gap
International Labour Office/ Organization (ILO), 36, 
261-262, 266, 280, 281n134, 292, 296
International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED), 228-289
intra-household sharing/ distribution/ allocation 
of resources, 35-36, 53, 175‑189, 211, 229, 229n120, 
333, 507
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  see also child(ren); gender (female, male, sex, 
women); inequality and its indicators
IRT, see Item Response Theory (IRT)
ISCED, see International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED)
ISER, see Institute for Social and Economic Research 
(ISER)
ISG, see SPC Indicators Sub-Group (SPC-ISG/ ISG)
ISTAT, see Statistics Italy (ISTAT)
Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT), see Statistics Italy 
(ISTAT)
Item Characteristic Curves (ICCs), 396-397
Item Response Theory (IRT)/ Model, 38, 194, 212-
214, 386, 395, 397
IZA, see Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
J
Jackknife re-sampling method, 466
JAF, see Joint Assessment framework (JAF)
joblessness, see employment; (quasi-)joblessness 
(QJ/ QJ-ness) and its indicator
Joint Assessment framework (JAF), 60
L
Labour Force Survey (LFS), see EU Labour Force Sur-
vey (LFS)
labour market, see employment
Latent Trait Analysis, see Item Response Theory (IRT)
legal basis of EU-SILC, see EU-SILC > EU-SILC legal 
basis
LFS, see EU Labour Force Survey (LFS)
LIS, see Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
Lisbon agenda/ strategy, 37, 43, 261, 279, 289, 296
LISER, see Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic 
Research (LISER (formerly CEPS/INSTEAD))
London School of Economics (LSE), 33n1, 65n29, 
103n51, 401n176, 519-520a1
long-term care, see public services > long-term care
longitudinal component/ measure, 34, 38-40, 42-44, 
52, 52n10, 55-58, 61, 90, 207, 207n109, 306-307, 371- 
372, 374-376, 378, 380, 385‑399, 401‑417, 428b23.1, 
452, 465, 467, 469, 471, 477, 479‑497, 501, 503, 511, 513
  see also attrition; EU-SILC ‘following’ rules/ ‘trac-
ing’ rules; household surveys; material depriva-
tion (MD); non-response; panel; panel length/ 
rotational panel/ re-interviewing rate; registers; 
sample
 household splits, 35, 404, 416, 481-497, 501
Lorenz curve, 104, 106, 134, 168, 283
Lorenz dominance, 104, 106
low income, see AROP
LSE, see London School of Economics (LSE)
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), 465n218, 
519-520a1
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research 
(LISER (formerly CEPS/INSTEAD)), 33n1, 65n29, 
193n104, 209n110, 367n168, 385n172, 401n176, 
435n191, 449n204, 499n233, 519-520a1
Luxembourg Jobs Summit, 43, 261
Luxembourg National Statistical Institute (STATEC), 
see Statistics Luxembourg (STATEC)
M
macroeconomic approach/ evaluation/ statistics, 
38, 40-41, 65-66, 68, 319, 321f17.2, 352, 355, 361, 510-
511, 513, 515
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, 511
macro-level statistics, 38, 355-356, 361
macro-micro modelling, 355
material deprivation (MD), 33, 36, 42-44, 53, 154, 171-
173, 193‑207, 209‑224, 226-227, 230, 233-237, 241‑
258, 299-301, 350, 367‑38, 385‑399, 421, 494-495, 
509, 511, 512t29.1, 514
  see also affluence (richness); AROP; AROPE; 
child(ren); deprivation sequences; employ-
ment; Europe 2020 social inclusion target/ goal; 
Great Recession/ 2008 crisis/ crisis; Item Char-
acteristic Curves (ICCs); Item Response Theory 
(IRT); (quasi-)joblessness (QJ/ QJ-ness) and its 
indicator; standard error
  child-specific material deprivation (CH-MD) 
and its indicator/ items, 36, 43, 194, 209‑224, 
449-450, 514, 514n239
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  criteria for material deprivation indicator, 193-
195, 200f10.6
   see also additivity test; reliability tests; suit-
ability tests; validity tests
  curtailment of material deprivation, 38, 385-387, 
389-390, 395, 397
  definition of (standard/ severe) material depri-
vation, 33n2, 43, 171, 196, 333-334, 197, 225, 395-
396, 433, 439, 456
  dynamics (evolution) of material deprivation, 
36-37, 44, 367‑383, 385‑399
  longitudinal variables of, 43, 53, 194n198, 203-
206, 211-212, 509, 511, 514
  material deprivation data, 60, 191, 210-213, 217, 
242-258, 515
  material deprivation as a component of AROPE, 
44, 154, 200, 333-351, 469, 514
  material deprivation threshold, 43, 194, 196, 203, 
215, 217, 220, 226, 367
  multidimensional approach and, 33, 225-231, 
233-234, 237
  persistent material deprivation and its indicator, 
38, 42, 371-378, 382-38
  robustness of material deprivation measure, 43, 
207, 223, 367, 514
  (severe) material deprivation and its indicator, 
33n2, 38, 43, 154, 171, 193‑207, 213, 215, 226, 
228-230, 231t12.1, 257, 299-300, 308, 308f16.6, 
310-314, 333‑351, 367‑383, 386, 396-397, 469-
471, 474t26.3c, 509, 514
  standard error estimation for, see standard error
  (standard) material deprivation and its indica-
tor, 43, 171, 193-194, 196-198, 201-206, 367‑383
Matthew effect, 283
MD, see material deprivation (MD)
MDGs, see Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
mean excess function (mean residual life function), 
134
MEGE (real monthly full-time equivalent gross earn-
ings), see wages/ wage distribution
micro-data(set)/ micro-statistics, 34, 38, 41-42, 51, 
53, 55, 60, 66, 69, 90, 124, 127, 130, 160, 182, 142n126, 
280, 331, 335, 353, 353n157, 357, 500, 506, 509, 515
microeconomic approach/ statistics/ theory, 41, 66, 
331, 359, 390, 510, 515
microsimulation, 5, 38, 177, 353-355, 357, 360-361, 
512, 514-515
migration/ emigration, 46, 317, 360, 412n183, 440, 
455, 455n125, 512
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 44
missing population, 46, 51, 75, 186n102
  see also attrition
modified OECD equivalence scale, see income > 
equivalence scale
monetary poverty, see AROP; income > income 
poverty
mortgage indebtedness, 77, 141, 144-145, 147, 154, 
156, 193, 250f13.7, 387t21.1
MPI, see multidimensional poverty > Multidimen-
sional Poverty Index (MPI)
multidimensional poverty, 33, 36, 51, 53, 191, 138, 
225‑240
  see also Cronbach’s Alpha; FGT (Foster–Greer–
Thorbecke) index; poverty > Sen poverty 
measures
  dynamics of, 228, 233, 234t12.2, 235f12.2, 
236t12.3
  Alkire-Foster (AF) methodology, 36, 225-228, 
237
  Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), 36, 225-
229, 237
  overview of history and literature of, 226-227
N
national accounts (NA), 34, 37, 41-82, 68n38, 81n44, 
86-87, 126, 156, 318-319, 321-323, 331, 510-511, 
515-516
  see also AROP, GHDI (Gross Household Dispos-
able Income), Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), macroeconomic approach/ eval-
uation/ statistics; recommendations for im-
provement of EU-SILC and EU social indicators
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needs-adjusted EU scale (NA scale), 35, 159-162, 166, 
166n84, 166n87, 168-171, 173
  see also SNA scale (simplified needs-adjusted 
scale)
Net-SILC (First Network for the Analysis of EU-SILC), 
5, 7
Net-SILC2 (Second Network for the Analysis of 
EU-SILC), 5, 7, 33, 33n1, 34, 40, 43, 61, 65n29, 89n45, 
103n51, 123n59, 141n70, 159n76, 175n90, 193n104, 
209n110, 225n114, 241n123, 261n129, 279n130, 
299n141, 317n152, 333n153, 353n157, 367n168, 
385n172, 401n176, 402, 419n185, 435n191, 449n204, 
465n218, 479n221 and n222, 499n233, 509, 513-516, 
519-520a1, 519n241
‘new’ register countries, see registers > ‘new’ regis-
ter countries
NLPCA, see nonlinear principal component analysis 
(NLPCA)
nonlinear principal component analysis (NLPCA), 
227
non-cash income, see income > non-cash income
non-income data, see income > non-income data
non-monetary poverty, 139, 154, 194, 223
  see also material deprivation
Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISH), 
68, 74, 79
non-register countries, see registers > ‘survey’/ 
‘non-register’ countries
non-response, 44, 55-56, 58-59, 124-125, 138, 168, 
360, 404-405, 413, 465, 483, 486, 489, 494-495, 500, 
504, 506
  see also attrition
Norwegian Research Council, 159n76
nowcasting, 38, 40, 353‑363
  see also AROP; income > distribution of income
NPISH, see Non-Profit Institutions Serving House-
holds (NPISH)
Nuffield College, Oxford, 33n1, 65n29, 103n51, 
519-520a1
O
Observatoire de l’Enfance, de la Jeunesse et de 
l’Aide à la jeunesse, 211, 223
OECD, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)
OECD-modified equivalence scale, see income > 
equivalence scale
OECD Framework for Statistics on the Distribution 
of Household Income, Consumption and Wealth, 
242
Office for National Statistics (ONS), see Statistics UK 
(ONS)
‘old’ register countries, see registers > ‘old’ register 
countries
ONS, see Statistics UK (ONS)
Open Method of Coordination, 401
OPHI, see Oxford Poverty and Human Develop-
ment Initiative (OPHI)
optimal taxation, 5
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD), 41, 65, 65n30, 66n34, 73-75, 
77-78, 87, 90, 101, 104, 123, 140, 159, 160, 163-164, 
167t8.1, 169t8.3, 172t8.5, 173-174, 175n91, 181, 184, 
187n103, 188, 225-226, 239, 242, 257, 290n138, 297, 
419n185, 503n234, 504
  see also Education Database at OECD Statistics
OECD Family Database, 164
OECD System of Health Accounts, 163
Oxford Martin School, 33n1, 65n29, 103n51
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 
(OPHI), 225n114, 519-520a1
P
panel, see EU-SILC; EU-SILC ‘following rules’/ ‘trac-
ing rules’; European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP); household (social) surveys; British House-
hold Panel Survey; longitudinal component/ 
measure; material deprivation (MD) > longitudinal 
variables of; panel length/ rotational panel/ re-in-
terviewing rate; recommendations for improve-
ment of EU-SILC and EU social indicators > extend-
ing the rotational panel; recommendations for 
improvement of EU-SILC and EU social indicators 
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> setting up tighter specification of the following/ 
tracing rules
panel length/ rotational panel/ re-interviewing 
rate, 40, 44, 52, 52n9, 56, 306, 382, 386n174, 403, 417, 
420-421, 471, 477, 480-481, 480n224, 490-496, 502, 
512-513, 515
PAPI, see paper and pen(cil) interview (PAPI)
paper and pen(cil) interview (PAPI), 58
Pareto coefficient/ distribution/ fitting/ index/ sim-
ulation, 127-129, 138-139
Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficient, 
268, 274-276 tables
Pen’s Parade, 437, 439
persistent poverty (risk) rate (= persistent 
at-risk-of-poverty rate, persistent AROP), 39, 52, 371, 
401‑ 417, 419-421, 423, 433, 467, 469, 471, 476t26.4
  see also AROP; attrition; child(ren) > child pov-
erty/ well-being and its indicators; European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP); income; 
material deprivation > child-specific material 
deprivation (CH-MD) and its indicator/ items
  definition of, 371, 401, 403, 420
  persistent poverty (risk) indicator/ measure, 401, 
403, 512
  standard error for, see standard error
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, 133
polarisation, see bi-polarisation; employment
Potential Outcomes approach, 450
poverty, passim
  see also AROP; AROPE; employment; expen-
diture > expenditure poverty; global poverty 
line; household composition/ type/ structure; 
income > distribution of income; income > in-
come poverty; material deprivation (MD); mul-
tidimensional poverty
  child poverty/ well-being and its indicators, see 
child(ren)
  dynamics of poverty, 33, 36, 41, 43-44, 65, 65‑87, 
228, 286-296, 299-315, 365, 368, 373, 419‑434, 
511
   see also AROP; income > dynamics of income 
poverty; persistent poverty (risk) rate
  extreme poverty, 45-46
  income poverty, see income > income poverty
  poverty (risk) gap, 67, 67n36, 107t5.1, 134, 292
  see also, income > income poverty gap
  poverty lines ($1.25, $1.90, $2 a day), 45
  poverty curves, 104-112, 117
  poverty (risk) rate, 89, 100, 177, 422f23.3, 
429f23.8, 430f23.9
  see also AROP; income > income poverty
  poverty risk, see AROP
  Sen poverty measure, 106, 106n57, 121
poverty reduction target, see Europe 2020 social 
inclusion target/ goal
PPP, see Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
PPP-HFC index, 319, 323, 323t17.2
PPS, see Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)
primary sample unit (PSU), see sample > primary 
sample unit (PSU)
propensity score based methods, 431-433, 450-451, 
453-457
PSU (primary sample unit), see sample > primary 
sample unit (PSU)
public services, 35, 159‑174
  care for the elderly, 159-161, 164, 166, 173
  childcare services, 35, 60, 164-166, 167t8.1, 173, 
359, 385n173, 430, 511, 512t29.1
   see also ECEC (early childhood education and 
care)
  education, 34-36, 39, 48, 53-54, 79, 156, 159-
168, 173, 182, 204, 205t10.2, 209, 213, 228-230, 
231t12.1, 233-234, 237, 289, 305, 305f16.4, 312, 313, 
314t16.3, 325, 326t17.3, 329, 336t18.2, 355-356, 
356n163, 361, 381, 381f20.10, 407, 410f22.2f, 411, 
431t23.2, 432, 433t23.3, 435, 435n191, 436n193, 
440-443, 444n202, 445-447, 452, 452n210, 455, 
484, 488, 511-512, 512t29.1
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  healthcare, 35, 61, 159-160, 162-166, 166n87, 
167t8.1, 173, 300, 512t29.1
  long-term care, 35, 61, 159, 162-166, 167t8.1, 173
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